not surprisingly, the CHA struggled with relocation. The process was initially very contentious; two lawsuits were filed against the agency, and a court-appointed independent monitor oversaw relocation (Popkin 2006). The Relocation Rights Contract, negotiated in 2000, formally spelled out the CHA’s obligations to leaseholders during the housing transformation. The contract defined the terms for lease compliance and the steps residents could take to “cure” lease violations and remain eligible to move into the new mixed-income developments. The contract also specified the services to be offered to residents while they waited for permanent housing; by mid-decade, the CHA had developed a comprehensive relocation and case management system (Popkin 2010).

When the Plan for Transformation began, the CHA’s family public housing developments were among the poorest, most troubled communities in the nation. As extensive social science literature has shown, living in communities with concentrated poverty undermines residents’ safety and mental health, and it seriously limits access to employment, social networks, quality schools, and adequate health care (Cutler and Glaeser 1997; Ellen and Turner 1997; Massey and Denton 1993; Roman and Knight 2010; Wilson 1987). CHA’s public housing is now dramatically better, thanks to improved management and new construction and design ideas.

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By the 1990s, when the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) initiated its ambitious Plan for Transformation, the agency’s distressed, high-rise public housing developments were icons of failed federal housing policy. As the CHA implemented its 10-year revitalization strategy to “transform” 25,000 units, it faced the daunting challenge of relocating thousands of residents. The agency had little experience providing relocation counseling or case management. Further, CHA residents were especially disadvantaged: because of the terrible conditions in the family developments, many tenants who had had better options had left long ago, leaving behind a population dominated by the extremely vulnerable (Buron and Popkin 2010).
The CHA’s transformation efforts have undoubtedly changed the face of public housing in Chicago; the notorious developments are gone and are gradually being replaced with new, mixed-income housing. Evidence about how the original residents have fared is mixed but generally more positive than many originally expected (Vale and Graves 2010). The CHA Panel Study, which tracked a sample of residents from the Madden/Wells development from 2001 to 2009, shows that, eight years after the Plan’s inception, most of these residents are living in better housing in substantially safer neighborhoods (Popkin et al. 2010). Still, even with these gains, most former Madden/Wells residents are living in moderately poor, predominantly minority communities that offer little opportunity for them and their families (Buron and Popkin 2010).

In addition, the Plan has not been able to help CHA’s most vulnerable families—those “hard to house” families with multiple, complex problems such as serious mental and physical ailments, addiction, domestic violence, and histories of lease violations. These problems often make them ineligible for mixed-income housing or unable to negotiate the private market with a Housing Choice Voucher. These families risk being left behind in CHA’s remaining traditional public housing developments, barely better off than before the Plan for Transformation began.

The Chicago Family Case Management Demonstration was an innovative effort to improve the circumstances and life chances of CHA’s most vulnerable families, with the goal of ensuring that participants were stably housed in better conditions.1 The Demonstration—a partnership of the Urban Institute, the CHA, Heartland Human Care Services (Heartland), and Housing Choice Partners (HCP)—provided households from the CHAs Dearborn Homes and Madden/Wells developments with intensive case management services to test the feasibility of providing wraparound supportive services in public and assisted housing, Transitional Jobs, financial literacy training, and relocation counseling and support (Popkin et al. 2008). The Urban Institute conducted a rigorous evaluation, including a baseline and follow-up survey, administrative interviews, focus groups with service providers and program administrators, in-depth resident interviews, and analysis of program and administrative data (see text box on page 11).

Initially, the CHA planned to relocate only some of the residents in Madden/Wells and none of the families in Dearborn (Popkin et al. 2008). But as conditions in Madden/Wells deteriorated, the CHA accelerated its plans and closed the development in summer 2008. At the same time, the agency received additional federal funds to comprehensively rehabilitate Dearborn. As a result, nearly all Demonstration participants had to move.

Generally, participants now live in much better housing in neighborhoods where they feel safer. However, most still live in public housing, and their new neighborhoods are still poor and racially segregated. This brief explores relocation outcomes for Demonstration participants, including their experiences with relocation services and their housing and neighborhood outcomes.

Moving Public Housing Residents to Better Neighborhoods

In most American cities, public housing has been located in poor, predominantly minority communities. Housing Choice (Section 8) Vouchers offer residents the potential to move to a broader range of areas, but the realities of rental markets, discrimination, voucher program rules, and residents’ own preferences often mean that voucher holders also end up in high-poverty, racially segregated areas. Over the past two decades, federal housing policy has emphasized mobility and deconcentration strategies to help voucher holders move to areas that provide greater social and economic opportunity (Turner, Popkin, and Rawlings 2009). The theory behind these approaches is that public housing residents will experience greater well-being in more diverse, higher-opportunity neighborhoods (Joseph, Chaskin, and Webber 2007). However, these efforts have only moderately benefited low-income minority families. Evidence from two longitudinal studies of relocation—the five-site HOPE VI Panel Study and the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) Demonstration—shows these efforts helped them move to better housing in safer neighborhoods (Briggs, Popkin, and Goering 2010; Popkin, Levy, and Buron 2009). But these safer neighborhoods are generally still poor and racially segregated, and relocating does not appear to help residents overcome personal and structural barriers to better employment, earnings, health, or educational outcomes (Briggs et al. 2010; Levy 2010).

The transition from public housing to the private rental market with a voucher is challenging. New voucher holders can have difficulty accessing transportation to search for apartments, bypassing discriminatory or unscrupulous landlords, passing tenant screenings, and finding large units (if necessary) (Buron, Levy, and Gallagher 2007). As a result of these barriers (along with resident preferences, social networks, and knowledge), public housing residents often relocate to high-poverty areas when receiving a voucher. Voucher holders often settle in neighborhoods near their pre-voucher housing (Oakley and Burchfield 2009; Popkin and Cunningham 2000).

Relocation counseling is one strategy to help voucher holders access better neighborhoods. Relocation counseling may involve neighborhood tours for residents interested in vouchers, help locating apartment listings, assistance negotiating with landlords, housekeeping and tenant’s rights workshops, and school quality information sessions. Research
on the CHA's Housing Opportunity Program and MTO residents who received relocation counseling and restricted vouchers (only usable in areas with less than 10 percent poverty) shows that participants were more likely to move to higher-opportunity neighborhoods than those not receiving relocation counseling (Cunningham and Sawyer 2005; Turner and Briggs 2008; Turner et al. 2008). The intensity of the counseling may matter as well; in a study of four cities, Varady and Walker (2009) find little difference in outcomes between voucher holders who participated in moderate relocation counseling and those who received no counseling at all.

Moving Out
When the Demonstration began in 2007, the CHA was conducting staged relocation in Madden/Wells in preparation for closing the development and anticipated only minimal relocation in Dearborn, which was to remain a traditional public housing development. The 3,000-unit Madden/Wells development, located on the city’s near South Side, was one of the CHA’s largest public housing complexes. In 2007, the CHA was partway through demolishing and replacing Madden/Wells with a new, mixed-income community called Oakwood Shores, and only about 300 households lived in the remaining buildings. All the residents were African American, and most were long-term public housing residents with low incomes and poor physical and mental health (Popkin et al. 2010). In response to rapidly deteriorating conditions, the CHA first moved a group of residents in fall 2007, under an “emergency move” order, then decided to shutter the development entirely by August 2008.

The trajectory for Dearborn residents was very different. Dearborn is an 800-unit development of six- and nine-story buildings on State Street, about a mile south of the Loop (Bowly 1978). During the first phases of the Plan for Transformation, the CHA used Dearborn as replacement housing for residents who were leaving other developments that were being demolished and had failed to meet the criteria for temporary vouchers or mixed-income housing. The resulting influx of residents from Robert Taylor Homes and Stateway Gardens created a volatile situation, with multiple gangs competing for territory within the development. The CHA received a federal grant that allowed it to comprehensively rehabilitate Dearborn; by 2010, about half the buildings were reopened. All around the development is evidence of the rapid gentrification that has spilled over from the booming South Loop community: new grocery stores, a Starbucks, gourmet restaurants, and a hotel. The redevelopment activity meant that nearly all Dearborn residents moved from their homes during the Demonstration, most of them temporarily to other units in Dearborn.

HCP provided relocation counseling for most Demonstration participants, while Heartland provided post-relocation support as part of its intensive case management services (Northeastern Illinois University [NEIU] relocated 65 families as part of the emergency closure at Madden/Wells). HCP’s relocation services for the Demonstration included reduced caseloads, workshops, and neighborhood tours intended to help educate residents and encourage them to consider making nontraditional moves to “opportunity areas” that were lower poverty. The workshops highlighted the benefits of opportunity areas, tenant rights and responsibilities, housekeeping, and school choice. Residents received a modest incentive for participation in each workshop. HCP also incorporated “second mover” counseling, conducting outreach to families that had used their vouchers to move to traditional high-poverty areas to try to encourage them to consider a second move to an opportunity area.

Because of the expedited closing of Madden/Wells and the CHA’s decision to rehabilitate Dearborn, nearly all Demonstration participants had to find a new place to live, at least temporarily. Relocation counselors strove to help residents make a permanent housing decision that avoided the disruption of having to move multiple times. Seventy-five percent of participants moved just once; another 8 percent had yet to relocate from their Dearborn apartment when we followed up in 2009. Still, a not-inconsequential share of participants—15 percent—moved two or more times between 2007 and 2009; half of these residents had relocated with vouchers.

“Moving to Oakwood Shores bettered my family, because the housing [at Madden/Wells] had all the people hanging out in the hall. At [Oakwood Shores], can’t just live here and not do anything.”
Demonstration participants had three relocation options: move to another public housing development (or, for Dearborn residents, another building within the development); relocate to a private-market apartment with a voucher; or, if they qualified, move into a mixed-income development. Most participants (59 percent) moved into public housing, including 73 percent of Dearborn residents and 47 percent of those from Madden/Wells, while just 28 percent (mostly from Madden/Wells) chose vouchers. This pattern is very different than that for CHA Panel Study respondents (Buron and Popkin 2010); more than half of Panel Study respondents moved with vouchers in 2001, and just 12 percent remained in traditional public housing (figure 1). Demonstration participants’ relocation decisions were influenced by a combination of factors: over 80 percent said they had to move because their development was being demolished or rehabilitated. Participants who made a second move cited a range of reasons, including finding a safer neighborhood (35 percent), losing their rental assistance (12 percent), and wanting a larger apartment (7 percent). In in-depth interviews, respondents told us that they chose public housing to avoid utility and other rent charges, because it was familiar, and because they could find attractive, newly rehabilitated units—a real contrast from previous residents’ assessments of CHA developments.

Given the vulnerability of the Demonstration population, we expected the housing search to be daunting for some residents, particularly those affected by Madden/Wells’ expedited move-out schedule. It is no surprise, then, that a third of households reported difficulty finding housing. The biggest problem residents faced was affordability (23 percent), followed by finding a home with enough bedrooms (19 percent) and finding a landlord who would accept the voucher.

Private-market landlords and mixed-income developments often have screening criteria that are not required for families moving into public housing developments (Theodos et al. 2010). In 2009, roughly one in five participants said that they had trouble qualifying for a mixed-income development or a voucher, citing poor credit histories, owed rent, and a lack of employment as their primary reasons. Additionally, a small group of residents noted legal barriers. In interviews, many residents discussed uncertainty around whether they met the move-in criteria for these developments. Tanya, a single mother living in Dearborn, described being confused and frustrated by relocation:

> They’ve been going back and forth with me trying to see if I can relocate to something else. Because I would like to move outside of here...How come I can’t move into one of this new stuff they’re building? But by I’m going through identity theft and there’s a lot of stuff on my record... If you know they look at that and it’s kind of hard, and I’ve been going through this for a few years because it ain’t easy to clear it up. You know I even put in for that Section 8 [down there] when they opened it back up not too long ago. And I got a letter saying that I didn’t get picked, you know. So, that was that.

There was little difference from the CHA Panel Study in the proportion that ultimately moved to a new, mixed-income community. As figure 1 shows, 18 percent of CHA Panel Study respondents moved to a mixed-income development; the comparable figure for the Demonstration was only five percentage points lower. This finding suggests that the intensive
case management services participants received may have helped them overcome some of the barriers to qualifying for the new developments.

**Demonstration Participants Live in Better Housing**

Demonstration participants experienced striking gains in housing quality. Four in five participants report that their current housing is in better condition than in 2007, with only 7 percent saying their present housing is worse. Over 80 percent of residents rank their current housing quality as good, very good, or excellent.

In 2007, respondents reported that their units were plagued with countless problems: water leaks, broken heat, cockroaches, mice, mold, and peeling paint. Stunningly, in 2009, more than half the respondents report virtually no housing problems (52 percent), another 23 percent report one problem, and the rest report two or more.

The magnitude of the gains vary only modestly by housing assistance. Mixed-income developments appear to have fewer problems than public housing developments or private-market apartments rented with a voucher. This makes sense, as most mixed-income developments were built within the past five years. Voucher holders’ units, which tend to be older, are more likely to have problems with rats, mice, and cockroaches, though still at much lower rates than in residents’ 2007 public housing units.

**Demonstration Participants Still Live in High-Poverty Neighborhoods**

The relocation services were intended to help Demonstration participants access neighborhoods that offered greater opportunity, including high-quality schools, job opportunities, and safer streets. Conditions in Dearborn and Madden/Wells were so bad in 2007 that almost any move would have improved the quality of life for these families. However, for various reasons, public housing residents tend to relocate to other low-income, predominantly minority neighborhoods (Popkin et al. 2009; Turner et al. 2008).

Demonstration participants generally did not travel far from their original development (figure 2). All remain within Chicago, clustering on the South and West sides of the city. Most remain in highly poor communities, with average poverty rates of 28 percent. Likewise, most Demonstration participants
still live in predominantly African American neighborhoods (79 percent black on average), although this represents a decrease from 2007 (86 percent black). The violent crime statistics are compelling and distressing. Most residents remain in the most violent neighborhoods in the city (figure 3), with no improvement from their original communities.

Demonstration Participants Feel Safer

Although most Demonstration participants moved to communities that differed little from their original developments, they believe their quality of life has improved dramatically. These findings are very similar to those from the CHA Panel Study (Buron and Popkin 2010; Popkin and Price 2010). We are not entirely sure what creates this discrepancy, but it may reflect the fact that Madden/Wells and Dearborn were intensely violent—more than showed up in official statistics—and moving somewhere else—even to a rehabilitated Dearborn—improved participants’ circumstances substantially.

Demonstration participants report large increases in neighborhood collective efficacy, a measure of social cohesion and social control closely correlated with crime (Sampson, Earls, and Raudenbush 1997). In 2009, respondents were twice as likely to say that their neighbors could be trusted (43 versus 21 percent) and that they shared the same values (58 versus 28 percent). Residents also perceived their new neighbors to have more of a stake in controlling delinquent behavior in their community. They reported that their neighbors were more likely to react to poor behavior such as kids skipping school, spray painting, disrespecting an adult, or fighting in front of their homes.

Likewise, Demonstration participants report dramatically decreased neighborhood problems. As figure 4 shows, respondents described significantly less physical and social disorder and violent crime (attacks or robbery, rape or sexual assault, and shootings).
Angelina, who moved from Madden/Wells to Oakwood Shores, explains why she feels so much safer in her new community:

“Oakwood Shores is a better community. Nice and quiet. Moving to Oakwood Shores bettered my family, because the housing [at Madden/Wells] had all the people hanging out in the hall. So you have people in and out the hallway, and there wasn’t any lock on the outside on the door, or security to be buzzed in. You got kids hanging in the hallway before going to school. At [Oakwood Shores], can’t just live here and not do anything.”

Given these dramatic improvements in residents’ perceptions of neighborhood quality, it is not surprising that residents are less fearful of their surroundings. The share of individuals who were never afraid to walk around outdoors increased from 34 to 56 percent. In addition to feeling safer, less than half as many households reported that police not coming when called was a big problem in their new neighborhood as did in their old one.

All Demonstration participants perceive significant gains in neighborhood quality. In a multivariate logistic regression analysis, we found no household-level determinants that led to living in a better neighborhood. In short, almost everyone’s neighborhood improved, regardless of their housing assistance, family structure, education, employment, or health. Such widespread improvement leads us to conclude that much of this gain was simply a product of leaving Madden/Wells and Dearborn. For those that stayed in Dearborn, they likely benefited from the rehabilitation and increased security in the new buildings.

### Some Residents Experience Hardship after Relocation

While most families benefited from relocation, a small minority of Demonstration participants experienced housing-related hardship after relocation. Despite the intensive services, some participants were at risk of losing their housing assistance: 3 percent said they had received a one-strike warning from their property managers or the CHA, 5 percent said they were threatened with eviction, 1 percent were evicted, and 3 percent reported that they did not have a place to stay at some point during the past 12 months. Nonpayment of rent was the main reason residents were evicted or threatened with eviction.

While we could not determine the impact of the intensive case management on resident outcomes as the study lacked an adequate control or comparison group, our bivariate findings indicate minimal differences between those that engaged in lease compliance and those that did not for such outcomes as one-strike warnings, eviction threats, and evictions. In fact, a higher percentage of engagers was non-lease compliant. One likely explanation is that residents are not engaging with these housing services until they are deemed non-lease compliant.

More commonly, Demonstration participants (especially those living in private apartments and mixed-income developments) report having trouble making their utility payments. In 2007, only about a third of the participants reported paying separately for utilities (i.e., utilities were included in their rent). But by 2009, four-fifths did. Of those who were responsible for paying for their utilities in 2009, 21 percent had been more than 15 days late paying their utility bill in the past year. Late payment was much higher among voucher holders; nearly half of these households had difficulty paying their utilities (45 percent). This finding is similar to that of other studies following public housing residents transitioning to vouchers (Levy 2010; Levy and Woolley 2007). In our in-depth interviews, respondents confirmed the added economic burden of including utilities in their monthly budget. Crystal explained the downside of moving with a voucher or into a mixed-income development:
With the voucher—it all depends on the amount of my voucher—I probably would be able to find a house. But, see, the only reason why I haven’t really jumped out there like a lot of people is because here I don’t pay utilities. So, if I move, I got other bills that I don’t have here. So, I haven’t really jumped out there because I don’t want to move somewhere I can’t afford. I just really [have] been taking my time with it. Because wherever I go, I want to be able to afford it.

While residents are struggling with the burden of increased utilities, more of them report paying their rent on time. The percentage of residents making late rent payments declined from 38 percent in 2007 to 17 percent in 2009. These findings are similar to those from the CHA Panel Study, showing that relocated residents choose to pay rent on time while delaying utility payments (Levy 2010). Case managers noted that property managers at mixed-income and private developments were much more likely to evict residents for not being lease compliant. This increased stringency has forced residents to place a higher premium on paying rent on time because they are more at risk for eviction. Indeed, just 8 percent of voucher holders and 3 percent of mixed-income residents paid their rent late, as opposed to 23 percent of public housing residents.

**Relocation Counseling in the Demonstration**

CHA residents in developments slated for demolition or rehabilitation may receive relocation counseling (Popkin 2010); for the Demonstration, HCP offered an enhanced relocation package. These services focused on preparing residents to be private-market renters, helping them move to lower-poverty neighborhoods, and encouraging them to factor school quality into their relocation decision. The costs of the relocation counseling services were $2,500 per household per year (HCP was paid once for all the families on its caseload. The organization received incentives from the CHA for placing residents in opportunity neighborhoods.) The relocation costs include relocation counselor and supervisor salaries; funding for workshops on housekeeping, tenant rights and responsibilities, and school choice; neighborhood tours; and follow-up counseling.

In 2009, more than half of respondents reported meeting with an HCP or NEIU relocation counselor at least once. These rates fall below the 90 percent of households that reported meeting with their case manager. Forty percent of families attended a housing choice or school choice meeting, over a third attended a housekeeping meeting, and almost a third went on a relocation tour. Of those who attended, nearly all thought that the services were at least somewhat helpful.

Relatively few residents made “opportunity moves.” By the end of 2008, HCP had provided showings in 88 opportunity areas (census tracts that were less than 23.5 percent poor and 30 percent African American) and 75 low-poverty areas (less than 23.5 percent poor). Yet by 2010, only 26 families had moved to a low-poverty area, and just 4 had moved to an opportunity area.

Our interviews with CHA staff, service providers, and participants suggest several reasons for this low success rate. First was the extreme vulnerability of Demonstration participants; eight years into the Plan for Transformation, these families had not been able to make a permanent housing decision. Most were extremely long-term CHA residents (21 years on average at baseline); most had not conducted a true housing search in decades, if ever.

Second, the expedited closure of Madden/Wells limited the relocation counselor’s ability to work with those families. The households caught up in the emergency closure in 2008 received no enhanced services; as the relocation schedule was moved up for remaining residents, relocation counselors reported they did not have sufficient time to adequately educate residents about their full housing and neighborhood choices. As a senior HCP administrator noted, “Time is the most important…time is so critical.” Faced with a tight timeline, counselors focused on teaching residents the relocation basics—tenant’s rights, proper housekeeping, and lease-compliance rules—as opposed to providing residents with information about schools, jobs, and safety. One CHA administrator felt that HCP performed admirably in difficult circumstances, noted that HCP “handled the curveball of closing the entire Wells site very well.”

Third, resident preferences led them to choose neighborhoods similar to those they left. In many cases, families had lived in Madden/Wells or Dearborn for generations, with friends and family residing nearby. When faced with economic hardship, families used these close, firmly rooted social networks as a safety net. Residents reported that moving to a better neighborhood on the city’s North side, especially without access to a car, would have left them physically isolated from the networks on which they depend (and who depend on them). Also, many households saw the neighborhoods surrounding Madden/Wells and Dearborn as improving, and they wanted to remain to participate in, and benefit from, that process. In some cases, preferences for better housing amenities—more space, a single-family home, a yard—led residents to stay in high-poverty, but more affordable, communities. And some residents, perhaps because of their distrust of the CHA or disillusionment with case management, simply did not want to participate in relocation counseling.

Finally, the collaboration between Heartland and HCP did not sufficiently address
Residents' relocation needs. According to our stakeholder interviews, the initial relationship between HCP and Heartland "was a bit rocky" because each did not understand the other's role within the Demonstration. By professional mandate and financial incentive, but also by organizational culture, HCP's main goal was to help residents move to opportunity areas. Heartland's case managers addressed families' broader needs, and they often felt that a family's best relocation option was one that made it feel comfortable, not the opportunity neighborhoods advocated by HCP. Recognizing this disconnect, the Demonstration's organizers arranged for Heartland staff to sit in on an HCP workshop. This reduced, but did not eliminate, the stresses between the two agencies. Poor communication between the relocation and service providers sometimes created problems as well. And HCP's second mover counseling, intended to help participants make a more informed second move, was never fully implemented.

Implications
Many policymakers and scholars regard the HOPE VI Program as one of the most successful urban redevelopment programs in the history of the United States. But despite its accomplishments, the HOPE VI program's record in meeting the needs of the original residents is mixed. To help these residents attain greater self-sufficiency, a team of service providers and researchers created the Chicago Family Case Management Demonstration, which ran from March 2007 through March 2010. While the Demonstration successfully engaged vulnerable households, and many families saw employment gains and reduced anxiety, the relocation picture was mixed. Nevertheless, residents are universally living in much higher quality homes and apartments. And generally, they have moved to neighborhoods where they feel safer, have more connections with their neighbors, and report less physical and social disorder.

However, fewer residents received relocation services than case management and other services. As a result of this and several other factors—resident preferences, resident needs, a compressed relocation schedule, and program design—relatively few households made opportunity moves. By 2009, most were still living in neighborhoods that were high poverty and racially segregated.

What, then, should be done to help families living in and relocating from distressed public housing? We draw several lessons from our evaluation of the Demonstration's relocation efforts:

- **Invest in intensive relocation counseling.** Under the Demonstration, the intensity of services was not sufficient to help residents overcome longstanding barriers to opportunity moves. To see significant gains, public housing authorities need to provide long-term, high-touch services.

- **Relocation counseling needs to be integrated with other services.** Poor communication between the relocation and service providers creates problems. A more integrated approach, where one organization provides the full suite of services, may better serve residents. By working with clients for several years and meeting multiple times a month, case managers build the most rapport with residents. Rather than duplicating this process with another service provider, case managers should participate more directly in the relocation counseling. However provided, the relocation counseling should be based on a trusting relationship. But given the demands on a case manager's time, dedicated relocation staff may continue to benefit residents.

- **Provide relocation counselors ample time to work with residents prior to their move.** Relocation counselors need sufficient time to work with residents before they are scheduled to move. As one HCP staff member reported, relocation service providers need to start working with households even before they receive notice of a pending move. Early on, counselors need to help residents learn what opportunity areas are and demystify the process of moving to and living in these communities. Of course, residents may choose to stay in nearby and impoverished communities for good reasons, and counselors should respect and support these families' decisions.

- **Follow up with families to help them make second moves.** Similarly, relocation counselors (in conjunction with case managers) need to continue to follow up with families to help them make second moves, especially families living in a private-market apartment with a voucher. This point needs to be stressed, as families with vouchers have little opportunity to receive ongoing case management support.

- **Devote federal attention and funds to resident services.** Federal policy has a role to play in many of these considerations. With its Choice Neighborhoods initiative, the Obama administration has the opportunity to build on nearly two decades of experience with HOPE VI. The program's allowance of funds being allocated for services is promising. Similarly, funds will be needed for other relocation efforts, and the development of best practices is critical. Finally, additional work is needed to help voucher families access middle- and upper-income communities by allowing for higher voucher payments in more expensive communities. HUD is rolling out a trial of zip-code level adjustments to fair-market rents, which if targeted appropriately, may help families access these communities.
Notes

2. Parts of the discussion about the developments was drawn from Theodos et al. (2010).
3. By declaring an emergency move, the CHA obviated requirements in its Relocation Rights Contract with residents, which established that residents had 180 days to leave their homes after receiving a move notice.
4. We use community areas as proxies for neighborhoods. Community areas refer to the work of the Social Science Research Committee at University of Chicago, which has unofficially divided the city into 77 community areas. Community areas represent much larger areas than census tracts, of which there are 865 in Chicago.
5. We define violent crime as Part 1 Personal Crime, which includes homicide, aggravated assault, robbery, battery, and rape. These variables are measured in census tracts, not community areas.

References


Chicago Family Case Management Demonstration

The Chicago Family Case Management Demonstration was a partnership of the Urban Institute, the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA), Heartland Human Care Services, and Housing Choice Partners, intended to test the feasibility of providing wraparound supportive services for vulnerable public housing families. The demonstration ran from March 2007 to March 2010, targeting approximately 475 households from the CHA’s Dearborn Homes and Madden/Wells developments with intensive case-management services, transitional jobs, financial literacy training, and relocation counseling.

The Urban Institute evaluated the Chicago Family Case Management demonstration to inform implementation and track outcomes for participants over time. In spring 2007, we conducted a baseline resident survey (n = 331, response rate 77 percent). The survey asked about a range of domains, including housing and neighborhood conditions, service use, mental and physical health, employment and economic hardship, and children’s health and behavior. We conducted a follow-up survey (n = 287, response rate 90 percent) in summer 2009, approximately two years after the rollout of the demonstration. The largest source of attrition between 2007 and 2009 was mortality; we were able to locate, if not survey, nearly all original sample members.

To complement the survey, Urban Institute staff conducted 30 qualitative in-depth interviews (21 adults and 9 adolescents) with participants in summer 2008. We also gathered information from CHA administrative records and case manager reports, including whether residents chose to engage in the demonstration services, whether participants were referred for additional services, and their relocation history. In addition, we assembled secondary data on neighborhood poverty, unemployment, crime, race and other characteristics that we received from the Metro Chicago Information Center. Finally, we conducted a process study to assess the efficacy and cost of the demonstration’s implementation. We conducted in-depth qualitative interviews with case managers, project staff, relocation providers, and CHA administrators, monitored service implementation weekly, and met regularly with Heartland and Housing Choice Partners leadership and CHA staff. We also thoroughly analyzed the costs associated with the intensive services.

The principal investigator for the Chicago Family Case Management Demonstration is Susan J. Popkin, Ph.D., director of the Urban Institute’s Program on Neighborhoods and Youth Development. Funding for the demonstration was provided by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Annie E. Casey Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Partnership for New Communities, JPMorgan Chase, and the Chicago Housing Authority.

About the Authors

Brett Theodos is a research associate in the Urban Institute’s Metropolitan Housing and Communities Policy Center.

Joe Parilla is a research assistant in the Urban Institute’s Metropolitan Housing and Communities Policy Center.

The authors wish to thank the dedicated staff from the CHA, Heartland Human Care Services, and Housing Choice Partners, the many colleagues who have contributed to and commented on this research, and, most of all, the Demonstration participants, who have so generously shared their stories with us.

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