TECHNICAL REPORT

Displacement and Disconnection?
Exploring the Role of Social Networks in the Livelihoods of Refugees in Gaziantep, Nairobi, and Peshawar

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Executive Summary

Of the millions of displaced people worldwide, a growing number are seeking protection in “cities of the south” where they receive little direct assistance or support. In such sites, displaced people’s abilities to feed, house, and clothe themselves are central to protecting themselves and reducing their dependence on humanitarian aid. In the absence of direct assistance or as a complement to limited aid, displaced people—like other newly urbanized migrants—must rely on informal or social resources to meet their immediate requirements and further their broader ambitions.

Building on original quantitative and qualitative work in three refugee-receiving cities—Nairobi (Kenya), Gaziantep (Turkey), and Peshawar (Pakistan)—this study explores how social networks further and hamper displaced peoples’ ability to become self-reliant. Its findings speak of the diverse social and economic worlds urban refugees must navigate. Much of this diversity stems from the cities’ respective economies, refugees’ socio-cultural histories, and gender roles. Three general findings reflect conditions, with variations, across groups and three sites:

- **Group membership is remarkably low.** Apart from Kenyan religious organizations, the population surveyed here participates in almost no regular or formalized groups, including cultural or economic associations.

- **Social networks are a remarkable asset for many but are either unavailable or a source of fear and a hindrance for others.** The same kind of networks that may provide succor can also constrain or suppress people. Their relative accessibility and desirability seems connected to gender roles and the politics of the community in question. Refugee social networks are weakest where communities of origin are fragmented and in conflict.

- **The in-group networks that initially offer protection through the exchange of information, housing, and other (usually nonmaterial) support become less effective as people seek long-term sustainability.** Long-term economic security is closely connected to people’s ability to forge social connections outside members of their own national or ethnic group. Language acquisition is often critical to creating these ties.

The report ends with recommendations for humanitarians seeking to assist displaced populations in urban areas. These recommendations include further efforts to provide residential status and the right to work for displaced populations. Such status does not guarantee of success, but it enhances the formal right to work along with the ability to move within a given city in ways that can help evade social, spatial,
and economic segregation. Language training is critical in this regard. For women, the ability to exit or evade patriarchal structures among co-nationals is particularly important. More generally, the findings encourage humanitarians to provide opportunities for continued residential mobility. This may mean ensuring that refugees can access housing in multiple sites across cities, particularly in areas with few other refugees. In this vein, the report also cautions against overt and ongoing support for refugee associations. Although such groups may help disseminate information and provide mutual support, they may also bind people within an ultimately restrictive social world. By encouraging refugees to organize socially based on nationality or legal status, aid agencies may ultimately reduce displaced people’s ability to form the extra-group connections needed for long-term autonomy.
Displacement and Disconnection?

According to the latest United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reports, 65.3 million people were displaced worldwide in 2015, an increase of 12.4 million from the year before. Of these, 21.3 million were refugees and another 40.8 million were internally displaced. To top it off, there were 3.2 million asylum seekers, or individuals whose claims to refugee status were pending determination. In 2015, 24 people were displaced from their homes every minute. This compares to 30 every minute in 2014 and 6 every minute in 2005. In many places, the numbers are likely to be considerably higher as increased restrictions on immigration and asylum have driven people underground where they remain un- or undercounted. Pakistan alone hosts 1.6 million people of concern. Turkey now hosts the largest number of any country in the world with 2.5 million, per “UNHCR Statistics–The World in Numbers” (http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/overview). Kenya’s numbers are smaller at just under a half million (UNHCR 2017), but it has been providing protection to refugees from central Africa and the horn for decades.

Of the millions of displaced people worldwide, significant numbers live in purpose-built camps and settlements where they receive direct assistance from international and domestic humanitarian and development organizations. Millions more—and an increasing number by almost all estimates—seek protection in urban communities. Apart from the relatively few who are granted asylum in the wealthy west, displaced people seek protection in spaces in which few public services are formally available to them. Indeed, in many such spaces, few public services are available to host populations. In such sites, the ability of displaced people to feed, house, and clothe themselves is central to their protection, economically contributing to host communities, and reducing dependence on humanitarian aid.

In the absence of direct assistance or as a complement to limited aid, displaced people—like other newly urbanized migrants—must rely on informal or social resources to meet their immediate requirements and further their broader ambitions. These goals may include returning to their communities of origin, but also long-term settlement in their current city or onward movement under their own power or through resettlement. This synthesis report and the three case studies accompanying it explore the varied roles of social networks as people of concern (POCs: refugees, asylum seekers, and people in refugee-like situations) seek self-reliance. The findings will allow humanitarian agencies to target direct assistance at those less likely to succeed and support broader initiatives to encourage self-reliance.
If successful, such targeting can generate economic benefits to host communities through several channels, including through a larger consumer base, increases in the labor supply, and greater inflows of public investments (including donor funding), which in turn trigger additional local economic activity (Ongpin 2009). The net effect of these forces depends on the relative size of the refugee population, their general state of health and education, and their ability to earn to supplement limited disposable incomes.

This study explores the role of social networks in furthering or hampering these objectives. While the work of sociologists has long recognized the importance of networks in finding work, housing, and accessing services, a growing body of research points to the possibility of “negative social capital”: social connections that limit individual and family capacity to gain a foothold in a new place (e.g., Cheong et al. 2007). Arguably, these considerations have direct and critical implications on the design and delivery of humanitarian interventions, the resulting well-being of POC, and the local economic environments within host communities.

Despite the importance of this topic, there is a dearth of evidence-based studies on it (Zetter 2012). This study addresses this gap in the humanitarian toolkit by assessing the role of social networks in displaced people’s quest for self-reliance in a variety of contexts. We seek to shed light on two core research questions:

- How does the relative strength of social network ties contribute to self-reliance and the socioeconomic well-being of people of concern? From academic literature on social networks, we know that stronger social ties (through greater social capital) can contribute to economic and social well-being, which is particularly true in refugee situations. However, competing research suggests strong social ties can also act as a brake on investment and individual or family accumulation. Given the ambiguity in the literature, this study will explore the role of varied forms of social connections on POC’s ability to achieve self-reliance (Valence 2010).

- What exogenous factors influence the strength of the social relationships that make achieving self-reliance and economic well-being more likely? The individual characteristics of POC (such as their educational background and household type), and variables related to rights (such as work permits) and services (water, sanitation, and so on), may shape this relationship.

Despite the robustness of the original data included here, our conclusions are complex and somewhat murky. In many ways this reflects the socially and politically complex environments in which the urban displaced seek protection. If nothing else, the data confirm that social networks are critical to how POC strive to improve their lives in such spaces, but that they vary remarkably depending on social,
economic, and geographic contexts. The experiences of men and women differ within and between sites so dramatically that further study is warranted.

Although the data and the case studies all deserve further attention, four general findings appear to reflect conditions across groups and three sites:

- **Formal group membership is remarkably low.** With the exception of limited membership in Kenyan religious organizations, the population surveyed here participates in almost no regular or formalized groups or cultural or economic associations.

- **Although social networks are a remarkable asset for many, they are either unavailable or a source of fear and a hindrance for others.** The same kind of networks that may provide succor can also constrain or suppress people. Their relative accessibility and desirability seem connected to gender roles and the politics of the community. Where communities of origin are fragmented and in conflict, refugee social networks are weakest.

- **The in-group networks that initially offer protection through the exchange of information, housing, and other (usually nonmaterial) support become less effective as people seek long-term sustainability.** Confirming long-standing sociological findings, economic security is closely connected to people’s ability to forge social connections beyond co-nationals. Language acquisition is often critical to creating these ties.

**Method and Limitations**

The research summarized here was conducted in three cities hosting significant and significantly different displaced populations in Kenya (Nairobi), Turkey (Gaziantep), and Pakistan (Peshawar). These three countries have varied cities receiving and hosting significant displaced populations. These include both long-term inter- and intrastate conflict settings and one site (Gaziantep) that has been directly affected—and potentially transformed—by the current crises in Syria and Iraq. Details on the cities’ morphologies, populations, and experiences with displacement are included in the case studies accompanying this synthesis.

All three cases demonstrate heightening restrictions on refugee movements and rights, reflecting the global move to tightening border controls, threats of closure and restrictions on rights, and mobility added to the already precarious situation facing new comers to the cities. Despite continued violence
and economic insecurity in the respective countries of origin (most notably Somalia and Afghanistan), the governments of both Pakistan and Kenya were encouraging returns with support from the UNHCR.

All three cases also speak to the challenges of seeking protection within cities that are rapidly transforming. Refugees arriving in the United States or Europe are entering spaces of relative legal, economic, and social stability. In the cases discussed here, displacement means entering cities—or particular neighborhoods—that are themselves in rapid flux. This takes multiple forms, often within the same city: refugee-driven urban expansion with new urban or periurban settlements, moves into already established neighborhoods that are rapidly transformed by refugee presence, or residence in highly contested and fluid spaces in which a mix of populations (including POC) are seeking livelihoods and the ability to move elsewhere.

In each country, we collected survey data through research instruments administered by reputable local firms and covering 1,000 households. The survey was designed by the core team—the authors of this and the accompanying briefs—and then translated and tested in each of the three locations. The core research team oversaw on-site enumerator training and continued to monitor data collection through regular contact. The team, based in Washington, DC, oversaw the creation of initial dataset, which was then analyzed by all team members. Subsequent qualitative research was carried out in Kenya and Pakistan to help explain variations and questions stemming from the quantitative analysis. Similar fieldwork could not be completed in Gaziantep owing to security concerns and the state of emergency in Turkey. Though we originally intended to conduct focus groups, many of our subjects were insecure and reluctant to gather in groups. Interviews with displaced people were thus conducted privately and individually. We complemented these interviews with extensive discussions with officials, representatives from international organizations, and members of civil society. Each case study provides further details and specificity. Data were collected through a two-phased strategy spanning about nine months between February and November 2016.

As each case study notes, considerable shortcomings in the data deserve to be recognized. Most notably, we concentrated on particular neighborhoods in each city. Without proper (current, complete) sampling frames for the populations and the places included in our data collection, it is difficult to know how much our sample is representative of the populations. And, owing to security situations linked to police, immigration policy, and social sanction, it was often difficult to access those who felt most insecure. This at least partially explains the overrepresentation of men in the Peshawar samples. It also raises questions about the levels of vulnerability and fragmentation described within the case studies.
Figures 1 through 4 compare the sample populations from the three cities by sex, age, registration as POCs, and education level.

**FIGURE 1**
Sex of Respondents by City

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaziantep</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peshawar</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FIGURE 2**
Average Age of Respondents by City and Sex

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaziantep</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peshawar</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FIGURE 3
Share of Respondents Registered with UNHCR as People of Concern by City and Sex

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaziantep</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peshawar</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: As no effort was made to verify people’s legal status, these figures reflect self-reporting on registration with the UNHCR. In all three countries, such registration offers some level of legal protection but does not necessarily equate to refugee status under domestic law or the 1951 UN Refugee Convention.

FIGURE 4
Education Level by City and Sex

- Less than primary / no education
- Finished primary
- Finished secondary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaziantep</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peshawar</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Core Findings

If nothing else, the survey offers insights into populations that are relatively new to their current locations and remain poorly documented and understood. The diversity of cases and displacement experiences also builds on a growing body of applied and scholarly literature about urbanization and urban displacement. In many respects the survey data confirm intuitive expectations. Most notably, the people included in our survey are generally vulnerable, often going days without food, living in insecure housing, and coping with considerable legal and social uncertainty. For some people, relatively high numbers of dependents nearby and in other locations are likely to exacerbate those risks.

Although we did not include a “host” control group in the survey, when we compared the survey findings with other data for the areas surveyed, refugees were generally worse off economically than those who had not been displaced. While we are unable to compare our data with deeply spatialized data from the three cities, it is safe to say that refugees—along with many of the people they live among—are living precariously. Part of this result may stem from selection bias: we targeted relatively poor areas because they were affordable for poor refugees. Wealthier refugees may be scattered throughout the cities and missed in our surveys. All the same, this economic disadvantage suggests limited spatial opportunities—that networks among people physically (and potentially culturally) nearby may offer refugees little help accessing employment and services. To integrate successfully, refugees need to be able to span social distance and geographic space.

Despite the billions of dollars of humanitarian aid dedicated to assist refugees in the regions described here, most of those included in the survey are effectively on their own. Whereas refugees in other settings often receive support from elsewhere in the diaspora, few included in this survey received financial assistance from anyone near or far. Some of their isolation undoubtedly stems from their proximity to conflict and their relatively recent displacement. It may also stem from their choice to avoid or leave purpose-built settlements and camps, which in turn may be a sign of agency and potential empowerment. The desire for urban settlement also undoubtedly reflects the ineffectiveness or unavailability of camp- or settlement-based assistance programs, especially for refugees with little chance of returning home. Refugees’ isolation, destitution, and vulnerability clearly illustrate the absence and shortcomings of effective urban-based assistance initiatives.

Despite this vulnerability, it is also evident from the case studies that self-settled refugees are economically active. As we know from previous research, even those in camps have an extensive economic life that often contrasts with the visions of vulnerability and helplessness presented by aid agencies and refugees themselves (Jacobsen 2003). For those in urban areas, this activity is both
desirable and necessary. People often choose cities over camps (where this choice is available) because of the economic freedoms self-settlement offers. Where there is no direct material assistance from private or public parties—as is largely the case in the three cities we surveyed—refugees must be relatively autonomous economically. The remaining sections of this report focus on the factors facilitating this autonomy.

One clear message concerns heterogeneity. In all three cities, gender plays a highly significant role in differentiating livelihood options. More qualitative work is needed to understand the social and material structures that restrict women’s economic and network engagements. The variations in gender experiences across national or ethnic groups in even a single location (the Nairobi brief is particularly illustrative) suggests that strong nonmaterial factors shape people’s engagements and entitlements. Indeed, generalized variations across national and ethnic groups with similar migration histories point to the need to carefully disaggregate refugee populations. For example, Tajiks in Pakistan typically earned 28 percent less than Afghans. Although regression analyses—which could control for education, language, and other factors—were inconclusive across the three cases, there is a case for strong variations based on ethnicity and nationality.

Social Capital and Group Membership

Much of the literature on immigrant integration speaks to the importance of associations for building solidarity and promoting mutual assistance, but there is little evidence that these groups are playing that role among the communities documented here. Table 1 shows this finding irrefutably. Reflecting previous findings on African cities, the only associations that seem to matter in Nairobi are religious ones. Despite refugees and hosts being largely Muslim in both Peshawar and Gaziantep, there appears to be little formal religious membership among refugees.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Association type</th>
<th>Peshawar</th>
<th>Gaziantep</th>
<th>Nairobi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business or professional</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreational, cultural, or social</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample size (N)</td>
<td>877</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>476</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The explanations for low group membership call for further research, but initial probing suggests a number of causes, including limited histories and familiarity with formal group structures in the communities of origin; limited space or resources for communal organizing in refuge cities; and fear of attracting attention from hostile host communities, police, or others. Formal or de facto prohibitions on refugee organizing in many places are likely to also play a role. Regardless of the cause, humanitarian organizations often approach formal associations to communicate with and help refugees. As the data above suggest, these organizations are not typically deeply embedded within the communities they ostensibly serve.

The Role of Networks

The survey data speak ambiguously about the role of social networks in urban refugees' ability to access de facto protection in new cities. There is no universal pattern across the three cities or the various groups therein. Disaggregating by both nationality and gender, moreover, presents a highly variegated population that enters and navigates the city in substantially different ways. Perhaps most important—albeit only hinted at by the data—are the temporal variations: the role of networks appears to vary (albeit without a singular pattern) over time.

If there is a story to be told, it is one that conforms generally to a literature on the role of social networks in livelihoods and literature. In the first instance, close kin, ethnic, or national connections tend to provide the assistance needed for survival in a new city. Perhaps most important here is the exchange of information and advice and assistance with accommodation. Figure 5 illustrates and compares this form of assistance with a far more limited number of people who receive direct financial assistance from those within their social networks.
The stories diverge considerably when it comes to providing access to the resource needed for long-term survival—that is, employment. The Nairobi data are most remarkable in this regard, but the declines are significant in all three cities. Although the explanations for this decline are not obvious from the quantitative data, a number of important factors emerge from the focus group discussions and background research. First among these is undoubtedly the nature of the urban economy. No amount of networking can find or create jobs where there are few to be had. Yet given the refugee populations’ employment profile, this does not explain much in our cases. As figure 6 suggests, Nairobi’s refugees are substantially better employed or self-employed than those elsewhere. In this case Nairobi’s diversified, informal economy may offer more suitable entry points than those in the other two cities.

Yet the qualitative work—as described in the accompanying case study—suggests that the explanation may instead be based in Somali refugees’ ability to find work within Nairobi’s existing Somali community. Work was far harder to come by for other groups in other cities, who relied far more heavily on self-employment. Again, gender plays an important role in shaping both social attitudes toward work and the networks women can use to find a way to support themselves. It is also important to note that even though Nairobi’s population was generally more economically engaged, their level of vulnerability (when gauged by nights sleeping hungry) was notably higher (figure 7). Counter to expectations, refugees rarely used the Internet or social media in searching for work; only about 13 percent reported doing so in Gaziantep, and the numbers were in the single digits in both Peshawar and Nairobi.
Perhaps the most important story from the data is that over time, connections outside one’s national group—typically with members of the host population—seem to be most effective at reducing vulnerability. Although further regression analysis is needed, the factor most strongly correlated with economic resilience was connections outside one’s immediate ethnic or national group.
Recommendations for Intervention and Research

The account above offers a complex, heterogeneous picture of the experiences of urban refugees and the role social networks play in their protection. If nothing else, the findings lend credence to two seemingly contradictory positions. First, refugees are remarkably agential in many cases; they find their ways in new places with little direct humanitarian assistance and sometimes even without legal status and documentation. Social networks—particularly those that ultimately extend beyond ethno-national “in groups”—are central to their successes. Such a position supports market-oriented approaches that rely less on material aid than on private-sector involvement and market integration. Wherever possible, these approaches should promote local integration and self-reliance. Second, social position—determined by language skills, gender relations, age, and country of origin—means that social networks are not equally available. Humanitarian interventions premised on social network support may ultimately produce greater inequality and vulnerability among subgroups of the displaced. For some refugees, lack of access to social networks—particularly those extending to “out groups”—means remaining trapped and marginalized. This appears to be particularly the case for women, who may face stigma from their own or host communities should they reach out to strangers. Other refugees avoid relying on both in- and out-group networks because of a prevailing lack of trust, internecine conflict, or the fear of observation and sanction. Humanitarian programs relying heavily on market-based solutions may do little to address such people’s economic and physical precarity.

As perpetual material aid is unviable in urban settings where displacement is likely protracted, humanitarian interventions must enable self-reliance through expanded social networks and other mechanisms. In developing practical programming principles, the UNHCR and others can build initial interventions based on the most likely obstacles toward self-reliance and social integration. Although geography and social context can determine the obstacles and opportunities presented to new arrivals, the commonalities across our three sites provide generalized guidance (Sen 1992). For these reasons, we recommend a two-phased approach to assisting refugees in urban areas. Efforts should start with providing the basic things necessary to survive and to escape abject poverty (Sen 1987). To some extent, the SPHERE standards address these basic capabilities—to ensure what Sen terms “minimally acceptable levels” (1992, 109). However, the SPHERE standards do so in a way that is welfarist and not premised on the principle of expanding agency and freedom. In the approach recommended here, ensuring that basic needs are met is not an end in itself. Indeed, should the provision of basic needs target refugees or particular nationalities, it may ultimately strengthen precisely the kind of national and ethnic associations that work against long-term sustainability. Instead, these efforts should be oriented at helping urban refugees over a threshold preventing them from gradually expanding other
capabilities. Doing so demands a second—much longer—phase involving monitoring, evaluation, and an expansion or specialization of protection activities to address specific challenges and continue expanding the capabilities of refugees and host populations. Through an initial phase dedicated to response on arrival that paves the way for longer-term integration, this approach explicitly considers the particularities of urban refugee settlement: economic diversity; that urban settlement is, de facto, a gateway to a durable solution; and the analytic and practical inseparability of refugees and hosts. Although many principles outlined below look familiar, the reasoning behind them may not be.

As indicated above—and by the remarkable diversity of experience captured in the related case studies—effective humanitarian interventions must begin from a nuanced understanding of the local, social, and institutional environment that considers the varied abilities of people based on their legal status, age, gender, and ethnicity or nationality. This understanding should go beyond simple enumeration or measurement of risks and vulnerabilities; it should include not just displaced people’s material condition and environment, but the socio-political structures that may serve as obstacles and opportunities. The following recommendations and considerations can help strengthen displaced people’s ability to become self-reliant through social networks and other means.

- **Enhance efforts to ensure displaced people have de facto rights to work and residential mobility.** Social networks are most effective when people have options to employ or evade them. This flexibility requires creating multiple pathways to accessing information, employment, housing, and services. Legal residential status may be one way to enhance refugees’ options, but legalization efforts must also extend to market-based sectors and ensuring that any documentation is respected by police, authorities, service providers, and potential employers. Although legal status, work permits, market licenses, or references for rental housing cannot guarantee access to employment, housing, or other forms of protection, it could facilitate interactions and engagements beyond fellow migrant communities. For those likely to work outside the home, establish formal business, or work in skilled sectors, legal status is likely to have a strong effect. Legal status may also facilitate mobility within a city in ways that create further opportunities for interaction and working. Without some form of protection, people may remain in ethnic or national neighborhoods that provide short-term shelter but work against long-term integration.

- **Offer strategic support for refugee associations while promoting “out-group” solidarities.** Many humanitarian organizations and government programs conduct consultations or distribute aid through associations based on nationality. Participation in such associations may provide valuable initial aid to migrants. However, by creating cohesive bonds and patterns of
social observation and discipline, they may also work against the formation of extra-ethnic/national links that provide better access to markets. Moreover, given refugees’ deep suspicion of civic-style associations, membership in these groups is likely to be low, and institutional resources may be easily captured by vested interests. More effective interventions may be oriented to producing refugee invisibility: promoting solidarities outside refugees’ co-nationals based on residential area, employment, gender, or other potential aspects of people’s identities. These solidarities will facilitate networks beyond one’s immediate in-group in ways that foster integration and long-term self-reliance.

- **Enhance opportunities for residential mobility.** Although ethnic or national enclaves can offer people initial security and support, the observational aspects of proximity can also work against people’s independence. This is especially likely for women. Moreover, residential isolation is likely to reinforce in-group versus out-group relations. As we know from studies of residential segregation elsewhere (Gowan 2011; Marcuse 1997), this reinforcement can have negative social and economic effects. By making refugees so visible, enclaves may also make them easy targets for harassment and political scapegoating. Interventions in this regard will need to be tailored to local housing markets and the nature of publicly funded housing provision. Current refugee housing programs often presume that residential proximity to co-nationals is an advantage. Using vouchers or providing referrals for refugees wishing to live outside immigrant enclaves may enable them to strategically engage or evade co-national social networks.

- **Enhance language acquisition.** Given the importance of extra-group interactions, facilitating refugees’ acquisition of one or more locally spoken languages can offer a critical step up. Language acquisition may be required for employment or securing products in the market, and it is critical to forging connections outside one’s immediate group. Such ties can ultimately help build solidarities and provide the kind of information and guidance that can improve physical and economic security.

An effective approach to protecting urban refugees that fosters networks and positive social capital may require substantial shifts in the humanitarian enterprise and mindset. Although the kinds of vulnerabilities documented here may warrant humanitarian interventions, effective protection must be oriented toward long-term settlement and integration. This need not mean complete social and political coherence with host populations, but rather the opportunity to expand social and professional networks beyond the refugee community. Doing so will require that humanitarians broaden the range of work they do, the skills they possess, and the ways they engage with formal and informal social and authority structures. Such efforts need not be more expensive than work in camps, but they require
considerable flexibility, adaptation, and learning. To some extent, humanitarians have already begun to recognize these imperatives. Still, much organizational learning is left to do.

However convinced we may be in our approach, we recognize the practical and political difficulties in realizing its implementation. Perhaps most obviously, a protection strategy dedicated to maximizing refugees’ freedom and integration may prove politically untenable in an era of such pronounced anti-immigrant hostilities. The demand that states recognize that refugees within their cities should not be contained to particular areas and must be given the rights to make their way economically and geographically within them may be unpalatable to some. Disregarding these politics is not the solution. Rather, advocates must develop strategies to persuade host communities (and governments) that refugees (and other non-nationals, for the distinctions are often missed) do not represent an inherent threat. This means developing media and publicity strategies that highlight the threats to law, welfare, and security that come from continued exclusion. By allowing states to “progressively expand” refugees’ freedoms, advocates may also be better able to negotiate locally acceptable programmatic interventions.

To conclude, we wish to reiterate that effective refugee protection will only be achieved by expanding the number of people able to analyze the material, social, and political status of refugees and other migrants in urban areas. Given the poor level of information available on cities across the global south—where most displaced people live—this means investing in programs to develop local analytical capacity. Preparing people for this task means producing bureaucrats, NGO employees, advocates, and scholars ready to analyze and debate existing conditions and collectively plot a course toward better protection.
References


Statement of Independence

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