HOUSING FINANCE POLICY CENTER

HOUSING FINANCE AT A GLANCE

A MONTHLY CHARTBOOK

May 2018



ABOUT THE CHARTBOOK

The Housing Finance Policy Center's (HFPC) mission is to produce analyses and ideas that promote sound public policy, efficient markets, and access to economic opportunity in the area of housing finance. *At A Glance*, a monthly chartbook and data source for policymakers, academics, journalists, and others interested in the government's role in mortgage markets, is at the heart of this mission.

We welcome feedback from our readers on how we can make At A Glance a more useful publication. Please email any comments or questions to <u>ataglance@urban.org</u>.

To receive regular updates from the Housing Finance Policy Center, please visit <u>here</u> to sign up for our bi-weekly newsletter.

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Related HFPC Work

INTRODUCTION

The 2017 HMDA Data

On May 7th, the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council announced the availability of Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data on mortgage lending activities in 2017. The richness of this data has been instrumental in helping researchers, academics and policymakers understand critical developments in mortgage lending across the nation.

Overall, in 2017 lenders originated a total of over 6.0 million home mortgages, about 1 million fewer than the 7.0 million they originated in 2016. This drop was driven by a substantial reduction in refinance originations in 2017 amidst rising mortgage rates. Compared to 2016, refinance originations were lower by 1.1 million in 2017. At the same time, purchase originations increased by over 150,000. The table below shows the origination loan count by loan purpose.

HMDA data also provides insight into lending patterns by race. The overall share of purchase mortgage lending to minorities saw a modest increase in 2017. Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians all received a slightly higher share of purchase mortgages in 2017 than they did in 2016. See table below.

Total Loan Count

	Purchase	Refinance	Total
2015	3,257,889	2,896,382	6,154,271
2016	3,609,333	3,423,450	7,032,783
2017	3,765,454	2,261,315	6,026,769

Share of Purchase Mortgages by Race/Ethnicity

	Black	Hispanic	White	Asian
2015	5.6%	10.0%	69.7%	5.8%
2016	6.1%	10.6%	68.0%	6.0%
2017	6.5%	10.8%	66.6%	6.3%

Minorities (especially black and Hispanic borrowers) tend to have lower incomes, savings, and wealth; they are also more likely than non-Hispanic whites ("whites") to have weaker credit (lower credit score, higher LTV, higher debt-to-income ratio). Although two-thirds of all purchase mortgages in 2017 went to white borrowers, the minority share increased slightly to 23.6 percent in 2017, from 22.7 percent in 2016. HMDA data also sheds light on the denial rate of mortgage applications, i.e, the ratio of mortgages approved to total applications evaluated by lenders. In 2017, the denial rate for all purchase originations continued its downward trend and declined to about 10 percent, down from 11 percent in 2016. This is consistent with the improvements in credit availability as witnessed by the gradual decrease in credit scores and increases in debt-to-income ratios of recent originations (see pages 13 and 14).

In 2017, mortgage denial rates were also down for minorities. Both blacks and Hispanics saw a slight reduction in denial rate, while whites and Asians were as likely to be denied a mortgage in 2017 as they were in 2016.

Observed Denial Rate by Race/Ethnicity

	Black	Hispanic	White	Asian	All
2015	20%	15%	10%	12%	11%
2016	19%	14%	9%	11%	11%
2017	18%	13%	9%	11%	10%

This could be explained by two factors – the improvement in the overall credit profile of the application pool, and the loosening of the tight lending standards. For the latter, as the HCAI shows (page 16), overall credit availability remains very tight compared to historical standards. Although the progress made in 2017 is small, it suggests we are at least moving in the right direction.

INSIDE THIS ISSUE

- Agency refinance shares declined sharply in April 2018 as interest rates stayed high and purchase activity picked up in Spring (page 11).
- Serious delinquency rates resumed the decline in Q1 2018, after the uptick in the second half of 2017 due to the hurricanes (pages 22 and 29).
- Both Fannie and Freddie's average g-fees on new acquisitions edged up in Q1 2018 (page 25).
- Fed absorption of gross issuance dropped to new historical low in April 2018, as Fed's MBS taper size increased from \$4 to \$8 billion (page 31).
- FHA, VA and PMI's mortgage insurance activities all experienced a seasonal decrease in Q1 2018 (page 32).


OVERVIEW MARKET SIZE OVERVIEW

Since 2012, the Federal Reserve's Flow of Funds report has consistently indicated an increasing total value of the housing market, driven by growing household equity and 2017 Q4 was no different. Total debt and mortgages increased slightly to \$10.6 trillion, and household equity reached a new high of \$15.2 trillion, bringing the total value of the housing market to \$25.8 trillion, surpassing the pre-crisis peak of \$23.9 trillion in 2006. Agency MBS make up 60.0 percent of the total mortgage market, private-label securities make up 4.5 percent, and unsecuritized first liens at the GSEs, commercial banks, savings institutions, and credit unions make up 30.1 percent. Second liens comprise the remaining 5.4 percent of the total.

Value of the US Housing Market Debt, household mortgages Total value Household equity (\$ trillions) 30 \$25.8 25 20 \$15.2 15 \$10.6 10 5 Ω 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Sources: Federal Reserve Flow of Funds and Urban Institute. Last updated March 2018.

Size of the US Residential Mortgage Market




Sources: Federal Reserve Flow of Funds, Inside Mortgage Finance, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, eMBS and Urban Institute. Last updated March 2018. Note: Unsecuritized first liens includes loans held by commercial banks, GSEs, savings institutions, and credit unions.

OVERVIEW MARKET SIZE OVERVIEW


As of March 2018, debt in the private-label securitization market totaled \$491 billion and was split among prime (18.6 percent), Alt-A (37.3 percent), and subprime (44.1 percent) loans. In April 2018, outstanding securities in the agency market totaled \$6.45 trillion and were 43.7 percent Fannie Mae, 27.4 percent Freddie Mac, and 29.0 percent Ginnie Mae. Ginnie Mae has had more outstanding securities than Freddie Mac since May 2016.

Private-Label Securities by Product Type



Sources: CoreLogic and Urban Institute.

Agency Mortgage-Backed Securities




Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.

March 2018


OVERVIEW ORIGINATION VOLUME AND COMPOSITION

First Lien Origination Volume

After a record high origination year in 2016 (\$2.1 trillion), the first lien originations totaled \$1.8 trillion in 2017, down 14 percent from 2016, mostly due to elevated interest rates. The portfolio originations share was 29 percent, the GSE share was around 46 percent, and the FHA/VA share was around 24 percent, all consistent with 2016 shares. Origination of private-label securities was under 1 percent in both years.



Sources: Inside Mortgage Finance and Urban Institute. Last updated March 2018.




(Share, percent)

Sources: Inside Mortgage Finance and Urban Institute. Last updated March 2018.


OVERVIEW MORTGAGE ORIGINATION PRODUCT TYPE

Adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) accounted for as much as 42 percent of all new originations during the peak of the 2005 housing bubble (top chart). The ARMs fell to an historic low of 1 percent in 2009, and then slowly grew to a high of 6 percent in April 2014. Since then, ARMs have begun to decline again to 1.2 percent in February 2018. The 15-year fixed-rate mortgage (FRM), predominantly a refinance product, accounted for 14.5 percent of new originations in February 2018. If we exclude refinances (bottom chart), the share of 30-year FRMs in February 2018 stood at 92.1 percent, 15-year FRMs at 5.0 percent, and ARMs at 1.0 percent.

All Originations



Purchase Loans Only




Sources: CoreLogic, eMBS, HMDA, SIFMA and Urban Institute.

OVERVIEW SECURITIZATION VOLUME AND COMPOSITION


Agency/Non-Agency Share of Residential MBS Issuance

The non-agency share of mortgage securitizations in the first four months of 2018 was 3.9 percent, slightly above the 3.4 percent share in 2017 and the 1.8 percent share in 2016. The nonagency securitization volume totaled \$11.62 billion in the first guarter of 2018, only a 2 percent increase over the same period in 2017, but there is a change in the mix. The non-performing and reperforming (scratch and dent) deals dropped 48 percent compared to a year ago, while the prime securitizations surged 80 percent year over year. Nonagency securitizations continue to be tiny compared to pre-crisis levels.




Sources: Inside Mortgage Finance and Urban Institute. Note: Based on data from April 2018.





Sources: Inside Mortgage Finance and Urban Institute.






Sources: Inside Mortgage Finance and Urban Institute. 10

OVERVIEW AGENCY ACTIVITY: VOLUMES AND PURCHASE/ REFI COMPOSITION


Agency issuance totaled \$378.7 billion in the first four months of 2018, \$1.136 trillion on an annualized basis. This is down about 11.3 percent from the first four months of 2017. In April 2018, the refinance share declined for all three agencies. This is a result of increasing interest rates and the spring uptick in purchase activity. Loans sold into GSE pools in April are based on February and March home sales.



Agency Gross Issuance

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute. Note: Annualized figure based on data from April 2018.

Percent Refi at Issuance




Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.

Note: Based on at-issuance balance. Figure based on data from April 2018.

OVERVIEW NONBANK ORIGINATION SHARE


The nonbank origination share has been rising steadily for all three agencies since 2013. The Ginnie Mae nonbank share has been consistently higher than the GSEs, standing at 80 percent in April 2018. The Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac nonbank shares stood at 54 and 58 percent, respectively. The nonbank originator share is higher for refinance loans than for purchase loans across all three agencies.

Nonbank Origination Share: All Loans




Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.

Nonbank Origination Share: Purchase Loans



Nonbank Origination Share: Refi Loans



Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute

OVERVIEW NONBANK CREDIT BOX

Nonbank originators have played a key role in opening up access to credit. The median GSE and the median Ginnie Mae FICO scores for loans originated by nonbanks are lower than their bank counterparts. Within the GSE space, both bank and nonbank FICOs have declined since 2014, with further relaxation in FICOs since 2017. In contrast, within the Ginnie Mae space, FICO scores for bank originations have increased since 2014 while nonbank FICOs have declined. This largely reflects the sharp cut-back in FHA lending by many banks.


FICO All Median FICO Bank Median FICO Nonbank Median FICO 770 760 750 744 740 730 726 720 715 710 700 690 680 Dec-13 Apr-14 Jun-14 Aug-14 Dec-14 Feb-15 A pr-15 Jun-15 Aug-15 Oct-15 Dec-15 Apr-16 Jun-16 ⁻eb-18 Apr-18 Aug-13 ⁻eb-14 Dct-14 ⁻eb-16 Aug-16 Jec-16 ⁻eb-17)ec-17 Oct-13 Apr-17 Jun-17 Aug-17 Dct-17 Oct-16

Agency FICO: Bank vs. Nonbank

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.

GSE FICO: Bank vs. Nonbank

Ginnie Mae FICO: Bank vs. Nonbank




Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.


Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.

OVERVIEW NONBANK CREDIT BOX

The median LTV ratios for loans originated by nonbanks are similar to their bank counterparts, while the median DTIs for nonbank loans are higher, indicating that nonbanks are more accommodating in this as well as in the FICO dimension. Note that since early 2017 there has been a measurable increase in DTIs. This is true for both Ginnie Mae and GSE loans, banks and nonbank originators. Rising DTIs are to be expected in a rising rate environment, as higher rates and usually accompanying higher home prices drive up borrowers' month payments, and the reduction in refinance volumes makes lenders more apt to work a bit harder to get a loan approved for a marginal borrower.

GSE LTV: Bank vs. Nonbank






Ginnie Mae DTI: Bank vs. Nonbank

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.

GSE DTI: Bank vs. Nonbank



Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.

Sources: *eMBS* and Urban Institute.

Ginnie Mae LTV: Bank vs. Nonbank

STATE OF THE MARKET MORTGAGE ORIGINATION PROJECTIONS

Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and MBA all forecast origination volume in 2018 to be marginally lower than the 1.7-1.9 billion estimated for 2017. These 2017 and 2018 numbers are considerably lower than the \$2.0 trillion of originations in 2016. The differences owe primarily to a decline the refi share: from 48-49 percent in 2016 to 35-38 percent in 2017 to a forecast 25-29 percent in 2018. Fannie, Freddie and MBA all forecast 2018 housing starts to be around 1.3 million units, up from a 1.2 million units in 2017. Home sales forecasts for 2018 are around 6.3 million, a slight increase from 2017 levels.

Total Originations and Refinance Shares

	Or	riginations (\$ billior	าร)		Refi Share (%)	
Period	Total, FNMA estimate	Total, FHLMC estimate	Total, MBA estimate	FNMA estimate	FHLMC estimate	MBA estimate
2018 Q 1	386	346	346	43	44	37
2018 Q2	473	445	444	28	20	26
2018 Q3	436	450	450	23	20	22
2018 Q4	396	370	370	25	21	27
2019 Q 1	339	355	355	32	24	28
2019 Q2	463	465	465	24	23	22
2019 Q3	460	460	460	24	23	22
2019 Q4	415	365	365	26	21	26
FY 2014	1301	1350	1261	40	39	40
FY 2015	1730	1750	1679	47	45	46
FY 2016	2052	2125	1891	49	48	48
FY 2017	1842	1850	1710	38	36	35
FY 2018	1690	1740	1610	29	25	27
FY 2019	1686	1780	1645	26	23	24

Sources: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Mortgage Bankers Association and Urban Institute.

Note: Shaded boxes indicate forecasted figures. All figures are estimates for total single-family market. Column labels indicate source of estimate. Regarding interest rates, the yearly averages for 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017 were 4.2%, 3.9%, 3.8%, and 4.0%. For 2018, the respective projections for Fannie, Freddie, and MBA are 4.4%, 4.6%, and 4.3%.

Housing Starts and Homes Sales

	Housi	ing Starts, thou	isands	Home Sales. thousands				
Year	Total, FNMA estimate	Total, FHLMC estimate	Total, MBA estimate	Total, FNMA estimate	Total, FHLMC estimate	Total, MBA estimate	Existing, MBA estimate	New, MBA Estimate
FY 2014	1003	1000	1001	5377	5380	5360	4920	440
FY 2015	1112	1110	1108	5751	5750	5740	5237	503
FY 2016	1174	1170	1177	6013	6010	6001	5440	561
FY 2017	1203	1200	1208	6124	6120	6162	5538	624
FY 2018	1288	1300	1289	6275	6300	6280	5638	642
FY 2019	1306	1400	1376	6439	6440	6453	5786	667


Sources: Mortgage Bankers Association, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Urban Institute.

Note: Shaded boxes indicate forecasted figures. All figures are estimates for total single-family market; column labels indicate source of estimate.

STATE OF THE MARKET CREDIT AVAILABILITY AND ORIGINATOR PROFITABILITY

Housing Credit Availability Index (HCAI)


HFPC's Housing Credit Availability Index (HCAI) assesses lenders' tolerance for both borrower risk and product risk, calculating the share of owner-occupied purchase loans that are likely to default. The index shows that credit availability increased for a second quarter in a row to 5.8 percent, the highest level since 2013, in the fourth quarter of 2017 (Q4 2017). This increase was mainly driven by the credit expansions within both the GSE and government channels, thanks to higher interest rates and lower refinance volumes. More information about the HCAI, including the breakdown by market segment, is available <u>here</u>.



Sources: eMBS, Corelogic, HMDA, IMF, and Urban Institute. Note: Default is defined as 90 days or more delinquent at any point. *Last updated April 2018*.

Originator Profitability and Unmeasured Costs

When originator profits are higher, mortgage volumes are less responsive to changes in interest rates, because originators are at capacity. Originator Profitability and Unmeasured Costs (OPUC), formulated and calculated by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, is a good relative measure of originator profitability. OPUC uses the sales price of the mortgage in the secondary market (less par) and adds two additional sources of profitability; retained servicing (both base and excess servicing, net of g-fees), and points paid by the borrower. OPUC has generally been high when interest rates were low, as originators are capacity constrained due to refinance volume, and have no incentive to reduce rates. Conversely, when interest rates are relatively high and refi activity is low, originators are competing for a more limited amount of mortgages, driving profitability down. In April 2018, OPUC stood at \$1.99, near the lower end of the range in recent years.




Note: OPUC is a is a monthly (4-week moving) average as discussed in Fuster et al. (2013).

STATE OF THE MARKET CREDIT AVAILABILITY FOR PURCHASE LOANS


Access to credit remains extremely tight, especially for borrowers with low FICO scores. The mean and median FICO scores on new purchase originations have both drifted up about 21 and 20 points over the last decade, respectively. The 10th percentile of FICO scores, which represents the lower bound of creditworthiness needed to qualify for a mortgage, stood at 645 as of February 2018. Prior to the housing crisis, this threshold held steady in the low 600s. Mean LTV levels at origination remain relatively high, averaging 88.0, which reflects the large number of FHA purchase originations.

Borrower FICO Score at Origination



Sources: CoreLogic, eMBS, HMDA, SIFMA and Urban Institute. Note: Includes owner-occupied purchase loans only.


Combined LTV at Origination



Note: Includes owner-occupied purchase loans only.

STATE OF THE MARKET CREDIT AVAILABILITY FOR PURCHASE LOANS

Credit has been tight for all borrowers with less-than-stellar credit scores- especially in MSAs with high housing prices. For example, the mean origination FICO for borrowers in San Francisco-Redwood City-South San Francisco, CA is 770, while in Fort Worth-Arlington, TX it is 736. Across all MSAs, lower average FICO scores tend to be correlated with high average LTVs, as these MSAs rely heavily on FHA/VA financing.




Origination FICO and LTV


STATE OF THE MARKET HOUSING AFFORDABILITY

National Mortgage Affordability Over Time

Home prices remain affordable by historic standards, despite increases over the last five years and the recent interest rate hikes. As of March 2018, the share of median income needed for the monthly mortgage payment with a 20% down payment stood at 22 percent. With a 3.5% down payment, the share of income is higher, at 26 percent in March 2018. If interest rates rise to 5.5%, the housing expenses to income share with both a 20 percent and a 3.5 percent down payment would be equivalent to the 2001-03 averages (24 and 28 percent, respectively). As shown in the bottom picture, mortgage affordability varies widely across MSAs.



Mortgage Affordability by MSA




Sources: : CoreLogic, US Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, American Community Survey, Moody's Analytics, Freddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey, and the Urban Institute.

Note: Mortgage affordability is the share of median family income devoted to the monthly principal, interest, taxes, and insurance payment required to buy the median home at the Freddie Mac prevailing rate for a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage and property tax and insurance at 1.75 percent of the housing value. Data as of March 2018.

STATE OF THE MARKET FIRST-TIME HOMEBUYERS

First-Time Homebuyer Share

In February 2018, the first-time homebuyer share of GSE purchase loans was 48.9 percent, its highest level in recent history. The FHA has always been more focused on first-time homebuyers, with its firsttime homebuyer share hovering around 80 percent; it stood at 82.2 percent in February 2018. The bottom table shows that based on mortgages originated in February 2018, the average first-time homebuver was more likely than an average repeat buyer to take out a smaller loan and have a lower credit score and higher LTV and DTI, thus requiring a higher interest rate.



Note: All series measure the first-time homebuyer share of purchase loans for principal residences.

Comparison of First-Time and Repeat Homebuyers, GSE and FHA Originations

-	GS	Es	FH/	4	GSEs and FHA		
Characteristics	First-time	Repeat	First-time	Repeat	First-time	Repeat	
Loan Amount (\$)	235,667	259,270	205,314	226,647	222,669	253,491	
Credit Score	738.1	753.5	672.8	679.6	710.2	740.4	
LTV (%)	87.3	79.4	95.6	94.2	90.8	82.0	
DTI (%)	36.0	36.7	42.9	43.9	39.0	37.9	
Loan Rate (%)	4.41	4.28	4.46	4.37	4.43	4.30	

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.


Note: Based on owner-occupied purchase mortgages originated in February 2018.

STATE OF THE MARKET HOME PRICE INDICES

National Year-Over-Year HPI Growth

Home price appreciation remains very robust, as measured by both the CoreLogic's repeat sales index and Zillow's hedonic index. We will be monitoring the impact of rising interest rates on home prices. Historically, rising interest rates (generally observed in tandem with a stronger economy and higher inflation) have been associated with higher home price increases, despite the impact on affordability.

Year-over-year growth rate



 2001
 2002
 2003
 2004
 2006
 2007
 2008
 2009
 2010
 2011
 2012
 2013
 2014
 2015
 2016
 2017

 Sources: CoreLogic, Zillow, and Urban Institute.
 March 2018

Changes in CoreLogic HPI for Top MSAs

After rising 54 percent from the trough, national house prices have now surpassed pre-crisis peak levels. At the MSA level, ten of the top 15 MSAs have exceeded their pre-crisis peak HPI: New York, NY; Los Angeles, CA; Atlanta, GA; Houston, TX; Dallas, TX; Minneapolis, MN; Seattle, WA; Denver, CO, San Diego, CA, and Anaheim, CA. Two MSAs particularly hard hit by the boom and bust – Phoenix, AZ and Riverside, CA- would each need to rise 17 and 18 percent, respectively, to return to peak levels.

		HPI changes (%)				
MSA	2000 to peak	Peak to trough	Trough to current	to achieve peak		
United States	93.7%	-33.2%	54.0%	-2.9%		
New York-Jersey City-White Plains NY-NJ	111.6%	-16.7%	32.2%	-9.1%		
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Glendale CA	177.0%	-38.4%	77.5%	-8.6%		
Chicago-Naperville-Arlington Heights IL	65.9%	-35.7%	36.1%	14.2%		
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell GA	38.0%	-32.9%	66.2%	-10.2%		
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria DC-VA-MD-WV	155.2%	-34.1%	36.8%	10.9%		
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land TX	39.6%	-14.1%	48.0%	-21.4%		
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale AZ	123.7%	-52.6%	80.5%	16.9%		
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario CA	186.1%	-52.6%	78.8%	17.9%		
Dallas-Plano-Irving TX	34.3%	-13.8%	63.9%	-29.3%		
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington MN-WI	72.9%	-30.3%	47.6%	-2.9%		
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett WA	90.9%	-29.1%	95.6%	-27.9%		
Denver-Aurora-Lakewood CO	35.6%	-13.1%	83.0%	-37.1%		
Baltimore-Columbia-Towson MD	122.8%	-24.6%	16.5%	13.8%		
San Diego-Carlsbad CA	144.9%	-37.5%	68.5%	-5.0%		
Anaheim-Santa Ana-Irvine CA	160.6%	-35.7%	59.9%	-2.9%		

Sources: CoreLogic HPIs and Urban Institute. Data as of March 2018. Note: This table includes the largest 15 Metropolitan areas by mortgage count.


STATE OF THE MARKET NEGATIVE EQUITY & SERIOUS DELINQUENCY

Negative Equity Share

Negative equity

Near or in negative equity

With housing prices continuing to appreciate, residential properties in negative equity (LTV greater than 100) as a share of all residential properties with a mortgage continued to edge down to 4.86 percent as of Q4 2017. Residential properties in near negative equity (LTV between 95 and 100) comprise another 1.22 percent.




Sources: CoreLogic and Urban Institute.

Note: CoreLogic negative equity rate is the percent of all residential properties with a mortgage in negative equity. Loans with negative equity refer to loans above 100 percent LTV. Loans near negative equity refer to loans above 95 percent LTV. Last updated March 2018.

Loans in Serious Delinquency/Foreclosure


Ninety day delinquencies rose sharply due to the hurricanes in the second half of 2017, but have declined from 1.72 to 1.45 percent in the first quarter of 2018. The percent of loans in foreclosure continued to edge down to 1.16 percent. The combined delinquencies totaled 2.61 percent in Q1 2018, down from 2.91 percent in Q4 2017 and 2.76 percent in the same quarter a year ago.



Sources: Mortgage Bankers Association and Urban Institute. Last updated May 2018.

STATE OF THE MARKET MODIFICATIONS AND LIQUIDATIONS


Total modifications (HAMP and proprietary) are roughly equal to total liquidations. Hope Now reports show 8,354,003 borrowers have received a modification since Q3 2007, compared with 8,562,508 liquidations in the same period. Modifications and liquidations have slowed significantly over the past few years. In 2017, there were just 275,872 modifications and 218,641 liquidations.



Loan Modifications and Liquidations



Number of loans (millions)



HAMP mods
Proprietary mods
Liquidations

Sources: Hope Now and Urban Institute. Note: Liquidations include both foreclosure sales and short sales. *Last updated March 2018*.

- HAMP mods
 Proprietary mods
- Liquidations


Sources: Hope Now and Urban Institute. Note: Liquidations includes both foreclosure sales and short sales. Last updated March 2018.

December 2017


GSES UNDER CONSERVATORSHIP GSE PORTFOLIO WIND-DOWN

Both GSEs continue to contract their portfolios. Since March 2017, Fannie Mae has contracted by 15.1 percent and Freddie Mac by 17.2 percent. They are shrinking their less-liquid assets (mortgage loans and non-agency MBS) faster than they are shrinking their entire portfolio. The Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac portfolios are now both below the \$250 billion maximum portfolio size; they were required to reach this terminal level by year end 2018. Fannie met the target in 2017, Freddie met the target in February 2018.

Fannie Mae Mortgage-Related Investment Portfolio Composition



Freddie Mac Mortgage-Related Investment Portfolio Composition




GSES UNDER CONSERVATORSHIP EFFECTIVE GUARANTEE FEES

Guarantee Fees Charged on New Acquisitions

The latest 10-Q indicates that Fannie's average g-fees on new acquisitions increased from 55 to 57.1 bps in Q1 2018 and Freddie's increased from 46 to 50 bps. This is a marked increase over 2012 and 2011, and has contributed to the GSEs' profits. The GSE's latest Loan-Level Pricing Adjustments (LLPAs) took effect in September 2015; the bottom table shows the Fannie Mae LLPAs, which are expressed as upfront charges.

Sources: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mae and Urban Institute. Last updated May 2018. Fannie Mae single-family average charged g-fee on new acquisitions





Fannie Mae Upfront Loan-Level Price Adjustments (LLPAs)

_				LTV						
Credit Score	≤60	60.01 - 70	70.01 - 75	75.01-80	80.01 - 85	85.01 - 90	90.01 - 95	95.01 - 97		
> 740	0.00%	0.25%	0.25%	0.50%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.75%		
720 - 739	0.00%	0.25%	0.50%	0.75%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	1.00%		
700 - 719	0.00%	0.50%	1.00%	1.25%	1.00%	1.00%	1.00%	1.50%		
680 - 699	0.00%	0.50%	1.25%	1.75%	1.50%	1.25%	1.25%	1.50%		
660 - 679	0.00%	1.00%	2.25%	2.75%	2.75%	2.25%	2.25%	2.25%		
640 - 659	0.50%	1.25%	2.75%	3.00%	3.25%	3.75%	2.75%	2.75%		
620 - 639	0.50%	1.50%	3.00%	3.00%	3.25%	3.25%	3.25%	3.50%		
< 620	0.50%	1.50%	3.00%	3.00%	3.25%	3.25%	3.25%	3.75%		
Product Feature (Cum	Product Feature (Cumulative)									
High LTV	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%		
Investment Property	2.125%	2.125%	2.125%	3.375%	4.125%	N/A	N/A	N/A		

Sources: Fannie Mae and Urban Institute.

Note: For whole loans purchased on or after September 1, 2015, or loans delivered into MBS pools with issue dates on or after September 1, 2015.

GSES UNDER CONSERVATORSHIP GSE RISK-SHARING TRANSACTIONS

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have been laying off back-end credit risk through CAS and STACR deals as well as through reinsurance transactions. They have also done front-end transactions with originators and reinsurers, and experimented with deep mortgage insurance coverage with private mortgage insurers. FHFA's 2018 scorecard requires the GSEs to lay off credit risk on 90 percent of newly acquired loans in categories targeted for transfer. Fannie Mae's CAS issuances to date total \$1.04 trillion, while Freddie's STACR totals \$937 billion. In 2018, Fannie has issued 3 securities and Freddie has issued two.


Fannie Mae –	Fannie Mae – Connecticut Avenue Securities (CAS)								
Date	Transaction	Reference Pool Size (\$ m)	Amount Issued (\$m)	% of Reference Pool Covered					
2013	CAS 2013 deals	\$26,756	\$675	2.5%					
2014	CAS 2014 deals	\$227, 234	\$5,849	2.6%					
2015	CAS 2015 deals	\$187,126	\$5,463	2.9%					
February 2016	CAS 2016 - C01	\$28,882	\$945	3.3%					
March 2016	CAS 2016 - C02	\$35,004	\$1,032	2.9%					
April 2016	CAS 2016 - C03	\$36,087	\$1,166	3.2%					
July 2016	CAS 2016 - C04	\$42,179	\$1,322	3.1%					
August 2016	CAS 2016 - C05	\$38,668	\$1,202	3.1%					
November 2016	CAS 2016 - C06	\$33,124	\$1,024	3.1%					
December 2016	CAS 2016 - C07	\$22,515	\$702	3.1%					
January 2017	CAS 2017 - C01	\$43,758	\$1,351	3.1%					
March 2017	CAS 2017 - C02	\$39,988	\$1,330	3.3%					
May 2017	CAS 2017 - C03	\$41,246	\$1,371	3.3%					
May 2017	CAS 2017 - C04	\$30,154	\$1,003	3.3%					
July 2017	CAS 2017 - C05	\$43,751	\$1,351	3.1%					
August 2017	CAS 2017 - C06	\$31,900	\$1,101	3.5%					
November 2017	CAS 2017- C07	\$33,900	\$1,200	3.5%					
February 2018	CAS 2018 - C01	\$44,900	\$1.494	3.3%					
March 2018	CAS 2018 - C02	\$26,500	\$1,007	3.8%					
May 2018	CAS 2018 - C03	\$31,100	\$1,050	3.4%					
Total		\$1,044,772	\$31,637	3.0%					
	- Structured Agency Cr		<i>Q</i> QQQQQQQQQQQQQ						
Date	Transaction	Reference Pool Size (\$ m)	Amount Issued (\$m)	% of Reference Pool Covered					
2013	STACR 2013 deals	\$57,912	\$1,130	2.0%					
2014	STACR 2014 deals	\$147,120	\$4,916	3.3%					
2015	STACR 2015 deals	\$209,521	\$6,658	3.2%					
January 2016	STACR Series 2016 – DNA1	\$35,700	\$996	2.8%					
March 2016	STACR Series 2016 – HQA1		\$475	2.6%					
May 2016	STACR Series 2016 – DNA2	, ,	\$916	3.0%					
May 2016	STACR Series 2016 - HQA2	1 7	\$627	3.4%					
June 2016	STACR Series 2016 - DNA3		\$795	3.0%					
September 2016	STACR Series 2016 - HQA3		\$515	3.3%					
September 2016	STACR Series 2016 - DNA4		\$739	3.0%					
October 2016	STACK Series 2016 - HQA4		\$478	3.5%					
January 2017	STACK Series 2010 - HQA	, ,	\$802	2.4%					
February 2017	STACK Series 2017 - DNA1		\$753	2.4%					
	STACR Series 2017 - HQA1								
April 2017		+,· = -	\$1,320 \$700	2.2%					
June 2017	STACR Series 2017 - HQA2		\$788	2.5%					
September 2017	STACR Series 2017 - DNA3		\$1,200	2.1%					
October 2017	STACR Series 2017 - HQA3	1 /	\$600	2.8%					
December 2017	STACR Series 2017 - HRP1	, ,	\$200	1.3%					
January 2018	STACR Series 2017 - DNA	. ,	\$900	2.6%					
March 2018	STACR Series 2017 – HQA1	\$40,102	\$985	2.5%					
Total		\$937,339	\$25,793	2.8%					

Sources: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Urban Institute.


Note: Classes A-H, M-1H, M-2H, and B-H are reference tranches only. These classes are not issued or sold. The risk is retained by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. "CE" = credit enhancement.

GSES UNDER CONSERVATORSHIP GSE RISK-SHARING SPREADS

CAS and STACR spreads have moved around considerably since 2013, with the bottom mezzanine tranche and the first loss bonds experiencing considerably more volatility than the top mezzanine bonds. Tranche B in particular has been highly volatile because of its first loss position. Spreads widened especially during Q1 2016 due to falling oil prices, concerns about global economic growth and the slowdown in China. Since then spreads have resumed their downward trend but remain volatile.




Freddie Mac STACR Spreads at-issuance (basis points over 1-month LIBOR)



GSES UNDER CONSERVATORSHIP SERIOUS DELINQUENCY RATES

Serious delinguency rates of GSE loans remained elevated in March 2018 compared to recent trends, mostly due to recent hurricanes. Despite this recent increase, there has been a marked long term decline in serious delinguency rates as the legacy portfolio is resolved and the pristine, post-2009 book of business exhibits very low default rates. As of March 2018, 1.16 percent of the Fannie portfolio and 0.97 percent of the Freddie portfolio were seriously delinguent, up slightly from 1.12 percent for Fannie and 0.92 percent for Freddie in March 2017, reflecting the impact of the H2 2017 hurricanes and wildfires.


Serious Delinguency Rates-Fannie Mae



Sources: Fannie Mae and Urban Institute.

Note*: Following a change in Fannie reporting in March 2017, we started to report the credit risk transfer category and a new non-credit enhanced category that excludes loans covered by either primary MI or credit risk transfer transactions. Fannie reported these two new categories going back to January 2016.

Serious Delinguency Rates-Freddie Mac




Sources: Freddie Mac and Urban Institute.

Note*: Following a change in Freddie reporting in September 2014, we switched from reporting credit enhanced delinquency rates to PMI and other credit enhanced delinguency rates. Freddie reported these two categories for credit-enhanced loans going back to August 2013. The other category includes single-family loans covered by financial arrangements (other than primary mortgage insurance) including loans in reference pools covered by STACR debt note transactions as well as other forms of credit protection.

GSES UNDER CONSERVATORSHIP SERIOUS DELINQUENCY RATES


Serious delinquencies for single-family GSE loans, FHA loans, and VA loans declined in the first quarter of 2018, after increasing in the previous quarter due to the impact of hurricanes Harvey, Irma and Maria. GSE delinquencies remain high relative to 2005-2007, while FHA and VA delinquencies (which are higher than their GSE counterparts) are at levels lower than 2005-2007. GSE multifamily delinquencies remain at the levels prevailing before the financial crisis, although they did not reach problematic levels even in the worst years of the crisis. In November 2017, Fannie multifamily serious delinquency rate rose to 0.11 percent, its highest level since early 2014, mostly due to the recent hurricanes; it increased further to 0.13 percent in March 2018. Freddie remained flat at 0.02 percent.

Serious Delinquency Rates-Single-Family Loans



Sources: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, MBA Delinquency Survey and Urban Institute. Note: Serious delinquency is defined as 90 days or more past due or in the foreclosure process. Not seasonally adjusted. *Last updated May 2018*.

Serious Delinquency Rates-Multifamily GSE Loans



Sources: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Urban Institute.

Note: Multifamily serious delinquency rate is the unpaid balance of loans 60 days or more past due, divided by the total unpaid balance.

AGENCY ISSUANCE AGENCY GROSS AND NET ISSUANCE


Agency gross issuance was \$378.7 billion in the first four months of 2018, \$1.136 trillion on an annualized basis. This is down 11.3 percent year-over-year. When measured on a monthly basis, the agency gross issuance was lower year-over-year for fourteen consecutive months since March 2017, reflecting higher mortgage rates. Net issuance (which excludes repayments, prepayments, and refinances on outstanding mortgages) totaled \$68.8 billion in the first four months of 2018, down 27.2 percent from the same period of 2017.

Ag	ency Gr	oss Issuar	nce	Age	ency Ne	t Issuance	
lssuance Year	GSEs	Ginnie Mae	Total	lssuance Year	GSEs	Ginnie Mae	Total
2000	\$360.6	\$102.2	\$462.8	2000	\$159.8	\$29.3	\$189.1
2001	\$885.1	\$171.5	\$1,056.6	2001	\$368.4	-\$9.9	\$358.5
2002	\$1,238.9	\$169.0	\$1,407.9	2002	\$357.2	-\$51.2	\$306.1
2003	\$1,874.9	\$213.1	\$2,088.0	2003	\$334.9	-\$77.6	\$257.3
2004	\$872.6	\$119.2	\$991.9	2004	\$82.5	-\$40.1	\$42.4
2005	\$894.0	\$81.4	\$975.3	2005	\$174.2	-\$42.2	\$132.0
2006	\$853.0	\$76.7	\$929.7	2006	\$313.6	\$0.2	\$313.8
2007	\$1,066.2	\$94.9	\$1,161.1	2007	\$514.9	\$30.9	\$545.7
2008	\$911.4	\$267.6	\$1,179.0	2008	\$314.8	\$196.4	\$511.3
2009	\$1,280.0	\$451.3	\$1,731.3	2009	\$250.6	\$257.4	\$508.0
2010	\$1,003.5	\$390.7	\$1,394.3	2010	-\$303.2	\$198.3	-\$105.0
2011	\$879.3	\$315.3	\$1,194.7	2011	-\$128.4	\$149.6	\$21.2
2012	\$1,288.8	\$405.0	\$1,693.8	2012	-\$42.4	\$119.1	\$76.8
2013	\$1,176.6	\$393.6	\$1,570.1	2013	\$69.1	\$87.9	\$157.0
2014	\$650.9	\$296.3	\$947.2	2014	\$30.5	\$61.6	\$92.1
2015	\$845.7	\$436.3	\$1,282.0	2015	\$75.1	\$97.3	\$172.5
2016	\$991.6	\$508.2	\$1,499.8	2016	\$135.5	\$125.3	\$260.8
2017	\$877.3	\$455.6	\$1,332.9	2017	\$168.5	\$131.3	\$299.7
2018 YTD	\$249.9	\$128.8	\$378.7	2018 YTD	\$38.7	\$30.1	\$68.8
2018 YTD % Change YOY	-11.8%	-10.2%	-11.3%	2018 YTD % Change YOY	-27.4%	-26.8%	-27.2%
2018 Ann.	\$749.8	\$386.3	\$1,136.1	2018 (Ann.)	\$116.1	\$90.2	\$206.3

AGENCY ISSUANCE AGENCY GROSS ISSUANCE & FED PURCHASES

Monthly Gross Issuance

While government and GSE lending have dominated the mortgage market since the crisis, there has been a change in the mix. The Ginnie Mae share rose from its low levels in the pre-crisis period to 28 percent in 2010, then declined to 25 percent in 2013. Since then, the share has bounced back sharply, and now stands at 34.4 percent in April 2018. The increase in this share over the past year is due to the fact that rates have risen, and Ginnie Mae is less dependent on refi activity than its conventional counterparts.




April 2018

Sources: eMBS, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and Urban Institute.

Fed Absorption of Agency Gross Issuance


The Fed has begun to wind down their portfolio, and we are beginning to see the effects in slower absorption rates. During the period October 2014-September 2017, the Fed had ended its purchase program, but was reinvesting funds from mortgages and agency debt into the mortgage market, absorbing 20-30 percent of agency gross issuance. With the wind down, which started in October 2017, the Fed will continue to reinvest, but by less than their run off. In April 2018, total Fed purchases declined to \$10.0 billion, yielding Fed absorption of gross issuance of 10.5 percent, a new historical low, as the size of the MBS taper increased from \$4 to \$8 billion this month.



AGENCY ISSUANCE MORTGAGE INSURANCE ACTIVITY


MI Activity

In 2018 Q1, mortgage insurance activity via the FHA, VA and private insurers declined from the previous quarter's \$173 billion to \$150 billion, down 5.7 percent year -over-year from the same quarter in 2017. This seasonal decrease is driven by all three channels. Private mortgage insurers decreased by 12 billion, FHA decreased by \$7 billion, and VA decreased by \$5 billion. In the first quarter of 2018, FHA accounted for 34.8 percent of the market, down from 36.6 percent in 2017, losing 1.4 percentage market share to VA (26.1 percent) and 0.5 percent to private mortgage insurers (39.1 percent).



Sources: Inside Mortgage Finance and Urban Institute. Last updated May 2018.

MI Market Share



Sources: Inside Mortgage Finance and Urban Institute. Last updated May 2018.

AGENCY ISSUANCE MORTGAGE INSURANCE ACTIVITY

FHA premiums rose significantly in the years following the housing crash, with annual premiums rising 170 percent from 2008 to 2013 as FHA worked to shore up its finances. In January 2015, President Obama announced a 50 bps cut in annual insurance premiums, making FHA mortgages more attractive than GSE mortgages for all borrowers. The April 2016 reduction in PMI rates for borrowers with higher FICO scores and April 2018 reduction for lower FICO borrowers has partially offset that. As shown in the bottom table, a borrower putting 3.5 percent down will now find FHA more economical except for those with FICO scores of 720 or higher.

FHA MI Premiums for Typical Purchase Loan

Case number date	Upfront mortgage insurance premium (UFMIP) paid	Annual mortgage insurance premium (MIP)		
1/1/2001 - 7/13/2008	150	50		
7/14/2008 - 4/5/2010*	175	55		
4/5/2010 - 10/3/2010	225	55		
10/4/2010 - 4/17/2011	100	90		
4/18/2011 - 4/8/2012	100	115		
4/9/2012 - 6/10/2012	175	125		
6/11/2012 - 3/31/2013 ^a	175	125		
4/1/2013 - 1/25/2015 ^b	175	135		
Beginning 1/26/2015 ^c	175	85		

Sources: Ginnie Mae and Urban Institute.

Note: A typical purchase loan has an LTV over 95 and a loan term longer than 15 years. Mortgage insurance premiums are listed in basis points.

* For a short period in 2008 the FHA used a risk based FICO/LTV matrix for MI.

 $^{\circ}_{b}$ Applies to purchase loans less than or equal to \$625,500. Those over that amount have an annual premium of 150 bps.

Applies to purchase loans less than or equal to \$625,500. Those over that amount have an annual premium of 155 bps.

 $^{\circ}$ Applies to purchase loans less than or equal to \$625,500. Those over that amount have an annual premium of 105 bps.

Initial Monthly Payment Comparison: FHA vs. PMI

Assumptions								
Prop	Property Value			\$250,000				
Loar	Loan Amount			\$241,250				
LTV				96.5				
	Base Rate							
Conforming			4.66%					
	FHA 4.70%							
FICO	620 - 639	640 - 659	660 - 679	680 - 699	700 - 719	720 - 739	740 - 759	760+
FHA MI Premiums								
FHAUFMIP	1.75%	1.75%	1.75%	1.75%	1.75%	1.75%	1.75%	1.75%
FHAMIP	0.85%	0.85%	0.85%	0.85%	0.85%	0.85%	0.85%	0.85%
PMI								
GSE LLPA*	3.50%	2.75%	2.25%	1.50%	1.50%	1.00%	0.75%	0.75%
PMI Annual MIP	2.25%	2.05%	1.90%	1.40%	1.15%	0.95%	0.75%	0.55%
Monthly Payment								
FHA	\$1,444	\$1,444	\$1,444	\$1,444	\$1,444	\$1,444	\$1,444	\$1,444
PMI	\$1,711	\$1,648	\$1,613	\$1,524	\$1,482	\$1,443	\$1,402	\$1,378
PMI Advantage	(\$267)	(\$204)	(\$169)	(\$80)	(\$38)	\$1	\$42	\$66

Sources: Genworth Mortgage Insurance, Ginnie Mae, and Urban Institute.

Note: Mortgage insurance premiums listed in percentage points. Grey shade indicates FHA monthly payment is more favorable, while light blue indicates PMI is more favorable. The PMI monthly payment calculation does not include special programs like Fannie Mae's 33 HomeReady and Freddie Mac's Home Possible (HP), both offer more favorable rates for low- to moderate-income borrowers. LLPA= Loan Level Price Adjustment, described in detail on page 25.

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