ABOUT THE CHARTBOOK

The Housing Finance Policy Center’s (HFPC) mission is to produce analyses and ideas that promote sound public policy, efficient markets, and access to economic opportunity in the area of housing finance. At A Glance, a monthly chartbook and data source for policymakers, academics, journalists, and others interested in the government’s role in mortgage markets, is at the heart of this mission.

We welcome feedback from our readers on how we can make At A Glance a more useful publication. Please email any comments or questions to ataglance@urban.org.

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The Growing Importance of Nonbanks in the Mortgage Market

This month we are introducing a new section on nonbank originators (pages 12, 13 and 14). Nonbank financial institutions have played an increasingly important and growing role in servicing and originating mortgages in the post-crisis years. Within the agency space (i.e. Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae-backed loans), the share of mortgages originated by nonbanks has rose from 33 percent in 2013 to 60 percent in 2017 (page 12). The growth of nonbank originations has been even more dramatic for Ginnie Mae – from 36 percent to 76 percent. Nonbanks currently account for 52 percent of Fannie Mae purchases (up from 38 percent in 2013) and 49 percent of Freddie’s purchases (up from 22 percent). The bottom two charts on page 12 show that nonbanks have a bigger share of the refinance market than the purchase market.

But the role of nonbanks goes beyond just originating more mortgages. They have also played an important role in easing access to mortgage credit. As page 13 shows, the median FICO score for nonbank originations has been consistently less than the median FICO for bank originations for all three agencies. More importantly, nonbank median FICO has declined by 30 points (745 to 715) since early 2013 in comparison to just a 7 point drop (755 to 748) in the bank median FICO. The median FICO for all agency originations has dropped 23 points from 752 to 729, largely due to nonbank FICO relaxation. Further, nearly all of the FICO relaxation has occurred in the refinance market with purchase originations seeing very little to no FICO relaxation. Thus, while it has become easier to qualify for a refinance mortgage to reduce the monthly payment, obtaining a new mortgage remains very difficult.

The bottom two charts on page 13, which highlight median bank and nonbank FICOs for GSEs and Ginnie Mae, also show the same pattern of lower nonbank FICOs than banks. It is noteworthy that while bank and nonbank FICOs for the GSEs as well as nonbank FICOs for Ginnie Mae have declined since 2014, bank FICOs for Ginnie Mae have actually increased. This largely reflects the sharp cut-back in FHA lending by many depository institutions.

The median LTV ratios for loans originated by nonbanks are similar to those of their bank counterparts, hovering around 80 percent for the GSEs, and 96.5 percent for Ginnie Mae. However, the median DTIs of non-bank loans are higher, indicating the non-banks are more accommodating in the DTI dimension as well as the FICO dimension. Note that in 2017 there has been a measurable increase in DTIs across both the GSEs and Ginnie channels, for both banks and nonbanks.

The growing role of nonbanks in the mortgage market is an important development that not only affects consumer access to credit, but also has implications for the broader mortgage market. For instance, increased reliance of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and especially Ginnie Mae on nonbanks, which are not as stringently regulated as banks are, can pose greater counterparty risk to the agencies. At the same time, regulators and policymakers should recognize the positive role of nonbanks in originating and servicing mortgages as they craft new policies. We hope that our new charts and data on nonbanks aids those efforts.

INSIDE THIS ISSUE

• We added new pages that show nonbank originator shares in the agency market, and compare loans originated by bank and nonbank originators along credit scores, LTVs and DTIs (pages 12-14)
• Fannie Mae’s average g-fees on new acquisitions fell slightly in Q2 2017 while Freddie Mac remained flat (page 25)
• Fannie Mae completed a new, $31.9 billion risk-sharing deal in August 2017 (pages 26 and 27)
• Private mortgage insurance activities rose and gained market share over FHA and VA in Q2 2017 (page 32)

Note: We have eliminated monthly reporting of HARP and HAMP data. No new HAMP applications were considered after 12/31/2016; while HARP was extended until year-end 2018, refinances under this program have been very low over the past year, and we do not see this changing.
The Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds report has consistently indicated an increasing total value of the housing market driven by growing household equity since 2012, and 2017 Q1 was no different. While total debt and mortgages was stable at $10.3 trillion, household equity reached a new high of $14.4 trillion, bringing the total value of the housing market to $24.8 trillion, surpassing the pre-crisis peak of $23.9 trillion in 2006. Agency MBS make up 59.5 percent of the total mortgage market, private-label securities make up 4.9 percent, and unsecuritized first liens at the GSEs, commercial banks, savings institutions, and credit unions make up 29.9 percent. Second liens comprise the remaining 5.7 percent of the total.

### Value of the US Housing Market

![Graph showing the value of the US housing market from 2000 to 2017 Q1.](image)

**Sources:** Federal Reserve Flow of Funds and Urban Institute. *Last updated June 2017.*

### Size of the US Residential Mortgage Market

![Graph showing the size of the US residential mortgage market from 2000 to 2017 Q1.](image)

**Sources:** Federal Reserve Flow of Funds, Inside Mortgage Finance, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, eMBS and Urban Institute. *Last updated June 2017.*

**Note:** Unsecuritized first liens includes loans held by commercial banks, GSEs, savings institutions, and credit unions.
As of June 2017, debt in the private-label securitization market totaled $520 billion and was split among prime (18.1 percent), Alt-A (39.5 percent), and subprime (42.3 percent) loans. In July 2017, outstanding securities in the agency market totaled $6.24 trillion and were 44 percent Fannie Mae, 27.3 percent Freddie Mac, and 28.6 percent Ginnie Mae. Ginnie Mae had more outstanding securities than Freddie since May 2016.

Private-Label Securities by Product Type

Sources: CoreLogic and Urban Institute.

Agency Mortgage-Backed Securities

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.
First Lien Origination Volume

After a record high origination year in 2016 ($2.1 trillion), the first lien originations totaled $385 billion in the first quarter of 2017, mostly due to the increase in interest rates and traditionally low winter activity. The share of portfolio originations was 21 percent, down sharply from 31 percent in 2016. The GSE share went up to 53 percent, from 46 percent for 2016. The FHA/VA share was slightly up: 25 percent in Q1 2017 versus 23 percent in 2016. Origination of private-label securities was well under 1 percent in both periods.

Adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) accounted for as much as 42 percent of all new originations during the peak of the 2005 housing bubble (top chart). The ARMs fell to an historic low of 1 percent in 2009, and then slowly grew to a high of 6 percent in April 2014. Since then, ARMs began to decline again to 3.8 percent in May 2017. The 15-year fixed-rate mortgage (FRM), predominantly a refinance product, accounted for 15.2 percent of new originations. If we exclude refinances (bottom chart), the share of 30-year FRMs in May 2017 stood at 89.3 percent, 15-year FRMs at 6.1 percent, and ARMs at 3.2 percent.

Sources: Corelogic, eMBS, HMDA, SIFMA and Urban Institute.

May 2017
The non-agency share of mortgage securitizations in the first seven months of 2017 was 2.7 percent, compared to 1.8 percent in 2016 and 4.5 percent in 2015. The non-agency securitization volume totaled $28.8 billion in H1 2017, a 32 percent increase over the same period in 2016. Much of the volume was in non-performing and re-performing (scratch and dent) deals. The volume of prime securitizations in H1 2017 totaled $4.48 billion, higher than H1 2016 ($3.68 billion). Non-agency securitizations continue to be tiny compared to pre-crisis levels.

**Sources:** Inside Mortgage Finance and Urban Institute.

**Note:** Based on data from July 2017.
Agency issuance totaled $750.3 billion in the first seven months of 2017, slightly down from $752.2 billion a year ago. In July 2017, refinances continued to decline to 34 and 32 percent of Fannie Mae and Freddie’s businesses, respectively, because mortgage rates have remained elevated since the election. Ginnie Mae’s refinances remained steady at 25 percent.

Agency Gross Issuance

($ trillions)

![Graph showing agency gross issuance from 2000 to 2017.]

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.
Note: Annualized figure based on data from July 2017.

Percent Refi at Issuance

![Graph showing percent refi at issuance from 2004 to 2017.]

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.
Note: Based on at-issuance balance. Figure based on data from July 2017.
OVERVIEW

NONBANK ORIGINATION SHARE

Nonbank origination share has increased for all three agencies since 2013, with Ginnie Mae seeing the biggest increase (from 36% to 76%, or 40 percentage points). Within the conventional space, Freddie’s nonbank origination share has witnessed a much bigger increase (from 22 to 49 percent, or 27 percentage points) than Fannie’s (from 38 to 52, or 14 percentage points). As a result, Fannie and Freddie’s nonbank origination shares have now nearly converged. Nonbank origination share is higher for refinance than for purchases across all three agencies.

Nonbank Origination Share: All Loans

Nonbank Origination Share: Purchase Loans

Nonbank Origination Share: Refi Loans

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.
OVERVIEW

NONBANK CREDIT BOX

Nonbank originators have played a key role in opening up access to credit. The median GSE and the median Ginnie Mae FICO scores for loans originated by nonbanks are lower than their bank counterparts. Within the GSE space, both bank and nonbank FICOs have declined since 2014 with further relaxation in FICOs in 2017. In contrast within the Ginnie Mae space, FICO scores for bank originations have increased since 2014 while nonbank FICO has declined. This largely reflects the sharp cut-back in FHA lending by many banks.

Agency FICO: Bank vs. Nonbank

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.

GSE FICO: Bank vs. Nonbank

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.

Ginnie Mae FICO: Bank vs. Nonbank

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.
The median LTV ratios for loans originated by nonbanks are similar to their bank counterparts, while the median DTIs for nonbank loans are higher, indicating the nonbanks are more accommodating in this dimension as well as in the FICO dimension. Note that in 2017 there has been a measurable increase in DTIs. This is true for both Ginnie Mae and GSE loans, banks and nonbank originators.
STATE OF THE MARKET
MORTGAGE ORIGINATION PROJECTIONS

Origination volume for calendar year 2016 was close to $2.0 trillion. In 2017, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and MBA expect origination volume to be in the $1.55-$1.65 trillion range, owing to a sharp decline in refinance activity due to rising interest rates. In 2017, the share of refinances is expected to be in the 33-34 percent range, representing a drop from the 48 percent refi share in 2016. Fannie, Freddie, and MBA all forecast 2017 housing starts to total 1.21 to 1.24 million units, an increase from 2016. Home sales forecasts for 2017 range from 6.20-6.28 million, a rise from 2016 levels.

Total Originations and Refinance Shares

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Total, FNMA estimate</th>
<th>Total, FHLMC estimate</th>
<th>Total, MBA estimate</th>
<th>Refi Share (%)</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FNMA estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017 Q1</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>48</td>
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<tr>
<td>2017 Q2</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>33</td>
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<tr>
<td>2017 Q3</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>32</td>
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<tr>
<td>2017 Q4</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>28</td>
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<tr>
<td>2018 Q1</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>345</td>
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<tr>
<td>2018 Q2</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>482</td>
<td>445</td>
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<td>2018 Q3</td>
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<td>2018 Q4</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>355</td>
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<tr>
<td>FY 2014</td>
<td>1301</td>
<td>1350</td>
<td>1261</td>
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<tr>
<td>FY 2015</td>
<td>1730</td>
<td>1750</td>
<td>1679</td>
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<tr>
<td>FY 2016</td>
<td>2052</td>
<td>2125</td>
<td>1891</td>
<td>48</td>
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<tr>
<td>FY 2017</td>
<td>1649</td>
<td>1545</td>
<td>1612</td>
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<tr>
<td>FY 2018</td>
<td>1541</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>1588</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Mortgage Bankers Association and Urban Institute.
Note: Shaded boxes indicate forecasted figures. All figures are estimates for total single-family market. Column labels indicate source of estimate. Regarding interest rates, the yearly averages for 2014, 2015, and 2016 were 3.6%, 3.7%, and 3.6%. For 2017, the respective projections for Fannie, Freddie, and MBA are 4.1%, 4.2%, and 4.2%.

Housing Starts and Homes Sales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total, FNMA estimate</th>
<th>Total, FHLMC estimate</th>
<th>Total, MBA estimate</th>
<th>Total, FNMA estimate</th>
<th>Total, FHLMC estimate</th>
<th>Total, MBA estimate</th>
<th>Existing, MBA estimate</th>
<th>New, MBA Estimate</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 2014</td>
<td>1003</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1001</td>
<td>5377</td>
<td>5380</td>
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<td>1108</td>
<td>5751</td>
<td>5750</td>
<td>5740</td>
<td>5237</td>
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<tr>
<td>FY 2016</td>
<td>1174</td>
<td>1170</td>
<td>1177</td>
<td>6011</td>
<td>6010</td>
<td>6001</td>
<td>5440</td>
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<td>6203</td>
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<td>FY 2018</td>
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<td>1360</td>
<td>1338</td>
<td>6352</td>
<td>6300</td>
<td>6702</td>
<td>6007</td>
<td>695</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Mortgage Bankers Association, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Urban Institute.
Note: Shaded boxes indicate forecasted figures. All figures are estimates for total single-family market; column labels indicate source of estimate.
CREDIT AVAILABILITY AND ORIGINATOR PROFITABILITY

STATE OF THE MARKET

Housing Credit Availability Index (HCAI)

HFPC’s Housing Credit Availability Index (HCAI) assesses lenders’ tolerance for both borrower risk and product risk, calculating the share of owner-occupied purchase loans that are likely to default. The index shows that credit availability increased slightly to 5.4 in the first quarter of 2017 (Q1 2017), up from 5.2 in Q4 2016 and the highest level since 2016. The measure is less than half of the 2001-2003 standard of 12.5 percent. HCAI is likely to go up further with the post-election spike in interest rates, as lender may expand the credit box when origination volumes drop. More information about the HCAI, including the breakdown by market segment, is available here.

Sources: eMBS, Corelogic, HMDA, IMF, and Urban Institute.
Note: Default is defined as 90 days or more delinquent at any point. Last updated July 2017.

Originator Profitability and Unmeasured Costs

When originator profits are higher, mortgage volumes are less responsive to changes in interest rates, because originators are at capacity. Originator Profitability and Unmeasured Costs (OPUC), formulated and calculated by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, is a good relative measure of originator profitability. OPUC uses the sales price of the mortgage in the secondary market (less par) and adds two additional sources of profitability; retained servicing (both base and excess servicing, net of g-fees) and points paid by the borrower. Driven by the post-Brexit decline in interest rates, OPUC rose sharply to $3.21 in July 2016. With the post election increase in interest rates, OPUC now stands at $2.16.

Note: OPUC is a is a monthly (4-week moving) average as discussed in Fuster et al. (2013).
Access to credit has become extremely tight, especially for borrowers with low FICO scores. The mean and median FICO scores on new purchase originations have both drifted up about 21 and 20 points over the last decade, respectively. The 10th percentile of FICO scores, which represents the lower bound of creditworthiness needed to qualify for a mortgage, stood at 647 as of May 2017. Prior to the housing crisis, this threshold held steady in the low 600s. LTV levels at origination remain relatively high, averaging 87.6, which reflects the large number of FHA purchase originations.

### Borrower FICO Score at Origination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FICO Score</th>
<th>90th percentile</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>10th percentile</th>
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<tbody>
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<tr>
<td>500</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** Corelogic, eMBS, HMDA, SIFMA and Urban Institute.

**Note:** Includes owner-occupied purchase loans only.

### Combined LTV at Origination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LTV</th>
<th>90th percentile</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>10th percentile</th>
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<td>110</td>
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<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** Corelogic, eMBS, HMDA, SIFMA and Urban Institute.

**Note:** Includes owner-occupied purchase loans only.
Credit has been tight for all borrowers with less-than-stellar credit scores--especially in MSAs with high housing prices. For example, the mean origination FICO for borrowers in San Francisco-Redwood City-South San Francisco, CA is 772, while in Detroit-Dearborn-Livonia, MI it is 735. Across all MSAs, lower average FICO scores tend to be correlated with high average LTVs, as these MSAs rely heavily on FHA/VA financing.

**Origination FICO and LTV**

**Origination FICO**

- Mean origination FICO score
- Mean origination LTV

**Origination LTV**

Sources: Corelogic, eMBS, HMDA, SIFMA and Urban Institute.

Note: Includes owner-occupied purchase loans only. Data as of May 2017.
National Housing Affordability Over Time

Home prices are still very affordable by historic standards, despite increases over the last four years and the recent interest rate hike. Even if interest rates rise to 5.5 percent, affordability would still be at the long term historical average. The bottom chart shows that some areas are much more affordable than others.

Sources: CoreLogic, US Census, Freddie Mac and Urban Institute.

Note: The maximum affordable price is the house price that a family can afford putting 20 percent down, with a monthly payment of 28 percent of median family income, at the Freddie Mac prevailing rate for 30-year fixed-rate mortgage, and property tax and insurance at 1.75 percent of housing value.

Affordability Adjusted for MSA-Level DTI

Sources: CoreLogic, US Census, Freddie Mac and Urban Institute calculations based on NAR methodology.

Note: Index is calculated relative to home prices in 2000-03. A ratio above 1 indicates higher affordability in May 2017 than in 2000-03.
First-Time Homebuyer Share

In May 2017, the first-time homebuyer share of GSE purchase loans decreased slightly to 47.2%, after hitting the highest level in recent history in April (47.9%). The FHA has always been more focused on first-time homebuyers, with its first-time homebuyer share hovering around 80 percent and stood at 83.1 percent in May 2017, a hair away from the May 2016 peak of 83.3 percent. The bottom table shows that based on mortgages originated in May 2016, the average first-time homebuyer was more likely than an average repeat buyer to take out a smaller loan and have a lower credit score and higher LTV and DTI, thus requiring a higher interest rate.

Sources: eMBS, Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and Urban Institute.
Note: All series measure the first-time homebuyer share of purchase loans for principal residences.

Comparison of First-Time and Repeat Homebuyers, GSE and FHA Originations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>GSEs</th>
<th>FHA</th>
<th>GSEs and FHA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Loan Amount ($)</td>
<td>227,420</td>
<td>252,931</td>
<td>247,844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit Score</td>
<td>740.6</td>
<td>755.9</td>
<td>741.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTV (%)</td>
<td>87.0</td>
<td>79.0</td>
<td>81.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTI (%)</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>36.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loan Rate (%)</td>
<td>4.22</td>
<td>4.10</td>
<td>4.11</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.
Note: Based on owner-occupied purchase mortgages originated in May 2017.
STATE OF THE MARKET
HOME PRICE INDICES

National Year-Over-Year HPI Growth

While the strong year-over-year home price growth from 2012 to 2013 has slowed somewhat, home price appreciation remains robust as measured by the repeat sales index from CoreLogic and hedonic index from Zillow. We will continue to closely monitor how rising mortgage rates impact this strong growth.

Changes in CoreLogic HPI for Top MSAs

Despite rising 47.8 percent from the trough, national house prices still must grow 0.9 percent to reach pre-crisis peak levels. At the MSA level, seven of the top 15 MSAs have reached their peak HPI—New York, NY; Los Angeles, CA; Atlanta, GA; Houston, TX; Dallas, TX; Seattle, WA and Denver, CO. Two MSAs particularly hard hit by the boom and bust—Phoenix, AZ and Riverside, CA—would need to rise 23 and 25 percent to return to peak levels, respectively.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MSA</th>
<th>2000 to peak</th>
<th>Peak to trough</th>
<th>Trough to current</th>
<th>% Rise needed to achieve peak</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>93.7</td>
<td>-33.3</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York-Jersey City-White Plains NY-NJ</td>
<td>112.1</td>
<td>-16.6</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>-7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles-Long Beach- Glendale CA</td>
<td>177.2</td>
<td>-38.4</td>
<td>67.0</td>
<td>-2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago-Naperville-Arlington Heights IL</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>-35.8</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell GA</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>-32.9</td>
<td>59.4</td>
<td>-6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington-Arlington-Alexandria DC-VA-MD-WV</td>
<td>155.4</td>
<td>-34.2</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land TX</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>-14.1</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>-20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale AZ</td>
<td>123.7</td>
<td>-52.7</td>
<td>71.5</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario CA</td>
<td>186.2</td>
<td>-52.7</td>
<td>69.4</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dallas-Plano-Irving TX</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>-13.8</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>-26.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington MN-WI</td>
<td>73.0</td>
<td>-30.4</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seattle-Bellevue-Everett WA</td>
<td>90.9</td>
<td>-29.1</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>-21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denver-Aurora-Lakewood CO</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>-13.2</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>-33.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltimore-Columbia-Towson MD</td>
<td>122.8</td>
<td>-24.6</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Diego-Carlsbad CA</td>
<td>144.9</td>
<td>-37.5</td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anaheim-Santa Ana-Irvine CA</td>
<td>160.7</td>
<td>-35.7</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: CoreLogic HPIs and Urban Institute. Data as of June 2017.
Note: This table includes the largest 15 Metropolitan areas by mortgage count.
STATE OF THE MARKET
NEGATIVE EQUITY & SERIOUS DELINQUENCY

Negative Equity Share

With housing prices continuing to appreciate, residential properties in negative equity (LTV greater than 100) as the share of all residential properties with a mortgage continued to decline and stood at 6.1 percent as of Q1 2017. Residential properties in near negative equity (LTV between 95 and 100) comprise another 1.6 percent.

Sources: CoreLogic and Urban Institute.
Note: CoreLogic negative equity rate is the percent of all residential properties with a mortgage in negative equity. Loans with negative equity refer to loans above 100 percent LTV. Loans near negative equity refer to loans above 95 percent LTV. Last updated June 2017.

Loans in Serious Delinquency/Foreclosure

90 day delinquencies resumed their decline from 1.60 to 1.37 percent in Q1 2017, after last quarter’s seasonal upswing. The percent of loans in foreclosure continued to edge down to 1.39 percent. The combined delinquencies totaled 2.76 percent in Q1 2017, down from 3.13 percent in Q4 2016 and 3.29 percent for the same quarter a year earlier.

STATE OF THE MARKET
MODIFICATIONS AND LIQUIDATIONS

Total modifications (HAMP and proprietary) are now roughly equal to total liquidations. Hope Now reports show 8,242,918 borrowers have received a modification since Q3 2007, compared with 8,422,434 liquidations in the same period. Modifications and liquidations have slowed significantly over the past few years. In the first five months of 2017, there were just 142,640 modifications and 132,369 liquidations.

Loan Modifications and Liquidations

Number of loans (thousands)

Cumulative Modifications and Liquidations

Number of loans (millions)

Sources: Hope Now and Urban Institute.
Note: Liquidations include both foreclosure sales and short sales.
Both GSEs continue to contract their portfolios. Since June 2016, Fannie Mae has contracted by 19.1 percent and Freddie Mac by 11.5 percent. They are shrinking their less liquid assets (mortgage loans and non-agency MBS) faster than they are shrinking their entire portfolio. As of June 2017, both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are below their 2017 portfolio cap. By December 2018 each portfolio must be below the ultimate cap of $250 billion.
GSES UNDER CONSERVATORSHIP

EFFECTIVE GUARANTEE FEES

Guarantee Fees Charged on New Acquisitions

The latest 10-K indicates that Fannie’s average g-fees on new acquisitions decreased from 58.7 to 58.0 bps in Q2 2017 and Freddie’s remained flat at 54 bps. This is a marked increase over 2012 and 2011, and has contributed to the GSEs’ profits. The GSE’s latest Loan-Level Pricing Adjustments (LLPAs) were effective in September 2015; the bottom table shows the Fannie Mae LLPAs, which are expressed as upfront charges. Note that the September 2015 changes were very modest, and did not have a material impact on GSE pricing. In particular, the Adverse Market Delivery Charge (ADMC) of 0.25 percent was eliminated, and LLPAs for some borrowers were slightly increased to compensate for the revenue loss.


Fannie Mae Upfront Loan-Level Price Adjustments (LLPAs)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Credit Score</th>
<th>≤60</th>
<th>60.01 – 70</th>
<th>70.01 – 75</th>
<th>75.01 – 80</th>
<th>80.01 – 85</th>
<th>85.01 – 90</th>
<th>90.01 – 95</th>
<th>95.01 – 97</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 740</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.25%</td>
<td>0.25%</td>
<td>0.50%</td>
<td>0.25%</td>
<td>0.25%</td>
<td>0.25%</td>
<td>0.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>720 – 739</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.25%</td>
<td>0.50%</td>
<td>0.75%</td>
<td>0.50%</td>
<td>0.50%</td>
<td>0.50%</td>
<td>1.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>700 – 719</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.50%</td>
<td>1.00%</td>
<td>1.25%</td>
<td>1.00%</td>
<td>1.00%</td>
<td>1.00%</td>
<td>1.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>680 – 699</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.50%</td>
<td>1.25%</td>
<td>1.75%</td>
<td>1.50%</td>
<td>1.25%</td>
<td>1.25%</td>
<td>1.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>660 – 679</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>1.00%</td>
<td>2.25%</td>
<td>2.75%</td>
<td>2.75%</td>
<td>2.25%</td>
<td>2.25%</td>
<td>2.25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>640 – 659</td>
<td>0.50%</td>
<td>1.25%</td>
<td>2.75%</td>
<td>3.00%</td>
<td>3.25%</td>
<td>3.75%</td>
<td>2.75%</td>
<td>2.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>620 – 639</td>
<td>0.50%</td>
<td>1.50%</td>
<td>3.00%</td>
<td>3.00%</td>
<td>3.25%</td>
<td>3.25%</td>
<td>3.25%</td>
<td>3.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt; 620</td>
<td>0.50%</td>
<td>1.50%</td>
<td>3.00%</td>
<td>3.00%</td>
<td>3.25%</td>
<td>3.25%</td>
<td>3.25%</td>
<td>3.75%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Product Feature (Cumulative)

| High LTV               | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% |
| Investment Property    | 2.125% | 2.125% | 2.125% | 3.375% | 4.125% | N/A   | N/A   | N/A   |

Sources: Fannie Mae and Urban Institute.
Note: For whole loans purchased on or after September 1, 2015, or loans delivered into MBS pools with issue dates on or after September 1, 2015.
### GSES UNDER CONSERVATORSHIP

#### GSE RISK-SHARING TRANSACTIONS

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have been laying off back-end credit risk through CAS and STACR as well as through reinsurance transactions. They have also done a few front-end transactions with originators and experimented with deep mortgage insurance coverage with private mortgage insurers. FHFA’s 2017 scorecard requires the GSEs to lay off credit risk on 90 percent of newly acquired loans in categories targeted for transfer. Fannie Mae’s CAS issuances to date cover 33 percent of its outstanding guarantees, while Freddie’s STACR covers 44 percent. In August 2017, Fannie Mae issued a $31.9 billion CAS deal.

### Fannie Mae – Connecticut Avenue Securities (CAS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Transaction</th>
<th>Reference Pool Size ($ m)</th>
<th>Amount Issued ($m)</th>
<th>% of Reference Pool Covered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>CAS 2013 deals</td>
<td>$26,756</td>
<td>$675</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>CAS 2014 deals</td>
<td>$227,234</td>
<td>$5,849</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>CAS 2015 deals</td>
<td>$187,126</td>
<td>$5,463</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2016</td>
<td>CAS 2016 – C01</td>
<td>$28,882</td>
<td>$945</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2016</td>
<td>CAS 2016 – C02</td>
<td>$35,004</td>
<td>$1,032</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2016</td>
<td>CAS 2016 – C03</td>
<td>$36,087</td>
<td>$1,166</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2016</td>
<td>CAS 2016 – C04</td>
<td>$42,179</td>
<td>$1,322</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2016</td>
<td>CAS 2016 - C05</td>
<td>$38,668</td>
<td>$1,202</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2016</td>
<td>CAS 2016 - C06</td>
<td>$33,124</td>
<td>$1,024</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2016</td>
<td>CAS 2016 - C07</td>
<td>$22,515</td>
<td>$702</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2017</td>
<td>CAS 2017 – C01</td>
<td>$43,758</td>
<td>$1,351</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2017</td>
<td>CAS 2017 – C02</td>
<td>$39,988</td>
<td>$1,330</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2017</td>
<td>CAS 2017 – C03</td>
<td>$41,246</td>
<td>$1,371</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2017</td>
<td>CAS 2017 – C04</td>
<td>$30,154</td>
<td>$1,003</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2017</td>
<td>CAS 2017 – C05</td>
<td>$43,751</td>
<td>$1,351</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2017</td>
<td>CAS 2017 – C06</td>
<td>$31,900</td>
<td>$1,101</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$908,372</strong></td>
<td><strong>$26,886</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.0%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Percent of Fannie Mae’s Total Book of Business** 32.79%

### Freddie Mac – Structured Agency Credit Risk (STACR)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Transaction</th>
<th>Reference Pool Size ($ m)</th>
<th>Amount Issued ($m)</th>
<th>% of Reference Pool Covered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>STACR 2013 deals</td>
<td>$57,912</td>
<td>$1,130</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>STACR 2014 deals</td>
<td>$147,120</td>
<td>$4,916</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>STACR 2015 deals</td>
<td>$209,521</td>
<td>$6,658</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2016</td>
<td>STACR Series 2016 – DNA1</td>
<td>$35,700</td>
<td>$996</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2016</td>
<td>STACR Series 2016 – HQA1</td>
<td>$17,931</td>
<td>$475</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2016</td>
<td>STACR Series 2016 – DNA2</td>
<td>$30,589</td>
<td>$916</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2016</td>
<td>STACR Series 2016 – HQA2</td>
<td>$18,400</td>
<td>$627</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2016</td>
<td>STACR Series 2016 – DNA3</td>
<td>$26,400</td>
<td>$795</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2016</td>
<td>STACR Series 2016 – HQA3</td>
<td>$15,709</td>
<td>$515</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2016</td>
<td>STACR Series 2016 – DNA4</td>
<td>$24,845</td>
<td>$739</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2016</td>
<td>STACR Series 2016 – HQA4</td>
<td>$13,847</td>
<td>$478</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2017</td>
<td>STACR Series 2017 – DNA1</td>
<td>$33,965</td>
<td>$802</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2017</td>
<td>STACR Series 2017 – HQA1</td>
<td>$29,700</td>
<td>$753</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2017</td>
<td>STACR Series 2017 – DNA2</td>
<td>$60,716</td>
<td>$1,320</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2017</td>
<td>STACR Series 2017 – HQA2</td>
<td>$31,604</td>
<td>$788</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$769,668</strong></td>
<td><strong>$21,908</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.8%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Percent of Freddie Mac’s Total Book of Business** 43.73%

**Sources:** Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Urban Institute.

**Note:** Classes A-H, M-1H, M-2H, and B-H are reference tranches only. These classes are not issued or sold. The risk is retained by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. “CE” = credit enhancement.
GSES UNDER CONSERVATORSHIP
GSE RISK-SHARING SPREADS

CAS and STACR spreads have moved around considerably since 2013, with the bottom mezzanine tranche and the first loss bonds experiencing considerably more volatility than the top mezzanine bonds. Tranche B in particular has been highly volatile because of its first loss position. Spreads widened especially during Q1 2016 due to falling oil prices, concerns about global economic growth and the slowdown in China. Since then spreads have resumed their downward trend but remain volatile.

**Fannie Mae CAS Spreads at-issuance (basis points over 1-month LIBOR)**

**Freddie Mac STACR Spreads at-issuance (basis points over 1-month LIBOR)**

**Sources:** Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac Press Releases and Urban Institute.
Serious delinquency rates of GSE loans continue to decline as the legacy portfolio is resolved and the pristine, post-2009 book of business exhibits very low default rates. As of June 2017, 1.01 percent of the Fannie portfolio and 0.85 percent of the Freddie portfolio were seriously delinquent, down from 1.28 percent for Fannie and 1.08 percent for Freddie in June 2016.

Sources: Fannie Mae and Urban Institute.

Note*: Following a change in Fannie reporting in March 2017, we started to report the credit risk transfer category and a new non-credit enhanced category that excludes loans covered by either primary MI or credit risk transfer transactions. Fannie reported these two new categories going back to January 2016.

Sources: Freddie Mac and Urban Institute.

Note*: Following a change in Freddie reporting in September 2014, we switched from reporting credit enhanced delinquency rates to PMI and other credit enhanced delinquency rates. Freddie reported these two categories for credit-enhanced loans going back to August 2013. The other category includes single-family loans covered by financial arrangements (other than primary mortgage insurance) including loans in reference pools covered by STACR debt note transactions as well as other forms of credit protection.
Serious delinquencies for GSE single-family loans continued to decline. After the seasonal upswing in Q4 2017, both FHA and VA delinquencies resumed their decline to 3.99 and 2.13 percent in Q1 2017. GSE delinquencies remain higher relative to 2005-2007, while FHA and VA delinquencies (which are higher than their GSE counterparts) are at levels lower than 2005-2007. GSE multifamily delinquencies have declined to pre-crisis levels, although they did not reach problematic levels even in the worst years of the crisis.

**Serious Delinquency Rates–Single-Family Loans**


**Note:** Serious delinquency is defined as 90 days or more past due or in the foreclosure process. Not seasonally adjusted.

**Serious Delinquency Rates–Multifamily GSE Loans**

Source: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Urban Institute.

**Note:** Multifamily serious delinquency rate is the unpaid balance of loans 60 days or more past due, divided by the total unpaid balance.
The agency gross issuance totaled $750.3 billion in the first seven months of 2017, a 0.3 percent decrease year-over-year. When measured on monthly basis, the agency gross issuance was lower year over year for five consecutive months since March. If we annualize year to date gross issuance, volume is down sharply from 2016. Net issuance (which excludes repayments, prepayments, and refinances on outstanding mortgages) was up 44.1 percent versus the same period in 2016.

### Agency Gross Issuance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issuance Year</th>
<th>GSEs</th>
<th>Ginnie Mae</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>$360.6</td>
<td>$102.2</td>
<td>$462.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>$885.1</td>
<td>$171.5</td>
<td>$1,056.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>$1,238.9</td>
<td>$169.0</td>
<td>$1,407.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>$1,874.9</td>
<td>$213.1</td>
<td>$2,088.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>$872.6</td>
<td>$119.2</td>
<td>$991.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>$894.0</td>
<td>$81.4</td>
<td>$975.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>$853.0</td>
<td>$76.7</td>
<td>$929.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>$1,066.2</td>
<td>$94.9</td>
<td>$1,161.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>$911.4</td>
<td>$267.6</td>
<td>$1,179.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>$1,280.0</td>
<td>$451.3</td>
<td>$1,731.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>$1,003.5</td>
<td>$390.7</td>
<td>$1,394.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>$879.3</td>
<td>$315.3</td>
<td>$1,194.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>$1,288.8</td>
<td>$405.0</td>
<td>$1,693.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>$1,176.6</td>
<td>$393.6</td>
<td>$1,570.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>$650.9</td>
<td>$296.3</td>
<td>$947.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>$845.7</td>
<td>$436.3</td>
<td>$1,282.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>$991.59</td>
<td>$508.18</td>
<td>$1,499.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017 YTD</td>
<td>$490.05</td>
<td>$260.26</td>
<td>$750.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017 YTD %Change YOY</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>-2.7%</td>
<td>-0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017 Ann</td>
<td>$840.09</td>
<td>$446.16</td>
<td>$1,286.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Agency Net Issuance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issuance Year</th>
<th>GSEs</th>
<th>Ginnie Mae</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>$159.8</td>
<td>$29.3</td>
<td>$189.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>$368.4</td>
<td>-9.9</td>
<td>$358.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>$357.2</td>
<td>-51.2</td>
<td>$306.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>$334.9</td>
<td>-77.6</td>
<td>$257.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>$82.5</td>
<td>-40.1</td>
<td>$42.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>$174.2</td>
<td>-42.2</td>
<td>$132.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>$313.6</td>
<td>$0.2</td>
<td>$313.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>$514.9</td>
<td>$30.9</td>
<td>$545.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>$314.8</td>
<td>$196.4</td>
<td>$511.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>$250.6</td>
<td>$257.4</td>
<td>$508.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>-303.2</td>
<td>$198.3</td>
<td>-$105.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>-128.4</td>
<td>$149.6</td>
<td>$21.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>-42.4</td>
<td>$119.1</td>
<td>$76.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>$69.1</td>
<td>$87.9</td>
<td>$157.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>$30.5</td>
<td>$61.6</td>
<td>$92.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>$75.1</td>
<td>$97.3</td>
<td>$172.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>$135.5</td>
<td>$125.3</td>
<td>$260.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017 YTD</td>
<td>$82.7</td>
<td>$79.2</td>
<td>$161.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017 YTD %Change YOY</td>
<td>88.29%</td>
<td>15.75%</td>
<td>44.13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017 Ann</td>
<td>$141.8</td>
<td>$135.7</td>
<td>$277.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.
Note: Dollar amounts are in billions. Annualized figure based on data from June 2017.
Monthly Gross Issuance

While government and GSE lending have dominated the mortgage market since the crisis, there has been a change in the mix. The Ginnie Mae share reached a peak of 28 percent of total agency issuance in 2010, declined to 25 percent in 2013, and has bounced back sharply since then. With the elevated mortgage rates since the election, monthly agency issuance has been lower year over year for five consecutive months since March. Fannie Mae gross issuance decreased from $56 billion in January 2016 to $45 billion in July 2017 and Freddie Mac's number dropped from $39 to $28 billion. Less dependent on refinances, Ginnie Mae gross issuance fell less from $43 to $41 billion in the same period, driving its share up to 36 percent in July 2017.

Sources: eMBS, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and Urban Institute.

Fed Absorption of Agency Gross Issuance

In October 2014, the Fed ended its purchase program, but continued buying at a much reduced level, reinvesting funds from pay downs on mortgages and agency debentures into the mortgage market. Since then, the Fed's absorption of gross issuance has been between 20 and 30 percent. In July 2017, agency gross issuance edged up to $113.5 billion while total Fed purchase declined to $23.0 billion, yielding Fed absorption of gross issuance of 20.3 percent, down from 22.5 percent last month. In their June 2017 meeting, the Fed announced a new balance sheet reduction plan that is expected to be used to cut back on MBS monthly purchase volume later this year.

Sources: eMBS, Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Urban Institute.
AGENCY ISSUANCE
MORTGAGE INSURANCE ACTIVITY

MI Activity

In 2017 Q2, mortgage insurance activity via the FHA, VA and private insurers rose from previous quarter’s $159 billion to $177 billion, but down 6 percent year-over-year from the same quarter in 2016. This quarter’s increase is mainly driven by private mortgage insurers’ $19 billion growth, while FHA edged up slightly and VA activity declined. FHA’s market share fell from 41 to 37 percent and VA share fell from 27 to 23 percent in 2017 Q2, while the private insurance market’s share increased to 40 percent (from 32 percent the previous quarter).


MI Market Share

FHA premiums rose significantly in the years following the housing crash, with annual premiums rising 170 percent from 2008 to 2013 as FHA worked to shore up its finances. In January 2015, President Obama announced a 50 bps cut in annual insurance premiums, making FHA mortgages more attractive than GSE mortgages for all borrowers. The April 2016 reduction in PMI rates for borrowers with higher FICO scores has partially offset that. As shown in the bottom table, a borrower putting 3.5 percent down will now find FHA more economical except for those with FICO scores of 740 or higher.

**Initial Monthly Payment Comparison: FHA vs. PMI**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FHA MI Premiums</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FHA UFMIP</td>
<td>1.75%</td>
<td>1.75%</td>
<td>1.75%</td>
<td>1.75%</td>
<td>1.75%</td>
<td>1.75%</td>
<td>1.75%</td>
<td>1.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FHA MIP</td>
<td>0.85%</td>
<td>0.85%</td>
<td>0.85%</td>
<td>0.85%</td>
<td>0.85%</td>
<td>0.85%</td>
<td>0.85%</td>
<td>0.85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSE LLPA*</td>
<td>3.50%</td>
<td>2.75%</td>
<td>2.25%</td>
<td>1.50%</td>
<td>1.50%</td>
<td>1.00%</td>
<td>0.75%</td>
<td>0.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMI Annual MIP</td>
<td>2.25%</td>
<td>2.05%</td>
<td>1.90%</td>
<td>1.40%</td>
<td>1.15%</td>
<td>0.95%</td>
<td>0.75%</td>
<td>0.55%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Monthly Payment**

| FHA | $1,346 | $1,346 | $1,346 | $1,346 | $1,346 | $1,346 | $1,346 | $1,346 |
| PMI | $1,721 | $1,659 | $1,614 | $1,492 | $1,442 | $1,388 | $1,340 | $1,300 |
| PMI Advantage | ($375) | ($313) | ($269) | ($147) | ($96) | ($42) | $5 | $45 |

**Sources:** Genworth Mortgage Insurance, Ginnie Mae and Urban Institute.

**Note:** Mortgage insurance premiums listed in percentage points. Grey shade indicates FHA monthly payment is more favorable, while light blue indicates PMI is more favorable. The PMI monthly payment calculation does not include special programs like Fannie Mae’s HomeReady and Freddie Mac’s Home Possible (HP), both offer more favorable rates for low- to moderate-income borrowers. LLPA = Loan Level Price Adjustment, described in detail on page 21.
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