Urban Wire Congress Could Increase Generic Competition and Lower Prescription Drug Costs by Combining Three Reforms
Lisa Clemans-Cope
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A man compares two medications at the pharmacy check-out.

Health care costs, including drug prices, are a major concern for many Americans. In an Axios-Ipsos poll earlier this year, most adults said they would be more likely to vote for a candidate with plans to make prescriptions and health insurance more affordable in this year’s midterms.

Prescription costs are also top of mind for policymakers. Congress currently faces a December 11 government funding deadline and a list of expiring health provisions that it could address in a year-end health package with drug affordability measures. And next year, Congress must renew the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA’s) generic drug user fee program, which funds the administration’s reviews of generic drugs, before it expires in September. The 2017 renewal added incentives for generic versions of drugs with little competition, so the 2027 renewal could open a similar window.

Generic competition is one of the most reliable ways to lower prescription drug prices. To help Congress understand and increase competition, we discuss three reforms that could be combined to bring lower-cost generic drugs to market sooner and help more people access needed medications.

Lowering drug costs requires reforms that target multiple tactics manufacturers use to delay generic competition

After generics enter the market, drug prices drop sharply. Estimates show that the average net price falls by about three-quarters by the fourth year after entry for drugs made from chemicals. Every month a generic is delayed from launching, patients, employers, and programs, particularly Medicare, keep paying the brand price.

Our recent report reviewed the evidence on seven tactics brand-name manufacturers use to delay generic competition: patent thickets, product hopping, pay-for-delay settlements, denial of product samples, parking of the 180-day generic exclusivity period, authorized generics, and citizen petitions. Taken one at a time, most of these tactics are legal, and a single drug often faces several of these barriers.

Policy and practice changes to address these tactics often fall short because they’re aimed at a single tactic and manufacturers adapt to them. For example, FTC v. Actavis opened pay-for-delay deals to antitrust review. To get around this, manufacturers increasingly started using noncash deals that are harder to detect, such as a brand promising (often implicitly) not to launch its own lower-priced “authorized” generic. In addition, committees in both chambers have already approved citizen petition reforms in the INSULIN Act of 2026 and the Lower Costs, More Transparency Act of 2026, but policies aimed at a single barrier are unlikely to affect many drugs.

Though our report offers reforms in eight areas that Congress can consider, we focus on three that target several tactics. Together, they address all seven tactics above, at least in part.

Source: Authors’ analysis in Lisa Clemans Cope and Jessica Banthin, Anticompetitive Tactics Delaying Generic Drug Entry and Price Competition (Washington, DC: Urban Institute, 2026).

Notes: FDA = Food and Drug Administration. “Partly” means the reform reaches the tactic only in drug-device markets (such as inhalers) or by shrinking the pool of secondary patents the tactic relies on. The seven tactics that delay generic drug entry are defined as follows. “Patent thickets” refers to stacking many independent patents; “product hopping” occurs when patients are switched to a new version of a drug; “pay-for-delay settlements” pay generics to stay off the market; “sample denial” occurs when companies withhold samples needed for testing; “exclusivity parking” refers to when the first generic delays launch and blocks other generics from entering the market; “authorized generics” refers to when a brand launches or withholds its own generic version of a drug; and “citizen petitions” are late petitions that stall FDA approval.

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1. Raise patent quality

Secondary patents, which cover features such as a drug’s coating, dose, or delivery device rather than its active ingredient, underpin patent thickets (dense webs of overlapping patents) and product hops (moving patients to a slightly changed version of a drug).

To address these tactics, Congress could direct the Patent and Trademark Office to raise examination standards. Congress could also make it easier for the office to challenge weak secondary patents, for example by reexamining patents that brands list with the FDA. A “one-and-done” rule could go further, capping the total number of patents or years of protection for each drug, so that later patents cannot keep extending protection.

Congress has already started making progress with this reform. In June, the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee approved the Medication Affordability and Patent Integrity Act (S. 2658) by a bipartisan 16–6 vote. Because companies have an incentive to stress a drug’s novelty to patent examiners while telling the FDA the drug is similar to existing ones, the bill would require them to give both agencies consistent information.

2. Expand the FDA’s authority to resolve disputes, instead of leaving them to litigation

Generic developers need samples of brand drugs to test, but brands sometimes refuse to sell samples. These brands often cite safety requirements that limit distribution even after the FDA has said providing samples for testing would not violate them. Congress could let the FDA order the sale of samples when its own review finds no safety reason to refuse.

Citizen petitions let anyone ask the FDA to take or hold off on regulatory action, but brands sometimes file them to slow a competitor’s approval.

Citizen petition reform of this process has advanced furthest, while no pending bill yet addresses samples. The INSULIN Act and the Lower Costs, More Transparency Act, both approved by committees in July, would make it easier for the FDA to reject petitions filed mainly to stall a competitor, building on the warning signs listed in its guidance. Both bills would also set a deadline to file once the petitioner learns the facts behind its concern (60 days in the House bill [PDF] and 180 days in the Senate bill [PDF]). In addition, Congress could let the FDA approve generic inhalers and other drug-device combinations whose devices differ from the brand’s in acceptable ways. Researchers, the FDA’s own budget requests, and the Fair Price Device Act (H.R. 5158) have proposed this solution.

3. Prohibit exclusionary patent settlements

Congress could create a statutory presumption against exclusionary patent settlements. This policy would treat deals that keep generics off the market as anticompetitive, unless the companies prove otherwise.

Settlements are where three manufacturer tactics meet—pay-for-delay, exclusivity parking, and no-authorized-generic pledges—and today, courts weigh each deal case by case. Exclusivity parking works because the first generic company to challenge a brand’s patents earns 180 days during which the FDA cannot approve other companies’ generic versions, so a settlement that delays its launch also holds back every generic behind it.

The generic industry’s trade group argues that settlements under current rules have saved the health system billions by bringing generics to market years before patents expire. But that benchmark assumes the patents would have held. In a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) study of patent challenges from 1992 to 2000, generics won 73 percent of the cases decided in court, so many could likely have launched even earlier by winning in court. The real test is whether the brand’s payment brought about a later entry date than the generic would have agreed to without that payment. Settlements with signs of payment for delay raised US drug spending by more than $3 billion a year (in 2024 dollars) from 2014 to 2023.

A pending bill would go partway. The Preserve Access to Affordable Generics and Biosimilars Act (S. 1096), approved in April 2025 by the Senate Judiciary Committee, would presume a settlement unlawful if the generic receives anything of value for delaying its product. But the legislation would cover only future settlements and would strip the first generic’s 180-day exclusivity only after a settlement is found unlawful. The Congressional Budget Office estimated that an earlier version would cut deficits by about $1.6 billion from 2024 to 2034. Making the loss of exclusivity automatic could also reduce exclusivity parking.

Though these reforms can help bring generics to market sooner, questions remain

One open question is how far to go in limiting the 180-day exclusivity law, which is widely seen as the main incentive for generic manufacturers to challenge patents. While some researchers say lengthening the exclusivity period could spur more patent challenges in certain markets, others argue that doing so may delay later generics more than it spurs challenges. A cautious approach could curb misuse of the exclusivity period without gutting it, then track what happens to patent challenges.

Another open question concerns product hopping, which none of the three reforms fully addresses. The Drug Competition Enhancement Act (S. 1040), also approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee in April 2025, could help fill that gap by letting the FTC treat certain product switches as anticompetitive.

Agencies have tools under current law, but enforcement alone is unlikely to fix the problem. The FTC has challenged more than 300 patent listings as improper, and the FDA’s 2019 guidance targets petitions filed to stall generics. But agencies work one case at a time, need steady resources, and can reverse their policies, while manufacturers move to other tactics.

A year-end health package, which could move with the December 11 funding bill, and next year’s renewal of the Generic Drug User Fee Amendments give Congress two openings for change. Taking up the combined reforms described here in either opening could have a substantial impact on generic competition and prescription drug affordability.

Research and Evidence Health Policy
Expertise Health Care Coverage, Costs, and Access
Tags Federal health care reform Health care spending and costs
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