EVALUATION OF TARGET’S SAFE CITY INITIATIVE
IMPLEMENTING PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS TO ADDRESS CRIME IN RETAIL SETTINGS

NANCY G. LA VIGNE
COLLEEN OWENS
SAMANTHA S. HETRICK

This project was supported by Grant No. 2006-JF-CX-0021 awarded by the National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. Points of view in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice or the Urban Institute.
© 2009. The Urban Institute. All rights reserved.

Opinions expressed in this document are those of the authors, and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the National Institute of Justice, the Target Corporation, the Urban Institute, its trustees, or its funders.
Acknowledgments

This project would not have been possible without the support of Safe City partners in each of the study sites. We are particularly thankful to Ms. Karin Schmerler of the Chula Vista Police Department, Sergeant Eric Franz of the Cincinnati Police Department, Chief Douglas Holland of the Hyattsville Police Department, and Captain Mike Gillooly of the Tucson Police Department, all of whom served as the lead points of contact for this evaluation. All were extremely generous with their time, insights, data, and resources. In addition, staff from the Buffalo Police Department and the Sam Houston State University generously provided data for comparison analysis purposes.

We also thank the Target Corporation for being willing partners in this evaluation, especially Mr. Steve Persian, who until recently served as the national Safe City coordinator for Target. Both the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) and the Target Corporation contributed financial support for this evaluation. We appreciate the guidance of Ms. Winnie Reed, Chief of NIJ’s Crime Control and Prevention Resources Division, who has been a supportive and helpful grant monitor.

Several former Urban Institute staff contributed greatly to this project, including Mark Coggeshall, who planted the initial seeds that led to this evaluation effort; Michelle Scott, who provided a lead role in the comparison site selection and crime prevention guide development activities; Kevonne Small, who directed the field work associated with the process evaluation in Chula Vista and Cincinnati; and Tobi Palmer, who served as project director during the key period of our data collection efforts. We would also like to thank our NIJ peer reviewers, as well as Terry Dunworth, Hannah Dodd, and Pamela Lachman from the Urban Institute, for their careful review of this report.
Abstract

In 2006, the Urban Institute (UI) received a grant from the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), along with seed funding from the Target Corporation (Target), to engage in an action-research partnership to evaluate the implementation of Safe City. Launched by Target in 2003, Safe City is a crime prevention model that has been implemented in designated retail areas in jurisdictions across the United States. The model is characterized by frequent meetings and information-sharing among the police, Target, and neighboring retailers, along with enhanced technology, such as the use of radio networks enabling real-time communication among Safe City partners and the implementation of Closed-Circuit Televisions (CCTVs). The overall goal of Safe City is to combine the expertise, resources, and credibility of local law enforcement, retailers, community leaders, and civic organizations to increase safety in and around the designated Safe City area in each jurisdiction.

The UI evaluation of the Target Safe City program involved an evaluation of the program’s implementation in four jurisdictions: Cincinnati, Ohio; Chula Vista, California; Hyattsville, Maryland; and Tucson, Arizona. This research partnership also employed Situational Crime Prevention (SCP) principles to advance and expand the “Safe City” program in these sites, as well as to produce SCP guidebooks designed to inform the efforts of other community-based public-private crime prevention partnerships. The specific goals of this study were to:

1. Develop a logic model of Safe City and materials to guide the implementation of a data-driven, SCP approach to the program for dissemination to Safe City partners;

2. Select comparison sites for impact analysis purposes, matching on mall type, and retailer composition, crime volume, geographic location, and demographics of the surrounding area;

3. Collect pre- and post-intervention crime and survey data from Safe City partners and local police departments to describe Safe City processes, measure changes, and quantify impacts on crime; and

4. Analyze the effectiveness and net cost/benefit of the intervention.
These activities together served as the building blocks for a process and impact evaluation in two of the four sites, including a cost-benefit component, and a process evaluation in the remaining two sites. This mixed evaluation approach was necessary because the findings on implementation of the Safe City model varied significantly by study site, with Cincinnati and Chula Vista successfully implementing the full model, Hyattsville partially implementing the model, and Tucson terminating its program within the first year. Both Cincinnati and Chula Vista observed increases in perceptions of safety among businesses in designated Safe City areas, but other measures of success reported by businesses were less definitive. In addition, in both sites some statistically significant and cost-effective reductions in crime were identified, although Chula Vista’s reductions were limited to robberies and coincided with increases in property crimes and vandalism.

In synthesizing both the process and impact evaluation findings across sites, it appears that Cincinnati and Chula Vista were more successful due to a strong grounding in community policing and past experience engaging in partnerships between law enforcement and local businesses. These sites also conducted more thorough crime analyses, leading to a wide array of initiatives that included both technology and traditional crime prevention approaches. By comparison, both Hyattsville and Tucson selected their intervention – CCTV systems—in the absence of such analyses.

These findings suggest that the engagement of multiple stakeholders in a Safe City initiative must involve increased communication and authentic partnerships. They also underscore the importance of adhering to a problem-solving approach to crime prevention, whereby a thorough analysis of existing crime problems supports the identification of the underlying causes of those problems, guiding the development of effective responses. In the case of Safe City, the two jurisdictions that conducted problem analyses were able to develop and implement a wider array of complementary interventions, gaining support from businesses and community members along the way, increasing perceptions of safety in the designated Safe City areas, and achieving some (albeit limited) cost-effective reductions in crime.
# Table of Contents

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS................................................................................................................................. ii

ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................................... iii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................................................... 1

INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................................................. 10

CRIME IN SHOPPING AREAS ........................................................................................................................ 13

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS ............................................................................................................. 17

- Task 1: Select Evaluation Sites .................................................................................................................. 17
- Task 2: Develop Logic Model and SCP Materials ..................................................................................... 18
- Task 3: Select Comparison Sites ............................................................................................................... 19
- Task 4: Collect Baseline Data ................................................................................................................... 22
- Task 5: Collect Process and Post-Intervention Data ................................................................................ 22
- Task 6: Analyze Impact ............................................................................................................................ 23
- Task 7: Conduct Cost-Benefit Analysis .................................................................................................... 25

Methodology ................................................................................................................................................... 25

THE SAFE CITY LOGIC MODEL ................................................................................................................... 31

- Goals and Objectives .................................................................................................................................. 31
  - Identify Partners ........................................................................................................................................ 32
  - Engage Partners ....................................................................................................................................... 34
  - Identify and Implement Targeted Solutions ............................................................................................ 36
  - Manage the Initiative ............................................................................................................................... 37

WESTERN CORRIDOR SAFE CITY PROJECT, CINCINNATI, OHIO ................................................................ 39

- Background ................................................................................................................................................. 39
- Safe City Planning Activities ...................................................................................................................... 40
  - Identification of Focus Area .................................................................................................................... 40
  - Development of Mission and Goals ........................................................................................................ 42
  - Project Administration .............................................................................................................................. 43
- Pre-Implementation Activities: June–August 2006 ................................................................................ 43
- Safe City Implementation Phase: February 2007–August 2008 ............................................................... 44
- Summary of Planned and Actual Activities .............................................................................................. 46
- Process Evaluation Results ......................................................................................................................... 47
  - Safe City Partnership Activities ............................................................................................................. 47
  - Safe City Business Partners’ Perceptions ................................................................................................. 49
- Impact Analysis Results ............................................................................................................................. 61
  - Description of Cincinnati’s Safe City Evaluation Area ......................................................................... 62
  - Crime Trends Before and After Safe City Implementation ................................................................... 63
  - Statistical Analysis Results ...................................................................................................................... 65
- Cost-Benefit Analysis Findings .................................................................................................................. 68
  - Program Costs – Planning and Implementation Costs .......................................................................... 70
  - Cost of New Crime ................................................................................................................................... 73
- Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................... 75

CHULA VISTA SAFE CITY PROJECT, CHULA VISTA, CALIFORNIA ......................................................... 77

- Background ................................................................................................................................................ 77
- Structure of Chula Vista Safe City Case Study .......................................................................................... 78
- Safe City Planning Activities: May – October 2006 ................................................................................. 78
  - Identification of Focus Area ..................................................................................................................... 78
### APPENDICES

| Appendix A: | Safe City Logic Model |
| Appendix B: | Baseline and Follow-Up Business Survey Instruments |
| Appendix C: | Cost-Benefit Analysis Survey |
| Appendix D: | Cincinnati Western Corridor Safe City Logic Model |
| Appendix E: | Cincinnati Western Corridor Safe City Mall Security Survey and Business Training Documents |
| Appendix F: | Chula Vista Safe City Focus Area 5 Sub Areas |
| Appendix G: | Chula Vista Safe City Signs (English and Spanish) |
| Appendix H: | Chula Vista Daytime CPTED Report |
| Appendix I: | Chula Vista Nighttime CPTED Report |
| Appendix J: | Chula Vista Logic Model |
| Appendix K: | Hyattsville Logic Model |
| Appendix L: | Hyattsville CCTV Assessment Report (UNISYS) |
Executive Summary

In 2003, the Target Corporation (Target) partnered with the Minneapolis Police Department to tackle crime in a busy downtown area that was home to Target’s corporate headquarters. Drawing on a model employed in Northamptonshire, England, Target developed a crime prevention collaborative among the police, Target, and neighboring merchants. The success of this effort led Target to formalize its crime prevention model, naming the initiative “Safe City” and launching it in cities throughout the United States. In each city, a designated Safe City area was identified, typically characterized by a retail mall anchored by a Target retail store.

As envisioned by the Target asset protection staff who developed Safe City, the initiative was designed to increase information-sharing and surveillance capabilities among Safe City partners through the convening of frequent meetings and the use of technology, such as radio networks enabling real-time communication among merchants and the police or Closed-Circuit Televisions (CCTVs). Target staff in local Safe City initiatives plays the role of convener, bringing prospective partners together to introduce the concept. Upon the commitment of local law enforcement to implement Safe City, Target staff transfer ownership, enabling the police to lead the initiative and guide the activities of the program in partnership with retailers and civic partners. The overall goal of Safe City is to combine the expertise, experience, resources, and credibility of local law enforcement, retailers, community leaders, and civic organizations to increase safety in and around the designated Safe City area.

As originally conceptualized by its developers, the Safe City model clearly articulated the role that police, in partnership and communication with businesses and the community, could play in preventing crime in retail settings. It also described the potential value of employing technology, such as CCTV and radio link communications, to increase surveillance and enhance communications. The model was less developed, however, with regard to how Safe City partners (once convened) should identify and prioritize crime problems, analyze the nature of those problems, and develop prevention strategies that are guided by theory and prior research. These issues were identified by
Urban Institute (UI) staff members who, in 2005, were approached by Target to discuss the prospects of evaluating the initiative. A year later, the Urban Institute (UI) received a grant from the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), along with seed money from Target, to work in partnership with Target to enhance the Safe City model and conduct a process and impact evaluation of the initiative in four sites: Chula Vista, California; Cincinnati, Ohio; Hyattsville, Maryland; and Tucson, Arizona. This action-research partnership was designed to employ Situational Crime Prevention (SCP) principles to advance and expand the Safe City program in these sites, as well as to produce SCP guidebooks to inform the efforts of other community-based public-private crime prevention partnerships. The specific goals of this study were to:

1. Develop a logic model of Safe City and materials to guide the implementation of a data-driven, SCP approach to the program for dissemination to Safe City partners;

2. Select comparison sites for impact analysis purposes, matching on mall type, retailer composition, crime volume, geographic location, and demographics of the surrounding area;

3. Collect pre- and post-intervention crime and survey data from Safe City partners and local police departments to describe Safe City processes, measure changes, and quantify impacts on crime; and

4. Analyze the effectiveness and net cost/benefit of the interventions.

These activities together served as the building blocks for a process, impact, and cost-benefit analysis evaluation in two of the four sites, and a process evaluation in the other two sites. The findings from those evaluation efforts are detailed below.

**PROCESS EVALUATION FINDINGS**

The process evaluation documented the decisions each jurisdiction made in:
identifying the specific retail area that would be the focus of Safe City; examining the nature of existing crime problems in that area; convening police and business partners to discuss crime problems and develop solutions; and implementing specific crime prevention measures. Findings on implementation of the Safe City model varied significantly by study site, with Cincinnati and Chula Vista successfully implementing the model, Hyattsville partially implementing the model, and Tucson terminating the program within the first year.
Executive Summary

Cincinnati, Ohio

While Cincinnati’s long-term goal was the implementation of a vast network of CCTVs throughout the designated Safe City area (a goal that was not accomplished during the evaluation period), decision-makers focused on other, more immediate, strategies in addition to this goal. Approximately 300 businesses were trained in loss prevention, robbery prevention, and personal safety, and all businesses in the area were enrolled in an email-based crime alert program. In addition, increased foot patrols were dedicated to the Safe City area, aided by the purchase of two new Segways. Officers also conducted more than 150 Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) assessments, which resulted in businesses erecting fences, installing alarms and cameras, and conducting staff trainings on theft prevention.

Cincinnati Safe City partners identified an ambitiously large area for Safe City, spanning a major corridor that extended four miles in length and included retail, residential, and public use areas, including several private and public schools. Despite this large area and the diverse set of partners that were drawn from it, Safe City stakeholders had a shared vision of the initiative. They focused on proactive measures to implement crime prevention strategies and increase communication, both with each other and with local law enforcement, in the interest of coordinating efforts. While engaging the public schools as partners was cited as a challenge, project participants viewed the overall initiative as a success, referencing pre-existing relationships and high levels of trust as positive factors in helping Safe City get off of the ground and complete many project goals.

Chula Vista, California

Chula Vista identified a large strip mall troubled by panhandlers, day laborers, and transients as its Safe City area. The main interventions consisted of a series of CPTED walkthroughs and associated changes in landscaping and lighting; the posting of Safe City and anti-panhandling signage; and extensive research on the nature of the day laborer problem and strategies to address it. Similar to Cincinnati, Chula Vista already had a strong history of partnerships between police, businesses, and other community representatives when Safe City was launched. The police department’s longstanding
commitment to community policing made the concept of Safe City an easy sell to patrol officers, many of whom chose to work on the project based on a personal and professional interest in doing more community crime prevention work.

For the most part, Chula Vista’s Safe City activities were focused on gaining a better understanding of the nature and underlying causes of the crime and disorder problems occurring in the designated Safe City area. The initiative was also designed to strengthen pre-existing partnerships between law enforcement and businesses affected by these problems. Safe City was particularly effective in improving communication. Partners characterized their pre-Safe City communications with each other as nonexistent, minimal, or even adversarial. As a result of participating in Safe City meetings, however, partners reported improved communication and relationships among the stakeholders and an unprecedented level of partnership. Specifically, partners felt that Safe City activities led to an increased awareness of how retailers can assist with crime prevention, take more proactive approaches to community safety, and leverage resources more effectively.

Chula Vista’s main challenge was characterized by frustrations on the part of some partners at the slow pace at which solutions were implemented. Some conjectured that if they had been able to accomplish some early successes, they might have increased support for the project. In addition, justice partners and some retailers found it difficult to motivate certain retailers to participate, especially those retailers who viewed public safety as outside the scope of their jobs. Finally, in retrospect, partners observed that the initiative may have been more successful had they chosen to focus on one or two crime problems rather than addressing multiple issues and spreading their resources so thinly.

Hyattsville, Maryland

Like Cincinnati, Hyattsville Safe City partners were focused on the procurement and implementation of CCTV in the designated Safe City area. Unfortunately, attempts to raise funds for CCTV were largely unsuccessful. Moreover, with so much time and effort dedicated to that single goal, only a few other interventions were implemented; most of these were outside the span of the designated Safe City evaluation period. Two Segways were purchased for the project, and plans for additional bike patrols and a web-based business alert system were underway in late 2008. Nonetheless, the inability of the city to
raise funds for CCTV brought the project to a standstill for many months. This delay, coupled with the fact that few efforts were made to engage with prospective retail or community partners on non-CCTV aspects of the Safe City initiative, rendered the project unsuitable for the impact evaluation.

**Tucson, Arizona**

Tucson’s efforts also focused solely on the goal of implementing CCTV. That goal was identified in the absence of conversations with members of the city council, which resulted in the police department’s inability to obtain the necessary buy-in for what could have been a larger Safe City initiative involving other crime prevention interventions. Instead, opposition to CCTV by particularly vocal members of the city council resulted in the early termination of the Safe City initiative.

**IMPACT AND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSES**

The results of impact analyses for the two sites that successfully implemented Safe City, Cincinnati and Chula Vista, rely on three categories of data collection: (1) Pre- and post-intervention surveys of businesses; (2) Difference-in-Differences (DiD) analyses of pre- and post-intervention reported crimes in each Safe City area and a matched comparison area; and (3) The documentation and collection of data on the costs of Safe City planning and implementation and on the costs of crimes that may have been prevented due to the intervention.

**Cincinnati Results**

Survey findings indicate that Safe City achieved some of its stated goals. Respondents reported increased communications among businesses and law enforcement, indicated a greater tendency to report victimizations, and felt that the area was safer after the implementation of the Safe City initiative. While businesses indicated a lack of awareness of the Safe City initiative by name, they were keenly aware of law enforcement partnerships with businesses to prevent crime. These findings were supported by the impact analysis, which compared pre- and post-intervention reported crime data: total crime was reduced significantly, with 5 fewer crime events per month.
Executive Summary

and no evidence of geographic displacement. Results of the cost-benefit analysis indicated that, because the cost of the intervention was relatively low, the savings to society associated with preventing just a few crimes each month far outweighed the costs associated with those prevention efforts. The estimated cost of the Safe City intervention in Cincinnati over the 20-month evaluation period was $221,093, and a very conservative cost estimate of the crimes prevented by the initiative is $752,197, resulting in savings of three dollars for each dollar spent on Safe City. However, attributing these findings specifically to Safe City may be questionable, as Cincinnati had been engaged in crime prevention efforts in the study area prior to the initiation of the Safe City partnership.

Overall, during the time period of this evaluation, the Safe City effort in Cincinnati can be viewed as a modest success. Findings from interviews with Safe City stakeholders suggest that a large measure of this success stems from Cincinnati’s long history of community efforts to address crime in partnership with the police. These pre-existing relationships were likely critical in building trust, increasing communications among stakeholders, and yielding reductions in crime and increased perceptions of safety. Indeed, the fact that Cincinnati had engaged in several previous crime prevention initiatives meant that Safe City partners already possessed in-depth knowledge of the crime and disorder issues, enabling them to hit the ground running with Safe City. However, relationships alone were not enough to generate the support and funds necessary to implement the ambitious CCTV system Safe City leaders had envisioned within the evaluation project period, which spanned over three years in duration. It is important to acknowledge that the Safe City initiative in Cincinnati is still underway, making these impact analysis findings perhaps premature in light of the fact that the city remains dedicated to launching a widespread public surveillance system throughout the Safe City area.

Chula Vista Results

Chula Vista invested heavily in CPTED activities, conducting both daytime and evening walkthroughs of the site and making many recommendations to businesses for improvements in lighting and landscaping. Several of these recommendations were implemented and appear to have yielded benefits, based on reductions in businesses’
Executive Summary

Concerns about crime, increases in their perceptions of safety, and decreases in the amount of trash around businesses. However, the main crime problems the Safe City partners attempted to address – unwanted persons and auto thefts – were not reduced by the initiative, as measured by both pre- and post-implementation surveys of businesses as well as DiD impact analysis of reported crimes. The lone exception stemming from the DiD analysis of reported crimes was a significant (although marginal) reduction in robberies. Examining a reduction in robberies alone, a cost-benefit analysis of Safe City indicates a net savings. Unfortunately, because property damage and property crimes occurring in the designated Safe City area increased significantly between pre- and post-intervention periods, a cost-benefit analysis of all significant crime changes concluded that the costs of the initiative outweighed the benefits. This conclusion, however, assumes a causal relationship between Safe City and property damage and property crimes, which is not a theoretically compelling argument. A more likely explanation for the increase in these crimes is the fact that Chula Vista had experienced a significant reduction in crime in the months leading up to the Safe City initiative; given that the initiative began when the crime level was unusually low, any subsequent uptick in crime was likely the result of a regression to the mean. Indeed, further analysis employing an extended intervention and post-intervention period yielded significant reductions in total crime, robbery, motor vehicle theft, and violent crime categories. While these analyses are promising, the lack of any comparison site suggests that they should be viewed with cautious optimism.

CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

In synthesizing both process and impact evaluation findings across sites, it appears that Chula Vista and Cincinnati were more successful than Hyattsville and Tucson because of a strong grounding in community policing and past experiences engaging in partnerships between law enforcement and local businesses. These sites also saw beyond the promise of CCTV technology, drawing from crime prevention initiatives that included both technology and traditional problem-solving, such as the use of CPTED measures. Chula Vista, however, was the only site that adhered to the Situational Crime Prevention (SCP) model in developing its interventions, focusing on developing crime
specific strategies aimed at increasing the effort and risk associated with crime. Cincinnati’s approach resembled a community crime prevention initiative, targeting all types of crimes and yielding significant benefits in cost-effective crime reductions.

By comparison, both Hyattsville and Tucson overlooked the importance of developing a thorough understanding of the nature of their public safety problems and of identifying responses that were directly related to those problems. Both sites identified the response (cameras) in the absence of such an analysis. While it is possible that a thorough problem analysis may have pointed to CCTV as an appropriate response, such an analysis would have also generated other responses, including more affordable, non-technological ones. This would have provided the sites with an opportunity to move forward with some components of the Safe City initiative, demonstrating the collaborative’s responsiveness to community input and highlighting some of the early wins in crime reduction that these efforts might well have produced.

These findings have important implications for other jurisdictions interested in adopting the Safe City model. First and foremost, while the initiative should be led by local law enforcement, it cannot be dictated by it. Police agencies spearheading a Safe City initiative should engage businesses, residents, and local elected officials prior to identifying specific interventions. This is particularly important if the intervention is as controversial as CCTV, which often threatens those concerned about encroachments on civil liberties. The engagement of multiple stakeholders in a Safe City initiative must therefore involve increased communications and authentic partnerships that elicit the necessary buy in.

This evaluation also underscores the importance of adhering to a problem-solving approach to crime prevention, whereby a thorough analysis of existing crime problems supports the identification of the underlying causes of those problems, guiding the development of effective responses. In the case of Safe City, the two jurisdictions that conducted problem analyses were able to develop and implement a wider array of complementary interventions, gaining support from businesses and community members along the way.

From a research perspective, the evaluation results presented in this report point to the validity of theories of police-community partnerships, by which strong partnerships yield
effective interventions. In the case of Chula Vista, these findings also emphasize the value of engaging in a problem-solving process that is grounded in SCP theory, guiding the development of responses through a careful analysis of ways in which to increase the effort and risk and reduce the rewards of committing crime. Finally, from an action-research perspective, this evaluation highlights the challenges of evaluating real-world initiatives that far too often become derailed by politics and resource constraints.
Chapter 1

Introduction

In 2003, the Target Corporation (Target) partnered with the Minneapolis Police Department to tackle crime in a busy downtown area that was home to Target’s corporate headquarters. Drawing on a model employed in Northamptonshire, England, Target developed a crime prevention collaborative among the police, Target, and neighboring merchants. The partnership was characterized by frequent meetings and information-sharing among Safe City partners, enhanced by a radio network enabling real-time communication among merchants and the police, along with the implementation of 29 Closed-Circuit Televisions (CCTVs) directly linked to the Minneapolis Police Department. The success of this pilot, as measured by a 41 percent reduction in crime in the precinct in which Safe City is located, led Target to launch Safe City in retail sites (typically open-air shopping malls) throughout the United States (Bridges 2006).

Safe City is a unique model in that Target aims to bring prospective partners together to introduce the concept and then quickly transfers leadership and ownership of the program to local law enforcement to drive the activities of the program, in partnership with the local retailers and civic partners. The program builds upon participating merchants’ existing asset protection resources. It encourages the exchange of information among neighboring merchants and the police, as well as joint efforts to prevent crime and increase the likelihood of apprehending offenders. The goal is to combine the expertise, experience, resources, and credibility of local law enforcement, retailers, community leaders, and civic organizations to increase safety in and around the community. Safe City also aims to engage community leaders, civic associations, and elected officials to build public awareness and support for the program. An optional component of Safe City is the use of technologies such as CCTVs, radio communications, and call boxes to enhance the ability of Safe City partners to effectively increase customer and staff safety and provide a visible sense of security for shoppers in the area. Success of the program is measured through retail crime frequency and severity, shopper satisfaction ratings of
safety, and local crime rates.

As originally conceptualized by its developers, the Safe City model clearly articulated the role that police, in partnership and communication with businesses and the community, could play in preventing crime in retail settings. It also described the potential value of employing technology, such as CCTV and radio link communications, to increase surveillance and enhance communications. The model was less developed, however, with regard to how Safe City partners, once convened, should identify and prioritize crime problems, analyze the nature of those problems, and develop prevention strategies that are guided by theory and prior research and will thus be more effective at reducing crime.

In 2006, the Urban Institute (UI) received a grant from the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) to work in partnership with Target to refine the Safe City model, to enhance the problem-solving components of the model, and to conduct a process and impact evaluation of the model in four Safe City sites. This research partnership employs Situational Crime Prevention (SCP) principles to advance and expand the Safe City program in these sites, as well as to produce guidebooks that can inform the efforts of other community-based public/private crime prevention partnerships. The specific goals of the study were to:

1. Develop a logic model of Safe City and materials to guide the implementation of a data-driven, SCP approach to the program for dissemination to Safe City partners;

2. Select comparison sites for impact analysis purposes, matching on mall type and retailer composition, crime volume, geographic location, and demographics of the surrounding area;

3. Collect pre- and post-intervention crime and survey data from Safe City partners and local police departments to describe Safe City processes, measure changes, and quantify impacts on crime;

4. Analyze the effectiveness and net cost/benefits of the interventions through interrupted time series and cost-benefit analyses; and

5. Disseminate findings through a final report and articles in both professional and academic journals.
This report provides a detailed description of these evaluation activities and findings. It begins with a review of the literature and underlying theories behind the Safe City model and then offers a detailed logic model of the various Safe City activities, along with an explanation of how program developers anticipated those activities would lead to intended outcomes (e.g., reduced crime). We then turn to a description of the research design employed, along with profiles of each of the four Safe City evaluation sites. Each site is presented in this evaluation as a case study. Information is provided on the nature of the Safe City activities employed and a timeline for implementation, an analysis of surveys of Safe City partners before and after implementation, and analyses of the impact of the Safe City program on crime. The report concludes with a synthesis of lessons learned across the four evaluation sites, summarizing recommendations for other jurisdictions that may be interested in adopting the Safe City model.
Chapter 2

Crime in Shopping Areas

Shopping malls present a variety of opportunities for crime. Crimes occurring in shopping malls vary in part by the design and composition of the mall environment, as well as the populations who use it (Geason and Wilson 1992). Mall designs can take a variety of forms: they may be small or large, covered or uncovered, one- or multi-storied, with exposed or undercover parking or no parking at all (Geason and Wilson 1992). Despite these variations in setting, malls share a common reliance on the purchasing power of shoppers to stay in business. Increasing the number of shoppers typically increases profits, but more people, cars, and merchandise also may attract crime (Brantingham, Brantingham and Wong 1990; Geason and Wilson 1992).

Crimes occurring in and around malls include: burglary, robbery, shoplifting, theft of and from autos, vandalism, nuisance behavior, and violence to persons (The Cooperative Movement 2004). Many factors have been identified as generating these crimes, including those identified by Geason and Wilson (1992):

- The open design of most shopping malls may make crime targets more accessible;
- Poor or ineffective lighting can create places for offenders to hide and/or escape detection; and
- Increased accessibility to malls through public transportation and close proximity to housing units near malls creates crime opportunities for offenders.

Malls may also have ineffective “place managers” – business owners, managers, and employees – resulting in low guardianship of available targets and negative impacts on overall levels of safety (Eck and Weisburd 1995). Other researchers have noted that shoppers can be easily distracted and leave personal belongings such as purses or packages unattended (Poyner and Webb 1987). Moreover, both shopping malls and their parking facilities are difficult to secure because, by definition, they are open to the public,
and offenders are not likely to be noted as unusual in such settings (Smith 1996). This is particularly relevant to car crime, in that shopping mall parking lots provide a large selection of targets that are often left unattended for long periods of time (Plouffe and Sampson 2004). In some areas, malls and shopping centers experience motor vehicle theft rates fifteen to forty times that of next highest type of commercial entity (Kinney et al. 2008).

The problem of crimes occurring in retail settings in general, and specifically those occurring in shopping malls, is understudied in the United States, but research in Australia and the United Kingdom suggests that SCP measures can be effective (Geason and Wilson 1992; Poyner and Webb 1987; Welsh and Farrington 2003). SCP is supported by rational choice and opportunity theories of crime that purport that criminals engage in rational (if bounded) decision-making (Becker 1968; Cornish and Clarke 1986) and that environmental characteristics offer cues to the offender that promising opportunities for crime exist (Brantingham and Brantingham 1978, 1981; Cohen and Felson 1979; Harries 1980; Newman 1972; Wilson and Kelling 1982).

The practical implications of these theories are that while criminals are motivated, they may nonetheless be deterred from committing crime if they perceive a potential target to be: (1) too risky; (2) involve too much effort; (3) yield too meager a profit; or (4) induce too much guilt or shame to make the venture worthwhile (Clarke 1992, 1997; Clarke and Homel 1997). These are the basic tenets of SCP.

SCP strategies can be implemented to reduce many of the opportunities for crime that malls present, including: burglary, vandalism, shoplifting, and car crimes (Geason and Wilson 1992). Plouffe and Sampson (2004), for example, note that car thefts can be reduced by minimizing, securing, or blocking off vulnerable areas and adding locks or installing effective loading dock doors, as well as by using ticketing-triggered gates in parking areas and staffed exit points to prevent auto thefts. Multi-level parking facilities’ design, especially attractive for urban areas that have limited open space, also increases the difficulty of vehicle theft because it takes additional time to exit the premises (Mayhew and Braun 2004). In addition to these access control measures, increased surveillance has been found to reduce retail crime and can be achieved through: staffed and patrolled parking lots (Plouffe and Sampson 2004); formal and organized
surveillance through technologies such as CCTV (Brantingham and Brantingham 1981; Geason and Wilson 1992; Plouffe and Sampson 2004; Welsh and Farrington 2003); environmental design to enable more natural surveillance by those who work and live near shopping malls (Poyner and Webb 1987); and radio communications, such as Radio Link systems in conjunction with CCTV, to enable joint staff and police responses to crimes in progress (Wright and Gibson 1995; Wright 2000). Use of bicycle patrols and the presence of police substations in malls may also help to prevent crime (Hollinger and Dabney 1994; National Crime Prevention Council 1995). Proper balancing of costs and benefits of implementing environmental design changes must be weighed at each step, however. For example, while installing staffed booths or automated pay tellers before gaining exit from a garage might reduce auto thefts, the concentration of money in a fixed point could result in an increase of robberies (Mayhew and Braun 2004).

Experts believe that SCP can be an important tool for businesses because of its ability to reduce the impact of crime on businesses relatively quickly and at a reasonable cost (Burrows 1997; Felson and Clarke 1997). However, crimes against businesses not only affect the business but also the community at large (Hollinger 1997; Home Office 2006; Van Dijk 1997,). Shopping malls attract primarily property crime; however the presence of violent crime in an area tends to repel shoppers and additional retail development (Bowes 2007). Increased visibility of officer and security personnel reduces businesses’ and residents’ fears of crime and disorder, while it increases their perceptions of safety in the business and residential communities (Jim et al. 2006). This community impact suggests that local stakeholders, including law enforcement and shopping mall managers, have an incentive to partner to reduce crime. Such public-private partnerships between law enforcement and managers are an example of “third-party policing.” Third-party policing is the involvement of non-offending third parties (usually place managers) to prevent crime and disorder through regulating behavior at the places they control (Buerger 1998; Buerger and Mazerolle 1998; Eck and Weisburd 1995; Mazerolle and Ransley 2002). Third-party policing relies on the involvement of those who own or manage places where crime occurs, often over a period of time (Buerger 1998). Blurring the boundaries of private security and public law enforcement is a necessary step due to the finite resources of each. Most communities cannot support constant police presence in
retail centers, and many private security personnel lack the skills and knowledge that law enforcement officers acquire through policing. The movement of retired police to private security helps bridge this impediment (Davis et al. 2006). Utilizing third-party policing as a prevention measure is seen as the most logical approach to collaboration because it minimizes harm, has the least possible drain on public resources, and makes the shared responsibility of crime prevention tangible (Buerger 1998).

This literature on the criminal opportunities mall environments create, combined with the existing body of knowledge of the wide array of SCP measures that may be effective in reducing such opportunities, underscores the value of developing new and more effective approaches to preventing crimes in shopping malls. The community, residents, shoppers, law enforcement, and retail employees expect shopping malls to be safe places in which to shop, work, and recreate.

Retailers, mall managers, and real estate developers have been increasingly spending more of their operating budgets on security with the intent to make shopping centers safe places (Geason and Wilson 1992). SCP, in combination with third-party policing, holds tremendous promise as a means of spending that money in a cost-effective manner to reduce crime in and around shopping malls. Currently, applications of SCP approaches to prevent mall crime in the U.S. are rare and merit further exploration. Even scarcer are examples of action-research partnerships that involve researchers, place managers, and police to address crime at shopping malls.

The UI evaluation of Safe City is designed to build knowledge about what works in preventing crimes in and around shopping malls. Below is a description of the research methods used to achieve this aim, followed by a logic model of Safe City developed to guide the implementation of a data-driven, SCP approach to the program for dissemination to Safe City partners.
Chapter 3

Research Design and Methods

In brief, the research methodology for this multi-site crime prevention evaluation consisted of seven main tasks (described in greater detail below):

- Task 1: Select evaluation sites;
- Task 2: Develop a logic model and review Safe City program materials;
- Task 3: Select comparison sites;
- Task 4: Collect baseline data;
- Task 5: Collect process and post-intervention data;
- Task 6: Analyze impact on the intervention; and
- Task 7: Conduct cost-benefit analysis.

**Task 1: Select Evaluation Sites**

On March 16, 2006, UI staff traveled to Target headquarters in Minneapolis, MN, to take part in Target’s launching of the second phase of its Safe City project. This trip afforded UI staff the opportunity to meet Target’s local asset protection staff, learn more about the new sites, and develop relationships with the Target Safe City team. The meeting was a critical first step to UI’s engagement as an action-research partner with Target and the local sites and helped provide the context with which the UI research team began its site selection process for evaluation purposes.

At the time of the selection process, Target had 12 active Safe City sites across the country and another 5 that were just getting underway. Among these sites, UI staff employed several criteria in selecting those best suited for evaluation. Researchers began by requesting Target staff to identify a list of prospective sites based upon the degree to which they had a strong partnership with local law enforcement, the level of leadership and buy-in at the site, and their openness to being an evaluation site. Staff were also interested in examining sites that as a group were geographically diverse, represented
different types of retail environments, and had a diverse mix of crime problems. In addition, access to crime data from police departments working with each Safe City site was a contributing factor for site selection.

The final sites selected were Cincinnati, Ohio; Chula Vista, California; Hyattsville, Maryland; and Tucson, Arizona. At the time the evaluation commenced, Chula Vista and Cincinnati had recently begun their Safe City initiatives and the remaining two sites had been identified by Target but had not commenced projects formally. The selection of two existing sites and two new sites was desirable from an evaluation standpoint because prior experience indicated that partnerships often take a long time to develop. Thus, the inclusion of existing sites enabled UI evaluators to capitalize on pre-existing relationships and estimate the marginal value of applying a formal SCP framework and data-driven approach to their crime prevention efforts. These existing sites also allowed for a longer post-intervention follow-up period. The decision to select two new sites enabled UI to document the process of developing partnerships and to collect true pre-intervention survey data rather than doing so retrospectively, as was necessary with the existing sites.

In each site, the specific geographic area was determined by UI staff in close partnership with local Safe City partners. For evaluation purposes, UI recommended that the Cincinnati Safe City area be confined to the northwest part of the corridor in the Westwood neighborhood (to include the Target mall). Similarly, UI recommended identifying two business areas, the 3rd Street and the downtown areas, in Tucson. Hyattsville focused its crime prevention efforts on the Prince George’s Plaza Mall, and Chula Vista identified a strip mall anchored by a Target retail store as its Safe City area.

**TASK 2: DEVELOP LOGIC MODEL AND SCP MATERIALS**

The UI evaluation of the Safe City programs in Cincinnati, Ohio, Chula Vista, California, Hyattsville, Maryland and Tucson, Arizona officially began on October 1, 2006. UI commenced its work by developing a logic model describing the nature of the Safe City program and what its intended outcomes are, linking that model to SCP theory and prior research (see Appendix A). To develop the program logic model, evaluators reviewed the program data to distill the core features of the program, including outputs (changes the program attempted to implement), outcomes (in-program changes, such as
improved mall/police communications), impacts (longer-term changes, such as reductions in crime), antecedent variables (non-program factors, such as the characteristics of the mall environment that may have influenced the outputs, outcomes, and impacts), and mediating variables (conditions that modified the effects of outputs on outcomes and impacts). The logic model was subsequently revised based on additional information provided by program staff during site visits and interviews.

This task also involved the development of a series of data-driven guides to help Safe City partners ascertain what crime problems currently exist, prioritize which of those problems to address, identify the underlying causes of those problems, and implement and measure the results of SCP interventions in addressing those causes. Six Situational Crime Prevention (SCP) guides were developed by UI researchers in collaboration with SCP experts, Target, and NIJ on the following topics: retail burglary, car crime, panhandling, public disorder, vandalism, and shoplifting. The guides were disseminated to all Safe City sites participating in the evaluation and posted on Target’s Safe City website at the following hyperlink: Safe City Prevention Guides.\(^1\)

**TASK 3: SELECT COMPARISON SITES**

As part of our quasi-experimental outcome evaluation design, evaluators sought to control for potential history effects in the pre- and post-intervention analyses for each Safe City evaluation site by comparing trends in crimes\(^2\) for each Safe City site to a carefully matched comparison site that also houses a Target store. Comparing crime trends in the intervention and comparison sites enabled researchers to discern if the intervention was effective in preventing crime in the evaluation sites. The selection of comparison sites was coordinated with Target to identify matched sites based upon site type (i.e., enclosed mall, strip mall, or stand alone in retail area), crime volume, region, jurisdiction size and type, and local demographic data. UI staff began its selection of the four comparison sites by employing propensity score matching, using the characteristics

\(^1\) The URL is http://www.mysafecity.com/default.aspx/MenuItemID/386/MenuGroup/Safe+City.htm.
\(^2\) Our initial intent was to compare reported crimes, arrests, and calls for service but data access limitations resulted in variations in data comparison by site, leading us to focus solely on reported crimes.
of other Target stores and the areas immediately surrounding those stores. The goal was to identify stores that have similar characteristics to the stores involved in the Safe City evaluation. To qualify as a potential comparison site, the Target store in the site must have been open for the entire year of 2007 and the store could not be a former or planned Safe City site.

Given these parameters, UI staff used data provided by Target’s Asset Protection Division about each Target store as well as information about the communities in which Target stores were located throughout the country. These data are a subset of what Target uses in the selection of Safe City sites, and include store location, number of months each store was open in 2007, Capitalization (CAP) Index, and the number and average severity of incidents at each store. Because Target also considered other socio-demographic factors in site selection, UI researchers employed additional criteria, including: the number of retail establishments within 10 and 50 miles; the number of college graduates and college housing units in area; the number of households with income above $50,000 and below $25,000; median age; median household income within 1-mile radius; population density within one and three miles; the percent of population with English as the primary language; and median home value.

A member of the research team calculated propensity scores for each store based on variables that were anticipated to be influential in determining a store’s prevalence of crime; these serve as independent variables in logistic regression to calculate the scores. A dummy variable signifying whether a store is an evaluation site (1) or potential comparison site (0) served as the dependent variable. Logistic regression (in SAS v.9) was used to predict the likelihood of being a target site. UI staff employed a selection of different logistic regression procedures (stepwise, forward, and backward) and a variety of models with different combinations of predictors. Each result indicated that only one

---

3 Propensity scoring methods are often used to determine the impact of a program by comparing characteristics of program participants (treatment group) to individuals not participating (control group) but who are as similar to the treatment group as possible. Matching of propensity scores is also commonly used to select a comparison group from the control group that is most similar to the treatment group (Garrett 2005).
4 The CAP Index compiles crime statistics from police reports, FBI data, and corporate-incident loss reports. The model combines those statistics with neighborhood demographics and housing data to forecast losses at specific locations. The average CAP index across all Target store locations is 178.
5 All variables were modeled together, as was the CAP Index, percent of population with English as the primary language, and median home value.
variable, CAP Index, was statistically significant and therefore the best predictor of being an evaluation site. Given this, researchers based the comparison site selection on the original CAP Index values, rather than the propensity score calculations.

To assure the best matches, stores with similar CAP Index values were reviewed individually. In addition, information regarding the Target store retail environment was collected for these potential matches. This information included answers to the following questions:

- Is it a stand-alone store, located within an enclosed mall, or part of an open-air retail complex?
- How many other stores are in the same retail complex or mall?
- Is the store located in a largely commercial area or close to residential areas?
- Is there a strong relationship between the store and local law enforcement?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target Store Number</th>
<th>Target Store Name</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>CAP Index of Target Store</th>
<th>Target Store Type</th>
<th>Surrounding Area Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>204</td>
<td>Chula Vista North 4th</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>1.4757</td>
<td>Stand alone in retail area</td>
<td>Established older suburbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>858</td>
<td>Houston</td>
<td>TX</td>
<td>1.4557</td>
<td>Stand alone in retail area</td>
<td>Established older suburbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1093</td>
<td>Western Hills</td>
<td>OH</td>
<td>0.8472</td>
<td>Stand alone in retail area</td>
<td>Established older suburbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1013</td>
<td>Buffalo</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>0.8614</td>
<td>Stand alone in retail area</td>
<td>Established older suburbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1316</td>
<td>Tucson SW</td>
<td>AZ</td>
<td>1.5947</td>
<td>Strip mall</td>
<td>Growing new suburbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>265</td>
<td>Las Vegas Flamingo</td>
<td>NV</td>
<td>1.5840</td>
<td>Strip mall</td>
<td>Urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>Prince George's Plaza</td>
<td>MD</td>
<td>0.7688</td>
<td>Enclosed Mall</td>
<td>Established older suburbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>Glen Burnie North</td>
<td>MD</td>
<td>0.8560</td>
<td>Enclosed Mall</td>
<td>Established older suburbs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Evaluation sites are in bold.
Source: Target Corporation
The final evaluation/comparison site matches are presented in Table 3.1, along with corresponding characteristics of each specific Target store. Generally speaking, the stores are very similar in terms of crime index, store type, surrounding area, and relationship with law enforcement. However, it should be noted that the jurisdictions in which comparison sites are located could have different local economies and law enforcement strategies from those occurring in the treatment sites’ jurisdictions.

**Task 4: Collect Baseline Data**

As part of UI’s role in the evaluation, researchers sought to provide information to the evaluation sites on the nature of crimes occurring in the Safe City areas. Researchers therefore collected baseline data of historical calls-for-service, reported crime, and arrest data from each local police department and conducted a pre-intervention survey of Safe City partners. Between October and December 2006, baseline data regarding reported incidents were collected and analyzed for all four sites. Reports on baseline data were developed and shared with the sites to inform the development of their crime prevention interventions. The survey for local retailers and merchants (business survey) on their perceptions of crime and safety in and around their business areas was also designed and fielded. A copy of the business survey is attached in Appendix B. All four study sites were visited between February and April 2007. As described in each site’s case study, business survey data collection activities were completed for two sites (Cincinnati, OH and Chula Vista, CA), begun and halted for one site (Hyattsville, MD), and not collected for the last site (Tucson, AZ).

**Task 5: Collect Process and Post-Intervention Data**

The collection of process and post-intervention data consisted of: (1) program materials and electronically available data collected during site visits and by the on-site Target employees; (2) interviews with program staff on the nature of the Safe City partnership and any barriers to implementation; (3) pre- and post-intervention surveys with Safe City partners at each site; and (4) reported crime. In addition, we collected

---

6 Survey instruments differed slightly between evaluation sites, yielding slightly different data and making site by site comparisons infeasible for a few key measures.
reported crime, calls-for-service, and arrest data from police departments in comparison sites to coincide with the same pre- and post-intervention periods applied to the Safe City sites. All data on the activities associated with Safe City in each site were collected through May 2008. As such, this evaluation does not describe activities occurring after that date. It is important to note that the Cincinnati, Chula Vista, and Hyattsville sites all continue to engage in activities associated with Safe City.

Post-intervention Safe City partner surveys were conducted with the same businesses that completed the pre-intervention surveys. Semi-structured in-person interviews were also conducted with key Safe City staff to help further develop the program logic, assess program operations, identify barriers and facilitators to effective operations, and explore specific issues and lessons that stakeholders in other jurisdictions should be aware of if they are to successfully implement a Safe City program. In addition, evaluators posed questions about organizational, community, political, funding and other factors that may affect successful program operations to inform the transferability of Safe City.

UI conducted follow-up interviews with Safe City program staff during the post-intervention surveying of merchants and retailers during the Chula Vista site visit in February 2008 and the Cincinnati site visit in March 2008. A group interview with Hyattsville program staff was also conducted in June 2008.

**TASK 6: ANALYZE IMPACT**

The impact of the Safe City programs was assessed using general statistics to calculate mean changes before and after the initiative took place as well as more rigorous testing involving difference-in-differences analyses, which take into account displacement and controls for natural change by including comparison areas. For each impact site UI staff obtained address-level incident-based data for the designated Safe City geographic area. Incident-based data refers to crimes in which a police report was taken. The geographic area that was included in each evaluation is detailed in the site-specific sections that appear later in this report. In general, UI researchers conducted analyses on the treatment area that the UI staff, in conversation with Safe City leaders in each site, determined represented an appropriate evaluation area. These zones encompassed retail centers or strip malls and were approximately one-quarter-square-
mile areas. Since the goals of the initiative focused specifically on retail-related crime and public disorder occurring near retail facilities, theoretically UI researchers did not anticipate that a positive or negative impact of such a design would extend into any surrounding residential areas. In the case of residential burglary, for example, analyses of this kind would explore the possibility of a diffusion of benefits to the immediate area outside of the region receiving the treatment, and then just beyond that space, at roughly a half mile. An additional buffer or ring around the treatment area would then be used to measure whether the crime was displaced rather than reduced. In each of the Safe City sites retail areas were the focus of the interventions rather than residences. However, these retail areas were surrounded by residential areas, rendering exploration of a diffusion of benefits or displacement to fixed buffer areas untenable due to the fact the different types of crime and disorder problems occur in residential areas when compared to retail areas. Potential displacement areas were therefore selected from the nearest comparable retail location to the intervention site; these areas were located several city blocks away from the intervention sites. In addition to these displacement areas identified with each Safe City site’s jurisdiction, we also compared changes in crime in each jurisdiction to a matched comparison site in another jurisdiction that would likely have been selected as a Safe City site (see Comparison Site Selection description above).

Monthly crime counts were generated for each Safe City site and the corresponding comparison sites occurring before and after the intervention. Specifically, significant changes in average monthly crime counts were assessed within three areas: (1) the Safe City area; (2) a displacement zone; and (3) in a matched comparison area. Common crimes and related incidents committed in and around retail settings included: problem persons/activities, larceny, motor vehicle theft, and criminal damage/vandalism. The problem persons/activities category included: panhandling, public intoxication, disorderly conduct, begging, vagrancy, loitering, suspicious activities and persons, and trespassing. Larceny included petty theft, grand theft, shoplifting, and theft from motor vehicles. Criminal damage/vandalism included graffiti, arson, destruction of property, and tampering of property. Other top crimes committed in and around Safe City retail settings included: assault, burglary, and drug offenses. Each section details the results for the
categories that experienced significant reductions or increases in crime and are tailored toward the specific crime types of interest by that particular site.

As referenced previously, it is important to emphasize that for the purpose of this impact evaluation it was necessary to select an artificial end date for the Safe City initiative in each site. As such, neither the impact evaluation results nor the cost-benefit analysis described below take into account any longer-term benefits of crime reduction. These findings also do not describe the impact of interventions that Safe City partners implemented that fell outside of our designated intervention period.

**TASK 7: CONDUCT COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS**

The mission of the Safe City program is to maximize safety and reduce crime in communities by implementing a community-based, public-private partnership that is led by local law enforcement. The partnership employs real-time communication technologies and targeted preventive measures, including SCP techniques. As such, the total cost of implementing Safe City will vary by site depending on the activities and technologies undertaken, the amount of Target and community-based donations to the initiative, and the amount of in-kind labor donated by each site’s police department. The costs calculated here include the costs to the site of implementing the initiative and not the total cost to Target for implementing Safe City in each site and as a whole.

**Methodology**

Given the limited accomplishments of Tucson and Hyattsville during the evaluation period, only Chula Vista and Cincinnati were included in the cost-benefit analysis component of this evaluation. Cost data from these two sites were collected through administration of a cost-benefit survey (explained in more detail below) and the collection of reconciled budgets, when available.

The Safe City initiative in each site incurred two sets of costs—planning costs and implementation costs. Costs associated with planning were accrued over four-month time periods in each site. Implementation costs included expenditures for the implementation activities, administration, and management of the Safe City program which accrued over
an 18-month timeframe in each site. For the most part, planning costs include indirect costs while implementation costs include both direct and indirect costs. Direct costs include expenditures by each site on technical solutions and other crime prevention activities paid for by Target donations and other community donations allocated to Safe City. As will be detailed below, the total amount Target donated to Safe City varied by site, and included no restriction on use other than it had to be used for activities and solutions that kept with the Safe City program logic model. The cost of labor associated with the planning and implementation of Safe City in each site is categorized as an indirect cost since, with minimal exception, salaries were paid for by each respective police department and not through Target or community donations.

It is important to note that in each of the study sites, the costs incurred are likely underestimated. For example, both sites relied on volunteers quite heavily but we have not included associated costs (or cost savings) of volunteers in our calculations. Each police department relied on an intern in addition to their full-time and part-time salaried staff to help with the initiative. Also, community volunteers dedicated an incalculable amount of hours toward the implementation of Safe City in each site by attending monthly meetings, completing surveys, and participating in such events as robbery prevention training, CPTED walkthroughs, neighborhood watch, and other crime prevention activities. In addition, neither site had fully completed the intervention of their Safe City program during the intervention time period. Finally, we determined that it was not possible to measure costs incurred by individual businesses associated with Safe City, as the surveys conducted with businesses yielded little useful data in that regard. As a result of these factors, the assessment of the total cost of the Safe City intervention in each site was likely underestimated. Moreover, those estimates were only reported expenditures to-date rather than including planned expenditures representing future activities which may or may not have had an overall impact on the cost-benefit of the Safe City initiatives in each site.

---

7 It is important to note that while the intervention time period of the evaluation lasted 18 months, each site continued the intervention after the evaluation ended.

8 Some of the Safe City funding did go toward overtime labor in Cincinnati for some non-Safe City dedicated officers.
As shown in Appendix C, each site was provided with a 14-page survey designed to document the potential costs associated with the intervention. To ensure that this survey included all aspects of the program and to clarify what should be included in each category, in the Fall of 2008, researchers from the Urban Institute conducted several telephone interviews with the main law enforcement contact managing Safe City in both Cincinnati and Chula Vista. The strategy for distinguishing between which costs to include in each of the two categories, planning and implementation, was ultimately divided by the date in which the cost was accrued. The kick-off meeting was the established cutoff point where the planning ceased and the intervention began. Sites were asked to provide detailed information on: all donations received (both Target and community); meetings and crime and disorder prevention activities during both planning and implementation periods; staffing hours allocated to Safe City and fully loaded costs; type and number of CPTED solutions implemented and their respective costs; and the type and number of technical solutions implemented and their respective costs. Sites were also asked whether any programs were discontinued as a result of Safe City to ensure “business as usual” remained the same in the intervention area. In addition, UI researchers asked sites to share next steps for their Safe City programs, document challenges and lessons learned, and provide the UI research team with a reconciled budget if available.

As presented earlier in this report and in the Safe City Program Logic Model in Appendix A, Safe City is comprised of four major components: (1) identifying key partners and garnering support from local law enforcement; (2) engaging key partners and formalizing Safe City; (3) identifying and implementing targeted solutions; and (4) managing the Safe City program. For purposes of the cost-benefit analysis these components and their subcomponents are categorized as belonging to either the planning or implementation phase. Component one, identifying key partners and garnering support from local law enforcement includes the following subcomponents: (1) engage law enforcement partners; (2) assess the community; and (3) develop an inventory of partners. As noted in Figure 3.3 below, all of these activities are included in the planning phase. Component two, engaging key partners and garnering support from local law enforcement, includes three subcomponents: (1) coordinate pre-kick-off meeting; (2)
convene Safe City kick-off meeting; and (3) formalize Safe City. Coordination of the pre-kick-off meeting occurs during the planning phase. The kick-off meeting signifies the beginning of the implementation phase. During implementation, sites engage partners, work together to formalize Safe City, identify and implement targeted solutions, and manage the initiative.

Costs associated with the nine activities/components associated with the planning and implementation phases can be roughly categorized into direct and indirect costs. Costs associated with the planning phase are captured by labor costs incurred by the police departments in each site. Therefore, money spent during this phase did not come from Target or community donations. Costs associated with the implementation phase include both direct and indirect costs. During this phase, the sites spent their own money on labor and Safe City and community donations (both cash and in-kind) on the Safe City kick-off and implementation meetings, as well as the identification and implementation of CPTED solutions, technical solutions, and other crime and disorder prevention activities.

**Figure 3.3. Safe City Cost Allocation Categories**

Once the program costs were generated, the cost of new crime was calculated based on victimization costs, which accrue to the public in the form of estimated fear or change in behavior as a result of crime, costs associated with the criminal justice system, and the financial burden of investigation, arrest, prosecution, and incarceration costs. Estimates
of the cost of crime are based upon the framework and methodology employed in Roman et al. (2008), which was originally developed by Cohen (1998). We estimated the total cost of crime using the following formula:

\[ \text{Total Cost of Crime (CoC)} = V_{C_i} + C_{J_i} + C_{I_i} \]

Victim costs (VC) were obtained from Roman’s (2009) cost estimations based on historical jury awards, which included both tangible and intangible harm as a result of victimization. The criminal justice costs (CJ) were calculated based on arrest, pre-sentencing, and prosecution (CJ) and then adjusted for inflation over time. Data on the cost of arrest came from Roman, Woodard, and Riggs (1998). Pre-sentence costs consisted of pre-sentence detainment (Roman et al. 1998) and adjudication; this was calculated on a per minute basis for trial costs and then assumed a mean sentence length of 40 hours for rape, 10 hours for larceny and stolen property offenses, and 20 hours for all other offenses (Roman et al. 1998). Following sentencing, the incarceration costs\(^9\) (CI) were based on the probability of each type of sentence and the percentage of time served (Durose and Langan 2004) and to which facility such an offender would reside (state prisons: Stephan 2004; jails: Roman and Chalfin 2006). The subscript \(i\) denotes that the total cost was calculated for each type of crime.

---

\(^9\) These calculations were not adjusted for inflation because only the total expected cost of sentencing was provided by the authors. Therefore, the daily costs for prisons and jails could not be disentangled to allow for adjustment over time based on the year the data were calculated.
As shown in Table 3.4, the total cost of crime was calculated for each crime type that was readily available. The distribution of offenses and associated costs related to each are described in detail with the site-specific sections. It is important to note that the “dark figure of crime” was not accounted for in this analysis, as only crimes reported to police were used to generate the cost-benefit outcome. Therefore, our estimates are quite conservative and do not consider the crime that goes unreported.
Chapter 4

The Safe City Logic Model

The mission of the Safe City program is to maximize safety and reduce crime in communities by implementing a community-based, public-private partnership that is led by local law enforcement. The partnership employs real-time communications technologies and targeted preventive measures, including SCP techniques. The following information describes Safe City and the underlying logic behind the program’s components as well as specific strategies and activities used to implement Safe City. The Safe City logic model identifies core features of the Safe City program including the main inputs, outputs, and anticipated short and long-term outcomes.

GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

Safe City is a community-based safety program led by local law enforcement with the support of retail and community partners. The Target Corporation developed the Safe City model and promotes the implementation of the program in retail centers identified as public safety risks. Target, however, does not “own” Safe City. Rather, the Safe City model explicitly calls for local law enforcement officials to lead the program. Safe City has several broad goals, including:

- Reducing crime and creating safer communities;
- Increasing public perceptions of safety;
- Sustaining proactive and engaged Safe City partnerships;
- Encouraging community support for Safe City; and
- Increasing the number of retail sites involved with Safe City by demonstrating successful implementation in other communities.

More specific goals of Safe City are to:

- Strengthen the ability of law enforcement to lead local Safe City initiatives;
• Reduce crime by implementing situational crime prevention techniques, communications technologies, and other targeted solutions;
• Identify ways that Safe City partners can effectively identify, prioritize, analyze, and prevent crime;
• Increase collaboration among internal partners; and
• Create a formal infrastructure for partnerships with law enforcement, neighboring businesses, and community partners.

The implementation of Safe City has four major components: (1) identifying key partners and garnering support from local law enforcement; (2) engaging key partners and formalizing Safe City; (3) identifying and implementing targeted solutions; and (4) managing the Safe City program. The purpose of this section is to describe the logical relationship between these four components of Safe City and their expected short-term and long-term outcomes. Readers should refer to the logic model in Appendix A, which complements the description below.

**Identify Partners**

Crime negatively affects the viability of a community, including the ability of retail and other businesses in that community to thrive. The communities where Target stores are located are no exception. However, the Safe City model purports that any one Target store’s practices alone cannot feasibly reduce crime in the community. Rather, partners are needed to develop and sustain a comprehensive, effective, and viable crime prevention strategy. The most important partner for Safe City is local law enforcement, primarily because law enforcement: (1) is the most logical entity to lead the Safe City program, (2) has unique expertise in crime prevention methods, and (3) has access to useful crime data and crime reduction resources (patrol officers, radios, records of service calls/arrests, funds, surveillance towers, etc.). Therefore, the initial steps of Safe City are designed to introduce Safe City to law enforcement, gain their support, and transfer ownership of Safe City to them. In addition to establishing a relationship with law enforcement, the beginning stages needed to implement Safe City are characterized by assessing the community and establishing an inventory of partners.
Engage law enforcement partners. The backbone of Safe City is a strong partnership with law enforcement. Establishing a partnership with law enforcement involves: assessing the current and potential relationship with law enforcement; securing support for Safe City; setting expectations and limitations; identifying safety and crime statistics or challenges; understanding how community efforts will bring attention and results to the partnership; and identifying limitations on commitments and resources.

Assess the community. Once law enforcement commits to leading the Safe City effort, steps are taken to assess the community and develop an inventory of potential Safe City partners. Assessing the community involves: determining the community’s readiness to participate in the Safe City program; ensuring that Target team members are willing to act as “Safeness Ambassadors” (retail staff serving an employee surveillance role); identifying local issues that could affect Safe City (both positively and negatively); determining strategies to engage the community; and identifying existing crime prevention efforts into which Safe City could be integrated.

Develop an inventory of partners. According to the Safe City model, the next step is for Target asset protection staff to work with law enforcement to create an inventory of potential partners (e.g., mall managers, property owners/developers, other businesses and retailers, local service clubs, chambers, local government, etc.). It is anticipated that law enforcement will already have some type of relationship with potential partners or be aware of the businesses and civic organizations that should be invited to participate in Safe City. In addition, law enforcement and asset protection staff assess the loss prevention and safety efforts of key organizations and businesses within the Safe City area and their relationships with local law enforcement – even if they will not be participating in Safe City.
Expected Outcomes

The identification and engagement of Safe City partners is expected achieve the following results:

Short-term:

- Develop an awareness of community relations, persons, agencies, and local issues that could affect the success of Safe City;
- Develop an ability to engage law enforcement; and
- Develop an awareness of the role of law enforcement, retail, security, and community partners and identify the current status of their loss prevention and safety efforts, as well as their relationships with law enforcement.

Long-term:

- Forge strong, lasting relationships with law enforcement; and
- Shift ownership of Safe City to local law enforcement.

Engage Partners

Safe City initiators aim to engage the participants identified above early on in the planning process to ensure strong partnerships and a commitment to the Safe City program. In particular, relationships with law enforcement and mall management are forged to provide valuable leverage when Safe City is introduced to other partners.

Coordinate pre-kickoff meetings. Law enforcement participants extend an invitation to mall management to participate in the Safe City program. Mall management is introduced to Safe City through a series of pre-kickoff meetings. Pre-kickoff meetings also provide an opportunity to meet with key business and civic leaders from the Safe City site and the surrounding community in order to clarify the roles and expectations of law enforcement and other Safe City partners, to engage potential Safe City partners, and to generate support for the program.
Convene a Safe City Kick-Off meeting. Law enforcement participants send a letter inviting neighboring retailers, service or civic organizations and others to the kick-off meeting. Law enforcement leads the meeting and describes Safe City and its core principles. The goal is for law enforcement to secure a commitment from partners participating in Safe City by the end of the meeting.

Formalize Safe City. Law enforcement and other Safe City partners create a detailed action plan for Safe City. This plan incorporates ideas discussed at both the pre-kickoff and the kickoff meetings and identifies specific activities, roles, responsibilities, and interventions.

Expected Outcomes

The expected short- and long-term outcomes from partner engagement activities are to:

Short-term:

- Identify partners and confirm their support and involvement;
- Develop and understand Target’s role and the role of law enforcement;
- Identify ways to make Safe City a success;
- Develop relationships with partners;
- Identify priorities, specific projects, and activities needed to implement Safe City;
- Identify key partners’ roles and expectations; and
- Identify potential implementation challenges and develop strategies for managing those challenges.

Long-term:

- Develop a successful implementation plan (formalize Safe City); and
- Engage partners in the Safe City process.

---

10 It should be noted that, while the original Safe City initiative focused on areas anchored by Target retail stores, the model has since evolved to focus on areas identified by law enforcement as in need of additional public safety resources. This has resulted in a number of Safe City sites that no Target retail presence.
Identify and Implement Targeted Solutions

Targeted solutions are a critical component of the Safe City program. Safe City partners collaborate to identify crimes specific to the Safe City community, and then develop targeted solutions to reduce those crimes and create a safer community. Targeted solutions provide a focused response to crime and include situational crime prevention techniques (SCP), the use of Safeness Ambassadors, and information sharing between law enforcement and retailers. Specifically, these solutions are designed to reduce the rewards, increase the risk, remove excuses, and increase the efforts of crime as perceived by potential offenders. Strategies to accomplish this may include: use of two-way radios to help connect law enforcement with security and retail staff; strategic deployment of CCTVs and call boxes; and implementation of CPTED and other SCP measures. In addition, Safeness Ambassadors are employed to provide a visible presence of the Safe City program and increase employee surveillance in the Safe City area. Email communication and information sharing enables partners to share knowledge of potential crime risks and prevention strategies quickly and respond promptly.

Expected Outcomes

The expected short- and long-term outcomes from Safe City interventions are to:

Short-term:

- Identify crimes unique to the Safe City community;
- Increase perceived effort, increase perceived risk, and reduce anticipated rewards of those crimes;
- Improve real-time communication between security/retail staff/law enforcement regarding crime and crimes in progress;
- Increase reporting of crime;
- Increase police response to crime; and
- Increase swift apprehension of suspects.

Long-term:

- Reduce crime (shoplifting, burglary, auto theft/theft from auto, vandalism/nuisance behavior, robbery and assault);
• Increase perception of safety among patrons;
• Increase citizen satisfaction with both local law enforcement and mall security;
• Increase satisfaction among retailers with police reporting and responsiveness;
• Increase revenue/sales volume among retailers; and
• Increase awareness of Safe City, including recent success and progress of the program.

Manage the Initiative

Once Safe City is implemented, the goal is for the program to become part of “business as usual.” This is accomplished by establishing the framework for a partnership management structure, including possibly creating task-specific or specialized committees based on need. A Safe City Committee serves as the central organizational structure that manages the broad range of partners, resources, and responsibilities of Safe City. Committee members are charged with coordinating, recording, tracking and communicating with the rest of the Safe City partners and are responsible for the broad ongoing functions of the program. Task-specific subcommittees are also developed in order to maximize the special expertise of the partners and to focus on a variety of different work categories (e.g., crime trend committee, targeted solutions committee, community relations committee).

Management of Safe City also includes: (1) establishing a consistent and predictable meeting schedule to ensure commitment and participation in Safe City; (2) determining the communication methods to be employed by Safe City partners, such as Safe City committee meetings, newsletters, Safe City events, MySafeCity.com, as well as more informal modes of communication such as email, phone calls, one-on-one meetings and day-to-day contact; and (3) discussing marketing of Safe City including the Safe City toolkit developed by Target. The Safe City toolkit contains informational and promotional materials such as brochures, window clings, Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) books, pens, posters, and table tents.
Expected Outcomes

The expected short- and long-term outcomes of these management activities are to:

Short-term:

- Identify targeted solutions to facilitate the Safe City project;
- Increase stakeholders’ buy-in to Safe City and the number of key stakeholders; committed to becoming a partner in Safe City; and
- Identify broad long-term planning of future Safe City projects, potential challenges, and opportunities.

Long-term:

- Improve retail security;
- Strengthen coordination of public/private community safety programs;
- Increase perception of safety among patrons;
- Decrease local crime rates;
- Decrease retail crime frequency and increased safety;
- Support successful implementation of Safe City; and
- Increase number of Target communities involved in Safe City.

The logic model described above is critical in guiding the evaluation’s efforts to document the degree to which Safe City activities in each site are consistent with program develop, as well as whether those activities are achieving their intended impact. We now turn to the case studies of each evaluation site.
Chapter 5

Western Corridor Safe City Project, Cincinnati, Ohio

BACKGROUND

Cincinnati, Ohio is an urban city with a population of 332,458, making it the third largest city in Ohio. According to the most recent U.S. Census figures, approximately 77 percent of the population is 18 years or over, with a median age of 34.9 years. Fifty percent of the population identifies as white, and 44 percent identifies as black or African American. Approximately 15 percent identifies as Hispanic or Latino (of any race). The median family income is $41,832 (which is below the national average of $58,526). Twenty-three percent of families are below the poverty line, about double the nationwide average of 9.8 percent.11

In 2006, the year that Cincinnati launched its Safe City program, serious crimes were declining after an all-time high in 2002, but the city was still experiencing rates of violent and property crimes that exceeded the average for cities its size.12 For example, the city experienced 85 homicides, 2,329 robberies, and close to 14,000 Part I larcenies in 2006 alone.13 The largest share of these serious crimes occurred in District Three, one of Cincinnati’s five police districts and the focus of the Safe City program. District Three, which serves the western side of Cincinnati and covers approximately 20 square miles, has 95,000 residents and 14 neighborhoods. One hundred fifty-one sworn officers and 5 civilians patrol the District. In addition, three volunteer Citizens on Patrol groups patrol the District Three neighborhoods of Price Hill, Westwood and Saylor Park.14

This case study of the Cincinnati Safe City program begins with a narrative describing the timeline of Safe City activities and then turns to a summary of the goals

and objectives identified by Safe City partners and a discussion of the extent to which the project activities designed to accomplish these goals were completed and achieved the desired effects. The results of a pre- and post-crime and disorder survey of businesses located in and around the Safe City area will then be presented, followed by the results of the impact analyses employing T-tests and Difference-in-Differences analyses to assess Safe City’s impact on reported crime. These analyses are complemented by a section describing qualitative findings derived from one-on-one interviews with Safe City stakeholders. The case study concludes with a summary of the findings and implications across these data collection and analysis activities.

**SAFE CITY PLANNING ACTIVITIES**

The Cincinnati Police Department (CPD) reached out to Target in January 2005 through the Citizen Observer Alert Network to discuss Safe City. The Citizen Observer Alert Network is an information sharing website that enables users to share emails and text messages, and allows citizens, businesses, and the police to broadcast crime and safety information quickly.\(^{15}\) Following the outreach through Citizen Observer, Target visited Cincinnati to introduce the Safe City concept. Cincinnati stakeholders were interested in implementing Safe City because they envisioned it as an opportunity both to expand upon the many community-oriented policing initiatives already in place and to build a surveillance camera network.

From May to June 2006, the CPD met both internally and with Target to formalize the focus area, project concept, goals, timeline, project management, and estimated costs and funding. In July 2006, the UI evaluation team traveled to Cincinnati to meet with CPD Safe City partners and Target representatives to formally discuss the CPD implementation plan and how the evaluation would proceed.

**Identification of Focus Area**

At the July 2006 meeting with UI researchers, the CPD and Target, the CPD Captain who was the key initiator bringing Safe City to Cincinnati presented Cincinnati’s Safe

\(^{15}\) This includes the ability of businesses to share pictures of suspects online which is something the CPD cannot do for legal reasons.
City program, formally titled the “Western Corridor Safe City Project.” The proposed focus area of the Western Corridor Safe City Project was also presented; representing a relatively large geographic swath along the western side of the city spanning approximately five miles along mostly commercial areas interspersed with the Price Hill, Westwood, and Western Hills neighborhoods and ending at the city/county line. It was further presented that in the Westwood neighborhood of this designated Safe City area (the northernmost part of the corridor), both Part 1 and Part 2 crimes increased dramatically from 2005-2006, and smaller increases in Part 1 and Part 2 crimes occurred in the East Price Hill area (the southwest part of the corridor). It was noted that the demographics of the entire Safe City area are quite mixed and have changed substantially over the past fifteen years, with an increase in the proportion of Hispanic residents.\(^{16}\) The Target store in this area was described as being located within a relatively crime-free mall with occasional shoplifting issues and weekend car club\(^ {17}\) activity in the parking lot. The more problematic shopping area is about one and a half miles north of Target, at the city/county line, and had recently experienced a significant spike in crime, particularly shoplifting, street robberies, and thefts.

**Figure 5.1. Western Corridor Safe City Project Focus Area for UI Evaluation**

\(^{16}\) The CPD responded by enrolling officers in Spanish language classes.

\(^{17}\) Car club activity is when groups of individuals gather (often in parking lots) to compare their cars. This often precedes street racing.
UI researchers expressed concern that the Safe City area presented was too large geographically – both in terms of the CPD having a real impact on crime as well as from an evaluation perspective. It was therefore proposed that UI’s evaluation study area be confined to the northwest part of the corridor in the Westwood neighborhood, to Glenway Crossing, the retail strip mall home to a Target store, and the strip of businesses along Glenway Avenue (see Figure 5.1 for a map of the UI Safe City evaluation focus area).

UI also expressed concern about the feasibility of evaluating the CCTV portion of the initiative since it was dependent upon the receipt of funding that was not yet in and would, at best, take one year to implement from the time funding would be received. As a result, UI proposed focusing the evaluation on the other components of the initiative for the first year of the evaluation.

**Development of Mission and Goals**

As expressed in formal correspondence with Target, the “long-term goal for the [Cincinnati] Police Department and the Western Corridor Safe City Project is to develop a self-sustaining information sharing/community partnership that will positively impact the quality of life and economic development in the identified corridor and serve as a model for others to emulate.” More specifically, the Western Corridor Safe City Project concept, as described in a CPD memorandum to the Target Corporation, was envisioned to include an electronic information sharing network via internet and text devices; a community newsletter and community presentations. The network would link to the existing Citizen Observer Alert Network used by the CPD, and a Safe City project participant network would be developed to allow information sharing related to suspicious activity, crime information, community concerns, or special needs. Participants would also be able to receive alert information via email notification or text messaging on a cellular phone or pager. Additional information would be distributed via an electronic newsletter through the Citizen Observer Alert Network and at community

---

18 This concern proved to be a valid one: as of June 2009, Cincinnati had yet to implement the envisioned camera system along the Western Corridor.
19 Formal letter sent August 4, 2006 to the Target Corporation by Cincinnati Police Chief Thomas H. Streicher, Jr.
meetings. The CPD plan identified three key stakeholders to enlist in achieving those goals: businesses, educational institutions, and community groups/residents.

**Project Administration**

The management of the Western Corridor Safe City Project was led by the Western Corridor Safe City Advisory Board comprised of representatives from businesses, educational institutions, community groups and the CPD. The board, which convened on the first Friday of every month, was responsible for the oversight of expenditures related to the project, the recruiting of new members, and the resolution of complaints involving non-law enforcement issues. In addition to the Advisory Board, other key members included: a chairperson, a secretary responsible for maintaining records of all Safe City meetings, and a meeting coordinator responsible for the logistics and scheduling of all Safe City meetings.

**PRE-IMPLEMENTATION ACTIVITIES: JUNE–AUGUST 2006**

In June 2006, the CPD conducted a presentation on the Western Corridor Safe City Project with key business stakeholders. Representatives included community leaders, business managers, and educational representatives. The following month, Police Department Crime Prevention Specialists with Citizen on Patrol Volunteers conducted over 360 crime vulnerability surveys in the Safe City focus area and surrounding areas. During this time, they also distributed an invitation to participate in the Western Corridor Safe City Project and project literature.

At a meeting with UI researchers in July, the CPD spoke of plans to enhance the existing neighborhood watch program, the goal being to hold ten new neighborhood watch training programs in the Safe City and surrounding business areas and to enroll households in the Citizen Observer Alert Network so they could be quickly notified of crime threats in the area. These activities were envisioned to complement the area’s already active citizen patrol program, which includes citizen patrol cars and radios. CPD also stated the goal of increasing the number of citizen patrol participants in the project area and surrounding business area.
In August 2006, the CPD held a Citizens Observer Alert Network meeting to train businesses in loss prevention, robbery prevention and personal safety. Approximately 300 business representatives were in attendance. The alert network was designed to enable the police to quickly inform merchants about burglaries and other crime issues in and around their properties. By the time of the meeting, all businesses in the Safe City focus area and surrounding neighborhoods were enrolled in the Alert Network. Additionally, the CPD conducted a separate outreach effort with financial institutions by sending a trained team of officers from the Financial Crimes Unit to each financial institution to review their operations.

In the Fall of 2006, results of the crime vulnerability surveys conducted by the CPD in July 2006 were shared with businesses. According to a Safe City program official, conducting the crime vulnerability surveys with local businesses generated tremendous buy-in for the Safe City program. In addition, meetings were held with representatives of the private and public school systems to present the Safe City project.

On September 13, 2006, an emergency city ordinance was passed authorizing the CPD to make presentations and solicit donations to: fund the Western Corridor Safe City Project; establish an operating fund for the receipt of donations designated to support the project; and create the Western Corridor Safe City Advisory Board to provide community input into the administration of the Safe City project.


The official kick-off event for the Western Corridor Safe City Project was held on February 1, 2007 at a local community theatre in the project area. Present at the meeting were the CPD command staff, the city manager, the public information office, as well as community members and key stakeholders comprised of representatives from local businesses, schools, and churches. The kick-off lasted for about an hour and featured a presentation outlining the Western Corridor Safe City Project by the CPD Captain. At the kick-off event, Target presented the CPD with a check for $250,000 to assist with the implementation of the project. There were no conditions placed on the award, except that the money would be used for Safe City and that all decisions on its use would go through the Advisory Board.
At the commencement of the Safe City project in February 2007, the CPD immediately ramped up several efforts in the Safe City area. Email alerts through the Citizen Observer Alert Network, which had been used in other areas of Cincinnati since 2003, were expanded in February to include the areas served by the Safe City project. These alerts were sent out approximately once every 14 days by an unpaid intern in the CPD since the project began. Although license plate recognition software was not paid for by Safe City funds, the CPD expanded its use of this technology into the Western Corridor Safe City focus area, assigning a patrol car with license plate recognition to the area for eight hours per day. According to project officials, the use of license plate recognition software in the Safe City area was a very helpful tool.

In March 2007, the CPD worked to expand the existing neighborhood watch programs with the goal of getting more people involved so that they could extend their reach to more streets, including those in and around the Safe City focus area. In July 2007, the CPD used $10,000 of Safe City funding to purchase two Segways to complement foot patrols in the Safe City area. Since the Safe City project began, over 400 foot patrols have been dedicated to patrolling the Safe City focus area in two to three four-hour shifts per day. Every business in the Safe City focus area has been visited at least once by the CPD patrols. Safe City funding has been instrumental to this effort, as it has accounted for half of the total cost of foot patrols over the course of the Safe City project. In addition, CPD used Safe City to increase its annual National Night Out\(^\text{20}\) event to occur twice a year, using the popular event to ramp up interest and community involvement in the Safe City area.

The CPD also conducted many Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED)\(^\text{21}\) assessments of businesses in and around the Safe City area. Since July 2007, over 150 CPTED assessments have been conducted by the CPD. Examples of common recommendations to businesses based on CPTED assessments include: installing fences, installing alarms, changing lighting and purchasing surveillance cameras. The CPD noted

\(^{20}\) For a description of National Night Out, see: [http://www.nationaltownwatch.org/nno/about.html](http://www.nationaltownwatch.org/nno/about.html)

\(^{21}\) CPTED is defined as “the proper design and effective use of the built environment which may lead to a reduction in the fear and incidence of crime, and an improvement of the quality of life” (as defined at [www.CPTEDtraining.net](http://www.CPTEDtraining.net) (accessed 4/13/08).
that many businesses were unaware that relatively good-quality, low-cost surveillance cameras could be purchased for about $1,000.

In October 2007, the CPD conducted merchant training for local businesses on shoplifting. The CPD spoke with each business in the Safe City area and delivered a pamphlet on shoplifting prevention and safety.

**SUMMARY OF PLANNED AND ACTUAL ACTIVITIES**

While the main long-term goal of Cincinnati’s Safe City initiative was the implementation of a network of public surveillance cameras that would essentially blanket the entire western corridor of the city, CPD and its partners also identified more easily attainable implementation goals centered on increasing business and citizen awareness, communication, and involvement in crime control and prevention activities. This strategy proved prudent, as the fundraising and logistical challenges of the system turned out to be greater than anticipated. However, the Safe City partners were able to accomplish other tasks aimed at reducing crime in the focus area. As outlined in detail in the Cincinnati Logic Model found in Appendix D, these activities included:

- A kick-off meeting with 30-35 attendees;
- 14 all-partner meetings held with about 6-13 attendees on average;
- Training of approximately 300 businesses in loss prevention, robbery prevention, and personal safety;
- Enrolling all businesses in the focus area in the Citizen Observer Alert Network;
- Conducting outreach to all financial institutions in the focus area by a trained team of officers from Financial Crimes Unit;
- Emailing bi-monthly crime alerts through the Citizen Observer Alert Network, which was expanded to include the Safe City focus area;
- Expanding the use of CPD’s pre-existing License Plate Recognition technology to the focus area;
- Extending the existing neighborhood watch program to the focus area and surrounding areas;
- Purchasing two Segways for use in the focus area;
- Conducting increased foot patrols in the focus area (2-3 four-hour shifts/day);
• Conducting foot patrol visits to each business in the focus area;
• Expanding National Night Out to occur twice/year instead of once/year;
• Conducting over 150 CPTED assessments attended by two CPD officers lasting an average of one hour in duration, which resulted in businesses erecting fences, installing alarms and cameras, and conducting staff trainings on theft prevention; and
• Delivering training to local businesses on shoplifting, including the distribution of informational pamphlets on shoplifting prevention strategies.

Copies of the Citizen Observer enrollment form, and business training documents referenced above are included in Appendix E.

**PROCESS EVALUATION RESULTS**

This section details the results of Cincinnati’s Western Corridor Safe City Project through perceptions of Safe City partners on the project’s activities and effectiveness based on one-on-one interviews with project stakeholders. The following section summarizes baseline and follow-up surveys distributed to merchants in the Safe City focus area.

**Safe City Partnership Activities**

UI researchers sought to explore the nature and degree of activities and partnerships among Safe City stakeholders measured through a series of one-on-one interviews with these partners. These interviews focused on the extent to which: (1) Safe City goals were commonly understood and embraced; and (2) Safe City activities were implemented as planned. The following section summarizes key findings from these semi-structured interviews with selected Safe City stakeholders.

**Identification and Understanding of Goals**

Project partners were all able to quickly identify the goals of the Western Corridor Safe City Project and demonstrated a depth of understanding about their connection to crime and disorder within the focus area. Drugs, rundown/neglected buildings and other quality of life issues, and youth hanging out were mentioned by partners as some of the
most pressing concerns. An increase in prostitution was also mentioned and attributed to displacement from the focused anti-crime initiative that took place in the downtown area from 2005-2007. Partners cautioned that their initiative needed to be about more than displacement – it needed to also address some of the root causes of the problems. In their discussions of certain issues, such as delinquent or gang-involved youth, they demonstrated a depth of understanding and willingness to address these issues in a comprehensive manner.

**Safe City Work Plan and Activities**

The Safe City work plan and activities were fully identified by most partners. However, others focused on specific activities relevant to their roles in the partnership such as expanding neighborhood watch participation or addressing quality of life issues. Partners acknowledged that cameras would be introduced later on in the initiative, once other activities had been accomplished and demonstrated results. They felt that although the cameras would be important in helping police solve many crimes, the cameras would not be able to take the place of the community connections that they viewed as the heart of Safe City and critical in fighting crime and disorder and making their community a better place to live and do business. For example, one of the partners referred to the “broken windows” theory of crime prevention and cited the Western Corridor Safe City Project’s partnership with city building inspectors to address issues related to litter, illegal dumping, weed control, rundown/neglected buildings and street cleaning in a very focused area encompassing seven police reporting areas (including the Safe City area).

**Communication Among Safe City Partners**

Upon initiation of the project, partners convened meetings regularly on the first Friday of each. Communication among the Cincinnati Safe City partners was described by respondents as being very good. Those interviewed cited a long tradition of community partnerships to address crime and as a result, many of the board members had been involved in other crime prevention partnerships going on in the city prior to Safe City. For example, one of the partners was critical in establishing a program with the CPD which was in existence for the eight years preceding Safe City. The CPD sergeant
involved in Safe City already had long-established relationships with many of the key partners that came on board with Safe City. In addition, many of the partners are long-time residents of the community and have a vested interest in making Cincinnati a better place to live. These ongoing relationships and pre-existing levels of trust proved to be positive factors in helping Safe City get off the ground and complete many activities.

Challenges and Lessons Learned

Cincinnati Safe City partners cited many successes regarding the ability to engage businesses in taking proactive measures to implement crime prevention strategies and increase communications both with each other and law enforcement in the interests of coordinating efforts. Perhaps the greatest challenge encountered by the partnership was securing the involvement of the public schools in the initiative. CPD representatives observed that the Safe City focus area experienced many problems related to robberies and drug activities committed by the school-aged population. Given that nine schools service the Safe City focus area, the buy-in and engagement of principals and the superintendent was cited as critical for the initiative.

Safe City Business Partners’ Perceptions

As described above, Cincinnati’s Safe City activities were designed to reduce crime by increasing communications among residents, businesses, and the police; increasing the visibility of both citizens and law enforcement through increased citizen patrols and more intensive police foot patrols; and developing and implementing strategies to design out crime through CPTED measures. These measures were envisioned to reduce crime victimization experienced by businesses and increase perceptions of safety on the part of businesses. In order to assess the degree to which these intended outcomes were achieved, UI staff conducted pre- and post-Safe City surveys of businesses in the Safe City evaluation sites. This section describes the survey methodology employed and compares responses between survey waves.
Survey Methodology

In March 2007, the Urban Institute conducted a survey of businesses located in Cincinnati’s Western Corridor Safe City focus area, with a follow-up survey conducted in March 2008. The purpose of the surveys was to collect data on merchants’ perceptions of crime and safety in and around businesses located in the Safe City area. Specifically, the surveys sought information on the degree to which the Western Corridor Safe City Project achieved its desired impact on the following outcomes:

- Increasing perceptions of safety;
- Increasing interactions with the local police;
- Decreasing crime and disorder victimization;
- Increasing the reporting of crime;
- Reducing the impact of crime on business;
- Increasing crime prevention efforts; and
- Increasing community connections with respect to crime prevention strategies and information-sharing.

During the baseline survey, a total of 67 out of 83 Cincinnati businesses responded to the survey, representing an 81 percent response rate overall. The follow-up survey was distributed to the 67 businesses that responded during the baseline, and a total of 50 surveys were completed, representing a 75 percent response rate. The majority of the businesses surveyed were small (less than ten employees) and were located in an open-air shopping center. Results of both the baseline and follow-up surveys are presented below. Independent sample t-tests were conducted to test for significance (defined at p<.10) between pre- and post-intervention survey response items. Where applicable, significance is noted.

Perceptions of Safety

Perceptions of safety and concerns about crime shifted quite a bit from March 2007 to March 2008. During the baseline, surveyed Cincinnati business respondents expressed concerns about crime and disorder. Approximately 70 percent of respondents indicated that they were either concerned or very concerned about crime and disorder in their business area, as shown in Figure 5.2. By March 2008, 56 percent of businesses
were concerned or very concerned, and the share of businesses reporting low levels of concern or neutrality increased from 28 percent to 44 percent. Importantly, the changes in level of concern were found to be statistically significant.

**Figure 5.2. Level of Concern about Crime and Disorder in Business Area, Cincinnati**

As shown in Figure 5.3, businesses were most concerned about robbery, unwanted or loitering persons, and retail burglary. Of the changes between the two survey years, the decrease in concern about vandalism/criminal damage, from 57 percent in 2007 to 40 percent in 2008, was statistically significant.

In 2007, 69 percent of Cincinnati survey respondents indicated an awareness of crimes occurring in the area around their businesses; this increased to 74 percent in 2008. As shown in Figure 5.4, the largest percentage of respondents continued to learn about these crimes through conversations with customers or through the media. Notably, the least common means of finding out about crimes were receiving mail or email and attending community meetings; this remained true even over the course of Safe City implementation in the year between baseline and follow-up.

When asked about their feelings of safety in 2007, 48 percent of businesses reported feeling “neutral,” 28 percent felt “safe,” 17 percent felt “unsafe,” and a small percentage
felt either very safe (3 percent) or very unsafe (3 percent). As indicated by Figure 5.5 below, by 2008, those who reported feeling unsafe decreased by almost half (to 9 percent), and those who reported feeling neutral increased from 48 percent to 60 percent. These changes, however, were not statistically significant.

Figure 5.3. Crime and Disorder Problems Cited by Respondents, Cincinnati

Note: Survey respondents were asked to “mark all that apply.”

In terms of specific crime and disorder problems experienced by businesses, loitering or hanging out, indicated by 59 percent of all respondents in 2007 and 60 percent in 2008, continued to be the most frequently cited problem. However, dramatic changes with respect to other conditions were noted during the follow-up period. In particular, the presence of homeless and transient people decreased by almost half (although this
reduction was not statistically significant). In addition, businesses observed a statistically significant reduction in overgrown trees and shrubs (from 9 percent to 2 percent) and a statistically significant 50 percent decrease in rundown or neglected buildings (from 26 percent to 13 percent). Ironically, perhaps as a consequence of rundown buildings being demolished between survey periods, the percentage of businesses citing vacant lots as a common condition increased by about 50 percent – from 9 percent to 19 percent, as shown in Figure 5.6. These shifts in perceptions of safety and nature of crime problems between baseline and follow-up periods would indicate that Safe City achieved the desired effect.

Figure 5.4. Sources of Crime or Disorder Information, Cincinnati

![Bar chart showing sources of crime or disorder information in Cincinnati with data from 2007 and 2008.]

Note: Survey respondents were asked to “mark all that apply.”
Figure 5.5. Feelings of Safety, Cincinnati

Figure 5.6. Common Conditions in Business Area, Cincinnati
Contact with Local Police

Contact with police represents an important indicator of Safe City’s success, in that a key tenet of the Safe City model is that increased positive interactions with police will improve information sharing about emerging crime problems and effective strategies for crime prevention. Approximately 77 percent of all surveyed businesses had some form of contact with the local police within the six months leading up to UI’s 2007 survey. This slightly decreased in 2008 to 71 percent. It is noteworthy that the most dramatic change in response rates over the year was a statistically significant decline in those citing “reported a crime” as a reason for recent contact with the police – from 43 percent to 27 percent. This may indicate that reductions in reported crime are a result of reduced victimization.

Less common reasons for contact with the police either remained the same or in some cases declined over the year. In 2007, 19 percent cited surveys by the police as a reason for recent contact, which remained relatively stable at 16 percent in 2008. Participating in an event with the police remained unchanged at a low level of 9 percent over the year, and those citing community meetings as the reason for recent contact declined, but not statistically significantly. On a more positive note, while the largest share of respondents (60 percent) felt that police presence had stayed the same between baseline and follow-up periods, about 26 percent noticed an increase in police presence, suggesting that Safe City increased perceptions of the level of police presence among some share of businesses.

At both baseline and follow-up, Cincinnati businesses were divided on the question of how frequently the local police visit them without being asked to do so. Roughly 22 percent of businesses cited monthly contact with police (compared with 31 percent in 2007) as the most commonly cited level of frequency, and 27 percent cited that police never visit their businesses without being asked (relatively unchanged from 22 percent in 2007). And, as indicated in Figure 5.7, a large percentage of businesses (80 percent) agreed or strongly agreed that they feel comfortable approaching the police, which remained at exactly the same level measured at baseline.
Experience With and Reporting of Crime

As referenced earlier, perceptions of safety increased dramatically between baseline and follow up, suggesting that actual experience of victimization may have declined during that period. However, as noted in Figure 5.8, on average the crime and disorderly activities cited in 2007 remained at similar levels in 2008. The most commonly cited crime or disorder event in 2008 was unwanted persons on business property (66 percent) which is relatively unchanged from 61 percent in 2007. Other commonly cited crime and disorder events that remained unchanged between 2007 and 2008 were panhandling (48 percent versus 42 percent), bad check or card fraud (39 percent versus 36 percent), and shoplifting (37 percent versus 36 percent). Robberies, however, increased during this period (from 11 percent to 20 percent). One positive change did occur, however: there was a statistically significant decrease in the share of businesses citing graffiti as a common occurrence in their business area (from 28 percent in 2007 to 12 percent in 2008).
Figure 5.8. Crime and Disorder Experiences in Past Six Months, Cincinnati

Willingness to Report Crime

Regardless of the level of victimization, the Safe City model’s goal of increased communications between businesses and law enforcement should be embodied in increased reporting rates. Such an increase was indeed observed in survey responses: in 2008, 19 percent of surveyed businesses indicating reporting crime and disorder events all of the time, approximately twice the share of respondents from 2007 (9 percent). Likewise, the percentage of businesses indicating that they report crime none of the time fell by 10 percentage points from 41 percent to 31 percent between 2007 and 2008. While these shifts in reporting rates may be an indication of Safe City’s success in improving communications between businesses and law enforcement, they may also represent the shifts in type of crime victimization experienced by businesses. As outlined above, businesses reported a reduction in low-level crimes and acts of disorder (that might not merit reporting) and an increase in robberies, which are likely to be reported by most businesses. In fact, the most common reason businesses cited for not reporting crime in
both baseline and follow up periods was that they experienced no or very little damage or loss to their property (60 percent). Several respondents also indicated that they did not report crime or disorder to the police because they handled it themselves. Also noteworthy is the statistically significant increase (from 3 percent in 2007 to 10 percent in 2008) in those who responded that they did not report a crime because it was too time consuming.

**Impact of Crime on Business**

Another measure of Safe City’s success is the extent to which it may have mitigated the impact of crime on businesses. However, few significant changes were observed between baseline and follow-up periods: almost half the respondents reported that crime and disorder had no impact on their business during both survey waves (48 percent during baseline and 42 percent during follow-up). The top four types of impacts reported by businesses remained the same: incurring costs, disrupting business, losing customers, and lowering staff morale. During baseline, 61 percent of businesses reported incurring some costs due to crime and disorder, while 39 percent of businesses reported they incurred no costs. At follow-up, the percentage of businesses reporting some cost increased slightly to 64 percent, with 36 percent reporting no costs. The largest percentage of those incurring costs (22 percent) spent between $1,001 and $4,999 during baseline – this remained relatively consistent during the follow-up, at 21 percent. However, the percentage of businesses citing difficulty retaining staff due to crime and disorder decreased by a statistically significant amount from 6 percent in 2007 to no respondents in 2008.

**Crime Prevention Activities**

Given its focus on citizen patrols and CPTED activities, Cincinnati’s Western Corridor Safe City Project embodied a wide array of crime prevention activities. Thus, we would expect that a successfully implemented Safe City program would result in an increase in business efforts to prevent crime. However, this interpretation should be countered by the fact that if Safe City had an impact in reducing victimization, businesses may see less of a need to engage in crime prevention activities. The survey findings
support these conflicting outcome measures of Safe City success: little difference was identified in prevention activities before and after Safe City implementation. At both survey waves, about two-thirds of all businesses reported taking measures to secure their properties against crime problems, with the three most common measures being the installation of video surveillance systems, alarms, and door locks. Marginal decreases in crime prevention measures were observed among businesses reporting spending $500 on security and prevention measures, at 67 percent in 2007 versus 54 percent in 2008. On average, businesses did not regularly employ private or in-house security staff to patrol their business property, with an average of 13 percent of businesses responding positively to this question during both survey periods. Interestingly, during both surveys, no survey respondents reported participating in neighborhood watch to prevent crime. This could merely be a reflection of business respondents not residing in the immediate vicinity of the Safe City initiative.

Community Connections

The final Safe City measure explored through the business surveys was the extent to which Safe City encouraged an increase in communications among neighboring businesses, residents, and other community stakeholders. In March 2007, the largest share of Cincinnati businesses, about 52 percent, reported that they never exchanged crime and security information with neighboring business owners and managers. The share of those reporting that no information had been exchanged declined in 2008 to 43 percent. In addition, the survey results indicate an increase in those reporting that they share information on a monthly basis – from 24 percent in 2007 to 31 percent in 2008.

These small but positive findings are countered by the fact that the share of Cincinnati business respondents indicating that they were unaware of any community partnerships in their business area to address crime or disorder during baseline increased from 77 percent at baseline to 86 percent at follow-up. Among the 23 percent of businesses who were aware of existing crime prevention partnerships in 2007, only three businesses named the Safe City partnership. Among the 15 percent of businesses aware of such partnerships in 2008, only one business named the Safe City partnership. During both survey waves, the most frequently cited partnership was one located in the Price Hill
area, which was cited by several different names (e.g., Price Hill Will, Price Hill Civic Club, and Price Hill Coalition). The Westwood Civic Association and Citizens on Patrol were also named. This is not surprising given the fact that when interviewed, Cincinnati’s Safe City partners indicated that there had been long-standing community crime prevention partnerships and they focused on using Safe City funding to expand and improve many of the activities they had already been involved in, rather than to brand a new crime prevention initiative.

**Summary of Survey Findings**

The above comparisons of pre- and post-Safe City business survey results paint a mixed picture of the initiative’s success in achieving its intended goals. On the one hand, after Safe City was launched, respondents were less concerned about most types of crime and disorder in and around their businesses, suggesting increased perceptions of safety due to Safe City activities. In addition, it appears that Safe City activities may have reduced the incidence of vandalism and the existence of overgrown trees and shrubs and rundown or neglected buildings. These reductions may be the result of the intensive CPTED activities and increased foot patrols associated with the Safe City initiative, a hypothesis supported by the fact that perceptions of the level of police presence increased for a noteworthy share of respondents, as did both communications among businesses and law enforcement and reporting rates.

To counter these positive findings, however, it is noteworthy that a larger share of businesses surveyed indicated experiencing attempted burglary and robbery in the period following Safe City implementation. This perhaps explains why respondents did not indicate any reduction in the impacts of crime on their businesses. The only significant change noted was in the decreased percentage of businesses citing difficulty retaining staff due to crime and disorder around their properties.

In addition, survey respondents were largely unaware of community partnerships to address crime and disorder, and very few named Safe City as an existing partnership. They did, however, list many community crime prevention partnerships that existed prior to Safe City (and in some cases Safe City may have been perceived as an add-on to these previous efforts). This lack of awareness of Safe City may therefore be due to the fact
that Cincinnati did not focus on branding the Safe City initiative with names and signs, but rather implemented it as an extension of the community crime prevention activities in which they were already involved.

**IMPACT ANALYSIS RESULTS**

In order to measure the impact of Cincinnati’s Western Corridor Safe City Project in the Western Corridor focus area, UI researchers collected and analyzed crime-related data from the Cincinnati Police Department (CPD) for the period January 1, 2004 through November 30, 2008.

**Figure 5.9. Map of Cincinnati Evaluation Areas**
Description of Cincinnati’s Safe City Evaluation Area

The impact analysis was conducted for the Glenway Crossing Retail Center, which is part of the Western Corridor described earlier. This area is bounded by Glencrossing Way to Boudinot Avenue and Robinet Drive, Brater Avenue, and West Tower Avenue to Crookshank Road, with a buffer of approximately a quarter mile from each street to ensure all incidents related to the retail center are captured (see Figure 5.9). Additionally, a small area along Glenway Avenue and Warsaw Avenue was included in our analysis at the recommendation of CPD staff, who indicated that the Safe City interventions extended to this area and that it represented a retail space likely to benefit from the initiative.

Figure 5.10. Map of Cincinnati Comparison Area, Buffalo, New York

Analyses identifying significant changes in average monthly crime counts were conducted within three areas: (1) the intervention area; (2) a displacement zone; and (3) a matched comparison area in a different jurisdiction (see the Research Design and Methods section for a description of how the comparison area was selected). Since the two major roads included in the target area (Glenway Avenue and Glencrossing Way) are approximately a quarter mile apart, the comparison area was selected to include all data within a quarter mile of a matched Target store for inclusion in our analysis. An area
within Buffalo, New York was selected as the comparison site for the Cincinnati Safe City site (see Figure 5.10 for a map of the Buffalo comparison area).

The displacement zone for Cincinnati, as shown in Figure 5.11, was located approximately one and a half miles North of the focus area. This area was selected because it was within close proximity to the focus area and contained similar retail space to that which was included in the Western Corridor. For example, retail stores such as Walgreens are located in the comparison area, which includes larger parking facilities similar to those in the Cincinnati intervention area.

Figure 5.11. Map of Cincinnati Displacement Area

Crime Trends Before and After Safe City Implementation

Prior to Safe City, the top crimes\(^{22}\) reported to police (in order of frequency) were: larceny, assault, damage/vandalism, robbery, and burglary. These five categories include

---

\(^{22}\) These frequencies were based on the period of January 2004 through May 2005. Data on crimes reported to the police were provided by the Cincinnati Police Department (CPD).
more than ninety percent of all crime reported during the baseline period. As shown in Figure 5.12, both larceny and assault typically exceeded all other crime categories in each month. Larcenies accounted for nearly half of all incidents (47 percent), followed by assaults (16 percent). The next three top crimes, damage/vandalism, robbery, and burglary, accounted for approximately thirty percent of the total number of incidents during the baseline period. Motor vehicle theft (6 percent) and problem persons (3 percent) were also among the more frequently reported offenses. As described below, these categories continued to be the top crimes reported for the area, but the volume of incidents was reduced for certain crimes as a result of Safe City.

**Figure 5.12. Cincinnati Safe City Top 5 Crimes**

![Graph showing crime categories over time](image)

The Western Corridor Safe City Project commenced in June of 2006. At this time larcenies had begun to decrease after a peak in late 2005. However, over time they continued to decrease, albeit with a few peaks along the way, which may be related to seasonal shifts in crime. Assaults remained relatively stable during the post-intervention period, but robberies declined steadily, reaching an all-time low in the third quarter of

Statistical Analysis Results

Simple visual interpretation of the graph above does not confirm whether the Safe City initiative had an impact on crime. In order to test whether Cincinnati’s Western Corridor Safe City Project had an impact on crime, we examined eight categories of crimes: 23 (1) total crime, (2) violent crime, (3) property crime, (4) robbery, (5) burglary, (6) problem persons (including loitering, truancy, and panhandling), 24 (7) larceny, and (8) forgery and fraud. When examining the mean change before and after Safe City using independent samples t-tests, we found that although many of the categories of crime declined, only violent crime experienced a statistically significant reduction (see Table 5.13).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crime Type</th>
<th>Mean Before</th>
<th>Mean After</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>36.10</td>
<td>33.63</td>
<td>-2.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>-0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>2.97</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>+0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem Persons</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larceny</td>
<td>16.97</td>
<td>17.10</td>
<td>+0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault</td>
<td>5.90</td>
<td>4.97</td>
<td>-0.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damage</td>
<td>3.55</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>-0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent</td>
<td>9.28</td>
<td>7.57</td>
<td>-1.71†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property</td>
<td>25.52</td>
<td>24.77</td>
<td>-0.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

†Significant at p<.05.

23 The priorities for this site outlined in the logic model were used in determining which categories of crime to focus the analysis on.

24 Although the number of neglected buildings and the type of disorder that manifests as a result of properties being left vacant were of concern for the site, the data did not include indicators for these occurrences. The category that would most closely assess the impact of the initiative on this type of disorder would be problem persons because of the criminal behavior that may be reported within the vacant buildings.
To further investigate these findings, we introduced a comparison area in Buffalo, New York, which was chosen for its similarity with the treatment area, offering a reasonable counterfactual of what would have occurred without the Safe City initiative (see the Research Design and Methods section for details on comparison site selection criteria). Employing DiD analyses, statistically significant changes in average monthly crime rates before and after the start of Cincinnati’s Western Corridor Safe City Project in June 2006 were identified. As depicted in Table 5.14, the DiD analysis revealed a significant reduction in average monthly total crime counts, assaults, damage or vandalism, and violent incidents in the Safe City focus areas following start of Safe City.

**Table 5.14. Changes in Average Monthly Reported Crime Frequencies by Type, Cincinnati and Buffalo***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crime Type</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Before</th>
<th>After</th>
<th>Change</th>
<th>Difference-in-differences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Treatment</td>
<td>36.10</td>
<td>33.63</td>
<td>-2.47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Comparison</td>
<td>23.07</td>
<td>25.80</td>
<td>+2.73</td>
<td>-5.20†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Displacement Zone</td>
<td>2.90</td>
<td>3.30</td>
<td>+0.40</td>
<td>-2.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault</td>
<td>Treatment</td>
<td>5.90</td>
<td>4.97</td>
<td>-0.93</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Comparison</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>+0.90</td>
<td>-1.82†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Displacement Zone</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>+0.46</td>
<td>-0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vandalism</td>
<td>Treatment</td>
<td>3.56</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>-0.56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Comparison</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>3.23</td>
<td>+1.06</td>
<td>-1.61†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Displacement Zone</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>-1.18†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent</td>
<td>Treatment</td>
<td>9.28</td>
<td>7.57</td>
<td>-1.71</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Comparison</td>
<td>2.21</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>+0.52</td>
<td>-2.24†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Displacement Zone</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>+0.68</td>
<td>+0.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Safe City initiative began prior to June 2006, but those activities that were thought to impact crime began in June 2006; therefore, the intervention point was set at that point.
†Significant at p<.05.

More specifically, comparisons between Cincinnati mean crime frequencies before and after the intervention revealed a total crime decline of approximately three
incidents per month (36.10 to 33.63). Both the number of assaults and incidents of vandalism decreased by nearly one incident per month (from 5.90 to 4.97 and from 3.56 to 3.00, respectively), and violent crimes decreased by nearly two incidents per month (from 9.28 to 7.57). The DiD analysis examines these reductions in light of crime changes in the comparison area, Buffalo. Because the Buffalo comparison area was selected as a match for Cincinnati, Buffalo represents what we would expect to happen in Cincinnati had Safe City not been implemented there. Thus, since every crime category in Buffalo increased over the evaluation period, the increase results in a net benefit in Cincinnati reductions, with a total crime reduction per month of 5.20, and a reduction of almost two incidents per month for assault, vandalism, and violent crime.

As shown in Figure 5.15, following the start of the Western Corridor Safe City Project, the peaks in the crime incidents in the Cincinnati site decreased over time and did not reach as high a level as they were prior to the intervention. Yet in Buffalo, the peaks remained high after the intervention. It is important to acknowledge, however, that the enhanced crime reduction impact in Cincinnati identified through the DiD analysis is a function of the crime trends observed in the comparison area, where crime increased by approximately three incidents per month. Given that this comparison area is in a different city with likely a different economic\(^{25}\) and political climate and a unique set of historical events and law enforcement practices, readers should be cautioned against interpreting these findings as representing a definitive success of the Safe City initiative in Cincinnati.

We also employed DiD analysis to identify any signs of geographic displacement of crime following the implementation of Safe City. The displacement area was selected based upon advice from the Cincinnati Police Department. The criteria employed to select the displacement area were that the area needed to be in close proximity to the focus area and to have similar land use, but that it could not be receiving any resources as part of Safe City. As indicated in Table 5.14, there was no evidence of displacement.

\(^{25}\) While the CAP index used to match Buffalo and Cincinnati includes a measure of location socio-economic factors, these data are based on Census information and may not represent more recent economic climates.
effects, with the only crime category increasing being violent crime, which was marginal and not statistically significant (a net increase of .68 events per month). Interestingly, when testing for displacement effects, the area that was thought to have been negatively influenced by Safe City due to displacement actually experienced a significant reduction in vandalism as well (a net decrease of 1.18 events per month). This may be due to the diffusion of benefits associated with the CPTED initiatives law enforcement and business owners participated in, whereby displacement area businesses gained knowledge of crime prevention tips even though they were not technically a part of the designated Safe City geographic area.

**COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS FINDINGS**

The strategy for calculating the site-level costs follows the general framework as previously outlined in the *Research Design and Methods* section, with only minor additions that were unique to each specific site. Cincinnati’s Western Corridor Safe City Project received a $250,000 grant from the Target Corporation. Only the Cincinnati
Police Department (CPD) contributed to expenditures that were beyond those which were covered by the Target award.\textsuperscript{26} The cost survey was provided to the CPD in the Fall of 2008 and returned within a few weeks. Numerous follow-up calls were made by UI researchers to clarify any missing costs and questions that were outstanding, as well as to discuss how each cost estimate was calculated to ensure that all decision rules were consistently followed by each site.

Table 5.15. Safe City Initiative Costs, Cincinnati

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expenditures To Date (8/08)</th>
<th>Cost($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CPTED and Technical Solutions</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPTED</td>
<td>4,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segways</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Email Alerts</td>
<td>7,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>License Plate Recognition</td>
<td>16,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total CPTED and technical solutions</strong></td>
<td>38,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-Technical Solutions</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foot patrols</td>
<td>69,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Night Out</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss prevention, robbery prevention and personal safety training</td>
<td>5,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outreach to financial institutions</td>
<td>5,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shoplifting training; pamphlets created/distributed</td>
<td>5,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total non-technical solutions</strong></td>
<td>91,650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Spent</strong></td>
<td><strong>130,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Remaining Budgeted Costs**

| CCTV                                                            | 120,000 |
| **Total Remaining Budgeted Costs**                             | **120,000** |

| **Total Available**                                            | 120,000 |
| **Total Unbudgeted**                                           | 0       |

**Costs Paid for by CPD for Safe City**

| Total Planning Phase Labor (loaded)                            | 2,760   |
| Total Implementation Phase Labor (loaded)                      | 88,333  |
| **Total Labor**                                                | **91,093** |

**Total Cost Western Corridor Safe City** (Total donations spent + labor) | **221,093**

\textsuperscript{26} Although individual businesses may have incurred minor costs, we only included the larger Target Corporation grant and CPD expenditures in the analysis to generate a conservative estimate. Estimation beyond these two entities would introduce too much potential error for an accurate assessment.
Program Costs – Planning and Implementation Costs

Overall, the costs associated with Cincinnati’s Western Corridor Safe City Project totaled $221,093. Planning costs were minimal ($2,760) in relation to overall expenditures and accounted for one percent of the total. Planning costs included the cost of labor for CPD representatives to meet with Target to plan the Western Corridor Safe City Project during the four months prior to implementation. The total Safe City expenditures were predominately implementation costs, with an estimated $218,333 over the span of 18 months. The relatively low share of planning costs, as illustrated in Table 5.15, may be due in part to the fact that the Safe City model is very clearly delineated for sites and Target works collaboratively with each site during the planning phase to help launch the program. During the planning phase, CPD representatives reported spending approximately $1,800 of the $2,760 on internal meetings and conference calls with Target to determine the Safe City focus area and plan initial activities. CPD representatives reported that the bulk of these hours (about 30) went to planning the focus area. The remaining $960 of the $2,760 in planning costs went to planning the kick-off meeting. These costs are conservative, as a CPD intern also donated about six hours to coordinate the meeting.

As expected, implementation costs far exceeded that of planning costs; at $218,333, implementation costs account for 99 percent of the total expenditures for Safe City. The implementation costs are comprised of CPTED and technical solutions costs, non-technical crime prevention solutions, and labor (including management). The labor estimation was generated based on loaded rates that included the wages of each employee that participated, indirect costs, and fringe benefits. One dedicated CPD sergeant headed the Safe City initiative at almost full-time (120 hours/month) for the 18 months of the implementation period. Costs were not calculated for the unpaid CPD intern who worked 20-30 hours per month throughout the same time period. The cost of labor for the sergeant managing the Safe City initiative was paid for entirely by CPD and not through the $250,000 Target donation. In total, both the intern and the sergeant dedicated approximately 3,000 hours to both the planning and implementation of Safe City.

Some labor was paid for through the $250,000 Target donation. However, this was labor associated with officers implementing the CPTED and other technical and non-
technical crime prevention solutions of the initiative and did not include the labor associated with managing Safe City. As mentioned in the Cincinnati case study above, the long-term goal of Cincinnati’s Western Corridor Safe City Project was to implement a network of public surveillance cameras blanketing the entire western corridor of the city. Early on, however, CPD worked to identify more easily attainable goals centered on increasing business and citizen awareness, communication, and involvement in crime control and prevention activities. At the time of this report, CPD had spent approximately half ($130,000) of its $250,000 Target donation to further these activities. The remaining $120,000 is budgeted for implementing surveillance cameras, slated to begin in September 2009. Given the delay in the implementation of the surveillance system, CPD was still able to move their Safe City project forward and accomplish a significant amount of activities.

Expenditures for these activities amounted to $130,000 of the Target donation plus $88,333 in management labor paid for by CPD and included:

- A kick-off meeting with 30-35 attendees;
- 14 all-partner meetings held with about 6-13 attendees on average;
- Training of approximately 300 businesses in loss prevention, robbery prevention, and personal safety;
- Enrolling all businesses in the focus area in the Citizen Observer Alert Network;
- Conducting outreach to all financial institutions in the focus area by a trained team of officers from Financial Crimes Unit;
- Emailing bi-monthly crime alerts through the Citizen Observer Alert Network, which was expanded to include the Safe City focus area;
- Expanding the use of CPD’s pre-existing License Plate Recognition technology to the focus area;
- Extending the existing neighborhood watch program to the Safe City focus area and surrounding areas;
- Purchasing two Segways for use in the focus area;
- Conducting increased foot patrols in the focus area (2-3 four-hour shifts/day);
- Conducting foot patrol visits to each business in the focus area;
- Expanding National Night Out to occur twice/year instead of once/year;
• Conducting over 150 CPTED assessments attended by two CPD officers lasting an average of one hour in duration, which resulted in businesses erecting fences, installing alarms and cameras, and conducting staff trainings on theft prevention; and

• Delivering training to local businesses on shoplifting, including the distribution of informational pamphlets on shoplifting prevention strategies.

As illustrated in Table 5.15, CPTED and technical solution expenditures accounted for a smaller fraction of the total cost than the non-technical solutions – namely increasing foot patrols in the Safe City area and hosting an additional National Night Out event. Over the course of the 18-month implementation period, CPD utilized an approximate total of 400 foot patrols working in two to three four-hour shifts per day for four days per week in the Safe City corridor. In addition, CPD also conducted trainings for businesses on loss prevention, robbery prevention and personal safety at a total approximate cost of $5,350. Shoplifting training was also conducted, with pamphlets created and distributed for another $5,350. CPD also had their Financial Crimes Unit conduct special outreach to the financial institutions in the Safe City area at a cost of $5,350.

Although CPTED and technical solutions accounted for a smaller percentage of the total cost of the implementation (at the point of our evaluation), they still represent a significant percentage of the focus of the implementation. CPD conducted approximately 150 CPTED walkthroughs of local businesses during the 18-month intervention at a cost of $4,800. This cost represents the time, in labor, for one to two CPD officers to conduct hour-long walkthroughs. Two Segways were also purchased at a cost of $5,000 each for use in the Safe City area. In addition, CPD increased its use of License Plate Recognition software in the Safe City focus area. Although this software was not purchased with Safe City funds, it was assigned to the Safe City area for one eight-hour shift per day over the course of the implementation at an approximate cost of $16,050. Lastly, CPD made a concerted effort to enroll all businesses in the Safe City focus area in the Citizen Observer Alert Network. The cost of operating these alerts amounted to about $7,500 over 18 months. This cost is an underestimate, as it only includes the cost of maintaining
the website and not the cost of the labor that was expended by the CPD intern who
dedicated about one hour per month sending out bi-weekly alerts.

Cost of New Crime

Based on the cost of crime estimates generated by Roman (2009) and Cohen (1998),
seven crime categories were assigned costs. The crime categories of interest for this cost-
benefit analysis were chosen based on the results of the impact analysis, with only those
crime categories that were found to be significantly impacted by the Cincinnati program
included in the analysis. In Cincinnati, four crime categories were found to be
significantly impacted: total, assault, vandalism, and violent. The costs are broken into
the victim costs, costs associated with the criminal justice system (i.e., investigation,
arrest, and prosecution), and incarceration costs, and summed to provide a total cost to
society (see Table 3.4 in the Research Design and Methods section). Once the costs to
society were calculated, they were then multiplied by the average monthly change in each
crime type to obtain the average monthly cost or benefit to society by crime type.

Average Change * Cost to Society = Average Monthly Cost to Society

Estimated costs were then applied to each crime category to provide an approximation
of what the change in crime cost society.

Employing the estimates depicted in Table 5.16, individual cost/benefit ratios by
crime category can be generated. In Cincinnati, the intervention period that was used for
the impact analysis spanned 29 months. Therefore, each average monthly cost to society
was multiplied by the number of months (29) to obtain the approximate cost after the
intervention:

\[
\text{Average Monthly Cost to Society} \times \text{Number of Months in Intervention Period} = \text{Total Cost to Society by Crime Type}
\]
Table 5.16. Cost Calculations by Crime Type, Cincinnati

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crime Type</th>
<th>Average Monthly Change in Crime</th>
<th>Cost to Society per Crime Incident</th>
<th>Average Monthly Cost/Savings to Society</th>
<th>Total Cost/Savings to Society</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>-5.20</td>
<td>$116,976</td>
<td>1 $608,275</td>
<td>- $17,639.975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault</td>
<td>-1.82</td>
<td>$7,562</td>
<td>2 $13,763</td>
<td>- $399,122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vandalism</td>
<td>-1.61</td>
<td>$7,562</td>
<td>3 $12,175</td>
<td>- $353,075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent</td>
<td>-2.24</td>
<td>$259,027</td>
<td>4 $580,220</td>
<td>- $16,826,380</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cost of Intervention $221,093

1 Total crime cost calculated based on average of rape, aggravated assault, robbery, burglary, larceny, stolen property, and drug offenses for 2008.
2 Cost for assaults based on lowest crime category, larceny/theft. Assaults included both aggravated and simple assaults, therefore a conservative estimate was used to prevent inflated monthly costs which would have been caused by using the aggravated assaults cost alone.
3 No estimates were available for vandalism. The lowest cost category in 2008, larceny/theft, was used for the monthly estimate.
4 Rape, aggravated assaults, and robbery were averaged to obtain the cost of violent crime.

Typically, all crime types would then be totaled and subtracted from the cost of the intervention itself to obtain the net cost as a result of the intervention. If that total is negative, the dollar amount is the total savings produced by the intervention. As shown in Table 5.16, each of these types/categories showed a positive impact as a result of the intervention, yielding net reductions in crime. Moreover, the average cost to society for each crime type exceeded the total cost of the intervention.

Our estimates for total crime were comprised of all offense categories provided by the Cincinnati Police Department, which included those that were outlined in Table 3.4 in the Research Design and Methods section. Thus, the average of those offense categories that were available was used to estimate the cost in 2008 for total crime. However, in the impact analysis, the crime categories employed incorporated multiple crime types (e.g., violent crime included criminal homicide, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault and total crime included all crime types). Due to this aggregation of crimes by category rather than by type, only individual crime types were used in the overall cost-benefit estimation to avoid erroneously double counting certain incidents, such as assaults, which were already included in the equation. Therefore, the savings described below do not include the cost

---

27 Only those crime categories that were found to be significantly impacted were included in the cost-benefit analysis. This technique was used to capture the impact of the intervention and not the natural
reduction for the aggregated crime categories of total crime and violent crime that were found to be significantly reduced, with reductions of $17,639.975 and $16,826,380, respectively. If total or violent crime were included in the analysis, either category alone would have resulted in a significant net savings for Cincinnati.

The data available for impact analysis purposes included an assault category that combined both aggravated and simple assaults. With only costs associated with aggravated assaults available, we used the cost associated with the lowest crime category for 2008, larceny/theft, as a proxy for simple assaults, and combined estimates for simple and aggravated assaults to generate an estimate of $7,562 per assault event. Given a reduction in 1.82 assaults per month, we therefore estimate that Safe City prevented a $13,763 cost to society per month (1.82 multiplied by $7,562) and an overall savings of $399,122 for the post-intervention period ($13,763 multiplied by 29 months).

Costs associated with vandalism were not available, so the lowest crime category, larceny/theft, was used as a proxy. With an average monthly cost to society of $12,175, which was derived from a significant reduction in vandalism of 1.61 incidents per month and a per incident cost of $7,562, the savings over the 29-month period totaled $353,075 ($12,175 multiplied by 29 months).

With the cost of Cincinnati’s Western Corridor Safe City Project totaling $221,093, the savings from both assaults and vandalism far exceed the money that was spent. The monthly cost applied over the 29-month post-intervention period results in a savings of $752,197, which is a savings of $531,104 after the intervention costs are accounted for. It is also important to note that assaults, as well as other crimes such as larcenies, were declining at the end of our evaluation period. Therefore, additional savings may be realized as the intervention continues beyond 30 months.

CONCLUSION

Survey findings indicate that Cincinnati’s Western Corridor Safe City Project achieved some of its stated goals, increasing perceptions of safety through CPTED activities and increased foot patrols, as well as increasing the likelihood that victimized businesses report crimes to the police. However, businesses also reported a lack of fluctuation of crime.
awareness of the Safe City initiative and were more likely to report experiencing a robbery following the Safe City intervention. This increase in robberies may well reflect reality, in that robberies did increase in the third quarter of 2007 but ultimately dropped (although not statistically significantly) over time. In fact, total crime was reduced significantly – albeit only marginally – with no signs of displacement. Results of the cost-benefit analysis indicate that the cost of the intervention is relatively low, with the savings to society associated with prevented assaults far outweighing the costs associated with implementing a crime and disorder prevention program such as Safe City.

Overall, during the evaluation time period, the Cincinnati’s Western Corridor Safe City Project could be viewed as a modest success. Findings from interviews with Safe City stakeholders suggest that a large measure of this success stems from Cincinnati’s long history of community efforts to address crime in partnership with the police. These pre-existing relationships were likely critical in building trust, increasing communications among stakeholders, and yielding reductions in crime and increased perceptions of safety. Indeed, the fact that Cincinnati had engaged in several previous crime prevention initiatives meant that Safe City partners already possessed in-depth knowledge of the crime and disorder issues, enabling them to hit the ground running with Safe City. However, relationships alone were not enough to generate the support and funds sufficient to implement the ambitious CCTV system Safe City leaders had envisioned within the evaluation project period, which spanned over three years in duration. It is important to acknowledge that the Safe City initiative in Cincinnati is still underway, making these impact analysis findings perhaps premature in light of the fact that the city remains dedicated to launching a widespread public surveillance system throughout the Safe City focus area.
Chapter 6

Chula Vista Safe City Project, Chula Vista, California

BACKGROUND

Chula Vista, California, is a city of approximately 225,000, the second largest city in San Diego County and the fourteenth largest city in California. Located seven miles south of downtown San Diego and seven miles north of the United States-Mexico border, Chula Vista is demographically diverse; its population is 29 percent white (non-Hispanic), 13 percent Asian, and 4 percent black. Approximately half of the population also identify as Hispanic. The median family income is $71,298 (above the national average of $58,526). Recently cited as one of the fastest growing cities in the United States, Chula Vista’s population increased by 25 percent from 2000 to 2005, with its commercial and industrial sectors following similar trends.

Historically, violent crime in the San Diego region had been on the rise in recent years, with the rate of increase outpacing the national average in the late 1980s and early 1990s. However, the violent crime rate began to decrease in 1992, continuing a downward trend leading up to the inception of Safe City in Chula Vista. However, during the time Safe City commenced in Chula Vista, robberies were increasing. In fact, between 2003 and 2007, robbery was the only violent crime type to increase (30 percent) across the San Diego region. Out of the 4,313 robberies in 2006, 351 occurred in Chula Vista. Robberies, however, did not feature prominently in the retail area that was ultimately selected as the Safe City focus area. Prior to Safe City activities in 2004 and 2005, the top five crimes for the area were: larceny, motor vehicle theft, burglary, assault,


\(^{29}\) In a survey of city mayors, Chula Vista was ranked 21st out of 100 fastest growing cities in the United States. It is the seventh fastest growing city in California. Accessed at: http://www.citymayors.com/gratis/uscities_growth.html.


\(^{31}\) Ibid, see Appendix Table 12.
and forgery/fraud. These crimes accounted for nearly eighty-five percent of all crime, with larcenies (34.2 percent) far exceeding any other category.32

**STRUCTURE OF CHULA VISTA SAFE CITY CASE STUDY**

The Chula Vista Safe City case study begins with a narrative describing the timeline of Safe City activities. This description is followed by a summary of project goals and objectives identified by Safe City partners, and a discussion of the extent to which the project activities they set out to accomplish these goals were successfully implemented. The results of a pre- and post-intervention crime and disorder survey of businesses located in and around the Safe City focus area will then be presented, followed by the results of a pre-and post-intervention Difference-in-Differences analysis, which assesses the Chula Vista Safe City Project’s impact on reported crime. These analysis results are complemented by a section describing qualitative findings derived from one-on-one interviews with Safe City stakeholders. Analyses of changes in crimes and associated cost-benefit analyses explore the degree to which Chula Vista’s Safe City program resulted in cost-effective reductions in crime. The case study concludes with a summary of the findings and implications across these data collection and analysis activities.

**SAFE CITY PLANNING ACTIVITIES: MAY – OCTOBER 2006**

The initial plans for Safe City in Chula Vista began in May 2006, when representatives from the Target Corporation met with CVPD staff to introduce and discuss the Safe City concept. CVPD expressed interest in implementing Safe City and agreed to spearhead the effort in Chula Vista, naming the initiative “Chula Vista Safe City.” Over the course of several months, CVPD met with Target to identify the Safe City coverage area, and to develop the mission, goals and plans for administering and implementing the Chula Vista Safe City project.

**Identification of Focus Area**

The Safe City focus area is a business district located in the northwest section of Chula Vista. The area, represented in Figure 6.1, includes over 50 businesses with major

---

32 Chula Vista Police Department analysis of reported crime in Safe City area, October, 2006.
retail establishments, such as Target and Wal-Mart, strip malls, a city park, and a Department of Motor Vehicles satellite office.

Figure 6.1. Chula Vista Safe City Focus Area for UI Evaluation

The Chula Vista Safe City focus area is further broken down into five sub-areas to better target specific crime and disorder issues and response strategies (see in Appendix F).

**Development of Mission and Goals**

The “project concept” or mission of the Chula Vista Safe City project, as described to the Target Corporation, is “a partnership among law enforcement, local government, businesses, and others to address existing criminal activity, to reduce the risk of future criminal activity, and to promote a safe environment.”

Specifically, the goals of the Chula Vista Safe City project were to:

- Increase employee and customer safety in and around retail establishments;
• Increase customer desire to shop in the retail area;
• Reduce costs associated with crime repairs and prevention;
• Increase retailer responsibility for preventing crime around stores;
• Increase proactive policing in neighborhood; and
• Improve law enforcement and community relations.

Project Administration

The CVPD Community Relations Unit (CRU), a branch of the Administrative Services Division, was identified as the entity to lead the administration of the Chula Vista Safe City project. CRU was viewed as the most logical choice for this role because its existing responsibilities included problem solving crime and disorder problems in Chula Vista and it is the primary unit within CVPD that serves as a liaison between the department and the community. Indeed, the mission of CRU is to “increase community confidence in the Police Department and optimize police responsiveness by sharing concerns, perspectives, ideas and solutions with community stakeholders.”34 With respect to Safe City, CRU staff serve a clearinghouse role for information and are the lead convenors for retailers and the police. In addition, the Research and Analysis Unit (RAU) within the Fiscal Operations/Research Division works closely with CRU to develop and administer Safe City.

Due to the close proximity of National City, CVPD reached out to the National City Police Department to help partner in the Safe City effort. National City Police were invited to and attended meetings and provided CVPD with data on calls for service and crimes reported for the surrounding Safe City area covered by National City Police Department.

33 Quote taken from January 26, 2007 letter to Target Corporation from Chula Vista Police Chief Richard Emerson.
IMPLEMENTATION PHASE: OCTOBER 2006 – PRESENT

Recruitment of Partners: October 2006

The CVPD first identified potential Safe City business partners by driving through the focus area and recording each business’s name and address. They used this information to create aerial maps and a database with contact information for the 55 businesses that were identified. Shortly after the drive through, four CVPD staff members walked the entire focus area, introduced themselves to the manager of each business and handed out an introductory cover letter about the Chula Vista Safe City project and an invitation to the first Safe City meeting at the police department. They also asked each business to complete a short business survey to learn more about retailer concerns with crime and disorder in the focus area. Ultimately, 80 percent of the businesses completed and returned the survey.

From the surveys, police learned that “unwanted people hanging out on [the] property,” was the most frequently cited concern, with nearly 90 percent of business owners indicating that this had been a problem in the past six months. The survey data also provided a baseline measurement of the type and extent of problems in the area that was later compared to subsequent more comprehensive business survey data conducted by both CVPD and Urban Institute researchers.

To recruit additional law enforcement partners, staff from the CRU gave presentations on Safe City during roll call and asked officers to volunteer their time to the effort. More than 15 patrol officers signed up to volunteer. Additionally, a short survey was distributed to all patrol officers asking for their assessments of the crime and disorder problems in the Safe City focus area. In total, 92 officers completed the survey. As the survey was administered during roll call, this represents an almost 100 percent response rate.

The first Chula Vista Safe City project meeting was held on October 19, 2006 at the CVPD. Approximately 50 people were in attendance. The CVPD presented the results of the business survey, officer survey, and the analysis of data on crimes and calls for

---

35 The officers who volunteered for Safe City worked Safe City into their ongoing policing activities. They did not receive overtime or extra pay.
service in the focus area. The police survey asked officers to compare crime and disorder in the Safe City target area with other commercial areas in the jurisdiction; 64 percent of officers felt that crime and disorder was about the same, 27 percent thought crime and disorder in the Safe City area was more severe and 9 percent believed it was less severe in the Safe City area than other commercial areas. Officers were also asked whether they thought that crime and disorder had increased, decreased or stayed about the same in the Safe City area during the preceding six months. Seventy-nine percent of officers thought that crime and disorder had stayed the same, 17 percent thought it had increased, and 4 percent felt that it decreased. Lastly, officers were asked to rank crime and disorder problems in the focus area by most serious to least serious. The top four (out of twelve) crimes and disorder problems were: shoplifting, transients/loitering/sleeping, vehicle burglary (i.e., car break ins) and vehicle theft. A separate analysis of the top crime and calls for service types logged in the area identified auto thefts and disturbances as the top calls for service.

A total of 336 respondents across 27 businesses completed the business survey. Those surveyed included both managers and employees. Respondents reported feeling relatively safe in the Safe City area, with 55 percent feeling “very safe” and 21 percent feeling “somewhat safe.” At the same time, respondents reported being either “somewhat concerned” (42 percent) or “very concerned” (37 percent) about crime and disorder around their businesses. Like the police officers, the majority of respondents believed that crime and disorder remained the same over the six months prior to the survey. The top ranked crime and disorder concerns according to business survey respondents included: vehicle theft (60 percent), vehicle burglary (59 percent), shoplifting (50 percent) and robbery (49 percent). In a separate analysis, CVPD found that 8 percent of

---

36 It should be noted that employees and managers were surveyed at different time periods. Managers were surveyed in October 2006 while employees were surveyed in August 2007. The results presented combine both of these surveys.

37 One thing Chula Vista PD noticed in analyzing the employee survey data was that more employees indicated they were “not too concerned” about crime in the area than the managers surveyed 10 months earlier. Also, fewer employees indicated they were “very concerned” compared to the managers from the earlier survey. This could be due to the CPTED changes that took place between October 2006 and August 2007, or could just indicate that employees were less concerned about crime than managers.
Safe City area business employees (n=120) have very high risk vehicles and about 50 percent (n=750) do not have passive immobilizers.\(^{38}\)

**November – December 2006**

Two weeks after the first meeting, CVPD conducted a CPTED assessment of the Safe City area. A CRU staff person with expertise in CPTED led the assessment and was joined by fellow CRU and RAU colleagues, police officers, and several business partners. The assessment took approximately five hours, with an hour devoted to each of the five sub-areas. Photos were also taken to document environmental issues that could contribute to crime and disorder.

Subsequently, over 50 recommendations were included in a spreadsheet to organize CPTED concerns, recommendations, approximate cost, implementation status and responsible party by location. Issues of particular concern included overgrown foliage; evidence of public drinking (discarded beer cans and small hard liquor bottles); access control to private or semi-private property; panhandling hotspots identified through the business survey; unsecured trash bins; and transient encampments.

Also during this time period, CVPD, Safe City business partners, and the city’s legal staff worked with a graphic designer employed by the City of Chula Vista to develop four signs to be posted in the focus area. Three signs were created in both English and Spanish to address top issues identified in the business survey: panhandling; loitering, open containers and overnight camping; and trespassing. The fourth sign was developed with the aim of “branding” the Chula Vista Safe City area. RAU staff developed a map of suggested placement of approximately 175 signs and CRU staff worked with the Public Works Department to visually inspect each site for the most appropriate and effective placement of signage. CVPD convened the second all-partner Safe City meeting on December 7, 2006. CVPD staff presented and discussed the results of the CPTED, along with the results of the initial business and officer surveys. CPD staff stated that in order to be successful, Safe City partners would have to prioritize the crime and disorder problems to focus their efforts.

---

\(^{38}\) Passive immobilizers use a key that contains a computer chip which communicates with the car's engine so without the proper key, the only way to steal the car is to tow it.
Chapter 6

Safe City partners therefore identified five problems as the top priorities the Chula Vista: (1) Auto theft; (2) Shoplifting; (3) Transient disorder; (4) Panhandling; and (5) Day laborer disorder. Lastly, a Target representative at the meeting suggested a steering committee be formed to help direct the project.

January – February 2007

At the third all-partner meeting, CVPD proposed a seven-month timeline to research and develop responses to the five crime and disorder priority issues identified by the partnership. The group discussed the role of the Steering Committee and its membership. A total of ten business representatives and one community organization volunteered to serve on the committee.

The partnership then outlined the following responsibilities of the Steering Committee:

- Help develop the overall direction of the Safe City project by proposing and approving future meeting agendas;
- Attend all meetings; and
- Decide as a group how Safe City funds will be spent.

The first Steering Committee meeting was held six weeks later. Agenda items included selecting a spokesperson, exploring the possibility of developing a Safe City website, and developing measures of success for the project.

In addition to the establishment of a steering committee, one of the business partners present at the January all-partners meeting suggested that an evening CPTED assessment be conducted of their business area. The assessment was conducted at the end of January, with four business partners, six sworn officers and three civilian staff members. Issues of concern included dark areas/lighting needs, interrupted lines of sight, and access control. Recommendations were compiled in a report and incorporated into the spreadsheet of CPTED recommendations.

Around that same time period, one of the business partners posted signs prohibiting transient encampments in their business area in response to recommendations that came out of the first CPTED assessment. A street team of CVPD officers familiar with the area
of transient encampments visited the area periodically to inform the individuals that they needed to leave. Foliage providing coverage for the encampments was removed and a contractor was hired by the City of Chula Vista to rid the area of garbage and debris. When the officers visited the area three months later, they noted that the transient encampments were gone. CVPD pointed out that the encampments may not have disappeared entirely; a more likely explanation was that they were doing a better job of hiding from the authorities.

**March – April 2007**

In early March 2007, a fourth all-partner meeting was convened, focusing specifically on the problem of auto theft. Prior to the meeting, RAU staff reviewed auto theft incident reports, researched literature on vehicle theft, and conducted telephone interviews with auto theft victims. The results of this research were presented before the group, including the findings that about 30 percent of 2006 auto theft victims were staff employed by the two large retailers in the Safe City area, and that most auto thefts were concentrated in the three largest parking lots in the area. An informal review of case files by the CVPD found that private security bike patrols implemented in one of the three parking lots midway through 2006 reduced auto thefts by almost 75 percent.

The group proposed a variety of recommendations based on these findings, including:

- Providing Safe City businesses with anti-auto theft brochures;
- Providing employees with subsidies to purchase vehicle kill switches; and
- Implementing bicycle patrols in the most at-risk parking lots.

Following this meeting, representatives of the businesses associated with the three largest parking lots met to discuss how they could work together on implementing the recommendations. At the end of April, one of the business partners completed a month-long initiative to clean up dense landscaping surrounding their business and replace it with ground cover. This was done in response to recommendations that came out of the CPTED assessments, which determined that overgrown foliage could be contributing to crime and disorder in the area. Also in response to CPTED recommendations to increase
natural surveillance, two other business partners replaced broken light fixtures
surrounding their business and installed new light fixtures during the month of March.

Additionally, a second Steering Committee meeting was held and addressed holding a
media kick-off event announcing the Chula Vista Safe City Project, soliciting financial
support from project partners, creating a Safe City website, reviewing CPTED
recommendations, and drafting a list of measures of success.

May – June 2007

In early May, the Steering Committee partnered with the CVPD and chose a service
provider to create the Chula Vista Safe City website.39 Late in the month, the fifth all-
partner meeting was held focusing on the problem of shoplifting. CVPD research into
calls for service found that relatively few stores in the Safe City focus area called police
for assistance with shoplifting incidents.

To learn more about the nature and incidence of shoplifting in the Safe City area,
RAU staff developed and administered a store manager survey. Based on the survey
results, a review of recent literature on shoplifting, and a demonstration of anti-
shoplifting tactics used at the local Target store, RAU staff presented the following
findings to the group:

- Covert observational research indicates that 1 in 20 people entering a drug store
  will steal something. If this theft rate were to hold true for Safe City stores, a
  small store (100 customers per day) would experience about 1,500 thefts per year
  of merchandise valued at approximately $31,000.40
- It is cost prohibitive to hire the number of security staff that would be necessary
  to catch and process all or most shoplifters; in addition, there is little evidence that
  arrests reduce shoplifting.

---

39 The Chula Vista Safe City website can be found at: http://www.netsential.com/trialchulavistapd/default.aspx?MenuitemID=165/MenuGroup/Safe+City.htm
40 These figures assume the store is open six days a week and the average price of stolen items is $20.
• The most promising approaches to reducing shoplifting focus on emphasizing prevention over detection, and reducing the amount of time spent processing those who are caught stealing.

Based on these findings, CVPD staff recommended that stores with concerns about shoplifting periodically conduct daily inventories of “hot products” to determine the true level of loss; focus on making it harder to steal the hottest items and those targeted by amateurs; conduct “indoor CPTED” assessments; and routinely interview shoplifting suspects to learn how to deter shoplifters. The CVPD offered to work with Safe City stores to develop a tailored shoplifting assessment and reduction plan; three stores requested assistance, and CVPD staff is currently working to finish this plan and plans to pilot test this approach with one of the stores.

The media kick-off event took place on May 31, 2007. Prior to the meeting, CVPD, Safe City partners and the Target staff based in Minneapolis helped prepare by sending invitations to all Safe City partners, developing an agenda, preparing a media packet with frequently asked questions, and inviting and following up with local English and Spanish-speaking media outlets. A business partner and Steering Committee member created a banner featuring the names of Steering Committee member businesses to use as a backdrop for the event. In addition, a few Safe City signs created by the group were posted to brand the area during the media kick-off event. Five businesses ultimately pledged financial resources to the Chula Vista Safe City project totaling $4,000.

July – August 2007

In June and July 2007, about 60 Safe City signs, in English and Spanish, were posted throughout the Safe City focus area. Copies of the signs are included in Appendix G. The Steering Committee met during July 2007 for a presentation by a CCTV provider to explore the value in placing cameras in certain locations around the designated Safe City area. The Steering Committee was interested in further exploring CCTVs so a follow-up meeting was scheduled to discuss the prospects of pilot testing cameras and related logistical and implementation issues.

At the recommendation of the Steering Committee, employee and customer surveys were administered during July and August. The purpose of the employee survey was two-
fold: to assess employee levels of concern about specific crime and disorder problems identified earlier in the project, and to determine the number of employees who drove high-risk vehicles and would benefit from anti-theft device subsidies. The purpose of the customer surveys was to learn what concerns shoppers might have about the area. Draft surveys were circulated to all business partners for comment before they were distributed. Altogether, approximately 1,150 employee surveys were distributed and over 300 were hand-collected several weeks later, again by five CVPD staff who were each responsible for about 10 businesses. Customer surveys were administered midway through month 12 of the project at two locations. Unfortunately, CVPD staff had a difficult time administering surveys and did not collect enough information to analyze them. Despite staff having a well-marked booth outside of the Target and CVS stores, it appeared that most customers assumed they were selling something and did not want to stop either at the booth or when a staff member approached them.

During August, CVPD and Safe City business partners began an effort to address the issue of day laborers. About eight businesses in the Safe City area that were in close proximity to a fairly large day laborer gathering site expressed concerns about day laborers adding to congestion around businesses and possible deterrence of customers. CVPD conducted research on approaches other cities used to deal with day laborers (including site visits to nearby cities that were successfully addressing this issue) and presented the results of the research at all-partner meetings.

September 2007 – August 2008

From September 2007 through August 2008, Safe City Steering Committee meetings and all-partner meetings continued convening roughly every six weeks. In the Spring of 2008, CVPD coordinated a gathering in a public park to start a dialogue with some of the day laborers and to relay information shared with them by their business partners. CVPD learned a great deal of information from the day laborers, including that they did not want to be a disturbance to local businesses and wanted to work together to come up with a solution. This led to efforts on the part of CVPD to collaborate with the city’s Traffic Safety Commission with the goal of developing plans to construct a day laborer “loading
zone” to create a designated space for day laborers while minimizing impact on businesses and patrons.

During this time period, three ordinances were drafted to minimize the negative impact of day laborers and other loiterers in the Safe City area: an anti-panhandling ordinance, a no trespassing ordinance, and a shopping cart ordinance modeled after a successful ordinance used in a nearby city. These initiatives are still underway in partnership with Chula Vista city attorneys.

Two additional CPTED assessments were conducted, one during the day and one during the evening, in June 2008. CPTED solutions identified and planned for future implementation, included erecting a fence on a median in the Safe City shopping area to discourage panhandlers from standing on the median. Another planned intervention, the clean up of a business parcel, was delayed due to concerns about endangering protected wildlife. The city secured the help of a biologist and is scheduled to conduct the clean-up after bird mating season has concluded. A copy of the daytime CPTED report can be found in Appendix H and a copy of the nighttime CPTED report can be found in Appendix I.

**SUMMARY OF PLANNED AND ACTUAL ACTIVITIES**

For the most part, Chula Vista’s Safe City activities were focused on gaining a better understanding of the nature and underlying causes of the crime and disorder problems occurring in the designated Safe City site and strengthening pre-existing partnerships between law enforcement and businesses affected by these problems. The site’s planned and actual activities are detailed in the Chula Vista Safe City logic model found in Appendix J. The main accomplishments of the site include:

- Convening a kick-off meeting with approximately 50 attendees;
- Holding 16 partner meetings (10 full partner meetings and 6 steering committee meetings) with 15-30 people on average at full partner meetings and 10 at steering committee meetings;
- Conducting three (CPTED) walkthroughs, approximately three hours each, involving 4-6 CVPD staff and 6-8 community partners attending each walkthrough;
• Making over 50 CPTED recommendations to businesses;
• Removing a portable restroom that attracted transients and was in violation of code;
• Creating and posting 60 Safe City signs;
• Creating Safe City window clings for each of 55 businesses;
• Creating a Safe City website for use by partners and residents;
• Distributing and employing the crime prevention guides created by UI;
• Conducting interviews with day laborers and local businesses;
• Researching and conducting a site visit to Glendale, CA, to examine how they have innovatively dealt with day laborers;
• Working with the Traffic Safety Commission to create a day laborer loading zone;
• Working with businesses to remove dense landscaping, clean up transient encampments and install new lighting;
• Creating and distributing anti-panhandling signs; and
• Drafting an anti-panhandling ordinance (modeled after San Diego).

Notably, the Chula Vista Safe City partners considered investing in a public surveillance system as part of the intervention but determined that it was not feasible and would involve an unwise use of resources. It is important to note that these activities documented in the process evaluation for Chula Vista are only those that occurred during the designated evaluation period, which ended in August 2008. Many of the planned activities cited above are currently underway and may well be having a positive impact on crime reductions in the area. These post-evaluation period activities, their impact, and the costs and benefits associated with them are not documented in this report.

**PROCESS EVALUATION RESULTS**

The process evaluation results are presented in two sections below. The first section describes perceptions of Safe City partners on the project’s activities and effectiveness based on one-on-one interviews with project stakeholders. The second section describes the impact of the Chula Vista Safe City Project on perceptions of crime and disorder conditions and victimization experiences. These perceptions summarize baseline and follow-up surveys distributed to merchants in the Safe City area.
Safe City Participant Activities

In addition to the business survey whose findings are reported below, we sought to explore the nature and degree of activities and partnerships among Safe City stakeholders measured through a series of one-on-one interviews with these partners. These interviews focused on the extent to which: (1) Safe City goals were commonly understood and embraced; and (2) Safe City activities were implemented as planned. The following section summarizes key findings from these semi-structured interviews with selected Safe City stakeholders.

Identification and Understanding of Goals

Overall, the common goals identified by the partners were to: increase customer safety; increase customer desire to shop in the retail area; move crime and disorderly behavior out of the area; become more proactive; and become more involved with the community. Retail owners expressed that their primary goal for being involved in this initiative was for employees and customers to feel safe while at their establishments, stating that when customers feel safe they are more likely to patronize their businesses in the future. They were interested in reducing the problems occurring around their retail establishments so that they could reduce their expenditures on repairs and security measures. To accomplish these goals, retailers were fully willing to join forces with other business owners and the local police in order to remove elements that tend to foster criminal activity. Similarly, criminal justice partners (e.g., police, government officials) reported that their primary goal for participating in the initiative was to increase the involvement of the citizenry in solving crime and disorder problems. By working with retailers to identify and solve problems, criminal justice partners aimed to increase retailer responsibility for preventing crime around their stores.

Safe City Work Plan and Activities

Planning Phase

To identify the priority crime issues in the focus area that the partnership would address through the Safe City project, CVPD staff collected information using a retailer
survey, officer survey, CPTED walk through, and reviewed crime data (e.g., calls for service). Based on this information, the partners decided that their project would focus on auto theft, shoplifting, unwanted persons (e.g., transients, homeless persons, loiterers, panhandlers), and graffiti. While partners were able to articulate what they thought were the problems in the coverage area, they all thought that survey and crime analysis information from CVPD helped them feel like their concerns were justified. To them, the use of statistics helped lend credibility and a level of professionalism to the work that they were doing. They took pride in knowing that their work plan was data-driven.

To recruit CVPD staff for the Safe City project, CRU representatives gave presentations on Safe City during roll call and asked officers to volunteer to support the project. Several volunteers agreed to participate and they explained to the UI evaluation teams that their belief in the model’s goals and objectives was what made them decide to join the initiative. They expressed that a project aimed at helping community members’ problem solve crime and disorder issues would only help to make their jobs as law enforcement easier. For example, CVPD officers who volunteered to work on the project expressed that their job necessarily involved continuous involvement with the community, so Safe City was a natural extension of those efforts, demonstrating to community members that the police care. Moreover, officers wanted to participate in problem solving activities to help community members generate and implement feasible solutions to crime and disorder problems. Their experience, however, has taught them that community members can brainstorm creative solutions but that these solutions may not be feasible for police officers in the field either because the perceived solutions are illegal (e.g., violate individuals’ rights), or because the suggested solutions are outside police officer authority (e.g., requires the passage of zoning ordinances). Other officers expressed that Safe City interested them because they had not participated in this type of community-justice partnership and welcomed the opportunity to work with citizenry in this proactive way.

For some of the volunteers and retailers, working on a community-justice project was not a new concept. During our conversations with CVPD staff and retailers, they explained how they had worked with each other in the past and that they decided to join the Safe City partnership because of this prior working relationship. They viewed this
new crime prevention project as just another type of project for them to work on collaboratively. However, they also noted that what distinguished this project from other projects is that Safe City incorporates non-technical response strategies that focus on building relationships and increasing communication between public and private community stakeholders. They shared that the inclusion of retailers in what is commonly thought of as traditional criminal justice system work made the Safe City project a valuable and exciting change in the way they typically approach their jobs.

When asked about response strategies, partners reported that their interpretation of the Safe City model was to devise solutions that extend beyond technical response strategies such as surveillance cameras. They thought that the purpose of Safe City was to implement other strategies such as CPTED strategies, bike patrols, the posting of signs that describe and discourage problem behaviors, and the passage of local ordinances to help regulate problem behaviors. For example, the partners worked with city officials to pass an ordinance making it illegal to drink alcohol or smoke cigarettes in the park without a permit. Safe City partners believed that these ordinances were instrumental in helping curb some of the problem behaviors in the area.

**Formation of the Safe City Steering Committee**

A primary goal of the Chula Vista Safe City Project was to ensure that retailers have a leadership role. Although CVPD staff administered the project, they took considerable steps to ensure that retailers felt that their participation was valued and necessary for the success of the endeavor and that the Safe City partnership was a true collaboration between CVPD and the local business community. To this end, a steering committee was formed to provide leadership for the project. Ten retailers volunteered to serve on the steering committee and a retailer agreed to serve as the spokesperson. Other members of the steering committee included staff from CRU, staff from the CVPD research division, and the local Target representative. Although the steering committee was established early on in the process and met regularly, some CVPD staff and retailers expressed during interviews that the Safe city project was either under the direction of the CRU or the CVPD research division because they led meetings and communicated with partners.
Safe City Partners

CVPD, early on, worked with Target to define the scope for this project. The decision for the coverage area was based on distance from the local Target store and to a lesser extent, calls for service from particular retailers. CVPD staff made a firm decision not to expand beyond that initial focus area, believing that it was more desirable to realize success on a smaller scale before expanding the reach of their work. Thus, retailers within the coverage area were identified as partners for this project. Those partners interviewed by the UI evaluation team all knew who the other partners were even if they did not know each person’s name, and they indicated that all of the partners had equal value and all were important to its success. Overall, partners expressed that they liked the mix of people whose organizations were represented in the group, believing that the diverse group helped to ensure that solutions would meet the needs of multiple persons/entities.

Who attended meetings - There appeared to be a core group of partners that attend all meetings. This core group, most of whom also served on the Steering Committee, bonded over the issue of crime and disorder prevention and were considered by other partners as being the leaders of the collaborative. The criminal justice partners felt that people tend to come to meetings when the crime issue being discussed affects them directly, such as when they believe that the topic is most germane to their circumstances and they are looking for support from the police and other retailers. Partners who had regularly attended meetings from the beginning of the initiative observed that there were always new faces at the meetings and while at times that was frustrating because new members raised old concerns, older members also observed that this was indicative of the partnership’s ability to continuously attract retailers to attend meetings. Initially more of the larger retailers attended the meetings, but as the project progressed, a mix of large and small retailers began attending regularly.

Who did not attend meetings - Partners felt that retailers who did not attend meetings still supported their efforts and may just not have the time or resources to attend meetings during business hours. They also noted that small numbers of staff at some businesses was a factor for why some retailers did not attend meetings.
However, those who did not attend still received the information shared at project meetings through emails, mailing, and word-of-mouth and have, in some cases, implemented the crime prevention suggestions (e.g., cutting shrubbery behind the store to discourage people looking for hidden places to engage in illegal activity). While the partners felt it was unrealistic to get 100 percent participation, they did express hope that as successes of the partnership were publicized, more prospective Safe City partners would be inclined to participate as they get to know and trust more people in the group. Those interviewed also observed that the larger retailers, who would likely have more influence in encouraging others to participate, had not been attending meetings as regularly as the group hoped they would. Also, because the Chula Vista Safe City site includes a strip of property that belongs to another jurisdiction (National City), partners expressed that retailers in that other jurisdiction did not participate because the project was viewed as a Chula Vista project and not a National City project.

**Information Sharing** – The primary method of communication for the Safe City project was email, mailings, and in-person meetings. Most of the information shared about the Safe City project originated from the CRU staff, which sent out emails and hard mailings to the retailers that included meeting minutes, updates on project activities, and notices about upcoming meetings. To increase the exchange of information between officers and retailers, CRU staff gave each retailer with an email account an officer point-of-contact who they could contact in the case of non-emergency inquiries.

**Frequency of meetings** – The Safe City partners and Steering Committee members met on a monthly basis. Those interviewed believed that the frequency of meetings was sufficient and provided enough time in between meetings to make progress on desired goals. Respondents felt that meeting dates were well publicized (e.g., email notifications and mailings), the agendas were clearly articulated, the meetings were very structured, and that at the conclusion of each meeting there was a definite plan of action for the next steps.
**How they treated each other** – Partners indicated that meeting participants were courteous and professional and that everyone’s opinion was valued. While some partners may have contributed more to the discussion than others, all partners said that they felt comfortable sharing their thoughts even if they did not speak up during the meeting.

**Understanding of each other’s roles** – According to respondents, Safe City meetings have also increased partners’ understanding of one another’s roles in the community. The meetings provided an open environment in partners could discuss the nature of their work, what services they could provide, how they could contribute to the community’s overall safety, and their expectations from other community partners. Conversations during meetings helped police officers better understand what frustrates retailers, and retailers gained a better understanding of police officer resource limitations (e.g., delays in response time, what officers are allowed to do once they arrive) and their own role in crime/disorder prevention. Both retailers and police officers expressed that their participation in meeting discussions helped them gain a deeper appreciation for the work that they are all doing.

**Communication among Safe City Partners**

The Safe City partners met monthly either as a larger body (all partner meeting), or as a smaller group (Steering Committee). Prior to all meetings, CRU staff sent reminder emails to the partners including information on the meeting day, time and agenda items. Partners found these meetings, for the most part, to be well attended, interactive, and productive. Partners indicated that they typically left the meetings having learned something new and having worked on solidifying their relationship with others. They believed that the meetings led to action steps that were implemented, and increased knowledge that was useful for both their work and their private lives.

Prior to the Safe City project, most retailers and police communicated on an as-needed basis. They generally only spoke when there was a disagreement or problem, and some retailers expressed that they were reluctant to contact other retailers or the police
because they did not really know who could help them with crime/disorder concerns. Partners reported that their pre-Safe City communications with each other were non-existent, minimal or even adversarial, with retailers saying police were not meeting their needs, and police saying retailers were creating unnecessary work for law enforcement. Respondents believed that, as a result of participating in Safe City meetings, communication among all parties had greatly improved, and there were better relationships among the stakeholders. Partners were working together in ways they never had before and were becoming more comfortable contacting one another when needs arose because of their affiliation with the Safe City partnership. Those interviewed felt that the Safe City partnership served as a communication vehicle that was previously lacking; they now knew each other by name and felt that they had developed a rapport with one another. Specifically, partners felt that meetings led to an increased awareness of how retailers can assist with crime/disorder prevention, take more proactive approaches to community safety, and leverage resources more effectively.

**Partnership Strengths and Successes**

Partners were able to identify several strengths of their partnership that helped them to achieve their goals. Responses have been grouped into three themes: (1) high functioning members, (2) partner commitment, and (3) partnership synergy. Each is discussed below.

*High-functioning members* – Partners commented that they were able to move forward with their Safe City project largely because the members’ skills that enable them to work effectively in groups and to thoughtfully think through how to identify and address problems. Every partner expressed that they brought their own strengths to a group that was receptive to hearing from all persons.

*Commitment of partners* – Another strength of the project was that members were committed to making the project a success. Partners observed that there was always someone in the group who was willing to “roll-up their sleeves and get to work.” This willingness to work was something that partners found uncommon in other projects in which they have participated.
Synergy of the partnership – Some partners expressed that because they shared a common vision and approach to how the work should be done, they were able to operate as a unified group. They were able to focus on implementing their plan instead of working through common collaborative challenges such as issues of mistrust or battles over turf. They felt that this common mindset was a unique aspect of their partnership and questioned whether community members in other parts of the city would be able to come together and work as effectively.

Perhaps because of these identified strengths, partners reported they had experienced some successes with their partnership. The three primary successes cites by respondents are as follows:

CPTED walk through and implementation of suggestions – A clear success identified by partners were the activities of police officers and retailers joining together to inspect the project area during both day and night to identify elements that could foster crime and disorder (e.g., poor lighting, high brush). To them, the officers’ participation in this exercise known as a CPTED walk through demonstrated that CVPD was committed to the project and was willing to share its expertise in crime prevention. The officers pointed out retailers’ security vulnerabilities without making them feel like they were not doing their jobs well. Moreover, retailers learned about situational crime prevention and the changes that they could make to increase the safety and security of their businesses. To officers, this exercise was useful in showing retailers how they could take action to minimize some of the elements that can lead to problems around their establishments. Officers took the opportunity to focus retailers on how they too could help prevent and reduce crime and disorder around their stores.

Another success of the CPTED walk through was the list of solutions that was generated from this activity. These solutions – building a pavilion, replacing fencing, planting trees, installing lights – suggested to the group by situational crime prevention experts at CVPD were not only implemented by SC partners, but also by other retailers in the area who did not actively participate in the initiative. The fact that non-participating members implemented some of the suggested changes was
viewed as a success of the Safe City project. Partners believed that the changes that were made have led to decreased transient activity and pan handling in the area.

**Building relationships and understanding roles** – Partners spent considerable time early in the process learning about each other’s roles in the community and how the work they do can benefit each other. An increased understanding of partner jobs and roles in the community has improved expectations about what services the police can offer and what responsibilities retailers can assume. Retailers reported that they have a better understanding of why police officers may be delayed in responding to a call, or why officers cannot take certain actions in response to problem behaviors and have legal procedures that they must follow when responding to a crime. Through conversations with retailers, officers have been able to understand better the day-to-day concerns of retailers and their viewpoints on what retailers believe is the job function of the police. Officers expressed that they now believe that retailers have a better understanding of an officers’ job, that they feel more appreciated, and that with time retailers will take on more of the responsibility of protecting the area around their retail establishments. The building of relationships was important to all partners and they reported that it was necessary for them to develop trust so that as they move forward with developing and implementing their work plan. They have worked out personality or group dynamics that otherwise would have hindered them from focusing on the goals and objectives of the project. Because they built camaraderie they were able to work through issues in a respectful manner, where each partner’s viewpoints were considered and valued.

**Meeting participation** – The fact that partners met on a regular basis and identified the issues they wanted to address for their partnership was considered by respondents to represent an important success. Through conversations at meetings, partners were able to identify and agree upon the major issues were and how they would be prioritized and addressed. Partners reported that because members had a common approach, the support of the city, and an equal voice around the table people were motivated to attend and participate in meetings.
Challenges and Lessons Learned

Despite the successes highlighted above, Chula Vista Safe City members articulated several challenges they faced in establishing and implementing their initiative. The following challenges have taught them some valuable lessons that they believed could help inform others considering to establish a similar collaborative.

*Starting a new project and partner participation* – Partners expressed that starting something that is new and unknown can be difficult. To encourage people to try something new or to participate in yet another crime prevention project requires that you persuade them that their involvement will yield meaningful results for them. Demonstrating that there is real benefit to the people that you are trying to get involved is often a challenge. Some partners felt that they had not made progress fast enough on implementing their solutions and believed that if they had been able to move forward and realize some successes early on this would have helped to increase buy-in to the project.

*Displacing problem behaviors to neighboring areas* – Partners expressed concerns that the efforts at successfully reducing crime and problem behaviors in the Safe City area may have simply moved those problems to a neighboring community. They observed that the goal should be to solve some of the underlying causes of crime and disorder problems, such as drug addiction, so that related crimes such as thefts would be reduced and not just displaced to other areas.

*Limited funding and resources* – Justice partners reported that funding for these types of projects is always a challenge. The time and resources necessary to implement the solutions and to sustain a partnership like Safe City requires additional funding over time.

*Shift in traditional roles* – Partners observed that one challenge of participating in a public/private initiative like Safe City is that it is often difficult to convince retailers and criminal justice officers that they each have a role in community public safety. Justice partners, and some retailers, found it hard to motivate some retailers to
participate, especially those retailers who think public safety is outside the scope of their jobs.

**Legal barriers and cultural sensitivity** – In the Chula Vista site one of the primary crime and disorder problems was with problem persons – namely aggressive panhandlers and day laborers. This problem is entangled in larger societal issues surrounding immigration and homelessness. In some regards Safe City partners questioned how they along could address such deeply entrenched and challenging societal issues experienced by most communities within the United States.

**Solutions that affect city property** – Results from the CPTED walk through identified areas around the retail establishments that partners wanted altered to reduce perceived signs of decay. A challenge arose when some of the proposed changes involved environmentally protected public spaces. Having to get city permission to remove vegetation from areas near stores was viewed as an unforeseen challenge that partners found difficult to overcome.

These challenges have taught the Chula Vista Safe City partners some valuable lessons. The following discussions are key pieces of advice they wanted to share with others.

**Develop a partnership database that includes property managers and multiple representatives from an organization** – An early task of the CVPD was to develop a Microsoft Access© database with contact information for all the retailers in the coverage area. Using information from the retailer survey, a database was constructed to include a key person for a specific location and up to five contacts per site. Staff members responsible for emails and mailings relied on this database for partnership contact information and found that having a structured way of contacting and tracking retailers was extremely useful. Staff reported that a lesson learned was to also include contact information for property managers and owners.

**Focus first on building relationships and developing trust among partners** – Partners stated that before one begins to devise a work plan that meets the needs of all
partners in the coverage area, partners first need to get to know and trust one another. This initial step of building relationships is key before a group can focus on the process and implementation of the project. Partners observed that building relationships and clearly understanding each other’s roles helps make working together easier in the long-run. They also recommended selecting leaders who have strong interpersonal, relationship, and team building skills to lead the group. Ideally, the partners thought that others contemplating the formation of a Safe City project should first work on building relationships and then work on adapting the Safe City model to their community.

**Understand the crime/disorder issues in your area before developing a Safe City work plan** – All partners thought that the statistics presented to them at meetings gave their initiative credibility and encouraged partners to stay engaged. Retailers expressed that while they could talk about what they perceived to be the major issues around their establishments, having hard numbers presented to them in professional manner made them feel that their concerns were validated. They appreciated receiving findings from the retailer survey because they could use the findings to encourage others to participate, and it helped them better understand other retailers’ perceptions of the community. They also appreciated that they developed a work plan that was based on statistics, which helped justify tackling their priority issues. Partners recommended that every project of this kind should begin with a survey of retailers. They found that the survey process was a useful way to introduce the Safe City concept to retailers, to help build the master participant database, and to encourage partners to attend the meeting to learn about the survey results.

**Seek advice and support from experienced partnerships; do not reinvent the wheel** – Partners all felt that other jurisdictions thinking about starting a Safe City initiative in their area should visit an established Safe City site. Learning from experienced collaboratives will alert newcomers to potential obstacles and also offer suggestions on how to start-up and maintain a project successfully. Partners thought that they could provide newer sites with useful information and have also found that the
official Safe City website\textsuperscript{41} is a valuable resource that could provide helpful materials for other sites, such as copies of meeting minutes and a detailed work plan. They welcomed others to reach out to the Chula Vista Safe City Steering Committee for advice and guidance.

\textit{Develop a focused work plan} – Some partners leading the project expressed that the Safe City initiative was a complex, long-term project with multiple stakeholders and as such was very intensive. While they enjoyed working on the project and learned a lot, they advised that other jurisdictions implementing Safe City should consider focusing their energies on one issue at a time.

**IMPACT ON PERCEPTIONS OF SAFETY AND VICTIMIZATION EXPERIENCES**

As described above, Chula Vista’s Safe City activities were designed to increase employee and customer safety in and around retail establishments; increase customer desire to shop in the retail area; reduce costs associated with crime repairs and prevention; increase retailer responsibility for preventing crime around stores; increase proactive policing in the neighborhood; and improve law enforcement and community relations. In order to assess the degree to which these intended outcomes were achieved, UI staff conducted pre- and post-intervention surveys of businesses in the Safe City evaluation site. This section describes the survey methodology employed and compares responses between survey waves.

**Survey Methodology**

During the Spring of 2007 research staff from the Urban Institute conducted a survey of Chula Vista businesses targeted for inclusion in the Safe City evaluation. A follow-up survey was conducted in February 2008. The purpose of the survey was to collect data on merchants’ perceptions of crime and safety in and around businesses located in the Safe City area. Specifically, the survey sought information on the degree to which Safe City achieved its desired impact on the following outcomes:

- Increasing perceptions of safety;

\textsuperscript{41} See www.mysafecity.com.
Increasing interactions with the local police;
• Decreasing crime and disorder victimization;
• Increasing the reporting of crime;
• Reducing the impact of crime on business;
• Increasing crime prevention efforts; and
• Increasing community connections with respect to crime prevention strategies and information sharing.

During the baseline survey, a total of 41 out of 55 Chula Vista businesses responded to the survey, representing a 75 percent response rate overall. The follow-up survey was distributed to the 41 businesses that responded during the baseline and a total of 34 surveys were completed, representing an 83 percent response rate. About half of surveyed businesses are small, with 10 or fewer staff, while the other half consists of medium to large business of 11 to 51 or more staff. The majority of businesses are located in an open-air shopping center. Results of both the baseline and follow-up surveys are presented below. Managers were surveyed during both waves, with approximately 60 percent (during both waves) having between one and eight years of experience.

Independent sample t-tests were conducted to test for significance (defined at p<.10) for all survey variables. Where applicable, significance is noted.

Perceptions of Safety

Chula Vista business survey respondents’ concerns about crime and disorder in the Safe City focus area appeared to lessen during the post-intervention survey wave. In 2007, 46 percent of respondents indicated feeling very concerned about crime and disorder. By 2008, the percentage of businesses that indicated this level of concern dropped to 32 percent. In addition, the percentage of businesses expressing feelings of neutrality increased from 2007 (19 percent) to 2008 (32 percent), as shown in Figure 6.2.
These reductions in concerns about crime and disorder are consistent with survey findings indicating that 2008 respondents felt safer than those surveyed prior to Safe City implementation (an increase from 21 percent to 36 percent). While the largest share of Chula Vista survey respondents during both survey waves (61 percent in 2007 and 55 percent in 2008), indicated feelings of neutrality with respect to feeling safe in the area in and around their businesses, no businesses in either survey wave felt very unsafe and small percentages of businesses felt unsafe (see Figure 6.3).
Survey respondents cited both the presence of homeless and transient people and panhandling/begging as the two most common conditions or activities in and around their businesses during both survey waves. A by-product of these problems is the presence of trash in the area, which was cited by 40 percent of 2007 respondents as a common condition. In 2008, however, only 27 percent cited trash as a common problem, suggesting that the CPTED efforts employed by Chula Vista Safe City partners had an impact on survey respondents’ perceptions of trash as a common condition in their business areas. Figure 6.4 presents the share of businesses that observed these conditions or activities in the Safe City area.
Figure 6.4. Common Conditions in Business Area, Chula Vista

Contact with Local Police

The percentage of businesses reporting contact with Chula Vista police remained steady at exactly 66 percent from 2007 to 2008. When asked how they would describe their most frequent contacts with police, the largest percentage of businesses in 2007 (42 percent) indicated that their contacts were due to reporting crime, which remained relatively steady at 41 percent during 2008. However, the largest percentage of surveyed businesses in 2008 (44 percent) indicated a police officer responding to a call was the most frequent method of contact with police, reporting an increase of 12 percentage points from the pre-intervention survey (32 percent in 2007).

When asked how often the police visit their businesses without being asked to do so, surveyed businesses answered similarly in 2007 and 2008. In 2008, 52 percent of respondents indicated that police never visit their businesses without being asked, 16 percent indicated police visit annually, and another 16 percent indicated that police visit
monthly without being asked. It was very rare that police would visit businesses weekly (10 percent) or daily (7 percent) without being asked. It is important to acknowledge, however, that increased police patrolling of businesses was not a stated component of the Safe City intervention.

Chula Vista Safe City businesses overwhelmingly reported feeling comfortable approaching the police, with no businesses reporting that they feel uncomfortable or very uncomfortable approaching Chula Vista police during either survey wave. The large majority of respondents strongly agreed (63 percent in 2007 and 53 percent in 2008) or agreed (18 percent in 2007 and 19 percent in 2008) that they feel comfortable approaching the police. On the whole, survey respondents expressed satisfaction with Chula Vista police efforts. A combined 65 percent of respondents strongly agreed (44 percent) or agreed (21 percent) that they were satisfied with police efforts in 2007. This remained steady at 67 percent in 2008 (37 percent agreed and 30 percent strongly agreed). Figure 6.5 illustrates survey respondents’ satisfaction with police efforts.

Figure 6.5. Satisfied with Police Efforts, Chula Vista

![Satisfied with Police Efforts, Chula Vista](image)

During both survey waves, a large majority of businesses felt that Chula Vista police are interested in assisting them. A combined 75 percent strongly agreed (54 percent) or agreed (21 percent) in 2007. This remained virtually unchanged at a combined 72 percent agreeing (24 percent) or strongly agreeing (48 percent) in 2008. Only small percentages of businesses were neutral (10 percent in 2007 and 17 percent in 2008), disagreed (10
percent in 2007 and 3 percent in 2008), or strongly disagreed (5 percent in 2007 and 7 percent in 2008) when asked if police were interested in assisting them.

Chula Vista post-intervention survey respondents were also asked to describe any changes in local police presence in the area around their business. The largest share of businesses (72 percent) responded that police presence had stayed the same. The next largest share of businesses indicated that police presence had increased in the six months prior to the survey (21 percent in 2008). A small percentage of businesses reported that police presence had decreased (7 percent in 2008), and no respondents reported having never seen the police in the past six months.

### Experience with and Reporting of Crime

The most commonly cited crime and disorder events in the Chula Vista project area remained relatively similar from 2007 to 2008 (see Figure 6.6). Well over half of surveyed businesses reported the following: unwanted people on property (68 percent in 2007 and 2008), panhandling (56 percent in 2007 and 50 percent in 2008), graffiti (54 percent in 2007 and 65 percent in 2008), and bad check or card fraud (51 percent in 2007 and 47 percent in 2008). However, two statistically significant increases in perceptions of frequency of crime and disorder were also reported: burglary increased by 14 percentage points between 2007 and 2008, and the presence of disorderly persons increased from 17 to 32 percent of respondents in that same time period.

Despite the increases in perceptions of crime frequency cited above, the rate at which Safe City businesses reported crimes to the police remained the same from 2007 to 2008 (see Figure 6.6). While a majority of Chula Vista businesses (65 percent in 2007 and 64 percent in 2008) reported crimes they had experienced some of the time, a significant minority of respondents (22 percent in 2007 and 18 percent in 2008) reported crimes none of the time. Only 14 percent of respondents in 2007 and 18 percent in 2008 indicated that they reported all crime to the police.
Figure 6.6. Perceived Frequency of Crime and Disorder in Past 6 Months, Chula Vista

Impact of Crime

The percentage of respondents who felt that crime had an impact on their business decreased somewhat – from 73 percent in 2007 to 62 percent in 2008. As indicated in Figure 6.7, responses varied over both years when asked to specify the type of impact crime had. Interestingly, no businesses indicated that crime caused them to postpone a business investment in 2007, while a statistically significant 12 percent of businesses indicated it had caused them to postpone such an investment in 2008. It is possible that the economic recession also caused delays in investment during this time, but controlling for this is outside of the scope of this survey. Also statistically significant was a decrease from 7 percent to 0 percent in the share of businesses who reported changing stores’ layout in response to crime and disorder.
Figure 6.7. Crime Impact, Chula Vista

As indicated in Figure 6.8, in 2007, almost 80 percent of Chula Vista survey respondents incurred some form of business expense due to crime in the six months prior to survey administration versus 90 percent in 2008. While a greater percentage of businesses spent $500 or less in 2008 than in 2007 (37 percent versus 29 percent), a greater percentage of businesses spent $5,000 or more in 2008 (23 percent) than in 2007 (9 percent).

Figure 6.8. Cost of Crime, Chula Vista
Preventing Crime

The security measures Chula Vista respondents took to protect their properties against crime problems did not change meaningfully from 2007 to 2008. The most common measure during both years was the installation of alarms. The installation of closed-circuit television (CCTV) or security cameras and the installation of lighting were the next most commonly cited security measures. In addition, a notable share of respondents (20 percent in 2007 and 32 percent in 2008) stated that they had taken no measures to secure their properties against crime problems in the six months prior to the survey. Figure 6.9 lists security measures taken in order of frequency.

The majority of Chula Vista Safe City businesses (63 percent in 2007 and 54 percent in 2008) spent some money on crime prevention in the six months prior to the survey. In 2007, 33 percent spent $1,000 or less and 30 percent spent $1,001 or more. The percentage of businesses spending $1,001 or more decreased in 2008 (from 30 percent to 18 percent). Specifically, those that spent between $1,001 and $4,999 in 2007 comprised
21 percent (of 30 percent spending $1,001-$5,000 or more), this decreased to 7 percent (of 18 percent) in 2008. The share of those spending $5,000 or more remained relatively constant at about 10 percent during both waves. It is difficult to interpret this finding as indicating that crime prevention is costing businesses less. It is possible that at the time of the follow-up survey fewer businesses needed to spend money on certain crime prevention measures (such as alarms) since they had already invested in these measures during the baseline period.

**Community Connections**

Levels of exchanging information about crime and security remained similar from 2007 to 2008. The largest share of Chula Vista businesses (39 percent in 2007 and 44 percent in 2008) reported that they never exchanged crime and security information with neighboring business owners and managers. A notable minority, however, reported exchanging information on a monthly basis (31 percent in 2007 and 25 percent in 2008). Despite these levels of interaction, the majority of surveyed businesses were aware of Chula Vista community partnerships to address crime and disorder (62 percent in 2007 and 52 percent in 2008). Safe City also remained well known in both survey waves, with 32 percent of respondents naming it in 2007 and 35 percent naming it in 2008. Attendance at community meetings to address crime and disorder also remained relatively unchanged among surveyed businesses from 2007 (31 percent) to 2008 (27 percent). During both waves, exactly 69 percent of businesses indicated that they were asked to participate in such a partnership.

**CHULA VISTA SAFE CITY BUSINESS SURVEY SUMMARY**

The results of analyses of pre- and post-Safe City survey responses suggest that the Chula Vista Safe City partnership was marginally successful in changing business’ perceptions of increased safety. In terms of overall perceptions, it is positive to note that while Chula Vista businesses were highly concerned about crime and disorder in and around their properties during 2007, their concerns lessened when measured in the post-
intervention survey wave. In addition, the percentage of respondents who felt safe in their business areas increased from 21 percent to 36 percent, and businesses reported a statistically significant reduction in trash around their businesses. These findings suggest that the Chula Vista Safe City Project’s focus on CPTED measures yielded improvements in the appearance of the area, increasing perceptions of safety.

Despite these increased feelings of safety, the survey results do not indicate any improvements in respondents’ interactions and communications with each other, the police, or the larger community. Chula Vista Safe City businesses continued to have frequent and largely positive interactions with the local police from 2007 to 2008, but no discernable improvements in those interactions were identified. Similarly, respondents during both survey waves reported similar levels of information exchange with other businesses about crime experiences and security strategies. Nonetheless, a majority of surveyed businesses indicated an awareness of Chula Vista community partnerships to address crime and disorder (62 percent in 2007 and 52 percent in 2008), with Safe City the most commonly named partnership.

Given that the key component of the Safe City model – increased communications among businesses and the police – was not accomplished, it is perhaps not surprising that across most crime types, no reduction in perceived levels of crime and disorder was detected between survey waves. What is somewhat surprising, however, is the fact that for two crime types, burglary and disorderly persons, significant increases in perceptions of frequency of occurrence were reported. This finding is troubling given that reducing unwanted persons – whether present due to panhandling, day laborer activity, or other reasons – was a main focus of the Safe City initiative. However, no statistically significant changes in panhandling or public intoxication were observed. It is possible that businesses reported an increase in disorderly persons because of an increased awareness of the problem due to Safe City activities.

42 The entrance of UI as the evaluator of Safe City in Chula Vista followed some start up activities in which CPD engaged, including outreach to businesses in the 3 months preceding the UI baseline survey. This explains why similar shares of respondents recognized the Safe City project in 2007 as in 2008.
IMPACT ANALYSIS

In order to measure the impact of the Safe City initiative in Chula Vista, UI researchers collected data on reported crimes from the Chula Vista Police Department (CVPD) for the period January 1, 2004 through May 31, 2008. Since the Safe City site bordered on National City, California, which has its own police jurisdiction, UI also obtained data from the National City Police Department (NCPV) for the same time period.

Description of the Chula Vista Safe City Evaluation Area

Analyses identifying significant changes in average monthly crime counts were conducted within three areas: (1) the intervention area; (2) a displacement zone; and (3) a matched comparison area in a different jurisdiction (see the Research Design and Methods section for a description of how the comparison area was selected). As previously discussed, the shopping center for Chula Vista contained two retail hubs and a...
city park, Eucalyptus Park. The two retail areas were strip malls with exterior entries, large parking lots for customers, and major retail establishments. One contained a Wal-Mart and Best Buy, and the other included a Target, Old Navy, Ross, and Party City. The Safe City focus area also included a few interspersed restaurants and businesses located on the roads along the boundary, such as McDonald’s and U-Haul. Our analyses included both retail areas, the city park, and the various other businesses and restaurants within the shopping area designated for the Safe City intervention. This area is bounded by a major freeway (SR-54) on the North, North Broadway Street on the West, and North Glover Avenue on the East. The Southern border does not follow directly along streets; rather, it mostly outlines the Southern portion of Eucalyptus Park and then along Fifth Avenue and C Street (see Figure 6.10).

Figure 6.11. Map of Chula Vista Comparison Area, Houston, Texas

The displacement zone for Chula Vista was located nearly two miles east of the intervention area, at Plaza Bonita. This area was selected because it was within close proximity to the Safe City intervention area and contained similar retail space, including a Target store, a Best Buy, and JCPenney. Although this retail area was not a strip mall and had different interior retail space, CVPD had advised us that the area was
experiencing similar crime and disorder issues, and therefore was likely to be an enticing alternative for offenders who were deterred by the Safe City initiative in Chula Vista.

The comparison area that most closely matched Chula Vista was the Northwest Crossing Centre in Houston, Texas. This site also contains a Target store as well as Marshall’s, Best Buy, Babies ‘R Us, and various other businesses and restaurants (see Figure 6.11 for a map of the Houston comparison area).

**Crime Trends Before and After Safe City Implementation**

The top reported crimes in the Chula Vista intervention area from 2004 through the end of May 2008 included (in order of frequency): larceny, motor vehicle theft, burglary, forgery/fraud, and damage/vandalism. As shown in Figure 6.12, one-third of reported incidents were larcenies (33 percent). Burglaries (15 percent) and motor vehicle thefts (18 percent) combined made up another third of reported incidents.

**Figure 6.12. Most Frequent Reported Crimes, Chula Vista Safe City, 2004-2008**
Prior to Safe City, the focus area experienced a marked drop in larcenies leading up to the startup of activities.\textsuperscript{43} Property crime also significantly decreased\textsuperscript{44} during this baseline period, contributing to a low monthly average of reported crime prior to Safe City implementation. The trends for motor vehicle theft and burglary somewhat mirrored each other during the baseline period until the end of 2006, when burglary began to decline as motor vehicle theft continued to periodically spike. Damage/vandalism tended to increase over time and then declined to pre-intervention levels in the fourth quarter of 2007. Of the theft-related offenses, unusual spikes were seen during the fall/winter months rather than spring/summer.

**Statistical Analysis Results**

Given the baseline results and the priorities of CVPD and the Safe City partners as outlined in the logic model, the analyses in Chula Vista examined ten categories of crime: (1) total crime, (2) violent crime, (3) property crime, (4) robbery, (5) burglary, (6) problem persons, (7) larceny, (8) forgery and fraud, (9) motor vehicle theft, and (10) vandalism. Larceny included a number of the theft-related issues that were cited by CVPD as being top crimes for the focus area, such as petty theft and grand theft. The public nuisance crimes, such as panhandling, public drunkenness, and disorderly conduct, which were most frequently reported by retailers as problems in the area, were grouped into the category “problem persons” for the analysis. Graffiti, forgery, and motor vehicle theft were all separated into individual categories.

When examining the mean change in crime before and after Safe City using an independent samples t-test, UI analysts found that although a few of the categories of crime were reduced, only robbery significantly declined (see Table 6.13). In fact, larceny, vandalism, and property crime all significantly increased over time.

To further investigate these findings, analysts introduced a comparison area in Houston, Texas, as a means for controlling for other factors that may be influencing the

\textsuperscript{43} Larcenies significantly decreased between 2004 and 2005, with the average number of incidents per month falling from 15 incidents to less than 8 incidents, \( p < .05 \).

\textsuperscript{44} Between 2004 and 2005, property crime, which includes burglary, larceny, and vandalism, significantly declined by nearly 6 incidents per month, \( p < .05 \).
crime rate.\footnote{See Research Design and Methods section for more details on the method used to select the Houston comparison area.} The timeframe that was included in the analyses was January 2005 through May 2008. The intervention date was set to October 2006, when the Safe City partners were initially recruited. Employing (DiD) analyses to ascertain what portion of the Chula Vista Safe City crime decline could be linked to the initiative itself, the means were compared with changes in crime in a comparison site in Houston, Texas. Because the comparison area was chosen for its similarity to the treatment area on a variety of factors, the comparison area offers a reasonable counterfactual of what would have occurred without the Safe City initiative. In fact, in the comparison area, crime increased by approximately one incident for every five months (or one fifth of an incident per month).

\begin{table}[h]
\begin{tabular}{lrrr}
\hline
Crime Type & Mean Before & Mean After & Change  \\
\hline
Total  & 29.48 & 31.25 & +1.77  \\
Robbery & 1.57 & 0.80 & -0.77\footnote{Significant at p<.05.}  \\
Burglary & 4.71 & 5.15 & +0.44  \\
Problem Persons & 0.24 & 0.20 & -0.04  \\
Larceny & 8.00 & 10.05 & +2.05\footnote{Significant at p<.05.}  \\
Forgery/Fraud & 2.14 & 2.20 & +0.06  \\
Motor Vehicle Theft & 5.33 & 6.25 & +0.92  \\
Vandalism & 1.19 & 2.30 & +1.11\footnote{Significant at p<.05.}  \\
Violent & 3.00 & 2.25 & -0.75  \\
Property & 19.24 & 23.75 & +4.51\footnote{Significant at p<.05.}  \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Mean Change in Reported Crime by Type, Chula Vista *}
\*Means were calculated based on reported incidents to police. The before period spanned from January 2005 through September 2006. The after period began in October 2006 and continued through the end of May 2008.
\end{table}

As depicted in Table 6.14, the DiD analyses revealed a significant decrease in average monthly robberies and a significant increase in vandalism incidents and property crime in the Chula Vista focus area following start of Safe City.
Table 6.14. Average Monthly Change in Reported Crime Incidents by Type, Chula Vista and Houston*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crime Type</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Before</th>
<th>After</th>
<th>Change</th>
<th>Difference-in-differences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>Treatment</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>-0.77</td>
<td>-0.96†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Comparison</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>+0.19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vandalism</td>
<td>Treatment</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>+1.11</td>
<td>+1.03†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Comparison</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>+0.08</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property</td>
<td>Treatment</td>
<td>19.24</td>
<td>23.75</td>
<td>+4.51</td>
<td>+4.54†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Comparison</td>
<td>11.38</td>
<td>11.35</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MV Theft</td>
<td>Treatment</td>
<td>5.30</td>
<td>6.25</td>
<td>+0.95</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Comparison</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>+1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Displacement Zone</td>
<td>5.90</td>
<td>7.80</td>
<td>+1.90</td>
<td>+2.00†</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Safe City initiative began prior to October 2006, but included planning activities such as setting goals and establishing a mission. These tasks were not thought to impact crime; therefore, the intervention point was determined to be October 2006, when Safe City partners were selected. †Significant at p<.05.

Since the comparison area analysis results indicate that robberies should have increased by 0.19 incidents per month in Chula Vista had the Safe City initiative not been implemented, that increase becomes a reduction in crime because it was, theoretically, prevented by the program. Moreover, the reported reduction in the actual focus area (0.77) is then added to the number of incidents prevented. Thus, overall, the average number of robberies prevented is 0.96, which can be attributed to the Chula Vista Safe City Project (see Figure 27).

However, vandalism increased by slightly more than one incident per month and property crime increased by more than four incidents per month. In the comparison area, damage/vandalism increased by nearly one incident for every ten months and property crime barely increased by 0.03 incidents per month. As a result, the Safe City initiative did not have an impact on either of these types of crimes or those that were not included in the table because they were not found to be significantly impacted. It is important to note, however, that crime in the Chula Vista Safe City focus area declined significantly in the months leading up to the intervention, plummeting in the spring and early summer of 2006. This significant decline by nearly half may have contributed to the lack of an effect and even an overall increase in reported crime during post-Safe City implementation due to a naturally occurring regression to the mean.
UI analysts also sought to assess whether crime was being displaced to nearby areas due to the Chula Vista Safe City Project. Since one of the main focal points of the initiative was reducing motor vehicle thefts, the analysis examined those incidents in relation to the comparison area. As shown in Figure 6.16, in addition to comparison of motor vehicle thefts in the treatment area to the comparison area, researchers also assessed theft of motor vehicles in Plaza Bonita, a nearby parking area associated with a mall similar to the one that was the focus of Safe City and thus a likely location for displacement. The DiD revealed that motor vehicle thefts in the displacement area did significantly increase over time by an average of 2 incidents per month. However, given that the analysis did not detect a significant reduction in motor vehicle thefts in the treatment area, it would be questionable to conclude that the increase in Plaza Bonita was a result of displacement.
Figure 6.16. Reported Motor Vehicle Thefts by Area, Chula Vista, 2005-2008

ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS

Following the initial analyses, as reported above, the Chula Vista Police Department provided UI with an updated crime data file and asked UI to assist with their local report by conducting further analyses. To accommodate this request, the pre- and post-intervention dates were altered to incorporate a “response period” during which time the Chula Vista stakeholders reported ongoing implementation efforts. The dates that were used for this analysis were as follows: a pre-intervention period from October 2004 through September 2006, with a response period of October 2006 through September 2007, and a post-intervention period of October 2007 through July 2009. This includes two years of pre-intervention data, the specified response period that Chula Vista used for implementing the intervention, and nearly two years of post-intervention data. The lack of additional data from the comparison site, however, precluded us from replicating the earlier analysis. The results below, which indicate significant reductions in crime in four crime categories, should therefore be interpreted with caution, as they are derived strictly...
from independent sample t-tests rather than a more rigorous Difference-in-Differences analysis.

Table 6.17. Mean Change in Reported Crime by Type, Chula Vista *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crime Type</th>
<th>Mean Before</th>
<th>Mean After</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>30.96</td>
<td>23.91</td>
<td>-7.05†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>-0.81†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>4.88</td>
<td>4.14</td>
<td>-0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem Persons</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larceny</td>
<td>8.71</td>
<td>8.05</td>
<td>-0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forgery/Fraud</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor Vehicle Theft</td>
<td>5.83</td>
<td>4.14</td>
<td>-1.69†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vandalism</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent</td>
<td>2.88</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>-1.10†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property</td>
<td>20.71</td>
<td>17.23</td>
<td>-3.48‡‡</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Means were calculated based on reported incidents to police. The before period spanned from January 2004 through September 2006. The after period began in October 2007 and continued through the end of July 2009.
†Significant at p<.05.
‡‡Significant at p<.10.

These findings show that total crime, robbery, motor vehicle theft, and violent crime were all significantly reduced following the intervention. When the significance threshold is relaxed slightly with p < .10, property crimes were also found to be significantly reduced. Larceny, however, was not found to be significantly impacted through this supplementary analysis, which may be explained by the significant drop in larcenies prior to the Safe City intervention referenced above.

Given the change in the time periods used in this analysis, a larger impact was found for Chula Vista. Total crime, which included all offenses, was found to be significantly reduced by 23 percent, where the initial analysis found a slight increase. Robberies continued to significantly decline by more than half. And, while motor vehicle theft and violent crime were not found to be significantly impacted previously, this analysis revealed a significant reduction by nearly 30 percent and 40 percent, respectively.

While these findings paint a more positive picture of how the Safe City initiative impacted crime in Chula Vista, an important caveat is that a comparison area could not be used in this analysis to control for various other factors that could also have influenced
crime during that time period. These additional findings were therefore not used in the cost benefit analysis below.

**COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS**

The Chula Vista Safe City Project received a $100,000 grant from the Target Corporation. Chula Vista was also able to garner financial support in donations from four businesses located in the Safe City focus area. Donations ranged in size from $500 to $2,000 and totaled $4,000 for a combined budget of approximately $104,000. The cost survey was provided to the CVPD in the fall of 2008 and returned with a reconciled budget within a few weeks (see Table 6.18). Numerous follow-up calls were made by UI researchers to clarify any missing costs, to solicit answers to questions that were outstanding, and to discuss how each cost estimate was calculated to ensure that all decision rules were consistently followed by each site.

**Program Costs – Planning and Implementation Costs**

Overall, the costs associated with the Safe City initiative in Chula Vista totaled $102,992. Labor costs, paid for through CVPD, comprised approximately 90 percent of the total cost at $92,740. Approximately two percent of the cost of labor ($1,928) represented labor costs associated with the planning phase of the initiative. The remaining $90,812 accounted for the cost of labor associated with managing the implementation of Safe City over the course of 18 months. Labor costs were shared among nine part-time staff which included two community relations specialists, two patrol officers, a public information officer, city attorney, a captain, sergeant and senior public safety analyst. These staff were also assisted by an unpaid intern who worked ten hours for one month. In total, across the nine staff and one intern, 1,570 hours were committed to Safe City, with the captain, senior public safety analyst, and two community relations specialists accounting for the majority of those hours (specifically, 1,166) dedicated to Safe City.
Table 6.18. Safe City Initiative Costs, Chula Vista

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expenditures To Date (7/8/08)</th>
<th>Cost($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Signage</td>
<td>8,082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Window Clings</td>
<td>938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Translation Services (written)</td>
<td>1,038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event Costs (refreshments, chairs/table)</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Spent</strong></td>
<td><strong>10,252</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Remaining Budgeted Costs</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Highland Median Fence</td>
<td>20,725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biologist</td>
<td>2,560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Vehicle Theft Brochures</td>
<td>2,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kill Switch Subsidies</td>
<td>12,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Website</td>
<td>1,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCTV[^46]</td>
<td>38,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Transient/Panhandling Related</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day Laborer Costs</td>
<td>1,268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Remaining Budgeted Costs</strong></td>
<td><strong>81,603</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total Available (not yet spent; does not include 2008 interest) | 93,173 |
| Total Unbudgeted                                              | 11,570 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anticipated Additional Costs: Day Laborer Project</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Signage</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trash Cans</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meeting Costs</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,900</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Costs Paid for by CVPD for Safe City</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Planning Phase Labor (loaded)</td>
<td>1,928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Implementation Phase Labor (loaded)</td>
<td>90,812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Labor</strong></td>
<td><strong>92,740</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total Cost Chula Vista Safe City (Total donations spent + labor) | 102,992 |

For the most part, Chula Vista’s Safe City activities focused on gaining a better understanding of the nature and underlying causes of the crime and disorder problems occurring in the designated Safe City site and strengthening pre-existing partnerships between law enforcement and businesses affected by these problems. As such, at the time of the intervention but determine that it was not feasible and would involve an unwise use of resources.

[^46]: Chula Vista Safe City partners considered investing in a public surveillance system as part of the intervention but determine that it was not feasible and would involve an unwise use of resources.
of our evaluation, the costs incurred with implementing the Chula Vista initiative were primarily the labor costs associated with CVPD planning and managing Safe City. These labor costs represent the following activities:

- Convening a kick-off meeting with approximately 50 attendees;
- Holding 16 partner meetings (10 full partner meetings and 6 steering committee meetings) with 15-30 people on average at full partner meetings and 10 at steering committee meetings;
- Conducting three (CPTED) walkthroughs, approximately three hours each, involving 4-6 CVPD staff and 6-8 community partners attending each walkthrough;
- Making over 50 CPTED recommendations to businesses;
- Removing a portable restroom that attracted transients and was in violation of code;
- Creating and posting 60 Safe City signs;
- Creating Safe City window clings for each of 55 businesses;
- Creating a Safe City website for use by partners and residents;
- Distributing and employing the crime prevention guides created by UI;
- Conducting interviews with day laborers and local businesses;
- Researching and conducting a site visit to Glendale, CA, to examine how they’ve innovatively dealt with day laborers;
- Working with the Traffic Safety Commission to create a day laborer loading zone;
- Working with businesses to remove dense landscaping, clean up transient encampments and install new lighting;
- Creating and distributing anti-panhandling signs; and
- Drafting an anti-panhandling ordinance (modeled after San Diego).

In addition to labor, CVPD spent $10,252 in Target and community donations towards creating the Safe City signs and window clings in both English and Spanish. This money was also used to pay for costs associated with hiring a translator to help facilitate conversations with day laborers and to pay for costs associated with meeting with day laborers (refreshments, table and chairs).
Since Chula Vista’s Safe City program continued beyond the evaluation, several technical and non-technical solutions and activities have been planned and budgeted for the future, as indicated in Table 6.18. These activities account for approximately $81,603 in anticipated budgeted costs. It is important to note that while some of these costs have not been incurred by CVPD yet, much CVPD and business partner time has been dedicated to planning for the implementation of these technical and non-technical solutions (time that is included in the total cost of labor). For example, CVPD had been working with a web developer to draft a Safe City website, but since the cost of the website had not been invoiced at the time that cost information was collected, it is not included as an expenditure of Safe City. CVPD has also been working with partners to develop a solution to panhandling at a busy intersection in the Safe City focus area. This has resulted in planned construction of a median fence at a cost of $20,725. While this cost has not been incurred yet, significant time has gone into planning for it. CVPD has also been working with retailers in the Safe City focus area to generate funds to encourage Safe City business employees with older model cars to purchase kill switches at a discounted rate. The CVPD has also been in discussions with a biologist who will be necessary in guiding cleanup in a portion of the Safe City area so that wildlife is not disrupted. Lastly, the CVPD anticipated budgeting approximately $38,000 for CCTVs but has since decided against implementing a camera surveillance system. It was unclear at the time of the evaluation what alternative interventions this budgeted money would be used for. It is possible that some of it may go towards the $11,570 in unbudgeted costs and $2,900 in anticipated additional costs associated with the day laborer issue.

It is important to note that as a result of the CVPD’s CPTED recommendations, businesses made three major changes resulting in $21,600 of costs – $17,000 to remove dense landscaping and replace with groundcover, $3,600 to conduct a clean-up of a transient camp, and $1,000 to conduct landscaping and lighting repairs. These costs were incurred by businesses so they have not been included in the total cost of Safe City because they are not a part of the cost to the CVPD. Other businesses may have made other changes based on the CPTED recommendations, but the exact changes and costs associated with them were outside the scope of this cost-benefit analysis. Also outside the scope of this cost-benefit analysis was the inclusion of estimates for labor or in-kind costs.
incurred by business partners attending meetings and participating in Safe City activities such as CPTED walkthroughs. Throughout the Safe City initiative businesses have donated food and in-kind resources such as banners branding the initiative which have not gone unaccounted. Since it can be reasonably assumed that these costs would benefit the Safe City focus area and these costs were not accounted for, the total cost of Chula Vista Safe City of $102,992, is likely underestimated.

Cost of Crime

Based on cost of crime estimates generated by Roman (2009) and Cohen (1998), seven crime categories were assigned costs. The crime categories of interest for this cost-benefit analysis were chosen based on the results of the impact analysis, with only those crime categories found to be significantly impacted by the Chula Vista Safe City program included in the analysis. The costs are broken into the victim costs, costs associated with the criminal justice system (i.e., investigation, arrest, and prosecution), and incarceration costs, and summed to provide a total cost to society (see Table 3.4 in the Research Design and Methods section). Once the costs to society were calculated, they were then multiplied by the average monthly change in each crime type to obtain the average monthly cost or benefit to society by crime type.

Average Change * Cost to Society = Average Monthly Cost to Society

Since the categories that were available for calculating the cost of crime did not properly align with each crime type of interest, conservative estimates were generated to allow for comparison. In Chula Vista, four crime categories were found to be significantly impacted: robbery, vandalism, property, and motor vehicle theft. However, only robbery was reduced and all other categories significantly increased following the intervention. We applied costs to each of these categories to provide an approximation of what the change in crime cost society.

---

47 Average costs associated with motor vehicle theft were not included in the analysis.
48 Only those crime categories that were found to be significantly impacted were included in the cost-benefit analysis. This technique was used to capture the impact of the intervention and not the natural fluctuation of crime.
### Table 6.19. Cost Calculations by Crime Type, Chula Vista

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crime Type</th>
<th>Average Monthly Change in Crime</th>
<th>Average Monthly Cost to Society per Crime Incident</th>
<th>Average Monthly Cost/Savings to Society</th>
<th>Total Cost/Savings to Society</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>-0.96</td>
<td>$294,599</td>
<td>- $282,815</td>
<td>- $5,656,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vandalism1</td>
<td>+1.03</td>
<td>$7,562</td>
<td>+ $7,789</td>
<td>+ $155,780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property2</td>
<td>+4.54</td>
<td>$106,115</td>
<td>+ $481,762</td>
<td>+ $9,635,240</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cost of Intervention  $102,992

1 No estimates were available for vandalism. The lowest cost category in 2008, larceny/theft, was used for the monthly estimate.

2 Property crime cost calculated based on average of robbery, burglary, and larceny using 2008 estimates. The cost of motor vehicle theft was not available to itemize each cost.

3 Average monthly change in crime calculated based on difference-in-differences analysis.

Employing the estimates depicted in Table 6.19, individual cost/benefit ratios by crime category can be generated. In Chula Vista, the intervention period that was used for the impact analysis spanned 20 months. Therefore, each average monthly cost to society was multiplied by the number of months (20) to obtain the approximate cost after the intervention:

\[
\text{Average Monthly Cost to Society} \times \text{Number of Months in Intervention Period} = \text{Total Cost to Society by Crime Type}
\]

Typically, all crime types would then be totaled and subtracted from the cost of the intervention itself to obtain the net cost as a result of the intervention. If that total is negative, the dollar amount is the total savings produced by the intervention. For this analysis, the crime categories employed incorporated multiple crime types, such as property crime, which included burglary, larceny, robbery, and motor vehicle theft. Due to this aggregation of crimes by category, only individual crime types were used in the cost-benefit analysis to avoid double counting certain incidents, such as robbery, which were already included in the equation.

As shown in Table 6.19, the cost of a robbery in 2008 was $294,599. With an average monthly decrease of 0.96 robberies, the savings over the 20-month post-intervention period totaled $565,631 ($282,815 \times 20). With the cost of $102,992 for Chula Vista’s Safe City, the net savings of the reduction of robberies alone over the 20-month period evaluation period is impressive, at $462,639.
Unfortunately, the impact analysis also discovered a significant increase in both vandalism and property crime categories. With an increase of 1.03 vandalism incidents per month, the cost increase totals $155,777. Together with the estimated cost of increases in property crime over the 20-month post-intervention period ($9,635,240), these costs far exceed the benefit of robbery reduction, at a net increase of nearly $10 million. To conclude, however, that the Chula Vista Safe City Project was not cost-effective is to assume that a causal relationship between Safe City and increases in property damage and property crimes exists, which is not a theoretically compelling hypothesis. A more likely explanation for the increase in these crimes is the fact that Chula Vista had experienced a significant reduction in crime in the months leading up to implementing their Safe City initiative; given that the initiative began when the crime level was unusually low, any subsequent uptick in crime was likely the result of a regression to the mean.

**CONCLUSION**

Safe City in Chula Vista was characterized by strong pre-existing partnerships that were further strengthened by a thorough problem analysis process. Safe City partners took the time and effort to identify the major problems occurring in the designated area, collecting data and qualitative information from multiple sources to understand the nature of those problems, and devising solutions that directly stemmed from the underlying causes identified during this rigorous problem analysis effort. Of particular note was the partners’ wise resistance to adopting certain responses prior to an understanding of the problems they were experiencing. While other Safe City jurisdictions leapt at the opportunity to invest in surveillance cameras when offered funds by the Target Corporation, Chula Vista partners were not willing to jump to a response prior to a thorough analysis.

While this approach is to be commended, the extensive nature of the site’s problem analysis also created challenges in that these analyses revealed a large number of problems and the partners did not prioritize those problems in order to narrow their focus on one or two of them, choosing instead to explore responses to all. In retrospect, partners
indicated that their efforts might have been better spent had they focused on fewer problems, at least at the outset.

Chula Vista invested heavily in CPTED activities, conducting both daytime and evening walkthroughs of the site and making many recommendations to businesses for improvements in lighting and landscaping. Several of these recommendations were implemented and appear to have yielded benefits based on reductions in business’ concerns about crime, increases in their perceptions of safety, and decreases in the existence of trash. However, the main crime problems addressed by the partners – unwanted persons and auto thefts – were not reduced by the initiative, as measured by both pre- and post-surveys of businesses as well as an impact analysis of reported crimes. And while a DiD analysis did yield a significant reduction in robberies, it also identified increases in property damage and property crimes. Further analysis employing an extended intervention and post-intervention period, however, indicate significant reductions in four major crime categories. While these analyses are promising, the lack of comparison groups suggests that they should be viewed with cautious optimism.
Chapter 7

Hyattsville Safe City Project, Hyattsville, Maryland

BACKGROUND

The city of Hyattsville, Maryland has a population of approximately 17,500 and a service area of three square miles. It is located approximately three miles from the border of Washington, D.C. With respect to demographic characteristics, 75 percent of the population identifies as white, 12 percent as black, 6 percent as “some other race” and 4 percent as Asian. Thirteen percent of the Hyattsville population also identifies as Hispanic/Latino, of any race. The median family income is $41,994 (below the national average of $58,526), with approximately 9 percent of families living below the poverty level.\(^{49}\)

Hyattsville is located in Prince George’s County, Maryland, which consists of 27 municipalities policed by several law enforcement agencies, including Prince George’s County Police, Maryland State Police, and University of Maryland Campus Police. These law enforcement agencies work collaboratively with the Hyattsville Police Department (HPD), which is composed of 33 sworn officers and 11 civilians. The Department also supports a Patrol Division, Criminal Investigation Section, K-9 Unit, bicycle patrols, crime prevention programs and a Tactical Team. In July 2006, HPD took over jurisdiction, from Prince George’s County Police, of the area surrounding the Prince George’s Plaza Mall.

In the two years prior to the beginning of the Safe City planning phase, Hyattsville had experienced a marked increase in theft, with smaller but notable increases in

\(^{49}\) This information is based on the most recent U.S. Census data which was collected in 2000 and based upon a Hyattsville population of 14,733. The population estimate of 17,500 accounts for the new jurisdiction acquired by Hyattsville in July 2006. Therefore, demographic information reported does not account for this increase.
residential burglary, assault, and robbery.\textsuperscript{50} The largest share of crimes occurring in Hyattsville were in Ward 4, home to what would be designated as the Safe City focus area. One of five wards within the city, Ward 4 historically experienced over half all the city’s reported crimes.\textsuperscript{51}

**SAFE CITY PLANNING PHASE: MAY 2006 – JULY 2007**

Hyattsville entered its planning phase as a Safe City site in May 2006. According to Target records, Hyattsville encountered delays during this initial start-up period and as a result, it took over a year to complete the steps Target requires prior to implementing a Safe City project. Below is a description of the major activities that occurred during this time period.

In May 2006, Target met with the HPD to present the Safe City concept. Target allocated 25 thousand dollars to Hyattsville to help with the Safe City initiative. However, by July 2006 Hyattsville was delayed in accomplishing Steps 2-4 (Assess, Inventory, and Pre-Meeting), as outlined in the Safe City Implementation Manual provided to the sites by Target. Target noted that Hyattsville lacked both a clearly defined scope and partner agreement and was behind schedule. In order to help address this, Target pledged to assist law enforcement in identifying technical solutions to implement and in developing a plan to support the implementation of those solutions.

By August 31, 2006, the Assessment and Inventory stages were completed. The HPD took ownership of Safe City and shortly thereafter presented the Safe City concept to nine local organizations, including the Prince George’s Plaza Mall (the site ultimately selected for the UI Safe City evaluation) and the University of Maryland. The general consensus among meeting attendees was to support the Safe City concept. Some concerns were expressed about the challenges of obtaining financial support beyond the initial $25,000 Target commitment, but nothing was finalized at that time.


As of the end of September 2006, the Hyattsville City Manager had visited the Minneapolis “Safe Zone” (the first Safe City site) to gain a better understanding of the Safe City model, the array of technical solutions typically employed by Safe City sites, and the ways in which partnerships are formed. Target allocated an additional $50,000 (bringing the total allocation to $75,000) towards the HPD Safe City effort at this time. Also during period, Verizon indicated that they would be willing to join the partnership, pledging to donate their fiber lines should they be needed to implement a CCTV system.

In October, 2006 Hyattsville continued to convene CCTV planning meetings, which were somewhat limited due to delays in receiving information regarding the power infrastructure within Hyattsville to support a CCTV system. A meeting was scheduled for December with the HPD, Target, Pepco, Verizon, and Comcast to gain support and secure financial contributions. Pepco and Verizon agreed to be partners and Target allocated additional resources totaling $100,000 towards the initiative. Verizon also made a commitment to donate fiber lines to help implement the CCTV system. A meeting was then scheduled with Unisys for early January 2007. Unisys is an information technology consulting firm and a corporate partner of Safe City.52

During February 2007, Target and the HPD presented the Safe City concept to city council members, including the mayor. In addition, Unisys decided to submit a bid to assess the video surveillance capabilities of Hyattsville and Hyattsville submitted requests for funding for this assessment to the city.

Urban Institute researchers visited Hyattsville in March 2007 to touch base with the Hyattsville Safe City team to gauge their progress in the Safe City planning process and to begin baseline data collection. After introductions, the meeting began with UI providing an overview of its role in the Safe City evaluation. Afterwards the HPD chief provided an overview of HPD’s progress with respect to the development and implementation of a plan for Hyattsville Safe City. The chief reported that he had delivered a public presentation of the Safe City initiative to Hyattsville City Council meeting in February 2007 and that the mayor, city administrator, and all (10) members of

---

52 A corporate partner of the Safe City program contributes needed resources to advance the program. Those resources include, but are not limited to, financial contributions, technical solutions, donations (equipment, cameras, radios) and ongoing program support. For a list of corporate partners, please see: http://www.mysafecity.com/default.aspx/MenuItemId/391/MenuGroup/Safe+City.htm
city council were very supportive of Safe City. Following the city council meeting, two newspaper articles were published describing Safe City. Initially the HPD was concerned that Hyattsville residents would react negatively to the installation of cameras in the neighborhood; however, no negative press ensued. The chief indicated his belief that residents are already used to having cameras in the city (from the past installation of cameras near hospitals) and thus expansion to other areas was not likely to generate alarm.

When asked how he felt the planning process was progressing, the chief remarked that he felt frustrated because implementation was delayed due to lack of full funding for the camera system they intended to implement. He felt it was premature to begin forming formal partnerships with the businesses in the Prince George’s Plaza Mall until funding for CCTVs was obtained, arguing that going to the businesses with a plan and no way to pay for it would not entice businesses to get involved. UI recognized this concern, but emphasized that Safe City was intended to be more than just a camera program and that there could be other things the HPD could be doing to engage partners. Examples included convening meetings to discuss current crime problems and identify priorities in addressing those crimes; conducting CPTED walkthroughs; and developing less expensive, non-technical crime prevention solutions. The chief was very receptive to these ideas.

By the end of April, a first version of Hyattsville’s Safe City “community plan” was submitted to both the city council and Target for approval. A conference call was then held in which Target suggested changes to the plan and also allocated another $50,000 to the Hyattsville effort (in addition to the previous $100,000 commitment). The community plan was approved by Target in May and a final $50,000 allocation was donated, bringing the total Target contribution to $200,000. At this same time, Target encouraged the HPD to formalize local community partnerships in anticipation of the kick-off event scheduled in August 2007.

**Focus Area**

The areas designated for the Safe City intervention were composed of three key locations: the area around the Mall at Prince Georges, the commercial strip around
Hamilton Street, and the corridor along Route 1 near the Washington, DC border, just south of the Riverdale Park neighborhood. These areas were noted as primarily experiencing problems with pedestrian robberies and vandalism. In addition, the HPD had observed that DC residents were responsible for a significant proportion of crime committed in Hyattsville, since both Route 1 (the corridor in an out of DC), and the two Metro stations (West Hyattsville and Prince George’s Plaza) provide easy access for persons to come into Hyattsville to commit crime and quickly return to DC. As a result, they were deemed important foci for a crime control intervention such as Safe City. With respect to the evaluation of the Hyattsville Safe City Project, UI staff focused on one of the three implementation areas – the area in and around the Prince George’s Plaza Mall. Figure 7.0 illustrates the focus area.

**Figure 7.0. Hyattsville Safe City Project Focus Area for UI Evaluation**

![Hyattsville Safe City Project Focus Area](image)

**Mission and Goals**

The mission of the Hyattsville Safe City Project, as articulated in their community plan was to “…share technology, expertise, resources, and information through local law enforcement partnerships and funding contributions from both government and private partners.” The technical solutions proposed to help meet these goals included the placement and use of CCTVs, as well as the potential use of portable cameras to enable officers to monitor a place or person from a distance, such as in a car around the corner.
Other technical solutions included: identifying a common radio channel to increase cross-jurisdictional communication among neighboring law enforcement agencies;\textsuperscript{53} expanding the use of license plate recognition technology to the Safe City area; and installing new emergency call boxes in strategic locations. Further information regarding Hyattsville’s mission, goals and activities can be found in the Hyattsville Logic Model included in Appendix K.

**Project Administration**

The HPD became the lead agency in charge of Safe City, but focused on developing partnerships with other local law enforcement agencies early on in the planning phase, such as Prince George’s County Police Department, University of Maryland Campus Police, and Metro Transit Police, as well as with private security entities. MOU agreements were also developed with four local police departments. Partnerships were also a focus of this first planning meeting, with the HPD chief stressing the importance of working with other law enforcement entities such as Prince George’s County Police Department, University of Maryland Campus Police, and Metro Transit Police. They also discussed plans to strengthen their relationships with private security entities. The chief indicated that Safe City would be a good vehicle for strengthening these partnerships and expanding them to other businesses and retailers.

**SAFE CITY IMPLEMENTATION PHASE: AUGUST 2007 – AUGUST 2008**

During a kick-off meeting of August 2007, the Safe City project in Hyattsville officially commenced. HPD convened two events as part of the kick-off: a meeting designed to describe Safe City and bring local retailers and partners on board, and a press conference to introduce the Safe City concept to the larger Hyattsville community. Thirty people attended the meeting, including six HPD officers, the HPD chief, two representatives from Target and the mayor of Hyattsville. The chief gave a PowerPoint presentation introducing the Safe City model and Hyattsville’s specific Safe City plan.

\textsuperscript{53} During a meeting with the HPD, it was noted that there are 26 counties and 21 municipalities in the surrounding area watch with their own radio systems and radio frequencies. One goal mentioned was to develop a 700-800 megahertz radio system to allow interoperability (this was quoted as costing approximately $70 million dollars).
The press conference was attended by over 50 people and 7 representatives from the media were in attendance.

With funding by Target in hand, Hyattsville commissioned Unisys to conduct the first phase of the implementation of their CCTV system. This phase consisted of an assessment of surveillance requirements for the city, possible camera locations, and deployment and operations recommendations. The assessment cost $50,000 to complete and was delivered to the city in October 2007. In sum, the report recommended the placement of approximately 47 cameras in 38 locations throughout the city at an average cost of $36,000 - $39,000 per camera. A copy of the report can be found in Appendix L.

During the months that followed, Hyattsville was unsuccessful in its efforts to generate sufficient funding for the planned CCTV system. In an effort to help Hyattsville move forward with non-technical solutions while pursuing CCTV funding, UI arranged two calls – one between Hyattsville Safe City leadership and Chula Vista Safe City leadership and another with Cincinnati Safe City leadership. During both calls, representatives from each Safe City program shared their experiences and suggested crime prevention strategies. HPD did pursue a few non-CCTV interventions. Bike patrols, Segways, and a web-based alert system were all written into the HPD FY08 budget, which went into effect July 1, 2007. Nonetheless, the inability of HPD to raise funds for CCTV brought the project to a standstill.

**PROCESS ANALYSIS**

Due to the delays in the implementation of the Hyattsville Safe City Project, the UI research team was unable to conduct an impact analysis of the effort. The project period for the NIJ-funded evaluation ran through June 2008. This limited the timeframe of the post-intervention data request to August 2008 through May 2008, yielding just nine months of data. This truncated post-intervention period would not yield the statistical confidence needed to identify an intervention impact if one existed, nor would it enable UI researchers to account for seasonality. In addition, the intervention itself was diluted due to the fact that the main focus of the effort, the installation of a CCTV system, was not implemented. Indeed, even as of June 2009, that system was not in place. The
evaluation of Hyattsville’s Safe City initiative, therefore, was limited to the planning and implementation described above.

IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Hyattsville’s challenges in implementing Safe City within the intended time period offer useful lessons for other jurisdictions considering the Safe City model. Several key decisions were made that, if approached differently, may have yielded more effective results. One early strategic error was Hyattsville’s identification of its main intended Safe City intervention – a CCTV camera system – prior to engaging local businesses and members of the community. The strategy was to raise full funding for the system before presenting the idea to the community. In some respects this is a very logical approach, in that HPD did not want to offer CCTV to the community if it could not ultimately follow through with implementation. However, had these stakeholders been offered the opportunity to describe their public safety concerns and suggest solutions at the outset, this more collaborative approach may have generated more political and financial support for the CCTV initiative.

Indeed, the Hyattsville approach was not consistent with the problem solving process articulated in the Safe City logic model. Rather than understanding the nature of the public safety problems and identifying responses that were directly related to those problems, HPD identified the response (cameras) in the absence of such an analysis. While it is possible that a thorough problem solving analysis may have nonetheless pointed to CCTV as a likely response, such an analysis would have also generated other responses, including more affordable, non-technical ones. This would have provided HPD the opportunity to move forward with some components of the Safe City initiative, demonstrating the agency’s responsiveness to community input and highlighting some of the early wins in crime reduction that these efforts might well have produced.
Chapter 8

Rio Nuevo/Safe City Centro, Tucson, Arizona

BACKGROUND

The second largest city in Arizona, Tucson is a community of 525,525 residents located along the Santa Cruz River in south central Arizona. The greater Tucson metropolitan area supports approximately 750,000 people and grows by about 2,000 new residents per month. Approximately 75 percent of the population is 18 years or older with a median age of 32.6. Sixty-three percent of the population identifies as white, 4 percent as black or African American, 4 percent as American Indian or Alaska Native, 3 percent as Asian, and 22 percent as “some other race.” Approximately 39 percent identify as Hispanic or Latino (of any race). The median family income is $44,217 (which is below the national average of $58,526). Thirteen percent of families are below the poverty line, which is slightly higher than the nationwide average of 9.8 percent. The University of Arizona and Davis-Monthan Airforce Base have a prominent presence in Tucson as two of its largest employers.

Of the 37,304 Part I offenses reported in 2006 by Tucson Police in the FBI’s Uniform Crime Report (UCR), the largest share (19,924) were larcenies. Interestingly, according to Tucson Police data, numerous reporting changes were implemented in 2005 that resulted in a 43 percent drop in the rate of larcenies. However, corrections for these changes results in an actual decrease of about 10 percent from 2004 to 2005. Nevertheless, it remained the most common Part I offense by the time Tucson began conversations with Target about starting a Safe City program in 2006. Violent crimes continued a downward trend that began some ten years prior, with a rate of 843 per

---

54 City of Tucson official website: [http://www.tucsonaz.gov/about.html](http://www.tucsonaz.gov/about.html)
55 Census information accessed 11/1/2008 at: [http://factfinder.census.gov](http://factfinder.census.gov)
56 City of Tucson official website: [http://www.tucsonaz.gov/about.html](http://www.tucsonaz.gov/about.html)
100,000 persons in 2006. While the rate of robberies fluctuated quite a bit in the years leading up to the Safe City initiative: the 2006 rate was 308 per 100,000 residents, representing an increase since 1994. On a more positive note, aggravated assault rates have plummeted by almost half during this same time period, and burglaries remained steady in the 12 years preceding Safe City.

While Tucson’s Safe City project commenced in a similar fashion to other sites, starting with a meeting between Target Corporation asset protection staff and the key personnel in the Tucson Police Department (TPD), it encountered major obstacles several months into the evaluation which ultimately prevented the project from being implemented. This section describes the major activities and roadblocks that occurred in an effort to present lessons learned that may be helpful for other cities interested in implementing a Safe City project in the future.

SAFE CITY PLANNING PHASE

In March 2006, Target representatives traveled to Tucson to present the Safe City concept. TPD staff expressed interest in becoming a Safe City site and over the course of the spring and summer of 2006 they developed their Safe City focus area and project plan. UI researchers traveled to Tucson, AZ to attend a meeting with representatives from Target, the TPD, and other project partners in June 2006. During this meeting the project concept and focus area were presented by Target and TPD representatives, as discussed below.

Project Concept

At the time the Safe City concept was presented to the TPD, downtown Tucson was going through a large redevelopment project in which the city was attempting to restore historical sites, and enhance attractions, housing, entertainment, retail and other commercial development. The TPD viewed the Safe City project as an opportunity to improve the quality of life of downtown workers, visitors and residents. In partnership with the Tucson Downtown Alliance (Downtown Alliance) and private business partners,

the TPD proposed the “Rio Nuevo/Safe City Centro Camera Project” as their Safe City project.

Working in partnership with a nationally recognized security company, the TPD selected 14 candidate camera location sites, most of which were local, state or federal government buildings located in downtown Tucson. The cameras were envisioned to be IP-based pan-tilt-zoom (PTZ) cameras designed to be easily relocated and to utilize the city’s extensive fiber-optic network. As conceptualized, the wireless camera system was to be viewed in the Downtown Headquarters Building of the Tucson Police Department, enabling downtown officers and supervisors the ability to monitor live incidents and direct any necessary police personnel to the scene. Footage was to be recorded on Digital Video Recorders (DVR) for follow-up investigations.

As described in a letter to the Target Corporation, the proposed CCTV system would allow project participants to access the system for their specific needs, such as parking lot security, special event management, and business watch programs. Electronic information sharing networks would link the TPD with the Downtown Alliance Officer and business partners to allow information sharing related to suspicious activities, crime information, community concerns, and special events. Project participants would also be able to receive alert information via email and notification or text messaging on a cellular phone or pager.

**Project Administration**

The proposed management of the Rio Nuevo/Safe City Centro Camera project was to be governed by a board to include representatives of business, educational institutions, community groups, the TPD and the Downtown Alliance.

**Focus Area**

The TPD selected the area in the center of the city that is undergoing extensive redevelopment as the focus area. This area is home to a concentration of bars, restaurants, and shops that cater primarily to students of the nearby university. It is worth noting that no Target retail store existed within the proposed Rio Nuevo/Safe City Centro Camera project focus area. The Target store participating in the cooperative is located
approximately two miles south of the central city. The boundaries of the Rio Nuevo/Safe City Camera Project focus area were defined, roughly, by the intersection of four roadways: Congress Street, Broadway, 4th Avenue, and Granada Avenue. See Figure 8.0 below.
While at the June 2006 meeting, UI researchers noted several concerns centering around the use of cameras as the primary Safe City intervention. During the course of the discussion, it became clear that the TPD officers in attendance and the representative of the TDA had no experience with CCTV cameras and little understanding of how they work. By contrast, the Target Asset Protection (AP) personnel in attendance and the Tucson Department of Transportation (DOT) representative demonstrated substantial expertise on the subject by answering all of the officers’ technical questions.

Below is a summary of the questions and concerns raised about the cameras:

- Some downtown business owners were concerned about whether they could face any liability, if for example, a patron was spotted on a camera leaving a bar drunk and was subsequently involved in an accident or altercation. No one was able to address the concern.

- A TPD representative was concerned that the business owners who would be included in the Safe City focus area might attempt to circumvent the 911 system by placing calls for service directly to TPD officers, which would interfere with prioritization of the calls performed by the 911 system.

- A TPD representative indicated that they do not have the resources to monitor the cameras except during “hot” times and special events. They planned to open the
camera feeds to local business associations, in part to share the monitoring burden.

- Civil liberties challenges were presented as a likely challenge from the city council. TPD would be making a presentation before the city council in the next few months addressing those concerns.

- Another concern arose related to what guidelines should be established for responding to public requests for video. The most common view among those present at the meeting was that honoring such requests would be prohibitively expensive.

- Lastly, the money to support the installation of the downtown cameras had not fully been raised. Target planned to make a significant contribution, but had not yet committed to a specific dollar amount. Most of the funding would have to be raised from the businesses in the Safe City focus area and TPD would have to play a leading role securing these commitments.

The June 2006 meeting concluded with a UI researcher presenting an overview of the Urban Institute, the evaluation, and accompanying data needs. Given the course of the meeting, the UI researcher stressed the fact that the Safe City model was more than just a camera program, and encouraged participants to consider exploring other interventions that might be guided by a thorough analysis of the crime and disorder problems experienced in the downtown area.

In September 2006, the TPD, in partnership with the Tucson Downtown Alliance, sent a letter to Target asking for assistance to proceed with the Rio Nuevo/Safe City Centro Camera project. In this letter, the project concept and project management were detailed along with the following project partners: the Tucson Police Department, Tucson Downtown Alliance, Target Corporation (listed as primary funding source), City of Tucson Management Services Division, Cox Communications, ADT-Sensormatic, and the Urban Institute. It was noted that the final project cost would be determined based on project scope and size of the surveillance camera network, but that projections ranged from $250,000 to one million dollars. The letter mentioned that the project would be funded solely from corporate or private donations and not by the City of Tucson, and that the TPD would provide training and support functions in addition to law enforcement duties. The long-term plans for the project included launching a state-of-the-art camera system in the downtown business area with the capability of being expanded once the
system was up and running and businesses were experiencing its anticipated crime reduction benefits.

On September 26, 2006, *The Arizona Daily Star* newspaper published an article about the Rio Nuevo/Safe City Centro Camera project entitled “Surveillance Cameras to Watch Downtown.” The lead sentence of the article began “Big brother may soon be coming to Downtown Tucson.” The article went on to detail the TPD’s plan to install 14 surveillance cameras in the downtown, describing the proposed locations and noting that while the TPD had a verbal pledge of funding from Target, the installation of cameras was subject to approval from city council. The City Manager and a councilwoman interviewed for the article both indicated that the city council would need weigh the policy issues of crime prevention against the interests of civil liberties. Councilwoman Karin Uhlich is quoted as saying, “anything that could improve safety is worth exploring, but some would be uncomfortable with that high degree of surveillance.” As perhaps could be anticipated, the article garnered significant public attention and opposition to the Rio Nuevo/Safe City Centro Camera project.

Indeed, the presentation of the project before the city council in October 2006 did not meet with approval. Target was prepared to make a $250,000 contribution towards the Rio Nuevo/Safe City Centro Camera project in mid-November, but funding was withheld pending city council approval. From October through December, the TPD worked unsuccessfully to generate support for the project. In December, during their monthly conference call with Target, the TPD asked that Target try to leverage support from other entities to help lead the project. Target emphasized that the burden was on TPD to lead the project and generate the necessary community support for it. By January 2007, Target indicated it was still prepared to make the $250,000 contribution if TPD submitted a revised community plan by March 30th. If, however, TPD was unable to produce such a plan, Target indicated it would close out the Tuscon project and reallocate the funding to another site.

In February of 2007 UI scheduled a site visit to Tucson to conduct a baseline survey of Safe City merchants. In conversations with the TPD and Target, UI proposed expanding the Safe City focus area to include both the original downtown/Rio Nuevo area and the Fourth Avenue area (represented by the Fourth Avenue Merchants
Chapter 8  Tucson, Arizona

Association, or FAMA). The Fourth Avenue area is an eclectic progressive retail area located between the University of Arizona and downtown Tucson. The neighborhood consists of a couple smoke shops, jewelry/bead stores, vintage clothing, restaurants and some bars. The FAMA has been very proactive in addressing public safety. Common crimes in the Fourth Avenue area include panhandling, vandalism – mainly “tagging” and etching in glass – and typical problem persons/disorder issues. Crime prevention efforts underway at the time of UI’s site visit included:

- Calling/emailing when merchants see something suspicious;
- Patrolling the area and creating a visible by wearing yellow shirts (e.g., when the local high school gets out, FAMA employees stand on the corner to make sure the kids are aware of their presence);
- Removing benches to deter persons from loitering;
- Working on keeping the area clean and picking up litter;
- Passing a law against people sitting on the curb;
- Creating “area restrictions” for problem persons; and
- Creating a taskforce made up of FAMA, the TPD, and social service agencies to deal with drug dealing (1999-2000).

Over the course of the two-day site visit, UI attended meetings with law enforcement, FAMA representatives, and Target staff. During the course of those meetings UI researchers emphasized that other sites in the Safe City evaluation had progressed both with and without technical solutions and that some cities were not even using CCTV. Examples of alternative solutions, such as a website enabling police and merchants to share information regarding incidents, were presented by UI which generated interest from the group. Target suggested taking CCTV off of the table and the TPD responded by saying that if CCTV were off of the table, there would be no problem getting buy-in for Safe City.

Target, the TPD and UI researchers then conducted separate meetings with FAMA and the Tucson Downtown Alliance to discuss the prospects of eliminating or at least postponing CCTV implementation in favor of other technical and non-technical crime prevention solutions. Both FAMA and the Downtown Alliance were receptive to this
approach and in favor of moving forward with presenting this revised project design before the mayor and city council for approval.

Much to the surprise of both UI and Target staff, in March 2007, the TPD sent an email to both entities indicating that it would be unable to implement its Safe City plan. UI staff proposed that in lieu of closing out the project entirely TPD consider modifying its Safe City plan so that it could move forward and also remain a study site for the evaluation. A captain from the Tucson Police Department responded favorably to the idea of modifying its action plan. A few weeks later the same captain notified us that both merchant associations had been trying to lobby the city manager’s office and the city council to move forward with the Safe City initiative. However, communications ceased for several weeks following these email exchanges.

UI initiated a conference call between UI and TPD leadership, which took place on June 14, 2007. The purpose of this call was to discuss next steps and help move the implementation of Safe City forward. TPD staff informed UI that the retailers were still lobbying the city council to move forward with Safe City, but that the TPD did not anticipate this occurring until 2008. However, this did not occur and Target officially removed Tucson from its list of Safe City sites.

IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In an interest to learn more about why Tucson was unable to implement Safe City, UI conducted interviews with members of city council, the TPD, and members of the business district. The results of these interviews are summarized in the section below.

- By identifying cameras as a solution to crime and disorder before reaching out to merchants, the TPD deviated from the basic structure of the Safe City model, which recommends first establishing partnerships with businesses and community members, soliciting input from them to identify their problems and then working together to implement a solution to identified problems.

- The TPD may have had more success convincing the local business associations and city council to approve the Safe City program if the department had been more informed about the use of CCTV in other jurisdictions and was able to more readily respond to the civil liberties concerns that were raised. It appeared as though the TPD was relying on CCTV expertise from local Target
representatives, which may have been less convincing to city council considering the “public” nature of the “public/private” partnership.

- Local business partners should have been involved from the beginning of the project to help guide discussions about the crime and disorder problems they were facing and possible solutions to these problems.

- FAMA was already implementing many successful non-technical solutions to address crime and disorder in their business area that could have provided an ideal evidence-based model for expansion into the downtown business area, had they been consulted early on.

- Given the strong branding of the Tucson Safe City project as a camera program (“Rio Nuevo Safe City Centro Camera Project”) and the subsequent media attention that branding garnered, it proved impossible for the TPD to win city council and public support for their project even after the use of CCTV was deemphasized.

- Better attention should have been paid to the political climate of Tucson. Stakeholders acknowledged that Tucson was known as a politically liberal city and that challenges to the civil liberties issues of CCTV use would be likely. This concern could have been better prepared for and addressed.
Chapter 9

Summary and Conclusion

Limitations

As with any research project, this evaluation has its share of threats to both internal and external validity. These threats are characterized by limitations in access to data and restrictions associated with the pace and nature of program implementation in each of the evaluation sites.

With regard to data access, the evaluation findings presented above would have been enhanced given the ability to collect more detailed crime and arrest data at both Safe City and comparison sites. For example, in Chula Vista, addressing the presence of “unwanted persons” – vagrants, transients, and those who engage in panhandling and drunk and disorderly behaviors – was a priority for Safe City stakeholders. Yet access to data on the prevalence of this problem both before and after the Safe City intervention was scarce. Had UI been able to obtain accurate data on calls for service and offender-specific offenses for both Safe City and control sites researchers would have been able to examine the impact of Safe City efforts on such public nuisance incidents. In addition, the small Ns associated with the study sites precluded the use of an interrupted time series design to measure the impact of the interventions. The restriction to the use of Difference-in-Differences analyses employing comparison areas did not enable researchers to discern whether pre- and post-implementation changes in crime were a function of a larger longitudinal trend or an actual result of the intervention.

In addition to the above-mentioned problems with data access, researchers encountered many challenges in estimating the costs of certain types of crimes that may have been prevented by Safe City activities. The existing research on the cost to society of crime types is limited to specific crime types that did not correlate directly to the crime types for which UI observed significant changes through the DiD analyses. Costs of the
Safe City Initiative were also not estimated with precision due to the lack of documentation of costs to individual retailers.

A common challenge in program evaluation relates to the pace with which programs are implemented, with program development and implementation often taking much longer than initially projected. While extensions to this evaluation period were sought and obtained for this project in order to adapt to the slow pace of implementation in both Tucson and Hyattsville, these extensions were not sufficient to fully capture Hyattsville’s activities, which continue to date. Even in the case of Cincinnati and Chula Vista, both of which moved forward with implementation at a relatively fast base, the limitations imposed by our evaluation period artificially truncate both the narrative describing implementation activities as well as the impact evaluation itself. It is possible that an extended evaluation period could yield very different results. Indeed, Chula Vista’s own internal analysis employing data for a longer post-intervention period yielded much more positive results in crime reductions that is presented here. Moreover, in the case of Cincinnati, neither the costs nor the potential benefits of the long-planned CCTV component of the initiative are captured in this evaluation.

The truncated post-intervention periods associated with this evaluation also threaten the ability to discern statistically significant changes in crime. Indeed, both Cincinnati and Chula Vista are still implementing elements of Safe City. Thus, in some respects the evaluation findings are premature as they do not account for any changes in the cost of implementation and possible reductions in crime and associated savings. In the case of Chula Vista, for example, Chula Vista had experienced a dramatic decline in the months preceding Safe City implementation. This led to an increase in crime following the intervention that was likely due to a natural regression to the mean rather than any counter-intuitive relationship between Safe City and increased crime. A longer post-intervention evaluation period may have put this increase in its appropriate context, demonstrating that while crime increased it was nonetheless suppressed.

Finally, the inclusion of comparison sites in this evaluation design was intended to offset the limitations associated with pre- and post-intervention DiD analyses. However, the assumptions behind the selection of comparison sites were based upon Census data that were almost ten years old. While sites may have been adequate matches
in the past, recent changes in local economies, related political factors, and local policing practices may vary greatly between each Safe City site and its comparison.

**SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH AND PRACTICE**

In synthesizing both process and impact evaluation findings across sites, it appears that Chula Vista and Cincinnati were more successful than Hyattsville and Tucson because of a strong grounding in community policing and recent past experiences engaging in partnerships between law enforcement and local businesses. These sites also saw beyond the promise of CCTV technology, aiming to identify an array of initiatives that included both technology and traditional problem-solving, such as the use of CPTED measures. Chula Vista’s approach more closely adhered to the SCP model, focusing in on responses to specific crime problems that were designed to increase the effort and risk associated with committing them. Cincinnati, while generating cost-beneficial reductions in crime, embraced more of a “everything but the kitchen sink” community crime prevention model than a SCP one.

By comparison, both Hyattsville and Tucson overlooked the importance of developing a thorough understanding of the nature of their public safety problems and of identifying responses that were directly related to those problems. Both sites identified the response (cameras) in the absence of such an analysis. While it is possible that a thorough problem analysis may have pointed to CCTV as an appropriate response, such an analysis would have also generated other responses, including more affordable, non-technical ones. This would have provided the sites with an opportunity to move forward with some components of the Safe City initiative, demonstrating the collaborative’s responsiveness to community input and highlighting some of the early wins in crime reduction that these efforts might well have produced.

These findings have important implications for other jurisdictions interested in adopting the Safe City model. First and foremost, while the initiative should be led by local law enforcement, it cannot be dictated by it. Police agencies spearheading a Safe City initiative should engage businesses, residents, and local elected officials prior to identifying specific interventions. This is particularly important if the intervention is as controversial as CCTV, which often threatens those concerned about encroachments on
Civil liberties. The engagement of multiple stakeholders in a Safe City initiative must therefore involve increased communications and authentic partnerships.

From a research perspective, the evaluation results presented in this report point to the validity of theories of police-community partnerships, by which strong partnerships yield effective interventions. In the case of Chula Vista, these findings also emphasize the value of engaging in a problem-solving process that is grounded in SCP theory, guiding the development of responses through a careful analysis of ways in which to increase the effort and risk and reduce the rewards of committing crime. Finally, from an action-research perspective, this evaluation highlights the challenges of evaluating real-world initiatives that far too often become derailed by politics and resource constraints. Rather than rejecting such research as having too great a failure rate, however, it should be recognized that the field can learn from examples of failed initiatives, not only from examples of successful ones.
References


Davis, Robert C.; Ortiz, Christopher; Rowe, Robert; Broz, Joseph; Rigakos, George; and Pam Collins. 2006. “An Assessment of the Preparedness of Large Retail Malls to Prevent and Respond to Terrorist Attack.” Report prepared for the National Institute of Justice, January, 2006.


Home Office. 2006. Business and Retail Crime at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/crime-


www.urban.org/ReentryRoundtable/roman_chalfin.pdf


APPENDIX A: SAFE CITY LOGIC MODEL
**Safe City Logic Model**

The mission of the Safe City program is to maximize safety and reduce crime in Safe City communities by implementing a community based, public/private partnership that is led by law enforcement and employs communications technologies and focused technical solutions, including situational crime prevention (SCP) techniques.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Broad Goals of Safe City</th>
<th>Specific Goals of Safe City</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| o Reduce crime and create safer communities  
  o Increase public perception of safety  
  o Sustain proactive and engaged Safe City partnerships  
  o Encourage community support for Safe City  
  o Increase the number of retail stores involved with Safe City by demonstrating successful implementation of Safe City in other communities | o Strengthen ability of law enforcement to lead local Safe City initiatives  
  o Reduce crime by implementing situational crime prevention techniques and other technical solutions  
  o Identify ways that Safe City partners can effectively identify, prioritize, analyze, and prevent crime  
  o Increase collaboration among internal partners  
  o Create a formal infrastructure for partnerships with law enforcement, neighboring businesses, and community partners |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Needs Addressed</th>
<th>Activity/Strategy/Process</th>
<th>Expected Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Partnerships** | Establish law enforcement partnerships, assess the community, and develop an inventory of partners. | **Short-term:**  
  o Identify crimes specific to Safe City communities  
  o Develop an awareness of community relations, persons, agencies, and local issues that could affect the success of Safe City  
  o Develop an ability to engage law enforcement  
  o Develop an awareness of the role of law enforcement, retail, security, and community partners and identify the current status of their loss prevention and safety efforts, as well as their relationships with law enforcement |  
**Long-term:**  
  o Forge strong, lasting relationships with law enforcement  
  o Shift ownership of Safe City to local law enforcement |

**Inputs:**
- Target initiative planning and seed funding
- Law enforcement leadership
- Cooperation/resources of retailers and property management

**Outputs include:**
- # of Safe City meetings
- # of crime stats identified
- # of calls for service originating from partners
- # of attendees at each meeting
- # of officer hours allocated to Safe City
- # of entities at each meeting
- # of hours allocated to Safe City activities by asset protection (AP) and security personnel
## Partnerships

The next set of steps in the Safe City process are designed to: (4) engage potential Safe City partners by introducing Safe City, explaining the project, clarifying roles and expectations, and generating support for the program; (5) have local law enforcement present the key message about Safe City and its core principles; and (6) have Target consult and support law enforcement to create a detailed implementation plan.

### Outputs:
- # of Safe City meetings
- # of committed Safe City partners
- # of entities at each meeting
- # of attendees at each meeting
- # of officer hours allocated to Safe City
- # of hours allocated to Safe City activities by asset protection and security personnel
- # of implementation challenges/strategies identified

### Short-term:
- Identify partners and confirm their support and involvement
- Develop and understand Target’s role and the role of law enforcement
- Identify ways to make Safe City a success
- Develop relationships with partners
- Identify priorities, specific projects, and activities needed to implement Safe City
- Identify key partners’ roles and expectations
- Identify potential implementation challenges and develop strategies/tactics for managing those challenges

### Long-term:
- Develop a successful implementation plan (formalize Safe City)
- Engage partners in the Safe City process

### Manage Safe City.

### Outputs:
- # of Safe City meetings
- # of Safe City Toolkits distributed
- # of entities at each meeting
- # of attendees at each meeting
- # of officer hours allocated to Safe City
- # of hours allocated to Safe City activities by asset protection and security personnel
- # of task specific committees created
- # of Safe City partners

### Short-term:
- Identify technical solutions to facilitate the Safe City project
- Increase stakeholders’ buy-in to Safe City and the number of key stakeholders committed to becoming a partner in Safe City
- Identify broad long-term planning of future Safe City projects, potential challenges, and opportunities

### Long-term:
- Improve retail security
- Strengthen coordination of public/private community safety programs
- Increase perception of safety among patrons
- Decrease local crime rates
- Decrease retail crime frequency and increased safety
- Support successful implementation of Safe City
- Increase number of communities involved in Safe City

By the time steps 1 through 6 (described above) have been achieved, law enforcement will assume full leadership of Safe City while Target consults and supports its efforts. Management of Safe City entails (7) establishing protocols to facilitate putting a partnership structure in place, possibly creating specialized committees based on need, establishing a meeting schedule, determining the communication methods to be employed by Safe City partners, and discussing the Safe City awareness process (using the Safe City toolkit developed by Target).

### Inputs:
- Law enforcement leadership
- Target initiative planning and seed funding
- Cooperation/resources of retailers and property management
- Marketing/promoting Safe City

### Inputs:
- Law enforcement leadership
- Target organizational planning/experience
- Safe City toolkits
- Engagement of Safe City partners/committed resources
Safe City partners collaborate to identify targeted solutions to reduce crime and create a safer community. This includes identifying ways to reduce the rewards, increase the risk, remove excuses and increase the efforts as perceived by potential offenders. Strategies may include: use of two-way radios to help connect law enforcement with security and retail staff; strategic deployment of CCTVs and call boxes; and implementation of CPTED and SCP measures. In addition, Safeness Ambassadors are employed to provide a visible presence of the Safe City program and increase employee surveillance in the Safe City area. Email communication and information sharing enable partners to communicate quickly and frequently.

### Outputs
- # of radio calls
- # of CCTVs in use
- # of call boxes installed
- # of calls from call boxes
- # of calls for service
- # of responses to calls
- # of perimeter checks
- # of Safeness Ambassador hours
- # of officer hours spent responding to calls
- # of CCTVs installed
- # of crimes caught on CCTV
- # of CPTED/SCP measures introduced

### Targets
- Increase police response to crime
- Improve real-time communication between security/retail staff/law enforcement regarding crime/crime in progress
- Increase perceived effort
- Increase perceived risk
- Reduce anticipated rewards
- Increase reporting of crime
- Increase swift apprehension of suspects
- Increase natural and employee surveillance

### Long-term
- Reduce crime (shoplifting, burglary, auto theft/theft from auto, vandalism/nuisance behavior, robbery and assault)
- Increase perception of safety among patrons
- Increase satisfaction among retailers with police reporting and responsiveness
- Increase revenue/sales; volume among retailers
- Increase citizens satisfaction with both local law enforcement and mall security
- Increase awareness of Safe City, including recent success and progress of program
APPENDIX B: BASELINE AND FOLLOW-UP BUSINESS SURVEY INSTRUMENTS
INSTRUCTIONS: Please respond to each question as best you can. Throughout the survey we will ask about the area around your business. In each case, we are referring to the outlined area on the attached map.

**PERCEPTIONS OF SAFETY**

1. How concerned are you about crime and disorder in the area around your business? See the outlined area on the attached map. Please circle ONE (1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Not at all concerned</th>
<th>Very concerned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. What specific crime problem are you most concerned about in the area around your business? Please mark ALL that apply.

- Robbery
- Retail burglary
- Unwanted or loitering persons
- Vandalism or criminal damage
- Public abuse of alcohol or drugs
- Vandalism or damage to car
- Delinquent or truant youth
- Other, please specify

3. Are you aware of any crimes occurring at your business and in the area around your business?

- Yes
- No

4. What is the primary way you find out about crimes in the area around your business? Please mark ALL that apply.

- A victim told me
- Witnessed a criminal act
- Conversation with neighboring businesses
- Conversation with customers
- Information from police
- Through media (radio, TV, etc)
- Received mailing or email
- At community meeting(s)
- Other, please specify
5. **How safe do you feel in the area around your business?** Please circle **ONE (1)** only.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Not at all safe</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>Very safe</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

6. **What conditions or activities are most common in the area near your business?** Please mark **ALL** that apply.

- Abandoned cars
- Rundown/neglected buildings
- Poor lighting
- Trash
- Illegal public drinking
- Overgrown shrubs/trees
- Homeless people
- Panhandling/begging
- Loitering/”hanging out”
- Youth skipping school
- Vacant lots
- Transient people
- None of these are problems

**CONTACT WITH LOCAL POLICE**

7. **In the past 6 months, have you had any contact with local police for ANY reason?**

- Yes………… 01
- No………… 02
- Don’t Know………… 9999

**Skip to Question # 9**

8. **How would you describe your most frequent contacts with police over the past 6 months?** Please mark **ALL** that apply.

- Participated in a community event or activity with police 01
- Attended community meeting with police 02
- Officer responded to reported crime 03
- Reported crime to police 04
- Surveyed by police department 05
- Had casual conversation with officer 06
- Asked police for information or advice 07
- Received traffic violation or citation 08
- Other, please specify 09

Not applicable 9999
9. About how frequently do local police visit your business without being requested to do so? Please mark ONE (1) box.

Daily….□ 01  Weekly….□ 02  Monthly….□ 03  Annually….□ 04  Never….□ 00

10. What has your experience been with police in your area? Please indicate the degree to which you disagree or agree with the following statements about your local police.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Not Applicable/ Don't Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I feel comfortable approaching local police with a crime report, problem, or concern related to my business</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police are interested in assisting me when they respond to an incident at my business</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am satisfied with the police’s efforts in the area near my business</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11. How would you describe any changes in local police presence in the area around your business in the past 6 months?

- Police presence has decreased………..□ 01
- Police presence has increased………..□ 03
- Police presence has stayed the same…□ 02
- I never see police……………………□ 00
- Don’t know…………………………□ 9999
12. In the past 6 months, how many times have crimes or disorderly activity occurred in your business, on your business property, or in the parking area that serves your business? Please mark ONE (1) box in each row.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>No crime</th>
<th>1 time</th>
<th>2-5 times</th>
<th>6-10 times</th>
<th>11+ times</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Burglary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Attempted burglary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Personal injury or violence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Robbery</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Theft by an employee</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Graffiti</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Damage or vandalism to building or property</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. Damage to vehicles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Stolen vehicle(s)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j. Shoplifting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k. Bad check or card fraud</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>l. Unwanted people on property</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m. Person(s) panhandling</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n. Public drinker(s)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o. Other disorderly person(s)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p. Other, please specify:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13. How often did you report these incidents to the local police? Please mark ONE (1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>No of the time</th>
<th>Some of the time</th>
<th>All of the time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>00</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
14. If you did not report all incidents to the local police, what was your reason for not reporting? Please mark ALL that apply.

Not applicable, I reported all crime... □ 00  Would increase insurance costs..... □ 06
No loss or damage to property........ □ 01  Unable to contact police........... □ 07
It was only an attempt.............. □ 02  No confidence in police response... □ 08
Too time consuming................ □ 03  Fearful of reprisals............... □ 09
Fearful of negative publicity........ □ 04  Little loss or damage to property... □ 10
No proof that incident occurred..... □ 05  Other, please specify............... □ 11

15. Over the past 6 months, what impact has crime had on your business (including crimes occurring in your building, on your property, or in the parking areas that serve your business)? Please mark ALL the ways crime has impacted your business.

Has had no impact.............. □ 00  Increased difficulty retaining staff........ □ 07
Disrupted regular business... □ 01  Increased difficulty recruiting staff........ □ 08
Lost customers............... □ 02  Increased difficulty obtaining insurance.... □ 09
Increased insurance cost ..... □ 03  Changed building/store layout or design.... □ 10
Damaged business image.... □ 04  Postponed investment in business......... □ 11
Lowered staff morale........... □ 05  Other, please specify.................. □ 12
Moved location of business... □ 06  Not applicable........................ □ 9999

16. In the past 6 months, approximately how much cost has your business incurred due to crime? Please mark ONE (1) box.

$0..................□ 00  $1001 – $4999...... □ 03
$500 or less.....□ 01  $5000 or more..... □ 04
$501 - $1000...□ 02  Not applicable........ □ 9999
PREVENTING CRIME AT YOUR BUSINESS

17. In the past 6 months, what measures have you used to secure your property against crime problems? Please mark ALL that apply.

- Have taken no measures
- Installed fencing or other similar perimeter control
- Installed closed-circuit television (CCTV) or security cameras
- Installed “no trespassing” signs on property
- Increased presence of security staff
- Installed new grilles or locks on windows
- Changed building/store layout or design
- Installed lighting outside business
- Installed alarms
- Started neighborhood or business watch group
- Asked for police advice
- Other, please specify

18. In the past 6 months, approximately how much have you spent on installation or maintenance of crime prevention and store security measures at your business? Please mark ONE (1) box.

- $0
- $100 – $499
- $500 or less
- $501 - $1000
- $1001 – $4999
- $5000 or more
- $5000 or more
- Not applicable

19. Does private or in-house security staff patrol your business property?

- Yes
- No

Page 6
20. How frequently do you exchange information on crime and security with neighboring business owners or managers? Please mark ONE (1) box.

   Daily….□ 01  Weekly….□ 02  Monthly….□ 03  Annually….□ 04  Never….□ 00

21. Are you aware of any partnerships in your area that bring together local organizations, businesses, residents, and police to work together to tackle crime?

   Yes…………□ 01  No…………□ 00  

   Skip to Question # 22

21b. If yes, what is the name of the partnership?


22. In the past 6 months, have you attended any community meetings concerning crime in the area near your business?

   Yes…………□ 01  No…………□ 00

23. Have you been approached by anyone (police, other businesses, or community organizations) to participate in a crime prevention partnership for the area near your business?

   Yes…………□ 01  No…………□ 00

ABOUT YOUR BUSINESS

24. Which ONE (1) of the following best describes the nature of your business?

   Electronics…………□ 01  Financial Services……□ 08
   Clothing……………□ 02  Health and Beauty……□ 09
   Appliance …………□ 03  Full service restaurant….□ 10
   Sporting Goods……□ 04  Fast service restaurant….□ 11
   Entertainment………□ 05  Home goods………………□ 12
   Hospitality/tourism…□ 06  Other, please specify……□ 13
   School/university…..□ 07
25. Approximately how many full-time staff (or full-time equivalent staff) do you have working at this business location, based on a 40-hour full-time workweek?

   10 or fewer staff…. □ 01
   11 to 25 staff……. □ 02
   26 to 50 staff……. □ 03
   51 or more staff…. □ 04

26. In what type of setting is your business located? Please mark ONE (1) that best describes your business setting.

   Business park…………….. □ 01
   Downtown commercial district... □ 05
   Industrial park…………….. □ 02
   Open air shopping center……… □ 06
   Office complex…………….. □ 03
   Other, please specify………… □ 07
   Enclosed shopping mall… □ 04

27. Approximately how many years have you worked at this store? Please mark ONE (1).

   Less than 1 year…. □ 01
   1 to 3 years……. □ 02
   4 to 8 years……. □ 03
   More than 8 years.. □ 04

28. What is your current position or affiliation with this store? Please mark ONE (1).

   Owner………………... □ 01
   Supervisor…………… □ 02
   Manager……………… □ 03
   Other, please specify… □ 04

   ____________________________

Thank you for your time!
APPENDIX C: COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS SURVEY
INSTRUCTIONS: Please respond to each question as best you can. Throughout the survey we will ask about the costs and benefits associated with your agency’s participation in the Safe City initiative. In each case, we are referring to the agency you are representing.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Your Name: __________________________________________________________

Your Position: __________________________________________________________

Agency Name: __________________________________________________________

Location: __________________________________________________________

City State

FUNDING

1) Please list the donor name(s), dollar amount(s), contribution date(s), and the specific reason(s) for each donation below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor Name/ Organization</th>
<th>Contribution Amount</th>
<th>Contribution Date</th>
<th>What specific items were these funds slated to pay for?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SAFE CITY MEETINGS AND ACTIVITIES

2) What was the date of your Safe City kickoff meeting? ______/______/______

3) Was it during regular working hours? Yes………………☐ 01  No………………☐ 00
4) How much time was needed to coordinate the kickoff meeting in terms of the number of staff and hours worked?

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full-Time:</td>
<td>Hours:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part-Time:</td>
<td>Hours:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteers:</td>
<td>Hours:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5) How long was the kickoff meeting (hours, minutes)? ______________________

  5a) If the meeting was off-site, what was the travel time? _________________

6) How many people attended? ____________________________

7) What was the cost of the kickoff meeting? $ ______________________

8) How often are Safe City meetings held? ____________________________

9) Are Safe City meetings typically held during regular business/working hours?
   Yes……………□ 01  No……………□ 00

10) What is the average length of time for a meeting? ______________________

11) What was the date of the most recent Safe City meeting? __________________

12) How many meetings have you held to date? ____________________________

13) What is the average number of attendees at your Safe City meetings? ______

Please list the businesses most often in attendance:

| 1. | 6. |
| 2. | 7. |
| 3. | 8. |
| 4. | 9. |
| 5. | 10. |
14) Are there any costs that you incur as a result of holding Safe City meetings?

Yes……………□ o1 No……………□ o0

[Skip to Question # 16]

15) Please detail these additional costs?

___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________

16) When did your Safe City program first begin? _____ / _____ / _____

17) Did any planning or other preparation activities take place prior to the start of Safe City?

___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________

18) How many people were involved in these activities? ______________

19) How many hours were devoted to these activities per person? ______________

___________________________________________________________________

20) What was the total cost of the planning or other preparation activities that took place prior to Safe City? ______________

---

**STAFFING**

21) What is the number of staff dedicated to the Safe City program in terms of:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Full-time Staff:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part-time Staff:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Volunteers:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

22) For each staff member listed above, complete the table as applicable:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Staff member</th>
<th>Full-time/Part-time/Volunteer</th>
<th>Number of months working on Safe City</th>
<th>Average number of hours per month dedicated to Safe City</th>
<th>Salary (loaded)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN (CPTED)

The following set of questions asks about CPTED solutions you may have implemented.

23) Were any of the staff members above hired specifically to work on Safe City?

Yes……………□️ 01  No……………□️ 00

◄ Skip to Question # 24

24) If yes, which ones?

___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________

25) Did you have a CPTED walkthrough of the Safe City area?

No……………□️ 00  ▶ If no, skip to Question 26.

Yes……………□️ 01  ▶ 25a) If yes, what was the date?      _______/_______/_______

25b) Have you had additional walkthroughs?

Yes……………□️ 01  No……………□️ 00

25c) If yes, how many? ________________

25d) How many hours did each take? ____________

25e) Did the CPTED walkthrough(s) occur during normal business hours?

Yes……………□️ 01  No……………□️ 00

25f) How many police department representatives were present at each walkthrough?

25g) How many business or community partners were present at each walkthrough? ________________

25h) How much did each CPTED walkthrough cost?
26) Did you add/change lighting in your Safe City area?

No……………□ 00 → If no, skip to Question 27.

Yes……………□ 01  → 26a) How many lights were:

- Added _____________
- Changed _____________

26b) When was each light:

- Added __________________
- Changed __________________

26c) How many employees (including internal and external) installed/changed the lights? ________________

26d) What is the hourly rate of each of the employee(s) who installed/changed the lights?

_______________________________________

26e) How many hours did they take to install/change?

_______________________________________

26f) How much did each light cost to add or change?

- Cost of each light _____________
- Installation/Labor Cost __________
- Total Cost ___________

26g) How much does each light cost to operate per month?

__________________________________________

26h) Are there any maintenance costs for these lights?

Yes……………□ 01   No……………□ 00

26i) If yes, what are they and who is responsible for these costs? ________________________________

_______________________________________

26j) Did you ever habitually add/change lighting prior to Safe City as a means of addressing crime and disorder in what is now the Safe City area?

Yes……………□ 01   No……………□ 00
27) Did you add/change signage?

No………………□ 00  ➔ If no, skip to Question 28.

Yes………………□ 01  ➔

27a) If yes, how many signs were:

   Added ______________
   Changed ______________

27b) When was each sign added/changed?

   Added ______________
   Changed ______________

27c) How many employees installed/changed the signs?

   (include internal and external employees)

   ________________________________

27d) What were the hourly rates for each of the employee(s) who installed/changed the signs?

   ________________________________

27e) How many hours did each sign take to install/change?

   ________________________________

27f) How much did each sign cost to:

   Purchase/change

   ________________________________

   Installation/Labor Cost ________

   Total Cost ______________________

27g) Are there any maintenance costs for these signs?

   Yes………………□ 01  No………………□ 00

27h) If yes, what are they and who is responsible for these costs?

   ________________________________

27i) Did you ever habitually add/change signage to address crime and disorder prior to Safe City in what is now the Safe City area?

   Yes………………□ 01  No………………□ 00

28) Did you alter the landscape in or around your Safe City area?

No………………□ 00  ➔ If no, skip to Question 29.

Yes………………□ 01  ➔

28a) If yes, how many times was it altered? ______________

28b) How many employees (including internal and external) altered the landscaping? ______________

28c) What were the hourly rates for each employee? ______________

28d) How many hours did it take to alter? ______________
28e) *How much did each alteration cost?*
   Total Cost (including labor) _______________

28f) Are there any maintenance costs for the landscaping?
   Yes............□ 01  No.............□ 00

28g) If yes, what are they and who is responsible for these costs?
   __________________________
   __________________________

28h) Did you ever habitually alter the landscaping to address crime and disorder prior to Safe City in what is now the Safe City area?
   Yes............□ 01  No.............□ 00

29) Did you add/change any entry/exit barriers?
   No.............□ 00  If no, skip to Question 30.
   Yes.............□ 01

29a) If yes, how many? ______________

29b) *When were these added/changed?*
   Added  __________________
   Changed __________________

29c) How many employees (including internal and external) added/changed the barriers?
   __________________________

29d) What were the hourly rates for each employee?
   __________________________

29e) *How many hours did they take to install/change?*
   __________________________

29f) *How much did each barrier cost to install/change?*
   Labor Cost _______________________
   Total Cost _______________________

29g) Are there any maintenance costs for these barriers?
   Yes.............□ 01  No.............□ 00

29h) If yes, what are they and who is responsible for these costs?
   __________________________

29i) Did you ever habitually add/change barriers in order to address crime and disorder prior to Safe City in what is now the Safe City area?
   Yes.............□ 01  No.............□ 00
### Question 30)
Did you add/change restrictions on pedestrian traffic?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. 00</th>
<th>Yes. 01</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>□</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **If no, skip to Question 31.**
  - 30a) If yes, how many times? _________________________
  - 30b) *When* were these restrictions added/changed?
    - Added _______________________
    - Changed _______________________
  - 30c) How many employees (including internal and external)
    added/changed the restrictions?
    ________________________________
  - 30d) What were the hourly rates for each employee?
    ________________________________
  - 30e) *How many* hours did it take to add/change them? _____
  - 30f) *How much* did adding/changing each restriction cost?
    - Labor Cost ________________
    - Total Cost ________________
  - 30g) Are there any maintenance costs for these restrictions?
    - Yes. 01   No. 00
  - 30h) If yes, what are they and who is responsible for these costs?
    ________________________________
  - 30i) Did you ever habitually add/change restrictions to
    address crime and disorder prior to Safe City in what is now the Safe City area?
    - Yes. 01   No. 00

### Question 31)
Did you implement any other CPTED solutions?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. 00</th>
<th>Yes. 01</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>□</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **If no, skip to Question 32.**
  - 31a) If yes, what were they? _________________________
  - 31b) When were they implemented? _________________________
  - 31c) How many employees (internal and external)
    implemented them?
    ________________________________
  - 31d) What were the hourly rates for these employees?
    ________________________________
31e) How many hours were spent on implementation for each CPTED solution? ______________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________

31f) How much did each solution cost to implement?
   Labor Cost ______________________________
   Total Cost ______________________________

31g) Are there any maintenance costs for these solutions?
   Yes……………□ 01   No……………□ 00

31h) If yes, what are they and who is responsible for these costs? ____________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________

31i) Did you ever habitually implement CPTED solutions to address crime and disorder prior to Safe City in what is now the Safe City area?
   Yes……………□ 01   No……………□ 00

**TECHNICAL SOLUTIONS**

The following set of questions asks about technical solutions you may have implemented.

Has your Safe City program implemented the following:

32) CCTV/video surveillance cameras?
   No……………□ 00    ▶
   Yes……………□ 01    ▶

   If no, did you already have CCTV cameras?
   Yes……………□ 01    No……………□ 00
   ▼  ▶ Skip to Question # 33

32b) If yes, as of what date? ______________________________

32c) How much did the CCTVs cost?
   Cost of cameras ______
   Installation Cost ______
   Total Cost ______

32d) Are the CCTVs monitored?
   Yes……………□ 01   No……………□ 00
   ▼  ▶ Skip to Question # 32f

32e) How often and by how many staff? ________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
32f) Have they been used as investigative aids?
Yes…□ 01 No…□ 00

31g) Are there any maintenance costs for these cameras?
Yes…□ 01 No…□ 00

32h) If yes, what are they and who is responsible for these costs?
________________________________________

32i) Did you ever habitually use CCTV to address crime and disorder prior to Safe City in what is now the Safe City area?
Yes…□ 01 No…□ 00

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>33) License Plate recognition?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No…□ 00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes…□ 01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes…□ 01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33d) If yes, what are they and who is responsible for these costs?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33e) Did you ever habitually use license plate recognition to address crime and disorder prior to Safe City in what is now the Safe City area?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes…□ 01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

34) Email alerts?
No…□ 00 | If no, skip to Question 35. |
Yes…□ 01 | 34a) If yes, as of what date? / / |
| 34b) How often are the alerts sent out? |
| 34c) Were there any costs in setting up the system? |
| Total Cost |
| Labor Cost |
34d) How much time is spent on email alerts per month?

_____________________

34e) What is the rate for the person/s responsible for the email alerts?

_____________________

34f) Are there any maintenance costs for these alerts?

Yes……………□ 01    No……………□ 00

34g) If yes, what are they and who is responsible for these costs?

_____________________

34h) Did you ever habitually use email alerts to address crime and disorder prior to Safe City in what is now the Safe City area?

Yes……………□ 01    No……………□ 00

35) Two-way radios between merchant and police?

No……………□ 00 ➔ If no, skip to Question 36.

Yes……………□ 01 ➔ 35a) If yes, as of what date? ______/_______/_______

35b) How much did it cost to implement two-way radios?

Total Cost ______________
Labor Cost ______________

35c) Are there any maintenance costs for these radios?

Yes……………□ 01    No……………□ 00

35d) If yes, what are they and who is responsible for these costs?

_____________________

35e) Did you ever habitually use two-way radios between merchants and police to address crime and disorder prior to Safe City in what is now the Safe City area?

Yes……………□ 01    No……………□ 00

36) Vehicle kill-switches?

No……………□ 00 ➔ If no, skip to Question 37.

Yes……………□ 01 ➔ 36a) If yes, as of what date? ______/_______/_______
36b) *How much* does it cost to implement vehicle kill switches?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Cost</th>
<th>Labor Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

36c) Are there any maintenance costs for these kill switches?

- Yes………□ □
- No………□ □

36d) If yes, what are they and who is responsible for these costs?

36e) Did you ever habitually use vehicle kill switches to address crime and disorder prior to Safe City in what is now the Safe City area?

- Yes………□ □
- No………□ □

37) Use of Segways to patrol Safe City area?

- No…………□ □
- Yes………□ □

If no, skip to Question 38.

37a) If yes, as of what date? ______/______/______

37b) *How much* did it cost to implement Segways? $_____

37c) Are there any maintenance costs for the Segways?

- Yes…………□ □
- No…………□ □

37d) If yes, what are they and who is responsible for these costs?

37e) Did you ever habitually use Segways to address crime and disorder prior to Safe City in what is now the Safe City area?

- Yes…………□ □
- No…………□ □

38) Use of foot patrols to patrol Safe City area?

- No…………□ □
- Yes………□ □

If no, skip to Question 39.

38a) If yes, how often since program began? __________

38b) How many foot patrols are dedicated to the Safe City area? ______________________

38c) What is the cost of having foot patrols patrol the Safe City area each time? ______________________
38d) Did you ever habitually use foot patrols to address crime and disorder prior to Safe City in what is now the Safe City area?

Yes...........□ 01  No.............□ 00

39) Perimeter Checks?

No.............□ 00  → If no, skip to Question 40.
Yes.............□ 01  → 39a) If yes, how often since program began? ____________

39b) How many employees conduct the checks? __________

39c) What is the cost of conducting the perimeter checks each time? __________

39d) Did you ever habitually use perimeter checks to address crime and disorder prior to Safe City in what is now the Safe City area?

Yes.............□ 01  No.............□ 00

40) Any other technical solutions?

No.............□ 00  → If no, skip to Question 41.
Yes.............□ 01  → 40a) Please explain: __________________________

____________________________________________________

____________________________________________________

Next Steps
The following set of questions asks about plans for future activities.

41) Do you have any Safe City activities planned for the future?

No.............□ 00  → If no, skip to Question 42.
Yes.............□ 01  → 41a) If yes, what are these activities? ________________

____________________________________________________

41b) When are they planned to begin? ________________

42) Is there a plan in place to transition Safe City to business partners?

No.............□ 00  → If no, skip to Question 43.
Yes.............□ 01  → 42a) If so, please describe the plan? ________________
43) Have you held any Safe City activities other than those listed above?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>No.</strong></th>
<th>□ 00</th>
<th>If no, skip to Question 44.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Yes.</strong></td>
<td>□ 01</td>
<td>43a) If yes, what were they and when did they occur?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

44) What are any challenges or lessons learned from your implementation of Safe City?

_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________

45) Please detail any programs that might have been *discontinued* as a result of Safe City? (i.e., Foot patrols used to patrol Safe City area, being replaced by use of Segways). How much did each *discontinued* program cost?

_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________

**IF YOU HAVE A RECONCILED BUDGET, PLEASE SEND US A COPY ALONG WITH YOUR RESPONSES.**

*Thank you for your time!*
APPENDIX D: CINCINNATI WESTERN CORRIDOR SAFE CITY LOGIC MODEL
**Western Corridor Safe City Logic Model**

The mission of the Safe City program is to maximize safety and reduce crime in Safe City communities by implementing a community based, public/private partnership that is led by law enforcement and employs communications technologies and focused technical solutions, including situational crime prevention (SCP) techniques.

### Broad Goals of Safe City

- Reduce crime and create safer communities
- Increase public perception of safety
- Sustain proactive and engaged Safe City partnerships
- Encourage community support for Safe City
- Increase the number of retail stores involved with Safe City by demonstrating successful implementation of Safe City in other communities

### Specific Goals of Western Corridor Safe City

- Develop a self-sustaining information sharing/community partnership
- Positively impact the quality of life in the focus area
- Positively impact economic development in the focus area and serve as a model
- Expand pre-existing electronic information sharing network about crime and community concerns to Safe City partners
- Develop electronic newsletter

### Needs Addressed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity/Strategy/Process</th>
<th>Expected Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Establish law enforcement partnerships, assess the community, and develop an inventory of partners.</td>
<td>Short-term:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Outputs:**  
  - Meeting between Target and CPD  
  - Ownership transferred to CPD  
  - 1 FT officer, 1 intern assigned to manage Safe City  
  - Safe City focus area identified  
  - Target donates $25,000 in seed funding |  
  - Identify crimes specific to Safe City communities  
  - Develop an awareness of community relations, persons, agencies, and local issues that could affect the success of Safe City  
  - Develop an ability to engage law enforcement  
  - Develop an awareness of the role of law enforcement, retail, security, and community partners and identify the current status of their loss prevention and safety efforts, as well as their relationships with law enforcement |
|  |
|  | Long-term: |
|  |  
  - Forge strong, lasting relationships with law enforcement  
  - Shift ownership of Safe City to local law enforcement |

### Partnerships

Safe City is implemented through a series of three steps designed to: (1) introduce Safe City to law enforcement; (2) gain their support; and (3) transfer ownership of Safe City to them. The community’s readiness/willingness for Safe City is evaluated and the property management/developer must be on board from the beginning of the process.

**Inputs:**
- Target initiative planning and seed funding
- Law enforcement leadership
- Cooperation/resources of retailers and property management

**Outputs:**
- Meeting between Target and CPD
- Ownership transferred to CPD
- 1 FT officer, 1 intern assigned to manage Safe City
- Safe City focus area identified
- Target donates $25,000 in seed funding
### Partnerships

The next set of steps in the Safe City process are designed to: (4) engage potential Safe City partners by introducing Safe City, explaining the project, clarifying roles and expectations, and generating support for the program; (5) have local law enforcement present the key message about Safe City and its core principles; and (6) have Target consult and support law enforcement to create a detailed implementation plan.

**Inputs:**
- Law enforcement leadership
- Cooperation/resources of retailers and property management
- Marketing/promoting Safe City

**Activity/Strategy/Process**

- Coordinate pre-kickoff meetings, convene a Safe City Kick-Off meeting, and formalize Safe City.

**Outputs:**
- Presentation of Safe City to key businesses by CPD
- Crime vulnerability surveys conducted by CPD Crime Prevention Specialists with Citizens on Patrol volunteers
- Invitations to participate in Safe City and project literature distributed to 360 merchants in focus area
- Meeting with UI researchers to discuss action plan
- Results of crime vulnerability surveys shared with businesses – helped secure buy-in to Safe City
- Meeting with representatives of public and private schools in focus area and CPD

**Expected Outcomes**

**Short-term:**
- Identify partners and confirm their support and involvement
- Develop and understand Target’s role and the role of law enforcement
- Identify ways to make Safe City a success
- Develop relationships with partners
- Identify priorities, specific projects, and activities needed to implement Safe City
- Identify key partners’ roles and expectations
- Identify potential implementation challenges and develop strategies/tactics for managing those challenges

**Long-term:**
- Develop a successful implementation plan (formalize Safe City)
- Engage partners in the Safe City process

**Manage Safe City.**

**Outputs:**
- Emergency city ordinance passed authorizing CPD to make presentations and solicit donations to fund the Western Corridor Safe City project
- Operating fund for receipt of project donations created
- Western Corridor Safe City Advisory Board created to provide community input on project administration
- Official kick-off event held at local theatre
- Target donates $250,000 (including seed funding) at kick-off

**Expected Outcomes**

**Short-term:**
- Identify technical solutions to facilitate the Safe City project
- Increase stakeholders’ buy-in to Safe City and the number of key stakeholders committed to becoming a partner in Safe City
- Identify broad long-term planning of future Safe City projects, potential challenges, and opportunities

**Long-term:**
- Improve retail security
- Strengthen coordination of public/private community safety programs
- Increase perception of safety among patrons
- Decrease local crime rates
- Decrease retail crime frequency and increased safety
- Support successful implementation of Safe City
## Targeted Solutions

Safe City partners will also identify solutions that utilize technology and/or process to facilitate crime prevention efforts. These targeted solutions allow for a focused response to crime and include situational crime prevention techniques, use of Safeness Ambassadors, and information sharing.

### Inputs:
- Law enforcement
- Target AP staff
- Retail security
- Committed resources from property management/developers and Safe City partners
- Communication technology
- Formal and informal communication among Safe City partners
- Public Safety Cameras (CCTV)
- Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED)
- Calls boxes
- SCP consulting by Urban Institute staff

### Needs Addressed

Safe City partners collaborate to identify targeted solutions to reduce crime and create a safer community. This includes identifying ways to reduce the rewards, increase the risk, remove excuses and increase the efforts as perceived by potential offenders.

###Activity/Strategy/Process

- Citizen Observer kick-off meeting to train approximately 300 businesses in loss prevention, robbery prevention, and personal safety
- All businesses in focus area enrolled in Citizen Observer crime alert program
- Outreach to all financial institutions in focus area by trained team of officers from Financial Crimes Unit
- Bi-monthly email alerts through Citizen Alert expanded to include Safe City focus area
- License plate recognition (not paid for by project but use expanded to include focus area) – patrol car with technology assigned to focus area 8 hrs/day
- Existing neighborhood watch program expanded to focus area and surrounding areas
- 2 Segways purchased to patrol Safe City area
- Over 400 foot patrols in focus area, 2-3 four-hour shifts/day
- Each business visited at least once by foot patrols
- National Night Out expanded by Safe City to occur twice/year instead of once/year
- Over 150 CPTED assessments conducted by CPD
- Merchant training for local businesses on shoplifting, pamphlets on shoplifting also distributed
- 6 situational crime prevention guides on car crime, panhandling, public disorder, retail burglary, shoplifting, and vandalism created by UI; copies distributed to site by Target

### Expected Outcomes

#### Short-term
- Increase police response to crime
- Improve real-time communication between security/retail staff/law enforcement regarding crime/crime in progress
- Increase perceived effort
- Increase perceived risk
- Reduce anticipated rewards
- Increase reporting of crime
- Increase swift apprehension of suspects
- Increase natural and employee surveillance

#### Long-term
- Reduce crime (shoplifting, burglary, auto theft/theft from auto, vandalism/nuisance behavior, robbery and assault)
- Increase perception of safety among patrons
- Increase satisfaction among retailers with police reporting and responsiveness
- Increase revenue/sales; volume among retailers
- Increase citizens satisfaction with both local law enforcement and mall security

---

Research Report: Evaluation of Target's Safe City Initiative -- Appendices A-32
APPENDIX E: CINCINNATI WESTERN CORRIDOR SAFE CITY MALL SECURITY SURVEY AND BUSINESS TRAINING DOCUMENTS
# Cincinnati Police Department

## Safe City – Western Corridor

### Business Security Survey

- **Business Name:** ___________________________________
- **Contact Person:** ______________________
- **Address:** _________________________________________
- **Date:** ________________   **Officer:** ____________________

## ALARM:

- **Alarm System** YES / NO   **Company:** __________________________
- **Front Door Sign** YES / NO
- **CPD Compliant** YES / NO   **Permit #:** __________________________
- **Rear Door Sign** YES / NO
- **Exterior Access to phone wires secure** YES / NO
- **Tested monthly** YES / NO

## CAMERA SYSTEM:

- **Video cameras present?** YES / NO   **Working** YES / NO
- **VCR**   **DVR**   **Computer**
- **Recording speed:** _________   **Retention:** _____________ **days**

## INTERIOR:

- **Interior Night Lights** YES / NO   **Light over Front Door** YES / NO
- **Lights over Rear Door** YES / NO
- **Locks changed since last key holder resigned / fired?** YES / NO
- **Do you know everyone who has a key?** (previous occupants / landlord) YES / NO
- **Are the locks in good working order – including strike plates with 3" screws into the jamb?** YES / NO
- **Mail delivered to a secure location** YES / NO
- **Notify the Cincinnati Police – Vacation Watch program that you are away?** YES / NO
- **Cash register** YES / NO   **Drawer kept out and visible from exterior at night** YES / NO

## EXTERIOR:

- **Windows unobstructed by shrubbery to permit maximum visibility?** ___ front ___ back ___ sides
- **Exterior lights around the building front, back and sides?** YES / NO   **DO they work** YES / NO
- **Do all exterior doors have wide angle viewers (peep holes)?** YES / NO
- **Exterior doors have a cylinder type dead bolt with a one inch throw and cylinder guard?** YES / NO
- **Do the exterior doors have a heavy slide type bolt or similar locking device which can only be opened from inside?** YES / NO
- **Can all of your doors be securely locked?** YES / NO
- **Do all of the exterior doors have inside hinges or locking/pinned non-removable hinges?** YES / NO
The Cincinnati Police Department is working with local business and community members in instituting a Safe City project along the Warsaw & Glenway Avenue Corridor.

To do this, we need your help.

Please provide the email addresses of all employees who work in your business. We will then give you access to the CitizenObserver.Com web site. Using this web site, all businesses in the Safe City Corridor will be able to communicate among each other and share information regarding criminal activity in the area.

PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE CLEARLY

@ @ @ @ @ @ @
@ @ @ @ @ @ @
@ @ @ @ @ @ @
@ @ @ @ @ @ @
@ @ @ @ @ @ @
@ @ @ @ @ @ @
@ @ @ @ @ @ @
@ @ @ @ @ @ @
@ @ @ @ @ @ @
@ @ @ @ @ @ @

If you are not able to return this to the officer today, please mail it to:

Cincinnati Police Department
Michelle Faulkner #1080
310 Ezzard Charles Drive
Cincinnati, Ohio 45214-2805
CALL 911 AND REPORT THE ROBBERY
AND THEN COMPLETE THIS FORM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SEX</th>
<th>AGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MALE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEMALE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HEIGHT</th>
<th>WEIGHT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HAIR</th>
<th>RACE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BLACK</td>
<td>WHITE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BROWN</td>
<td>BLACK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLONDE</td>
<td>OTHER</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EYES</th>
<th>HAT / MASK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TIE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GLASSES TYPE</th>
<th>TIE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SHIRT</th>
<th>COAT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PANTS</th>
<th>SHOES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPLEXION</th>
<th>SCAR / TATTOO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VEHICLE TYPE</th>
<th>VEHICLE PLATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VEHICLE COLOR</th>
<th>VEHICLE DOORS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**COURTESY OF**

CINCINNATI POLICE DEPARTMENT
COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING SECTION
310 EZZARD CHARLES DRIVE
CINCINNATI, OHIO 45214-2805
513-352-1472
ROBBERY PREVENTION

- Keep your front doors and windows clear of signs and posters to allow good, two way visibility. Employees can see suspicious persons outside. Passers-by and police can see inside.
- Keep the outside of your business well lit at night.
- Make sure your cash register area is clearly visible to outside observers.
- Practice good cash control. Keep a minimum amount in your cash drawer and make regular drops into a safe.
- Advertise outside that you keep a minimal amount of cash in the register and that you will not accept large bills.
- Don't keep large bills under the cash drawer. If you don't have a safe, find a less obvious place to hide your extra cash until you go to the bank.
- Use a safe that the clerk cannot open alone or that requires two keys. Post that fact conspicuously, including on the safe itself.
- Use video camera surveillance and make it well known.
- Always have at least two clerks working at night.
- Vary your banking routine. Carry cash in a variety of ways - a lunch sack, attaché case, flight bag, pocket, etc. Money bags are pretty obvious.
- Vary the times and routes that you use to go to the bank.
- Make deposits as often as possible, never less than once a day.
- Be alert for "customers" who seem to be loitering or glancing around the store while appearing to shop or browse through a magazine.
- Watch for suspicious persons outside the business - especially in parked cars and around telephone booths.
- If you see someone who is acting suspicious inside or outside, call the police to have them checked out.
- Two persons should be on hand at opening and closing times.
- At opening time, one person should enter the store and check to see if it has been disturbed.
- Before closing, one person should check the office, back rooms and rest rooms to make sure no one is hiding inside.
- Keep side and back doors locked. Have employees use the main entrance, if possible.
- Place markers at the main entrance that employees can use to help gauge the height of a robber as he leaves.
HOW TO RESPOND DURING A ROBBERY

- Try to stay calm. Don't make any sudden movements to upset the robber.
- Do exactly as you are told. **DO NOT RESIST!**
- Activate your alarm ONLY if you can do so secretly.
- Tell the robber about anything that might surprise him, such as someone who is expected to arrive soon.
- If you have to move or reach, tell the robber what you are going to do and why.
- Try to get a good look at the robber so you can describe him later.
- Don't be a hero. It's better to lose your money than your life.
- Give the robber time to leave.
- Note his direction of travel when he leaves.
- Try to get a description of his vehicle ONLY if you can do so without exposing yourself to harm.

WHAT TO DO AFTER A ROBBERY

- Call the police immediately, even if you have already activated the alarm.
- Close the store and lock the door(s) if you have a key.
- Do not discuss the details of the robbery with witnesses or fellow employees.
- Ask any witnesses to stay until police arrive. If they can't, get their names, phone numbers and addresses.
- Do not touch anything that the robber may have touched. Block off areas where the robber was, if necessary.
- Try to recall as much as you can about the robber's appearance, speech and mannerisms. Make notes.
- Step outside the store when the police arrive so that they'll know the robber is gone and you are safe.
- Let the police answer inquiries from the news media.
- Do not discuss the amount of money taken with anyone other than police.
EMPLOYEE THEFT

Having an elementary understanding of the more common forms of employee theft will help you formulate a strategy for subverting them. Here are just a few:

- **Forging Receipts** Salespersons can charge a customer one sum, ring up a receipt for less, and pocket the difference.
- **Hiding Receipts** When bookkeeping is sloppy and little supervision exists, employees can keep cash and receipts without raising an eyebrow.
- **Pocketing Loose Change** Small sums of money, such as fees or petty cash, may not be missed at all.
- **Pilfering Merchandise** Goods your firm purchases may never even make it to the shelves.
- **Fictitious Payroll** Occasionally personnel managers will authorize salary for fictitious workers, then keep it for themselves.
- **Over Billing Expenses** Managers with expense accounts may submit receipts twice and be reimbursed twice, or inflate actual expenses incurred.
- **Purchasing Fraud** Employees sometimes declare themselves suppliers of nonexistent goods, and subsequently reimburse themselves handsomely.

**KEEP A CLOSER EYE**

Watch for the tell-tale signs of internal theft. One subtle but noticeable indication of dishonest employees may be an unexplained rise in their living standards. Be careful, however, as newfound wealth or sudden success may occur for a number of reasons of which you might not be aware.

Pay close attention to management-level personnel who insist on handling routine clerical tasks themselves. And be on guard for clients complaining about overcharging or inconsistencies in shipping and billing practices. Following up on customer grievances often reveals clandestine theft.

**FIND PEOPLE YOU CAN TRUST**

Some employees have theft in mind from the start. You should be able to weed out these people by performing thorough background checks on all new hire prospects, particularly for sensitive positions involving the flow of money. Call previous employers to verify resume and application information.
MAKE IT HARD TO STEAL

While the majority of workers will not go out of their way to steal, the best defense is careful supervision that removes any easy opportunities.

Even though delegation of tasks is unavoidable, try to have a management-level supervisor oversee inventory and bookkeeping. If this is not possible, consider dividing these tasks among several staff members so no single employee has too much authority. Shifting responsibilities from one person to another allows them to check each other’s work for accuracy and suspicious activities. It also makes collusion between employees, or between an employee and an outside source, such as a distributor, considerably less likely.

It is possible to install physical obstacles to theft, such as alarm systems and secured, restricted areas. However, be aware that such obvious measures can have a negative effect on morale. While overt tactics to deter theft help prevent losses, they also convey very clearly to employees that they are not trusted.

WORK TOGETHER WITH EMPLOYEES

Workers will be less likely to steal if you create an environment in which they think there is a good chance of being caught. Training and "employee awareness" programs can inform workers about stealing problems and keep them on the lookout for theft of any kind. A good program can be motivational and enjoyable - Highlighted, for example, by group rewards for departments that show decreased rates of theft.

To make a security program such as this effective, it is crucial employees know they can turn over incriminating information on anyone in the firm without fearing job loss or other repercussions. Stress that management and supervisors are not above suspicion and that employee complaints will be taken seriously.

PROVIDE ALTERNATIVES TO STEALING

The most troubling cases of employee theft occur when workers are in desperate financial straits. Common problems, such as heavy medical expenses, can temporarily put people into situations where stealing seems necessary for survival. Let employees know in advance that they can come to management for assistance rather than resorting to theft. Although no company is a charitable organization, consider helping distressed staff members find financial counseling.

DETERMINE CLEAR POLICIES

To reinforce these other measures, a company should distribute clear, written policies on ethical behavior to be signed by each employee -- including the owner. It should be emphasized that there is no such thing as an "acceptable amount" of employee
crime, and that, in fact, none at all will be tolerated. There should also be no double standard at work: all infractions should be punished regardless of how important the person or how small the infraction.

**SET AN EXAMPLE**

Employees need to know that one uniform ethical standard applies to everyone in the firm. Executives and managers should be positive role models for workers. If management is found dipping into petty cash, fudging on expense accounts or taking home equipment, personnel will feel justified in doing the same. As is always ideally the case, leadership and direction begin at the highest level.

**SHOPLIFTERS**

- There are an estimated 25 million shoplifters in our nation today (approximately 1 in 11 Americans)
- Retailers lose $25 million a day to shoplifting.
- There is no profile of a typical shoplifter. A shoplifter can be anyone.

Shoplifters steal in all types of stores...

- 69% say they steal in department stores
- 63% in supermarkets
- 57% specialty shops
- 54% convenience stores
- 47% drug stores,
- 27% all other type stores

- Contrary to popular belief, men and women shoplift equally as often.
- About 25% of shoplifters apprehended are juveniles, 75% adults.
- Shoplifters say they are caught an average of only once every 49 times. They are turned over to the police 50% of the time.
- A small percentage of shoplifters are "professionals" who steal solely for resale or profit as a business. These include drug addicts who steal to feed their habit, hardened professionals who steal as a lifestyle, and international shoplifting gangs who steal for profit as a business.
- The vast majority of shoplifters are non-professionals who steal, not out of financial need or greed, but as a response to social and personal pressures in their life.
- Approximately 70% of non-professional shoplifters don't plan their thefts in advance. 30% do.
Shoplifters often buy some merchandise and steal other merchandise:

59% frequently
35% sometimes
6% never

Shoplifters classified as "first offenders" admit to stealing from retail stores at the following frequency:

13% say they steal daily or several times/day
57% say they steal monthly or more often
27% say they steal weekly or more often
43% say they steal less than monthly

DIFFERING TYPES OF SHOPLIFTERS

- Addictive-compulsive shoplifters: 75%
- Professionals, those who steal for profit or lifestyle: 5%
- The thrill seekers, those who steal on a dare for excitement: 5%
- Drug addicts, those who steal to pay for a drug habit: 5%
- Kleptomaniacs are those who steal for no reason: 1%
- The absent minded: 1%
APPENDIX F: CHULA VISTA SAFE CITY FOCUS AREA
5 SUB AREAS
Area 1
Area 2
Area 3
Area 5

Research Report: Evaluation of Target’s Safe City Initiative – Appendices A-48
Complete Focus Area

Research Report: Evaluation of Target’s Safe City Initiative – Appendices A-49
APPENDIX G: CHULA VISTA SAFE CITY SIGNS
(ENGLISH AND SPANISH)
Helping communities and businesses reduce crime and create an environment where people feel safe and secure.

We need your help!
CIUDAD SEGURA
Ayudando a las comunidades y a los negocios a disminuir la delincuencia y a crear un ambiente donde la gente se sienta segura y protegida.
¡Necesitamos su ayuda!
APPENDIX H: CHULA VISTA DAYTIME CPTED REPORT
On November 3, 2006, a crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) assessment was conducted in the five sub-areas of the Safe City focus area. Persons participating in the assessment included:

- Bryan Campos, Red Wing Shoes
- Joe Cline, Chula Vista Police Department
- L. David Creviston, U-Haul
- Ryan Foster, Target
- Angela Gaines, Chula Vista Police Department
- Debbie Gomez, Security Public Storage
- Roman Granados, Chula Vista Police Department
- Luis Jacobo, Wal-Mart
- Aurora Navarro-Grace, Department of Motor Vehicles
- Richard E. Preuss, Chula Vista Police Department
- Denise Rubin, Target
- Arlene Salvador, Best Buy
- Karin Schmerler, Chula Vista Police Department
- Susan Skillman, North Island Credit Union
- Kevonne Small, The Urban Institute

We started the inspection in sub-area 1 at the DMV office.

Concerns and issues at the DMV included vandalism, trash (including broken beer & liquor bottles) and human waste found in public areas, and unlawful overnight camping. Transients are taking discarded food from the Jack in the Box trash dumpsters and bringing it to the DMV parking lot area to sort it. They are then leaving the unused trash in the parking lot. The parking lot and shrubbery around DMV is also being used as a camping / sleeping area.
The trees and shrubbery around the perimeter of DMV are overgrown and provide hiding places for people to engage in undesired and illegal activity. The overgrown trees and shrubbery also reduce visibility into the areas where undesired and illegal activity is occurring. The trees in the south portion of the parking lot are overgrown and blocking the existing parking lot lights, which decrease the effectiveness of the lights. The north and west chain link fence has broken plastic slats in it. This fence also provides screening for illegal activity and reduces visibility into the area. The slats also provide an area for graffiti.
To help decrease the risk of continued undesired and criminal activity at and around the DMV site we recommend the following:

- Insure that parking lot and exterior building lights are on from dusk till dawn.
- The trees be trimmed up to 6 feet to allow visibility into the site from the street, and that the trees be trimmed so they do not block the existing lighting.
- The shrubbery on the west and north fence lines be trimmed down to 2 feet and thinned out to allow visibility into the area and to deny hiding areas for undesired and criminal activity.
- The shrubbery on the south side of the DMV by Third Avenue and the east side by N. Glover Avenue be replaced with low security-type ground cover plants.
- The shrubbery around the trash bins be trimmed to eliminate any hiding areas.
- The trash can on the north side of the building by the driver exam area be relocated closer to the waiting area benches.
- The parking lot be posted with “No Overnight Camping” signage.
- The plastic slats be removed from the chain link fences to increase visibility and reduce the risk of graffiti.

We then proceeded from the DMV north on N. Glover Avenue. The issues for this area included vandalism, graffiti, trash, and overnight camping. There are also three dead trees along the east property line of Plenums Plus, LLC (at N. Glover Avenue) that pose a safety risk.

To help decrease the risk of continued undesired and criminal activity along N. Glover Avenue we recommend the following:

- Trim shrubbery or replace it with low ground cover to reduce hiding spaces.
- Remove the three dead trees along the Plenums Plus, LLC fence line.
- Post street signs to prohibit on-street overnight camping.
We then moved to the area at and around U-Haul. The identified issues included vandalism, theft, graffiti, trash, day laborer disorder, and people trespassing (using the property as short cut) on northwest slope. Day laborers are gathering in the cul-de-sac north of U-Haul at the end of Trousdale Drive. The day laborers will ‘rush’ cars as they pull into the U-Haul entrance, causing a traffic hazard and scaring U-Haul patrons. The day laborers also gather at the cul-de-sac to drink alcohol and then use cars parked on the cul-de-sac to hide themselves and the alcohol when police enter the area.

To help decrease the risk of continued undesired and criminal activity at and around the U-Haul we recommend the following:

- Install wrought iron gates for the trash enclosure to prevent access to the contents and prevent graffiti to dumpsters.
- Replace shrubbery used as hiding area with low ground cover such as ice plant.
- Install a wrought iron fence along the west property line to reduce the risk of trespassing, theft, and people using property as a short-cut.
- Post Safe City signage.
- Investigate possibility of parking restrictions on cul-de-sac.
As undesired people are a concern area-wide steps should be taken to make the area less attractive to them. While inspecting the Sherwin Williams property, we saw that the business and landscaping was generally well-maintained. We did notice that the south side of the building had trash at the east end of the walkway and it looked like the area was being used by transients or day laborers. We found an uncovered hole in the walkway that was a safety risk and a faucet on the south wall of the building high enough that it could be used for washing or drinking.

To help decrease the risk of undesired and criminal activity at and around Sherwin Williams we recommend the following:

- Provide dusk-till-dawn security light for the south side of the building to increase visibility into the area after dark.
- Cover the open hole in the walkway to reduce the risk of injury and lawsuits.
- Remove the handle from the water faucet to reduce the risk of the area being used as a shower / laundry for transients and day laborers.
- Post Safe City signage.
As we continued down the block to the Rite-Buy / Factory Direct store, we noted that the same concerns regarding graffiti, trash, and undesired persons were evident.

To help decrease the risk of continued undesired and criminal activity at and around Rite Buy / Factory Direct we recommend the following:

- Regularly clean trash from around site.
- Remove graffiti ASAP; contact the City of Chula Vista Graffiti Eradication Hotline at (619) 691-5198 for assistance.
- Repair light fixture on tall monument sign.
- Repair and add light bulbs to existing wall-mounted light fixtures.

The area around Vista Paint has similar issues as the other businesses in the focus area.

To help decrease the risk of continued undesired and criminal activity at and around Vista Paint, we recommend the following:

- Repair burned-out light fixtures and consider add lighting at the rear of the building.
- Clean up the area around the trash bin (pallets, paint / cleaning container, and rags).

The Jack-in-the-Box restaurant is an attractor for transients due to the very nature of the business (food service), the 24 hour drive / walk up window, and unsecured trash bins where unused food is disposed of.
To help decrease the risk of continued undesired and criminal activity at and around Jack-in-the-Box we recommend the following:

- Secure the trash enclosure where any unused food is disposed of.
- Partner with the DMV to remove or reduce the shrubbery between the rear of the Jack-in-the-Box and the DMV to increase visibility.
- Do not allow walk-up sales at the drive-up window.
- Discourage loitering at the benches after the indoor dining part of the restaurant is closed through usage of Safe City signage.

The next phase of the inspection was sub-area 2 which we started at the CVS Pharmacy.
As in sub-area 1, unwanted persons, vandalism, graffiti, trash, and thefts are concerns in sub-area 2. Sub-area 2 has the additional concern of panhandlers harassing patrons in some of the common areas. Most of sub-area 2 is well maintained, with graffiti and trash removed in a timely manner. The area south of the CVS, La Fuente Mexican Food, and JFS Laundry has a drainage channel running east/west along the property. This area has trash in it, is overgrown, and has signs that people have been hiding or sleeping there.

The common area in front of Starbucks and by their drive-up window are areas where panhandlers approach patrons of the business for handouts.

Pine Palace Liquor has experienced robbery, thefts, and vandalism mainly through the rear door and in the rear parking lot.
To help decrease the risk of continued undesired and criminal activity in sub-area 2 we recommend the following:

- Trim shrubbery at rear of CVS / JFS Laundry / La Fuente Mexican Food. This may require partnering with City’s Public Works.
- Regularly clean trash from around site.
- Remove graffiti ASAP; contact the City of Chula Vista Graffiti Eradication Hotline at (619) 691-5198 for assistance.
- Consider placing Tangle Foot along the drainage ditch to reduce the risk of people trespassing there.
- Explore the possibility of fencing the drainage area.
- Post signage to discourage panhandling in area.
- Post Safe City signage.
- Install entry alert / buzzer and digital surveillance camera at that back door of Pine Palace Liquor.

We moved our inspection into sub-areas 3 & 5.

As in sub-areas 1 & 2, unwanted persons, vandalism, graffiti, trash, and thefts are concerns in sub-areas 3 & 5. As with sub-area 2, there is the additional concern of panhandlers in sub-areas 3 & 5 in front of the businesses and in the private street separating the Target parking lot from the National City Area. The panhandlers will stand in the small island between the lanes on N. Highland Avenue, soliciting money from the passing vehicles and creating a traffic hazard. Another traffic hazard in the area is the lack of a marked crossing area for pedestrians.
The panhandlers are also using the shaded area in the shrubbery at the northeast corner of the Target parking lot as a loitering/hiding area. Another concern at the Target store are skateboarders damaging property at the rear of the store by skateboarding on and around the loading docks. This not only is causing damage to the store but creates a traffic risk as the skateboarders jump off the loading dock area into the truck traffic area at the rear of the store.

The north end of the Security Public Storage site has an overgrown area that has been used for illegal dumping and possibly camping or hiding by unwanted persons. The shrubbery at the southeast corner of the site has also been used as a sleeping area.

The area between Colima’s Mexican Food, Bimbo-Oroweat Bakery, and the Coin Laundry has a continuing problem with transients camping in the bushes and in vehicles in the parking lot, in addition to the vandalism and graffiti other areas have noted.
Another area where transients are camping is just north of the Party City parking lot. The camping contributes to the trash, graffiti, and panhandling issues in the Party City parking lot and the private street south of Party City (N. Highland Avenue).

To help decrease the risk of continued undesired and criminal activity in sub-areas 3 & 5 we recommend the following:

- Reduce / trim the shrubbery in the parking lots to increase visibility. At the northeast corner of the Target parking lot, trim the trees that provide shade for the unwanted persons and reduce or replace the shrubbery with lower ground cover to take away potential hiding places.
- Provide crosswalks / crossing areas across N. Highland Avenue between Target and Southbay Marketplace.
- Bevel the median on N. Highland, then install a 4’ wrought iron fence in the center of the median to reduce panhandling and unsafe crossing at this busy intersection.
- At the north end of Security Public Storage, trim trees and shrubbery to take away hiding / camping areas and increase visibility.
- Consider using skate stopper devices to reduce skateboarding off the Target loading docks.
- Lock the Colima’s and Bimbo-Oroweat Bakery trash dumpsters with disposed food items in them.
- Trim shrubbery on the south side of the Bimbo-Oroweat Bakery and the Coin Laundry along C Street to increase visibility into the area.
- Post 30-minute customer parking only for the area between the Coin Laundry and Bimbo-Oroweat Bakery.
- Place signage to discourage panhandling throughout the Safe City Area. Post Safe City / No Loitering / No Overnight Camping signage.
- Reconsider the placement of a portable restroom behind Colima’s that is attracting transients to the area (giving consideration to County Health Department regulations regarding the placement).
- Trim trees around Security Public Storage that are blocking the existing lighting from the light fixtures.
We then continued our inspection in sub-area 4.

The concerns and issues we identified in the other four Focus areas are also evident in sub-area 4. Sub-areas 3, 4, & 5 have had significant issues with vehicle theft and vehicle burglary in the parking lots. In addition, sub-area 4 has two large open space areas that are used as major camps for transients, a ramp jump area for bikes and motorbikes, and an escape route / hiding area for criminals attempting to elude the police and / or security staff for the stores in the vicinity. The rear of the North Island Credit Union has a water faucet and a roof access ladder that could be used by unwanted persons.
To help decrease the risk of continued undesired and criminal activity in sub-area 4 we recommend the following:

- North Island Credit Union should install security measures on the roof access ladder and remove the handle from the water faucet.
- Shrubbery should be trimmed along the north fence line behind Wal-Mart to increase visibility.
- The bindles of cardboard at the rear of the Best Buy should be removed and/or secured as they are used in camps by transients.
- Efforts need to be made to remove the transient camp at the west side of the parking lot. This is a major attractor for criminal activity in the area. A partnership between the businesses, the City, and the Army Corp of Engineers needs to be explored to achieve this goal.
- A fence needs to be installed along the south edge of the parking lot / property. This is an escape route for criminals that could be easily closed off and greatly reduce the risk of criminal activity in the stores and the parking lots.
These recommendations are mainly general in nature. Each business in the Safe City area is invited to contact the Police Department to schedule an inspection for their business to address the specific concerns.

Please feel free to contact us:

Joe Cline, Sgt. – (619) 409-5466
Angela Gaines, PCRS – (619) 691-5187
Richard E. Preuss, PCRS – (619) 691-5127
Chula Vista Police Department
Community Relations Unit
315 Fourth Avenue
Chula Vista, CA 91910
APPENDIX I: CHULA VISTA NIGHTTIME CPTED REPORT
On January 31, 2007, a nighttime crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) assessment was conducted of the Safe City focus area. Participants in the CPTED assessment met at the Farmers Insurance office at 6:00 PM. The participants included:

- Shaun Albrektsen, American Assets Inc.
- Randy Castillo, Chula Vista Police Department
- Vanessa Coffeen, Farmers insurance
- David Creviston, U-Haul
- Francisco Dominguez, Chula Vista Police Department
- Angela Gaines, Chula Vista Police Department
- Roman Granados, Chula Vista Police Department
- Deanna Mory, Chula Vista Police Department
- Richard Preuss, Chula Vista Police Department
- Russell Rodriguez, American Assets, Inc.
- Karin Schmerler, Chula Vista Police Department
- Elliot Shaffer, Chula Vista Police Department
- Gary Wedge, Chula Vista Police Department

The first thing we noticed was that the lighting in the Target parking lot was excellent. The area between Target, Colima’s Produce, and the Farmers Insurance building was well-lit and had good levels of visibility.

The south parking lot for the Coin Laundry was dark. There was a light pole at the southwest corner of the parking lot but the light fixture was not operating and was overgrown by the tree next to it. The lights at the north end of Bimbo-Oroweat Bakery were also overgrown by trees and two of the fixtures were not working. We also noticed a hole had been cut in the fence. There was not adequate lighting around the Bimbo-Oroweat Bakery dumpster area.

Recommendations:

- Repair light pole in south parking lot of the Coin Laundry.
- Trim the trees at the west side of the south parking lot of the Coin Laundry.
- Trim trees at the north end of the Bimbo-Oroweat Bakery.
- Repair / activate north light fixtures at the Bimbo-Oroweat Bakery.
- Add lighting for the area around the Bimbo-Oroweat Bakery dumpster.
- Repair damage to the Bimbo-Oroweat Bakery’s chain link fence.

The trees along the south end of Security Public Storage are overgrown by trees, which reduces the effectiveness of the existing lighting. During the rain transients were sleeping under the overhang at the east side of Security Public Storage (one transient was observed and contacted during this inspection). The space under the overhang is dark with no lighting. The lighting at the north end of Security Public Storage needs to be turned on; the area was dark. The trees at the north end of the building are blocking light. We notice one light on the north side of the Target store that was out. A chain link fence with slats is impeding visibility between the north side of the Target store, the north end of Security Public Storage, and the Southbay Marketplace, property including the access road.
Recommendations:

- Trim trees along the South side of Security Public Storage.
- Consider wrought iron fencing to block the area under the overhang on the east side of Security Public Storage.
- Realign Target’s west building lighting to provide light for the area under the overhang.
- Activate existing lighting at the north end of Security Public Storage.
- Trim the trees at the north end of Security Public Storage.
- Repair the light fixture on the north side of the Target store.
- Remove the slats from the chain link fence along Southbay Marketplace’s south property line by Target and Security Public Storage.

The driveway area between Target and Southbay Marketplace is an area of concern due to the high volume of auto and pedestrian traffic. Visibility is restricted for vehicle exiting the Target parking lot northbound onto Southbay Marketplace’s property by the chain link fence with slats and shrubbery along the fence. Visibility is also restricted into the parking lot near the McDonalds.

At the west end of the Southbay Marketplace near the monument sign there are areas behind the shrubbery that would make good hiding places.

We also noticed that part of the lighting for the northwest of the GES storage / parking area is not operational.

The pole light at the northeast corner of Wal-Mart and several of the building lights on the north side of Wal-Mart are not operational.

The streetlight on Fifth Avenue approaching Wal-Mart is not operational.

It should be noted that the Southbay Marketplace property had excellent lighting.

Recommendations:

- Remove slats from chain link fence.
- Trim shrubbery down to a maximum height of two feet.
- Trim the shrubbery along south side of McDonalds down to two feet.
- Trim the shrubbery in the area of the Southbay Marketplace monument sign.
- Repair and/or activate the lights on the GES property.
- Repair or activate the lights on the Wal-Mart property.
- Notify City Department of Public Works of non-functioning street light.

Other items noted that should be considered for Southbay Marketplace include:

- Lock the cardboard dumpster at the rear of Old Navy.
- Remove unattended ladders at rear of Office Depot.
- Lock the dumpster lid at rear of the Ross Store.

Next we walked east to the U-Haul property. We noticed that visibility was restricted into the property from Fourth Avenue by the rental trucks parked along the west side of the property facing north and south. The trucks parked in this manner created screening and prevent us from being able to see into the property, which could increase the risk of criminal activity.
The parking lot and the dumpster on the north side of the U-Haul property needs additional lighting. A pole light placed near the dumpster could be directed into the parking lot and provide lighting for both. It may be possible to place lighting on the existing utility pole located at the west side of the north entrance driveway.

We also noted that Sherwin Williams has several lights out on their property. The open hole in the sidewalk on the south side of the building is still uncovered and open. The fence between Sherwin Williams and Factory Direct is in disrepair and has been cut.

We saw that there is no lighting on the north side of Factory Direct. The lights on the north side and rear of Vista Paint are not working.

We noticed that the DMV has excellent parking lot lighting, but needs to repair some of the wall pack lights.

The south side of Colima’s Produce was dark.

Eucalyptus Park was dark and had no night lighting for the area of the park at Fourth Avenue and C Street.

**Recommendations:**

- U-Haul should park their vehicles at the east side of the property facing east or west to allow visibility into the property.
- Additional lighting should be installed at the north end of the U-Haul property.
- Sherwin Williams should repair existing lighting.
- Sherwin Williams needs to cover / repair the open hole in their south sidewalk.
- The fence between Sherwin Williams and Factory Direct needs to be repaired.
- Light should be installed for the north side of Factory Direct.
- Lighting on the north side and rear of Vista Paint should be repaired.
- The DMV’s wall pack lighting should be repaired.
- Lighting should be increased on the south side of Colima’s Produce.
- Eucalyptus Park needs night lighting installed (the City Public Works has identified funds to install night lighting and the project is being scheduled).
APPENDIX J: CHULA VISTA LOGIC MODEL
The mission of the Safe City program is to maximize safety and reduce crime in Safe City communities by implementing a community based, public/private partnership that is led by law enforcement and employs communications technologies and focused technical solutions, including situational crime prevention (SCP) techniques.

### Broad Goals of Safe City
- Reduce crime and create safer communities
- Increase public perception of safety
- Sustain proactive and engaged Safe City partnerships
- Encourage community support for Safe City
- Increase the number of retail stores involved with Safe City by demonstrating successful implementation of Safe City in other communities

### Specific Goals of Chula Vista Safe City
- Increase employee and customer safety in and around retail establishments
- Reduce costs associated with crime repairs and prevention
- Increase retailer responsibility for preventing crime around stores
- Increase proactive policing in neighborhood
- Improve law enforcement and community relations

### Needs Addressed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partnerships</th>
<th>Activity/Strategy/Process</th>
<th>Expected Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Safe City is implemented through a series of three steps designed to: (1) introduce Safe City to law enforcement; (2) gain their support; and (3) transfer ownership of Safe City to them. The community’s readiness/willingness for Safe City is evaluated and the property management/developer must be on board from the beginning of the process.</td>
<td>Establish law enforcement partnerships, assess the community, and develop an inventory of partners.</td>
<td>Short-term:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>o Identify crimes specific to Safe City area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>o Develop an awareness of community relations, persons, agencies, and local issues that could affect the success of Safe City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>o Develop an ability to engage law enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>o Develop an awareness of the role of law enforcement, retail, security, and community partners and identify the current status of their loss prevention and safety efforts, as well as their relationships with law enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Long-term:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>o Forge strong, lasting relationships with law enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>o Shift ownership of Safe City to local law enforcement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Inputs:
- Target initiative planning and seed funding
- Law enforcement leadership
- Cooperation/resources of retailers and property management

### Outputs:
- Meeting between Target and CVPD
- Ownership transferred to CVPD’s Community Relations Unit (CRU) and Research and Analysis Unit (RAU)
- 10 CVPD employees assigned to Safe City part-time
- 10 law enforcement officers volunteer for Safe City (incorporate efforts as part of business as usual)
- 1,570 CVPD hours allocated to Safe City
- Safe City focus area identified
- 55 businesses identified in focus area, contact information gathered by CVPD and added to database
- CVPD introduced Safe City concept to businesses in focus area through in-person visit; invited businesses to partner meeting
- 55 businesses surveyed on crime/disorder problems
- 90 law enforcement officer surveys on crime/disorder concerns during roll call
- $40,000 in Target seed funding allocated
## Partnerships

The next set of steps in the Safe City process are designed to: (4) engage potential Safe City partners by introducing Safe City, explaining the project, clarifying roles and expectations, and generating support for the program; (5) have local law enforcement present the key message about Safe City and its core principles; and (6) have Target consult and support law enforcement to create a detailed implementation plan.

**Inputs:**
- Law enforcement leadership
- Cooperation/resources of retailers and property management
- Marketing/promoting Safe City

**Outputs:**
- Neighboring city (National City) invited as partner
- Calls for service data obtained from National City
- First all-partner meeting held
- Analysis of calls for service and reported crimes presented at first partner meeting
- Analysis of business and officer surveys presented at first partner meeting
- Priority issues identified
- Media kick-off held
- $100,000 (including $40,000 seed funding) donated by Target
- Safe City partners pledge contributions totaling $4,000

### Manage Safe City.

**Outputs:**
- Steering Committee created
- 14 Safe City meetings convened (9 full partner, 5 steering committee):
  - 10 committed Safe City partners in addition to CVPD/CRU
  - 15-30 avg attendees at each full partner meeting
  - 10 avg attendees at each steering committee meeting
  - 1,570 officer hours allocated to Safe City

## Short-term:
- Identify partners and confirm their support and involvement
- Develop and understand Target’s role and the role of law enforcement
- Identify ways to make Safe City a success
- Develop relationships with partners
- Identify priorities, specific projects, and activities needed to implement Safe City
- Identify key partners’ roles and expectations
- Identify potential implementation challenges and develop strategies/tactics for managing those challenges

## Long-term:
- Develop a successful implementation plan (formalize Safe City)
- Engage partners in the Safe City process

## Expected Outcomes

**Short-term:**
- Identify technical solutions to facilitate the Safe City project
- Increase stakeholders’ buy-in to Safe City and the number of key stakeholders committed to becoming a partner in Safe City
- Identify broad long-term planning of future Safe City projects, potential challenges, and opportunities

**Long-term:**
- Improve retail security
- Strengthen coordination of public/private community safety programs
- Increase perception of safety among patrons
- Decrease local crime rates
- Decrease retail crime frequency and increased safety
- Support successful implementation of Safe City
Safe City partners will also identify solutions that utilize technology and/or process to facilitate crime prevention efforts. These targeted solutions allow for a focused response to crime and include situational crime prevention techniques, and information sharing.

**Inputs:**
- Law enforcement
- Target AP staff
- Retail security
- Committed resources from property management/developers and Safe City partners
- Communication technology
- Formal and informal communication among Safe City partners
- Public Safety Cameras (CCTV)
- Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED)
- Calls boxes
- SCP consulting by Urban Institute staff

**Needs Addressed**

**Activity/Strategy/Process**

Safe City partners collaborate to identify targeted solutions to reduce crime and create a safer community. This includes identifying ways to reduce the rewards, increase the risk, remove excuses and increase the efforts as perceived by potential offenders.

**Outputs:**
- 3 Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) walk-throughs of Safe City area
- Over 50 CPTED recommendations to businesses
  - Safe City business invested $1,000 to repair broken light fixtures and add new lights (per recommendations stemming from CPTED walk-throughs)
  - Businesses made three main landscaping changes based on CPTED recommendations
  - 3 main landscaping changes – removal of dense landscape, clean-up of transient camp, and new lighting by few businesses
  - Removed a portable restroom that attracted transients and was in violation of code
- 60 Safe City signs created and posted
- Safe City window clings distributed to businesses
- 1 Safe City website created
- 6 situational crime prevention guides on car crime, panhandling, public disorder, retail burglary, shoplifting, and vandalism created by UI; copies distributed to site by Target
- Created and distributed anti-panhandling signs
- Interviewed day laborers and local businesses over 4-5 months
- Researched and visited Glendale, CA to examine how they’re innovatively dealt with day laborers
- Working with Traffic Safety Commission to create day laborer loading zone
- Anti-panhandling ordinance drafted (modeled after San Diego) – currently under review
- Shopping cart ordinance planned
- 0 CCTVs implemented (decided not feasible)

**Expected Outcomes**

**Short-term**
- Improve police response to crime
- Improve real-time communication between security/retail staff/law enforcement regarding crime/crime in progress
- Increase perceived effort
- Increase perceived risk
- Reduce anticipated rewards
- Increase reporting of crime
- Increase swift apprehension of suspects
- Increase natural and employee surveillance

**Long-term**
- Reduce crime (shoplifting, burglary, auto theft/theft from auto, vandalism/nuisance behavior, robbery and assault)
- Increase perception of safety among patrons
- Increase satisfaction among retailers with police reporting and responsiveness
- Increase revenue/sales; volume among retailers
- Increase citizens satisfaction with both local law enforcement and mall security

Research Report: Evaluation of Target's Safe City Initiative -- Appendices A-75
APPENDIX K: HYATTSVILLE LOGIC MODEL
Hyattsville Safe City Logic Model
The mission of the Safe City program is to maximize safety and reduce crime in Safe City communities by implementing a community based, public/private partnership that is led by law enforcement and employs communications technologies and focused technical solutions, including situational crime prevention (SCP) techniques.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Broad Goals of Safe City</th>
<th>Specific Goals of Hyattsville Safe City</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>o Reduce crime and create safer communities</td>
<td>o Share technology, expertise, resources, and information through local law enforcement partnerships and funding contributions from both government and private partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Increase public perception of safety</td>
<td>o Installation of CCTVs in and around focus area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Sustain proactive and engaged Safe City partnerships</td>
<td>o Identify common radio channel to increase cross-jurisdictional communication among neighboring law enforcement agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Encourage community support for Safe City</td>
<td>o Expand use of license plate recognition technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Increase the number of retail stores involved with Safe City by demonstrating successful implementation of Safe City in other communities</td>
<td>o Install new emergency call boxes in strategic locations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Needs Addressed

#### Partnerships
Safe City is implemented through a series of three steps designed to: (1) introduce Safe City to law enforcement; (2) gain their support; and (3) transfer ownership of Safe City to them. The community’s readiness/willingness for Safe City is evaluated and the property management/developer must be on board from the beginning of the process.

**Inputs:**
- Target initiative planning and seed funding
- Law enforcement leadership
- Cooperation/resources of retailers and property management

**Establish law enforcement partnerships, assess the community, and develop an inventory of partners.**

**Outputs:**
- Meeting between Target and HPD
- Ownership of Safe City transferred to HPD
- Focus area identified
- HPD visits Minneapolis Safe City site to gain better understanding of project model
- $25,000 seed funding allocated to HPD by Target
- Partnerships and MOUs developed between HPD and other local law enforcement – Prince George’s County Police Dept., University of Maryland Campus Police, Metro Transit Police

**Expected Outcomes**

**Short-term:**
- Identify crimes specific to Safe City communities
- Develop an awareness of community relations, persons, agencies, and local issues that could affect the success of Safe City
- Develop an ability to engage law enforcement
- Develop an awareness of the role of law enforcement, retail, security, and community partners and identify the current status of their loss prevention and safety efforts, as well as their relationships with law enforcement

**Long-term:**
- Forge strong, lasting relationships with law enforcement
- Shift ownership of Safe City to local law enforcement
### Partnerships

The next set of steps in the Safe City process are designed to: (4) engage potential Safe City partners by introducing Safe City, explaining the project, clarifying roles and expectations, and generating support for the program; (5) have local law enforcement present the key message about Safe City and its core principles; and (6) have Target consult and support law enforcement to create a detailed implementation plan.

**Inputs:**
- Law enforcement leadership
- Cooperation/resources of retailers and property management
- Marketing/promoting Safe City

**Outputs:**
- Safe City concept presented by HPD to 9 local organizations in focus area
- CCTV planning meetings held
- Key CCTV partners (Pepco and Verizon) identified and invited to meetings
- Target allocates additional $75,000 for total contribution of $100,000
- Unisys submits proposal to assess CCTV capabilities
- Final community plan submitted to city council and Target and approved
- Kick-off meeting – approximately 400 invites, 30 attendees (including mayor)
- Press conference held

---

### Manage Safe City.

**Outputs:**
- Key CCTV partners (Pepco and Verizon) brought on board
- HPD presents Safe City concept to city council members – obtains support of all members and mayor
- CCTV implementation assessment conducted by Unisys – assessment of surveillance requirements, possible camera location and deployment requirements (assessment cost: $50,000)
- Safe City managed by HPD, but project stalls due to inability to raise funds for CCTV system

---

**Short-term:**
- Identify technical solutions to facilitate the Safe City project
- Increase stakeholders’ buy-in to Safe City and the number of stakeholders committed to becoming a partner in Safe City
- Identify broad long-term planning of future Safe City projects, potential challenges, and opportunities

**Long-term:**
- Improve retail security
- Decrease local crime rates
- Decrease retail crime frequency and increased safety
- Support successful implementation of Safe City
## Needs Addressed

### Targeted Solutions

Safe City partners will also identify solutions that utilize technology and/or process to facilitate crime prevention efforts. These targeted solutions allow for a focused response to crime and include situational crime prevention techniques, use of Safeness Ambassadors, and information sharing.

### Inputs:
- Law enforcement
- Target AP staff
- Retail security
- Committed resources from property management/developers and Safe City partners
- Communication technology
- Formal and informal communication among Safe City partners
- Public Safety Cameras (CCTV)
- Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED)
- Calls boxes
- SCP consulting by Urban Institute staff

## Activity/Strategy/Process

Safe City partners collaborate to identify targeted solutions to reduce crime and create a safer community. This includes identifying ways to reduce the rewards, increase the risk, remove excuses and increase the efforts as perceived by potential offenders.

### Outputs:
- 2 Segways purchased to enhance patrols in focus area
- Patrol efforts enhanced at Mall at Prince Georges – 2 patrol officers assigned to mall
- Zero-tolerance policy for theft at Mall at Prince Georges implemented by mall security and HPD
- 6 situational crime prevention guides on car crime, panhandling, public disorder, retail burglary, shoplifting, and vandalism created by UI; copies distributed to site by Target

## Expected Outcomes

### Short-term
- Improve police response to crime
- Increase perceived risk
- Increase reporting of crime
- Increase swift apprehension of suspects

### Long-term
- Reduce crime (shoplifting, burglary, auto theft/theft from auto, vandalism/nuisance behavior, robbery and assault)
- Increase perception of safety among patrons
- Increase satisfaction among retailers with police reporting and responsiveness
- Increase revenue/sales; volume among retailers
- Increase citizens satisfaction with both local law enforcement and mall security
APPENDIX L: HYATTSVILLE CCTV ASSESSMENT REPORT (UNISYS)
Safe City Video Surveillance Assessment

Final Report and Recommendations

Prepared for the City of Hyattsville
October 15, 2007
# Table of Contents

1. Executive Summary .............................................................................................................. 2

2. Technical Overview .............................................................................................................. 7
   2.1. Assessment Phase Scope ............................................................................................. 7
   2.2. System Overview ........................................................................................................ 8

3. Operations ........................................................................................................................... 20
   3.1. Video Monitoring and Camera Control .................................................................... 21
   3.2. On-going System Maintenance and Support ............................................................ 21
   3.3. Standard Operating Procedures for Storage/Archival, Retrieval and backup of video surveillance data ................................................................................................................... 22

4. Assessment Phase ................................................................................................................ 23
   4.1. Considerations of Camera Placement ....................................................................... 24
   4.2. Stakeholder Involvement .......................................................................................... 24
   4.3. Solution Overview .................................................................................................... 26

5. Recommendations ............................................................................................................... 26
   5.1. Integrated Approach .................................................................................................. 27
   5.2. System Recommendations ........................................................................................ 27

6. Next Steps ............................................................................................................................ 30
   6.1. Planning Phase .......................................................................................................... 30
   6.2. Budgetary Estimates .................................................................................................. 31

7. Appendix A – Video Camera Placement Data ................................................................... 32

8. Appendix B – Camera location Site Visit Documentation .............................................. 35
   8.1. Camera Location as a Layer on GIS Map ................................................................. 36
   8.2. Camera Location and Crime Data as Layers on GIS Map ........................................ 37
   8.3. Camera Location Visual Assessment and Logistics Presentation ............................ 38
1. Executive Summary

The City of Hyattsville has embraced the goals and outputs of the Safe City initiative, which are to maximize safety and reduce crime by implementing community based public/private partnerships. As part of this initiative the City has launched the initial phases of a project that will ultimately implement and operate a limited, city-wide Video Surveillance network. To this end, the City has engaged Unisys as a national Safe City partner to conduct the first phase of this project. This first phase has involved the completion of a detailed assessment to review pertinent surveillance requirements of the city, conduct site surveys at locations of interest, provide deployment and operations recommendations and outline the next logical steps to meet the City’s surveillance goals. These include a planning phase, a proof of concept pilot, system deployment and ongoing operations.

An objective for The City of Hyattsville is to align the operation of the video surveillance system with the goals of the Safe City initiative which are to:

- Reduce crime and create safer communities
- Increase public perceptions of safety
- Sustain proactive and engaged community partners
- Encourage community support of Safe City

The City will leverage the advantages offered by the video surveillance technology to benefit the community. These benefits include promoting an increased sense of public safety, crime deterrence and facilitating local law enforcement agencies to maximize the efficiency of their personnel and resources.

During the initial stages of the engagement Unisys conducted a set of formalized interviews to gather the City and stakeholders perceptions and expectations of the future video surveillance system. Joint Unisys and City of Hyattsville planning sessions were conducted to identify law enforcement priorities as it pertained to the operations of the video surveillance system.

Identifying potential locations for the placement of cameras was an iterative process where the goals and outputs of the Safe City initiatives were considered with other factors such as City of Hyattsville historical crime data, Hyattsville law enforcement and public safety priorities, input from council members, initiatives undertaken by Safe City stakeholders, privacy concern issues, budgetary constraints and others.

It was decided to place cameras in public places to conduct surveillance on the City’s current and future most active commercial areas: the Route 1 corridor, the West Hyattsville business area and the East-West Highway commercial corridor. Placement of cameras in residential areas was intentionally avoided.

Taking into account the above criteria Unisys plotted potential camera locations on a Geographic Information System (GIS) map. Crime data provided by the City was
overlaid on the GIS/Camera map as an additional step to verify the effectiveness of camera placement. The camera locations were reviewed and revised by the City Police.

The next step was to conduct an actual site survey of all identified locations of interest. During the surveys information such as interested field of view, potential mounting assets and Global Positioning System (GPS) coordinates were documented and recorded employing a multi-media capable template.

After the site surveys were concluded another review process was conducted with the City. The final camera locations were approved by the City of Hyattsville Police Department.

The embracement of the Safe City initiative is a proactive measure the City is taking with community partners to increase security given the explosive growth taking place in Hyattsville.

Unisys conducted this Assessment Phase taking into account the unique circumstances of the City of Hyattsville as well as other objectives considered best practice by current video surveillance experts. These other objectives are summarized below.

**Objectives**

- **Improvement of Public Safety** – From the effective gathering of evidence to improved witness identification to the potential of proactive intercession of criminal activity, the video surveillance initiative must enhance the effectiveness of the law enforcement officials while improving the overall safety of the community.

- **As a Tool for Capturing Evidence** – Capturing crimes on digital video could have a dramatic effect on the prosecution of crimes. The intent is to ensure the successful introduction of forensic imagery as evidence in a court of law. The net effect is improved effectiveness of the law enforcement system while dramatically lowering court costs associated with prosecuting such offenses.

- **Witness Identification** – Capturing images facilitates witness identification, reduces labor associated with tracking down witnesses and improves effectiveness of prosecution.

- **Reduction in Crime in Targeted Locations** – While video surveillance alone is not a deterrent, it does serve as an effective tool for reducing crime in targeted areas when coupled with an effective public outreach campaign. This forces criminal activity to move outside of the view of the cameras. An effective means of capturing criminal activity is to couple the camera installations with an overall law enforcement strategy of prevention and community based partnerships.

- **Proactive Intervention** – During monitored hours, those responsible for monitoring live images and managing camera feeds have the ability to recognize potential criminal activity and, when coupled with an authorized law enforcement official, may be able to affect a dispatch of police forces to the observed location.
This may lead to catching the crime in progress or aiding a victim as quickly as possible, while affording an improved chance of catching the violator near the scene of the crime.

Accomplishing the above mentioned objectives requires a focus on technology as well as active participation and involvement of stakeholders. During the last eight (8) weeks Unisys has met with many of the key stakeholders who have expressed an interest in participating during the upcoming phases of the project. The City intends to carry out this project in an open and transparent manner providing opportunities for input from all parties. Hopefully this will garner the support required by the City to meet the Safe City goals and outputs.

Unisys recommendations provide a roadmap that will satisfy the City of Hyattsville’s video surveillance system current and foreseeable future requirements. Some of the considerations taken into account in making the system recommendations include the following characteristics:

- **Scalability** – The potential service needs of a municipality the size of the City of Hyattsville, which could ultimately include additional camera locations, imply that any system will need a certain level of scalability. Providing a scalable solution that is capable of integrating all of the video surveillance applications within the City, along with open application integration capabilities, will afford the City the greatest potential to leverage aggregate data needs and to provide a single interface with emerging applications for emergency preparedness and information requirements.

- **Flexibility** – Any solution should be able to leverage future investments the City will make in surveillance equipment, as well as adhering to open standards that enable integration of emerging devices, applications and technologies.

- **Bandwidth Conservation** – Options should be available to accommodate multiple forms of video compression, so as to conserve network bandwidth, which is typically finite and expensive. Video compression features can improve system capacity and limit the impact of adding new Internet Protocol (IP) video cameras to the system.

- **Auditable** – The management of the system must allow for accountability of the data being captured and how it is handled. The surveillance system must have the ability to demonstrate the use of the system has been limited to the purposes for which it was intended – justice and public safety initiatives. This can be accomplished by features that allow for the City to report on the usage of the system – accesses, data capture and retention policies. This is paramount in maintaining public confidence that the information being gathered is properly protected and utilized in a manner that demonstrates respect for individual rights and privacy.
• **Accessible** – Accessing/finding video data is the core requirement of the backend support mechanisms in surveillance systems. This usability requirement is enhanced when the various feeds can be aggregated centrally. Centralizing and distributing video data is not possible on some DVR and NVR surveillance systems. This limitation makes it difficult to monitor, analyze and share data.

• **Available** – The system should be equipped with failover systems on the backend that allow for high availability. Such systems should be part of the fabric of the backend environment supporting digital video.

• **Ease of Use** – The learning curve to utilize the digital surveillance system should not be punitive. Rather, the management system should be intuitive and reduce the effort required to monitor and analyze hours of digital video.

• **Open Systems** – While digital video surveillance provides significant benefits to communities today, new products, technologies and techniques continue to be developed. Avoiding proprietary systems and products helps to future-proof any implementation, having a positive effect on the total cost of ownership of the system being considered while allowing for adoption of advances in the field as they develop and mature.

• **Ability to Integrate Into Existing Operations** – The use and support of a digital surveillance system often affects multiple departments – for example, public property might be involved from an implementation and maintenance perspective, police and emergency management from a public safety/end user perspective, while information services may be involved from a back office operational support perspective. Integration into existing procedures for operations, such as backup, disaster recovery and network management allows for the operation and support to leverage currently used mechanisms and processes.

• **Disaster Recovery** – The safeguarding of video and the ability to retrieve it following a catastrophic event is critical to the long-term viability and credibility of the City’s surveillance program.

Taking each of these factors into account, the assessment that follows provides the City of Hyattsville our recommendations for the next steps of this effort. This detailed data is based on:

- Physical assessment of the jurisdiction with the assistance of the City of Hyattsville Police Department
- Strategic discussions with Chief of Police Douglas Holland and his staff
- Discussion and input with other City personnel and community leaders
- Stakeholder and partner input provided by a variety of sources, detailed in Section 4.2
- Technology assessments completed by the Unisys technical team based on the infrastructure restraints and requirements of the City
Conclusion

Unisys believes that the ideal system should be one that is scalable and can support a multitude of camera options while providing some level of resiliency and back-end support. We have based much of the recommendations on our experience with integrating similar solutions for other municipalities. Unisys suggests that the next step in this effort is a detailed planning period and proof of concept pilot test to demonstrate the capabilities of the desired end state. This next phase will also allow for the preparation of a deployment and implementation plan for execution by the City in a timely fashion.

Unisys recommends that the City of Hyattsville choose a complete, enterprise-class solution that provides the capabilities to aid in meeting its objectives while adhering to open standards to support expansion, low cost of ownership, is scalable to meet future surveillance needs and is easy to learn and use.
2. **Technical Overview**

2.1. **Assessment Phase Scope**

Unisys was retained by the City of Hyattsville to conduct the Assessment Phase of a video surveillance Project. The engagement summary and project deliverables are defined in this section.

**Engagement Summary:**

- Describe camera locations, network connectivity, operations and simplicity of function in a configuration appropriate for the City.
- Describe the video management and storage of the proposed Unisys video surveillance solution.
- Explore the most cost effective means of providing high speed network connections to the cameras, including the feasibility of utilizing wireless Radio Frequency (RF) systems.
- Investigate the feasibility of integration of an emergency callbox kiosk into the Unisys video surveillance solution.

**Overall Deliverables**

- Maps with Camera Locations, Conceptual Network Design including number of cameras and bandwidth requirements by neighborhood or area.
- Maps with available network elements and required future elements (fiber or wireless) to utilize in planning projects. A central high site (or sites) will be identified which provides the best RF coverage for wireless connectivity to the cameras, and has high speed network connection to the City Intranet.
- Provide three (3) copies of a three-ring bound summary report that contains:
  - Recommended camera locations and type(s), including the recommended field of vision of the cameras.
  - Describe camera operation, capability, and simplicity of function in a configuration appropriate for the City.
  - A schematic network diagram of the wireless RF network system showing the camera locations and high site wireless connecting points.
  - Network bandwidth requirements based on the maximum capacity of the system.
  - Video Management software recommendations for an automatic and manual video monitoring environment.
  - Video storage options and capacity recommendations.
- Video camera technology standards and recommendations.
- Wireless RF network technology standards and recommendations.
- Brief discussion of future considerations the City may be interested in, including the “blue box” emergency phone kiosk and its potential for integration with the video surveillance network.
- Budgetary cost estimates for the proposed design.

2.2. System Overview

Based on its current knowledge of the City’s environment, Unisys believes the following conceptual design would position the City to meet and exceed its Safe City objectives.

System Components at a Glance

Unisys recommends that the City adopt a best-of-breed solution for its video surveillance requirements. The primary solution elements should include:

- High quality IP Cameras
  - Pan Tilt Zoom (PTZ), fixed and megapixel
  - Weather resistant, vandal-resistant enclosures and power supply.
- Network infrastructure (video transport)
  - Combination of wireless and wire-line technologies
  - Point-to-multipoint (PMP) 4.9GHz public safety licensed wireless solution
  - Metro Ethernet, fiber, or point-to-point wireless connectivity to wireless high sites
- Video management and monitoring software solution
  - Video storage and retrieval
  - Video media transcoding
  - Video monitoring workstations and PTZ control
- Analytic options
  - License plate recognition
  - Advanced video motion detection
  - Unattended object detection
  - Intelligent software for creating a Common Operating Picture (COP) (see page 10, System Overview for additional details)
These combined components and technologies are the building blocks for an all encompassing scalable infrastructure for meeting the City’s short- and long-term goals for video surveillance.

Unisys’ video surveillance architecture has been proven in previous deployments. The architecture will provide the framework for Hyattsville’s video surveillance system implementation with the goal to meet the Safe City objectives.

Note: All diagrams are conceptual illustrations and are not intended to be to scale.

System Overview

Following are detailed descriptions of the key components of a video surveillance solution. Comprehensive video surveillance systems are hardware components, software applications and technologies that have been configured and integrated to perform specific tasks in a coordinated manner. Typical video surveillance systems capture, distribute, analyze, record and retrieve video data.
The remote edge of video surveillance systems typically encompass a **video camera** and in certain cases might also include special sensors, such as audio capabilities. This is where the video is captured and in certain cases digitized and “packetized” for efficient transport over a network. Cameras are mounted inside ruggedized, weather resistance enclosures designed for easy mounting and connection to power sources.

Cameras are typically connected to a **network**. These networks could be wired and/or wireless in nature and provide the transport media for the video stream to be stored and/or viewed. These networks could have multiple stages, such as backhaul and distribution. Typically, the backhaul stage is that section of the network that connects an operations central site to all the cameras. The distribution stage of the network connects a subset of the cameras to the backhaul.

The core functions of a video surveillance system are typically conducted at an operations center where video feeds are **monitored and managed** in an efficient manner. These central site systems are designed for camera controlling as well as for the video monitoring and management. Video management includes collecting, recording, routing, archiving and retrieving video to meet law enforcement and public safety requirements.

Video **analytics** are very specialized systems that automate the monitoring and surveillance function with external or built-in sensors. These could be motion, light and/or sound sensors. More sophisticated sensors can detect specific events within the content of the video stream which would trigger certain alarms.

To provide situational awareness for effective decision making a **Common Operating Picture** (COP) system could provide the means for managing a complex and dynamic environment. The goal of COP system is to provide the same accurate information to all parties involved (regardless of location) in real time as a dynamic situations unfolds. An example of a video surveillance COP system for the City of Hyattsville could be a GIS map with multiple layers of information such as street addresses and camera location.

**Description of System Components**

**High Quality IP Cameras**

Unisys recommends a camera solution that incorporates IP cameras mounted inside a vandal-resistant, ruggedized and hardened all-weather enclosure and power box. Unisys believes appropriate PTZ and stationary IP network cameras provide the best possible high-performance video surveillance platform and integrate with the recommended network architecture and video surveillance monitoring and recording systems. Together, these components comprise an end-to-end solution that would exceed the City’s operational requirements.

**PTZ**
Unisys recommends an IP Dome Camera, which combines the latest image processing technology to provide multiple compression formats and advanced functionality with a high-speed Pan/Tilt/Zoom (PTZ) capability. These cameras are best suited for monitoring a surrounding area (providing a near panoramic view) from a fixed location. Slip rings on the camera allow a full pan of 360 degrees, allowing users to monitor almost anywhere surrounding the camera using this single unit. In addition, equipped with a minimum powerful 26x optical zoom, the camera allows users to zoom in on small or distant objects with exceptional clarity. Designed for 24/7 operation, it should incorporate a Day/Night function, providing clear images even in extremely low lighting conditions. The camera should provide at least three compression formats; JPEG, MPEG-4, and H.264, capabilities include dual encoding to allow simultaneous streaming in JPEG and MPEG-4, as well as high frame rates of 30 fps in both JPEG and MPEG-4.

The PTZ camera might include other intelligent features, such as Intelligent Motion Detection and Intelligent Object Detection.

**Fixed**

These cameras are best suited for monitoring very specific, fixed locations. The fixed color IP network camera should be ideal for applications ranging from public safety surveillance to remote monitoring in areas such as shopping malls, airports, warehouses and more. It should provide a high picture quality and high sensitivity with a minimum illumination of 0.4 lx at F 0.95, 50 IRE. The camera should be equipped with an auto iris, high-performance vari-focal lens and features a CS mount that offers users the flexibility to replace the existing lens with a different lens to match the application requirements. It should also offer a variety of key features for surveillance and remote monitoring, such as a Day/Night function to provide clear monitoring images even in low light conditions, Advanced Video Motion Detection, and Unattended Object Detection.

This camera should offer three compression formats: JPEG, MPEG-4, and H.264 allowing users to choose the appropriate compression format to match the network environment and monitoring applications. It should also provide a high-frame rate of 30 fps when the image size is VGA (640 x 480) for JPEG and MPEG-4 operations.

**Megapixel**

These cameras are best suited when used in conjunction with analytics software such as facial and license plate recognition for forensics and evidentiary purposes. Within the past two years, megapixel video cameras have come onto the market that can greatly enhance the capability of surveillance solutions. While additional bandwidth or more efficient transport solutions are needed, the quality of the images is significantly better than the low resolution images that are more typical of most surveillance solutions today. In applications where video analytics are employed these cameras offer the ability to be located further away, reducing the
challenges of high angle views or low level positions which put the cameras at risk of being tampered.

In the surveillance industry, some best practices have emerged regarding the number of pixels required for certain applications. For an overview image, it is generally considered that 20 to 30 pixels are enough to represent one foot of a scene.

For applications that require detailed images, such as face identification, the demands can rise to as much as 150 pixels per foot. This means, for example, to increase the probability of identifying people passing through an area that is seven feet wide and seven feet high, the camera needs to provide a resolution of 1,050 x 1,050 pixels, which is slightly more than 1 megapixel.

Vandal-Resistant Enclosures and Power Supply
The enclosure should provide connections for 120 or 240Vac inputs to power the electronics in the housings. The enclosure should also provide space and mounting bracket options required for different camera installations. Other features should include:

- Design to meet NEMA 4 and IP 66 standards.
- Design for direct conduit connections.

The vandal-resistant enclosure should offer pendant mount, rugged metal top and tinted bottom dome appropriate to support IP Network PTZ or fixed camera with sufficient space to accommodate appropriate lens from the major vendors. Additional features should be offered for outdoor models such as heater and blower and cold weather for operation in wider temperature ranges such as -40° F to + 120° F.

Network Infrastructure (Video Transport)
If economically feasible, Unisys recommends that the City adopt a network infrastructure that consists of a backbone of fiber optic connections into the City’s network, a point-to-multipoint (PMP) system to distribute that bandwidth wirelessly, and IP video surveillance cameras outfitted with outdoor antennas attached to the PMP system. The backhaul to the City’s network would be provided by a metro Ethernet service and would connect a series of radio-equipped high sites into the City’s network. The metro Ethernet service could provide double digit Mbps bandwidth to each tower and for each PMP system. Initially, Unisys would propose using the City’s infrastructure when appropriate and available – such as public safety towers -- to minimize costs to the City. However, if such infrastructure is not available, Unisys could investigate other suitable options on commercially and privately owned real estate. In any case, each tower would be outfitted with a 4.9GHz base station with the most appropriate sector (45, 90, 120 degree) antennas. Using the licensed public safety 4.9GHz spectrum, the City would achieve security, range and freedom from interference.
Each tower site could support approximately 15 to 20 cameras in the field by connecting wirelessly via the 4.9GHz frequency. In certain instances the path from the camera to the tower site can be non-line-of-sight due to the capabilities of the PMP system when the environment allows for RF signal reflection. The video signals would be transmitted across a dedicated link from the in-field site to the tower location. The PMP base unit would aggregate the signals from all cameras in its sector and transmit them via the co-located metro Ethernet link, back to the City’s network.

Depending on other public safety considerations and preferences, a wireless mesh network can also be designed and deployed in concert with the wireless PMP infrastructure. In this situation the PMP network becomes the backhaul for the mesh network. This would add resiliency to the wireless network and also permit access to camera views from patrol cars and other public safety vehicles as well as appropriately equipped portable devices. This option often times presents some performance challenges.

The diagram below conceptually illustrates the end-to-end network design.
The depicted wireless architecture above is based on Unisys previous deployment experience in similar environments, along with meeting the Safe City initiative requirements. The architecture offers a highly cost effective and robust method for enabling connectivity from the camera. Wireless technologies are proven effective in this environment and eliminate the costs and logistical challenges associated with running fiber optic cabling to each camera.

Wireless technologies provide adequate bandwidth and coverage to support the City’s requirements around camera coverage, signal/coverage overlaps and video frame rates.

Following are additional important benefits associated with 4.9GHz wireless technology:
• The 4.9GHz frequency is a regulated spectrum and thus should minimize the risk of interference from other commercially available wireless solutions or services. This is a major consideration due to the growth associated with technologies operating in the unlicensed 2.4GHz and 5.xGHz WiFi frequencies.

• The wireless solution would be deployed for the sole use of the City of Hyattsville. This significantly reduces the City’s risk relative to performance issues and allows for maximum growth associated with the solution components.

• The 4.9GHz spectrum is a more secure solution for the City, simply due to the licensed and controlled nature of this particular wireless frequency.

• Superior performance and distance can be achieved by using high power radios and high gain antennas authorized by the FCC for licensed public safety applications.

• Unlike many competing wireless systems which optimize bandwidth in the downstream direction, the 4.9GHz system can be configured to optimize the upstream flow to give additional throughput to the video feeds from each camera.

• Enhanced quality of service (QoS) featuring CIR/MIR and prioritization based on Q-in-Q (802.3ad), DiffServ and port based to support data, VoIP and video can be combined in a single network.

• The technology offers advanced security mechanisms including WEP128, AES 128 encryption and FIPS 197 compliance.

• The architecture supports a “pay as you grow” expansion philosophy through the use of modular and scalable network components.

• 4.9GHz systems can be implemented in a variety of radio architectures, from point-to-point, and point-multipoint to wireless mesh infrastructures, or any combination.

Utilizing metro Ethernet for backhauling the video from the wireless high sites to the City’s network would provide the capacity for the immediate requirements, with appropriate scalability to account for long-term growth.

In summary, Unisys believes the depicted network architecture meets the capacity, coverage, growth/scalability and performance requirements and is one of the most cost-effective options for deploying this technology throughout the City.

**Video Management and Monitoring Software Solution**

Unisys recommends an enterprise-class video management platform that uses non-proprietary hardware that would enable the City to quickly configure and effectively manage complex video applications. The system should provide an end-to-end browser-
based solution for collecting, recording, routing and managing live and archived surveillance video while optimizing the use of bandwidth.

The recommended solution should enable any authorized user from virtually any location to access, view and control any cameras over the network. It should provide scalability and options for storage and retrieval of archived video data, including redundant off-site storage for disaster recovery.

In addition, the video management system should be based on industry standards and open APIs that would enable the City to integrate best-of-breed components for server hardware, storage, cameras/encoders, video analytics and command-and-control applications. The solution should be capable of integrating with most of the leading vendors in each space and provide the most choices to end users for their video security deployments.

Most importantly, the City would be able to scale the system over the long term to meet changing or growing needs by adding cameras, servers, storage, technologies and users as needed.

The video server provides:
- Secure login
- Flexible video displays
- Views with both live and archived video
- PTZ controls and presets
- Archive review and clipping, and
- Event notifications.

The City would be able to combine video codecs in a single server or system, including MJPEG, MPEG-2 and MPEG-4 to get the benefits of each. The City could manage bandwidth over each part of the IT network to complement capacity and protect other applications.

The video server has the following capabilities and features:
- Manages, distributes, and archives video
- Supports multiple video formats in one system
- Provides low-latency video with high quality images
- Archives at specified frame rates, durations, and locations
- Saves video clips
- Provides loop and event-based video recording
- Supports redundant multi-site storage
- Scales to large numbers of sites, cameras, viewers, and storage
- Offers an open architecture that supports old and new technologies.
Video Storage and Retrieval
The flexibility of the Unisys architecture will accommodate any of the market available storage configurations whether internal or external storage, Network Attached Storage (NAS) or Storage Attached Network (SAN) subsystems. Unisys recommends a storage sub-system that is scalable, highly reliable and available with top performance and configured to meet the requirements of overall surveillance system regardless of size and scope in a cost effective manner. The objective of a storage system is to keep critical data available all the time, while meeting the most challenging service levels. Storage subsystems should be simple to operate and upgrade. The subsystem should support advanced capabilities that are aligned with the overall system requirements such as the tamper proof and audit trail for forensic and evidentiary purposes.

Video Media Transcoder
Video Media Transcoders convert video streams from one format to another. The benefit of such conversion is to store and stream video at different video formats to best meet the requirements of a particular operation. For example it might be required to store video locally at very high quality, i.e. MJPEG format, for analysis while selectively transcoding any camera output to MPEG-4 format for viewing over a PDA or remotely via a low-bandwidth connection. Transcoding could also be used to create redundant archives at secure locations for selected cameras using MPEG-4 at lower bandwidth and storage consumption without sacrificing the high-quality local archives.

The Media Transcoder should:
- Transcode multiple streams simultaneously in real time
- Handle 4-CIF to Q-CIF MJPEG input resolution
- Create MPEG-4 streams at 5-15 fps, 100-500 Kbps
- Control pan-tilt-zoom cameras through PDAs or computers.

Video Monitoring Workstations
Video monitors can, and probably will vary depending on the City surveillance operations room. The video monitor feed can support most any size monitor or projection system compatible with the workstation. The quantity of workstations will depend on factors such as the City’s requirement to view the number of concurrent camera streams and the number of personnel conducting active monitoring. As a standard approach, Unisys recommends viewing no more than 20 cameras per monitor/workstation. Additional workstations, monitors and projection systems can be added in the future to support growth, changes to viewing requirements, and even geographical distribution of monitoring stations.

Video Analytics Options
The City should determine which video analytic options, if any, would be the most cost effective extension to the City’s video surveillance strategy.
Video analytics options include real-time detection of motion, breach, loitering, and left behind objects. Through customizable, user-defined alarm configurations, this type of software delivers greater situational awareness and provides real-time data for preemptive action. These systems provide alarms that can be tailored to meet different surveillance needs, such as wide-area surveillance, tailgating, objects thrown over a fence, abandoned vehicles, speeding vehicles, zone surveillance, removed objects, and graffiti. The software also uses polygons, easily drawn by the operator inside a camera’s screen-view, to define specific areas of concern for each alarm type.

**License Plate Recognition**

There are several critical steps to ensuring a successful deployment of a License Plate Recognition (LPR) system. These steps include 1) proper positioning of the cameras to optimize license plate capture rates, and 2) proper camera selection to include characteristics such as a stroboscopic illuminator that can capture accurate images independent of various lighting conditions (day/night) and sufficient digital imagery capable of capturing images regardless of the conditions or retro-reflectivity of the plate. A third critical step is to perform site surveys to determine camera placement and to design a vandal-resistant environment within which the cameras would operate.

Once proper camera placement and sufficient image capture capabilities are in place, the LPR system needs to query against various external databases to compare the captured number plate to databases containing license plate numbers of interest to law enforcement.

In addition to placing LPR-specific cameras at high volume traffic locations, the City should consider leveraging the video surveillance cameras deployed for this program by integrating LPR algorithms that can search recorded video for license plates. This capability would provide two main benefits.

**Advanced Video Motion Detection**

Some cameras are equipped with a built-in advanced video motion detection function that can trigger a variety of actions such as storing and transferring images or trigger external devices through output relays.

**3D Virtualization**

This unique video software system optimizes operators’ active involvement in the monitoring process. Conventional CCTV surveillance systems are viewed on large banks of video monitors, making it nearly impossible to manage, understand, and respond to the volume of disparate information presented. Over the past few years video analytics have been developed that detect movement or various changes in the scene to send alerts to the video monitoring solution that display only alert views. This technology greatly improves the performance of security personnel who otherwise can only monitor a few cameras for short periods of time. The 3D Virtualization system enables operators to “virtually” patrol security areas by easily moving throughout a simulated 3D target.
environment. This technology stitches multiple video camera outputs and sensor data feeds into a single-screen interface, optimizing the viewing efficiency of the operator while minimizing viewer fatigue. Additionally, the system assembles and manages surveillance information from dispersed sites into a central control workstation. It integrates geo-referencing for precise alarm location via geo-registered maps or imagery overlays. It is fully integrated and will slew PTZ cameras to alarm-generated areas. Taken together, these components offer a unique and powerful combination that provides unrivaled situational awareness.

**Unattended Object Detection**
Some cameras can detect objects that have been left in one place for a specified duration. Multiple detection areas can be specified. This feature can be useful for detecting suspicious objects that have been left behind in public spaces or detecting vehicles illegally parked.

**Face Detection and Identification**
Over the past 10 years, face recognition technology has advanced to a point where it is now possible to identify persons of interest against mug shot databases in near real time. These powerful tools, when coupled with strategically placed high quality video surveillance cameras can recognize the shape of a face and send an event alert consisting of video image frame to the security control center for display and playback. If the quality of the image meets the minimum standards set for the identification and an image of the person is in the database, the closest matching person’s image and name will be displayed on the event alert. Additionally, notification messages can be sent via e-mail, SMS, or other communications channels to law enforcement.

**Gunshot Detection**
Smart acoustic sensors when placed in strategic areas throughout the City can provide gunshot-detection capability. This detection capability works by analyzing the sounds and keying in on specific sounds associated with various gunshots. For instance, once a gunshot sound is detected, the system analyzes the sound received from the various acoustic sensors and triangulates on the source of the sound. The information is provided to the end user and a geo-location of the gunshot is then identified. The alert and associated data, when integrated with the video surveillance system, triggers the system to automatically slew the appropriate PTZ cameras towards the geo-location of the gunshot. This capability provides the City with the ability to monitor the location immediately and assess the level of threat associated with the event.

**Intelligent Software for Creating a Common Operating Picture**
Situational awareness is critical for effective decision making and performance in any complex and dynamic environment. The ability to provide a Common Operating Picture (COP) to all personnel involved in an event is vitally important to promoting awareness and expediting an appropriate response to an incident.
A COP provides a standard view of the entire environment. For example, a COP for the City of Hyattsville might provide a geo-spatial map of the City with various map layers such as street names, camera and sensor locations. Mouse clicks can cause zoom to occur on any region of the map and when a user clicks on a camera icon, the live video feed from the specific camera is displayed along with the associated camera controls.

Additional sensors can be added into the COP system such LPR, for example when a plate number is matched against a record of interest in a database, a trigger alert is generated. With the integration of the LPR system, the cameras and geo-spatial application, the COP can display the location of the vehicle with the recognized plates system and demographic information associated with the plates. Depending on the sophistication of the COP the system might be able to continue to track the movement of said vehicle.

Police and other emergency responders can be tracked via GPS devices in their vehicles and their location can be updated in real-time on the COP.

**Call Box Options and Capabilities**

The City of Hyattsville Police has indicated its interest in exploring the deployment of emergency call boxes as part of the Safe City video surveillance project. Deployment options have been discussed where the desire to integrate emergency call boxes with video surveillance cameras. The goal is to have the call boxes initiate a telephone call into the City of Hyattsville Communications room.

The current technology alternatives available in the market place for emergency call boxes offer options such, free standing pedestal w/ variable height, blue beacon/strobe light, speaker phone, lighted faceplates and integrated area lighting, ADA compliant.

In the Planning phase, once actual locations have been identified by the City of Hyattsville of the deployment of emergency call boxes, Unisys will overlay the technical requirements of the call boxes into the overall network and operational design of the video surveillance project.

**3. Operations**

Once the surveillance system has been deployed and fine tuned the City has to carefully plan and ultimately decide how best to integrate it into its current day to day operations. Surveillance system policies and procedures need to be developed and tested to appropriately align the performance of the system with the goals and objects of the Safe City initiatives as well as those of the day to day operations of the City of Hyattsville Police.
3.1. Video Monitoring and Camera Control

The City needs to decide what type of video monitoring and camera control it will conduct as part of their day to day video surveillance operations. The monitoring of video surveillance systems can fall into two major categories, Active and Passive Monitoring.

Active monitoring is conducted when the end user pro-actively observes and supervises the cameras’ video output in a rigorous and intentional manner. Active monitoring can be performed by either personnel staff or by automated surveillance systems.

- Video surveillance monitoring that is performed by personnel fixed to surveillance workstations observing the video streams is a labor intensive operation. Workload and staffing levels need to be balanced in order to achieve effective surveillance operations. Maximizing overall effectiveness and minimizing human fatigue should be an on-going operational objective.

- Video surveillance that is conducted by automated systems is still another form of active monitoring. Under this scenario advanced and sophisticated cameras, sensors and software applications have been highly integrated and custom algorithms configured to perform very specific surveillance tasks. These systems are the video analytics we have discussed in previous sections of this document. Video analytics are typically set up to generate alarms when events of interest have been detected by sensors or software triggers. These systems tend to be in the high end of the cost scale due to required computing resources, software licenses and integration effort to fine tune sensors, triggers and alarms. In a highly automated monitoring environment maximizing operational effectiveness, minimizing system generated false positives and integrating alarm generation to existing operations is the overall objective.

A typical approach to active monitoring is to find a balance between the use of video analytics and human resources in video surveillance operations.

Passive monitoring is when minimal or no rigorous video observation is performed by the end user. Video stream outputs are routed to recording assets for forensic viewing at a later date and time. The tradeoffs of this monitoring technique is that its very reactive in nature but low in capital and operating cost.

3.2. On-going System Maintenance and Support

A key factor to a successful video surveillance system operation is a well thought out and executed support and maintenance program. This program should embrace a life cycle approach given the system’s political and budgetary capital investments. The maintenance and support program should take into account the Safe City’s goals and
objects, the system’s level of complexity, the open market maintenance offerings and the City’s internal capabilities.

To ensure continuous success and effective video surveillance operations, resources have to be planned and dedicated to the operations and up keep of the system on an on-going basis. This system should be treated in the same manner as the City’s patrol car fleet, where routine inspections, oil changes and lube jobs, refueling and insurance payments are made on a periodic basis to ensure expected vehicle operations.

Similarly, to ensure the intended behavior of the video surveillance systems a proper maintenance and support program should be established. Since this system is the end results of numerous and diverse sub-systems each component should be dealt with individually.

Most video surveillance components have hardware and software elements. The City should consider the following maintenance and support modules for each of the major system components:

- **Cameras**:
  - Warranty replacement due to hardware failure
  - Technical support to conduct system troubleshooting
  - Maintenance support for unit replacement in the field

- **Network Elements**
  - Warranty replacement due to hardware failure
  - Technical support to conduct system troubleshooting
  - Maintenance support for system software upgrade and unit replacement in the field

- **Video Management and Monitoring**
  - Maintenance and technical support for server hardware
  - Technical support for software program w/ version upgrade

- **Video Storage and Retrieval System**
  - Maintenance and technical support for server hardware
  - Technical support for software program w/ version upgrade

- **Video Monitoring Workstations**
  - Maintenance and technical support aligned with current end user workstation environment

- **Video Analytics**
  - Maintenance and technical support for server hardware
  - Technical support for software program w/ version upgrade

### 3.3. Standard Operating Procedures for Storage/Archival, Retrieval and backup of video surveillance data

The City will need to establish standard operating policies and procedures for the ongoing video surveillance operations. This will include not only the monitoring aspect but
also the governance dictating how video data will be handled via storage, archival, retrieval and backup of such data. These practices to safeguard the data should not be approached lightly. Input from internal police resources, the City Attorney, public policies, prosecutors, regulatory bodies, public opinion, privacy laws, litigation experts, council members, stakeholders, technical nuances, financial considerations and other sources deemed appropriate should be considered. The City should strive to strike a balance between the aforementioned influences and operational efficiencies and effectiveness.

Four technical factors should be considered when establishing video archival policies and procedures. These are:

- video quality or image resolution
- quantity of video or frames per second
- format in which video should be stored, lossless or lossy compression techniques; and
- length of time video should be stored before being destroyed.

The way video is stored will have a financial impact in the upfront and on-going systems cost. The higher the resolution, the more frames of video for unit of time, the more lossless the encoding format is and the longer the video is stored the more computing and storage resources will be required, equating to higher system costs. As a trade-off, the higher the quality of the video the less likely a legal challenge will be introduced contesting the prosecutorial evidence.

The length of time video data is stored has financial as well as operational implications. There operational benefits and liabilities associated with the length of time video is archived. For example the longer video is stored the easier it is to retrieve historic data for forensic purposes. At the same time due to the State of Maryland Public Information Act, the City would be required to make the stored video data available to the public at large when requested.

Developing a data backup procedure for the video surveillance data is an industry best practice. Serious consideration should be given to privacy concerns when developing backup procedures. At the same time the procedure should mitigate the risk of a catastrophic loss of data at the operations center.

### 4. Assessment Phase

Unisys was retained by the City of Hyattsville to conduct the first phase of the Safe City video surveillance project. This includes:

- Identifying goals and outputs of the City of Hyattsville,
- Conducting site survey with City of Hyattsville Police of targeted areas of interest for surveillance
• Conducting preliminary assessment of potential camera and high site mounting assets
• Educating City officials on the nuances of video surveillance systems and technologies
• Reaching out to key Safe City initiative stakeholders
• Documenting Assessment Phase finding

During the Assessment Phase Unisys has worked under the guidance and in partnership with the City of Hyattsville Police. In multiple planning sessions video surveillance system goals, objectives and expectations were discussed and broad areas of interest for surveillance were identified. Immediately after the planning sessions Unisys marked up a GIS map layer with potential camera and high site locations. The Hyattsville Police Department reviewed and finalized the camera placement on the GIS map. Using the finalized GIS map actual sites visits were conducted to each identified camera and high site location. As part of an iterative process all camera locations were visited at least once and documented with pictures. In addition, preliminary potential mounting assets were identified. After the site visits the camera locations were adjusted within the GIS map. The findings of the site visits can be found in Appendix B of this document.

4.1. Considerations of Camera Placement

Identifying potential locations for the placement of cameras was an iterative process where the goals and outputs of the Safe City initiatives were considered with other factors such as City of Hyattsville historical crime data, Hyattsville Police law enforcement and public safety priorities, input from council members, initiatives undertaken by Safe City stakeholders, privacy concern issues, budgetary constraints and others. The last factors weighing on the proposed placement of cameras were issues identified during the site visits. The City should expect additional changes to identified camera locations through the planning and implementation stages as more logistics and installation issues arise.

The goal has been to place cameras in public places, especially to conduct surveillance on the City’s most active commercial areas. These areas were identified as the Route 1 corridor, the West Hyattsville commercial area, the East-West Highway commercial corridor and a few focused areas on Adelphi Road. The placement of cameras in residential areas was avoided.

4.2. Stakeholder Involvement

During the Assessment Phase for the City of Hyattsville Unisys initiated and conducted meetings and discussions with a variety of partners, stakeholder and vendors to acquire a more in-depth understanding of stakeholder requirements, interest, and level of participation in the Safe City initiative. During this phase Unisys also was able determine the level of complexity and the associated actions required for the Planning and Pilot Phase of the engagement for the City. Generally, these parties were amiable and cooperative regarding their expected level of involvement during the upcoming phases of
the Safe City project. Unisys estimates a great deal of cooperation and contribution to the effort as the City proceeds with the video surveillance initiative. During this initial assessment Unisys attempted to determine the following:

- Are the stakeholders willing to provide mounting assets to the City for the video surveillance equipment without initial or ongoing costs?
- Will the stakeholders allow the City to use power for the equipment without initial or ongoing costs?
- Are the stakeholders willing to contribute to the project by providing additional infrastructure or by direct contribution to the City for the purchase or equipment that will mutually benefit the parties?
- Are the stakeholders willing to provide right of access to the City for the maintenance and ongoing service required for the equipment once the initial infrastructure has been deployed and is operational?

During this assessment the details for each stakeholder’s level of cooperation and contribution were not finalized. The upcoming Planning and Pilot Phase will provide the time and resources for the negotiations that will need to take place to establish the necessary agreements and contracts. These stakeholders include but are not limited to:

- Target Corporation
- University Town Center (UTC)
- Taylor Land and Development
- Mid-City Financial
- PREIT (The Mall at Prince George’s)
- EYA
- Hollins Partners
- State Highway Administration
- WMATA

Additional discussions were held with other entities regarding their role in the Safe City video surveillance project. These meetings were held with both agencies and individuals for a variety of purposes and include but are not limited to:

- The Urban Institute (UI)
  - UI is conducting a research funded by US Department of Justice regarding the Safe Cities projects for several cities throughout the country.
- Councilwoman Ruth Ann Frazier to discuss the project’s general direction and benefits impact to the City.
- University of Maryland
  - A tour and overview of their extensive video surveillance network was provided
- Lt. Henry White – Price George’s County Police
While much of the work with the stakeholders and partners will need to be done during the next phase(s) of the project, Unisys’ involvement in these activities during the Assessment Phase served two (2) primary purposes. The first was to lay the groundwork for the planning; ensuring the City receives maximum support during this project given the complexity of this initiative. The second was to establish and maintain open dialogue to promote a transparent and positive relationship with all stakeholders. While the City has a vested interest in the success of the Safe City effort, Unisys recognizes the project is a cooperative venture, requiring partnership and consistent feedback from all involved parties to be a community success.

4.3. Solution Overview

The video surveillance overall solution is a suite of systems, technologies and components that are integrated to perform certain tasks. These building blocks have been identified in this Assessment Phase. The goal has been to provide a solid foundation on which a final video surveillance solution can be designed, planned, deployed and operated based on the specific requirement of the City of Hyattsville.

The core components of the solution are:
- PTZ and/or fixed IP network cameras,
- 4.9GHz Public Safety designated spectrum wireless network
- Wired network infrastructure
- Video monitoring and control system
- Storage and retrieval video data system
- Video monitoring work stations

Optional components are:
- Specialized video analytics as described in Section 2.2, Video Analytics Options

During the next phases of the project the City of Hyattsville will need to decide on how it will operate, maintain and support the overall system. Decisions will have to be made on the type of video surveillance monitoring technique the City plans to employ; tailor maintenance and support programs that aligns with the City’s needs and desired goals; develop policies and procedures to handle, safeguard and ultimately dispose of the video data the City stores and records. Unisys stands ready to assist the City with these decisions and has provided a Statement of Work for the planning phase of this project.

5. Recommendations

During the Assessment Phase Unisys gathered information from the City and its stakeholders. Joint Unisys and City of Hyattsville planning sessions were conducted to identify the ideal places to mount cameras and network repeater stations or high sites. Industry best practices, system vendors and video surveillance market trends were researched for validation and verification. Meetings were conducted with the City
Attorney, commercial real estate developers, City Council members and City officials to gather input and concerns regarding the video surveillance system. Additional system requirements such as open systems for investment protection, friendly user interfaces for ease of use, and cost-effectiveness have been identified.

5.1. Integrated Approach

Unisys is recommending that the City of Hyattsville consider a video surveillance solution that integrates all of the core components identified below with the capabilities to aid in meeting its public safety and law enforcement objectives. The system should adhere to open standards, providing maximum flexibility and low cost of ownership, is scalable to meet future surveillance needs, and is easy to learn, use and support.

5.2. System Recommendations

The core components of the integrated solution are the following:

- **IP Network Cameras**
  - **PTZ Camera**: We expect the majority of the cameras deployed within the video surveillance network to be Pan, Tilt, Zoom (PTZ) cameras. This type of camera offers the City of Hyattsville the most flexibility for general purpose surveillance applications.
  - **Fixed Camera**: We expect this type of camera to be deployed in specific locations where specialized functions need to be performed, such as license plate recognition, perimeter intrusion, and motion detection as well as others.
  - **Megapixel Camera**: This type of camera has the potential to be deployed as part of the Fixed camera population if certain applications such as license plate recognition require higher resolution than the standard PTZ/Fixed cameras. Portable cameras to address tactical situations should be considered as a potential enhancement to the core infrastructure.

- **Ruggedized, weather-proof camera enclosure**
  - Unisys will recommend camera enclosures that are suitable for the Hyattsville climate environment ensuring proper equipment operation all year round.

- **4.9GHz Public Safety Spectrum Point to Multi-point wireless network from camera to repeater (high) site.**
  - Unisys recommends that Hyattsville employs the 4.9Ghz Public Safety spectrum as the wireless video network distribution vehicle between the cameras and the high sites. The benefits are that the 4.9GHz frequency is a regulated spectrum and thus should minimize the risk of interference from other commercially available wireless solutions or services. The wireless network would be deployed for the sole use of the City of
Hyattsville. This significantly reduces the City’s risk relative to performance issues. Also the 4.9GHz spectrum is a more secure solution for the City, simply due to the licensed and controlled nature of this particular wireless frequency.

- **Metro Ethernet or comparable service from high sites to City Video Surveillance Operations Center**
  - Unisys recommends a network backhaul technology that is robust, flexible and scalable. A carrier grade service such as Metro Ethernet or some other fiber based service would be most appropriate to carry the video stream data from the high sites/base stations to the City of Hyattsville Police department HQ location.

- **Video Management and Control System**
  - Unisys recommends an enterprise-class video management platform that uses non-proprietary hardware that would enable the City to quickly configure and effectively manage complex video applications and integrate new cameras as they become available in the marketplace. The system should provide an end-to-end browser-based solution for collecting, recording, routing and managing live and archived surveillance video while optimizing the use of network bandwidth. The system should be scalable to grow if and when required as well as be user friendly from the end user and administration perspective.

- **Video Storage System**
  - Unisys recommends a Video Storage System that is capable of supporting any of the market available storage configurations such as Network Attached Storage (NAS), Storage Area Networks (SAN), internal and external subsystems. This storage system should be scalable to accommodate the unforeseen future requirements of the City’s video retention requirements. Ease of use to retrieve historical archives should be a key feature of this subsystem.

- **Video Monitoring System**
  - The video monitoring workstations should be set up as part of the overall City of Hyattsville monitoring strategy. The screens associated with the workstations should be selected after processes, procedures and the final location of the video surveillance center have been defined. The monitoring system should support additional workstations, monitors, and/or projection systems that can be added in the future, to support growth, changes to viewing requirements, or even geographical dispersion of monitoring stations.

- **Common Operating Picture System**
  - Situational awareness is critical for effective decision making and performance in any complex and dynamic environment. The ability to
provide a Common Operating Picture (COP) to all personnel involved in an event is vitally important to promoting awareness and expediting an appropriate response to an event. A COP provides a standard view of the entire environment in which the City is working. For example, a COP for the City of Hyattsville might provide a geo-spatial map of the City with various map layers such as street names, camera locations and sensor locations. Click and zoom can occur on any region of the map and when a user clicks on a camera, the live video feed from the camera is displayed along with the associated camera controls.

- **Video Analytics Systems**
  The analytics listed below are some of the most commonly requested and deployed systems for municipal video surveillance. It is expected that in the early stages of the video surveillance deployment the City will want to activate one or two of these optional capabilities to enhance the overall effectiveness of the video surveillance system.

  - **Motion Detection.**
    Cameras should be equipped with a built-in advanced video motion detection function that can trigger a variety of actions such as sending an alert to the operating station, storing and transferring images, or that can trigger an external device through its output relays.

  - **License Plate Recognition**
    There are several critical steps to ensuring a successful deployment of a License Plate Recognition (LPR) system. These steps include 1) proper positioning of the cameras to optimize license plate capture rates, and 2) proper selection of the license plate cameras to include characteristics such as a stroboscopic illuminator that can capture accurate images independent of various lighting conditions (day/night) and sufficient digital imagery to be able to capture images regardless of the conditions or retro-reflectivity of the plate. A third critical step is to perform site surveys to determine camera placement and to design a vandal-resistant environment within which the cameras would operate.

    Once proper camera placement and sufficient image capture capabilities are in place, the LPR system needs to query against various external databases to compare the captured number plate to a database of known number plates. The City’s integrator must have the ability to develop these interfaces using web interfaces and XML data structures in order to standardize the interface and provide rapid response to database queries. The City of Hyattsville has mentioned that they currently employ License Plate Recognition (LPR) technology. There may be an opportunity to integrate the new video surveillance system with the existing LPR technology.
Gunshot Detection
Smart acoustic sensors when placed in strategic areas throughout the city can provide an extremely effective and reliable gunshot-detection capability. This detection capability works by analyzing the sounds and keying in on specific sounds associated with various gunshots. For instance, once a gunshot sound is detected, the system analyzes the sound received from the various acoustic sensors and triangulates on the source of the sound. The information is provided to the end user and a geo-location of the gunshot is then identified. The alert and associated data, when integrated with the video surveillance system, triggers the system to automatically slew the appropriate PTZ cameras towards the geo-location of the gunshot. This capability provides the City with the ability to monitor the location immediately and assess the level of threat associated with the event.

6. Next Steps

Unisys recommends that the City continues with the Video Surveillance project. The next steps should be to embark on the Planning Phase which should include a small pilot camera deployment. After a successful pilot and once the City secures the appropriate funds it should continue with a full video surveillance system deployment.

6.1. Planning Phase

Unisys recommends that the next step be for the City to move forward with the Planning Phase. This phase should include the following tasks:

- Request from the FCC the 4.9GHz Public Safety Spectrum License
- Negotiate with Vendor, Stakeholder and Partner
  - Permits on existing mounting assets
  - Core system component pricing
  - Recurring network services
  - Real Estate Developers and Commercial Enterprises willing to participate in the Safe City initiative
- Complete vendor and equipment model selections for the video surveillance system and the associated infrastructure
- Develop deployment plans and timeline
- Procure equipment (or assist the City in the procurement) to facilitate an initial pilot test. We recommend that this pilot be a proof of concept which should include the deployment of a few cameras, the installation of a wireless high site and the integration of a video monitoring and camera control system.
  - Allow the City to participate in the evaluation of the potential Video Management solution
6.2. **Budgetary Estimates**

Unisys has submitted to the City of Hyattsville a draft SOW (Statement of Work) for the Planning and Pilot Test Phase required for the project. This SOW provides the pricing for all hardware and services required for this phase in preparation for the deployment phase. Final pricing for the implementation (Phase 3) will be developed and submitted to the City of Hyattsville during the planning completion of Phase 2. This pricing will be dependent on several factors, including but not limited to:

- Camera and radio equipment vendor selection
- Backoffice Video Management and storage solution
  - City of Hyattsville policies regarding length and type of storage will be a critical component to the final pricing
- Initial and ongoing costs for mounting asset approval and use
- Initial and ongoing costs for power at the mounting locations
- Installation costs that are to be negotiated during the planning effort
- Rate of deployment (how long the installation effort will take from initiation to completion)

Based on Unisys experience with the proposed solution and our work during the Assessment and Roadmap services an estimate of $36,000 - $39,000 per camera to include all services from Assessment through Implementation should be used as a budgetary planning estimate. These estimates are subject to the decisions to be made by the City of Hyattsville during Phases 2 and 3.
## Appendix A – Video Camera Placement Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Corner</th>
<th>Street</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>St</th>
<th>Zip</th>
<th>Lat</th>
<th>Long</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th># of Cameras</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Northwestern HS</td>
<td>7016 Adelphi Road</td>
<td>Hyattsville</td>
<td>MD</td>
<td>20782</td>
<td>38.97682</td>
<td>76.9529</td>
<td>Camera</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Mall at Prince Georges - JC Penneys</td>
<td>3401 Toledo Terr</td>
<td>Hyattsville</td>
<td>MD</td>
<td>20782</td>
<td>38.96994</td>
<td>76.9599</td>
<td>Camera</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Mall at Prince Georges - Macys</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Mall at Prince Georges - Target</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Belcrest Rd &amp; Toledo Rd</td>
<td>6586 Belcrest Rd</td>
<td>Hyattsville</td>
<td>MD</td>
<td>20782</td>
<td>38.9697</td>
<td>76.9538</td>
<td>Camera</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Toledo Rd &amp; Adelphi Rd</td>
<td>6607 Adelphi Road</td>
<td>Hyattsville</td>
<td>MD</td>
<td>20782</td>
<td>38.97</td>
<td>76.9491</td>
<td>Camera</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Home Depot</td>
<td>SR 410 &amp; Toledo Road</td>
<td>Hyattsville</td>
<td>MD</td>
<td>20782</td>
<td>38.96733</td>
<td>76.9677</td>
<td>Camera</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Main Entrance Prince George’s Plaza</td>
<td>Editors Park Drive</td>
<td>Hyattsville</td>
<td>MD</td>
<td>20782</td>
<td>38.96645</td>
<td>76.9577</td>
<td>Camera</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Hyattsville Metro Walkway</td>
<td>SR-410</td>
<td>Hyattsville</td>
<td>MD</td>
<td>20782</td>
<td>38.96639</td>
<td>76.9554</td>
<td>Camera</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Between Circuit City and Metro Stato</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Other side of Metro Station PGP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>SE Corner Prince George's Plaza</td>
<td>SR 410 &amp; Belcrest Road</td>
<td>Hyattsville</td>
<td>MD</td>
<td>20782</td>
<td>38.96667</td>
<td>76.9542</td>
<td>Camera</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Queens Chapel &amp; RT 410</td>
<td>6293 41st Ave</td>
<td>Hyattsville</td>
<td>MD</td>
<td>20782</td>
<td>38.96596</td>
<td>76.9483</td>
<td>Camera</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Stairs from Park behind metro St</td>
<td>6101 Jamestown Rd</td>
<td>Hyattsville</td>
<td>MD</td>
<td>20782</td>
<td>38.96418</td>
<td>76.9558</td>
<td>Camera</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Queens Chapel and Belcrest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Bet Metro Station &amp; Kirkwood Apts</td>
<td>5654 Ager Road</td>
<td>Hyattsville</td>
<td>MD</td>
<td>20782</td>
<td>38.95825</td>
<td>76.9685</td>
<td>Camera</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corner</td>
<td>Street</td>
<td>City</td>
<td>St</td>
<td>Zip</td>
<td>Lat</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td># of Cameras</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 W. Hyattsville Metro Entrance</td>
<td>2171 Hamilton Street</td>
<td>Hyattsville</td>
<td>MD</td>
<td>20782</td>
<td>38.95521</td>
<td>76.9673</td>
<td>Camera</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Hamilton St &amp; Ager Rd</td>
<td>2929 Hamilton St</td>
<td>Hyattsville</td>
<td>MD</td>
<td>20782</td>
<td>38.95564</td>
<td>76.9656</td>
<td>Camera</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Hamilton St &amp; 31st Ave</td>
<td>3113 Hamilton St</td>
<td>Hyattsville</td>
<td>MD</td>
<td>20782</td>
<td>38.95601</td>
<td>76.9633</td>
<td>Camera</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Queens Chapel Cntr parking</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hyattsville</td>
<td>MD</td>
<td>20782</td>
<td>38.95668</td>
<td>76.9621</td>
<td>Camera</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Hamilton St &amp; Queens Chapel Rd</td>
<td>3406 Hamilton St</td>
<td>Hyattsville</td>
<td>MD</td>
<td>20782</td>
<td>38.95547</td>
<td>76.9623</td>
<td>Camera</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Hamilton St &amp; Queens Chapel Rd</td>
<td>3406 Hamilton St</td>
<td>Hyattsville</td>
<td>MD</td>
<td>20782</td>
<td>38.95547</td>
<td>76.9623</td>
<td>Camera</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W Hyattsville Metro Station Path Entrance</td>
<td>5328 Queens Chapel Road</td>
<td>Hyattsville</td>
<td>MD</td>
<td>20782</td>
<td>38.95255</td>
<td>76.9663</td>
<td>Camera</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Hamilton St &amp; Rt 208</td>
<td>3828 Hamilton St</td>
<td>Hyattsville</td>
<td>MD</td>
<td>20781</td>
<td>38.95321</td>
<td>76.9544</td>
<td>Camera</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Baltimore Ave &amp; Madison St</td>
<td>5830 Baltimore Ave</td>
<td>Hyattsville</td>
<td>MD</td>
<td>20781</td>
<td>38.95869</td>
<td>76.9399</td>
<td>Camera</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Baltimore Ave &amp; Hamilton</td>
<td>5360 Baltimore Ave</td>
<td>Hyattsville</td>
<td>MD</td>
<td>20781</td>
<td>38.95426</td>
<td>76.9404</td>
<td>Camera</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Baltimore Ave &amp; Gallatin Street</td>
<td>4396 Gallatin Street</td>
<td>Hyattsville</td>
<td>MD</td>
<td>20781</td>
<td>38.95262</td>
<td>76.9407</td>
<td>Camera</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Train Overpath</td>
<td>4973 Baltimore Ave</td>
<td>Hyattsville</td>
<td>MD</td>
<td>20781</td>
<td>38.95215</td>
<td>76.9396</td>
<td>Camera</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 County Court House</td>
<td>5000 Block Rhode Island Ave</td>
<td>Hyattsville</td>
<td>MD</td>
<td>20781</td>
<td>38.94996</td>
<td>-76.942</td>
<td>Camera</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Baltimore Ave &amp; Arundel Place</td>
<td>4507 Arundel Place</td>
<td>Hyattsville</td>
<td>MD</td>
<td>20781</td>
<td>38.94692</td>
<td>76.9412</td>
<td>Camera</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Public Works Yard</td>
<td>4699 Arundel Place</td>
<td>Hyattsville</td>
<td>MD</td>
<td>20781</td>
<td>38.94672</td>
<td>76.9399</td>
<td>Camera</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 Giant Parking Lot</td>
<td>6261 Editor's Park Drive</td>
<td>Hyattsville</td>
<td>MD</td>
<td>20782</td>
<td>38.96638</td>
<td>76.9594</td>
<td>Camera</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33 School behind Giant</td>
<td>6101 Editor's Park Drive</td>
<td>Hyattsville</td>
<td>MD</td>
<td>20782</td>
<td>38.96493</td>
<td>76.9593</td>
<td>Camera</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34 City Hall - NE</td>
<td>4310 Gallatin Street</td>
<td>Hyattsville</td>
<td>MD</td>
<td>20781</td>
<td>38.95324</td>
<td>76.9417</td>
<td>Camera</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corner</td>
<td>Street</td>
<td>City</td>
<td>St</td>
<td>Zip</td>
<td>Lat</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td># of Cameras</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 City Hall - SW</td>
<td>4310 Gallatin Street</td>
<td>Hyattsville</td>
<td>MD</td>
<td>20781</td>
<td>38.95295</td>
<td>76.9424</td>
<td>Camera</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36 Arts District Development</td>
<td>5488 Baltimore Ave</td>
<td>Hyattsville</td>
<td>MD</td>
<td>20781</td>
<td>38.95541</td>
<td>76.9401</td>
<td>Camera</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37 UTC Walkway</td>
<td>6479 Belcrest Rd</td>
<td>Hyattsville</td>
<td>MD</td>
<td>20782</td>
<td>38.96792</td>
<td>76.9538</td>
<td>Camera</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38 Parking lot N of UTC</td>
<td>6725 Belcrest Rd</td>
<td>Hyattsville</td>
<td>MD</td>
<td>20782</td>
<td>38.97243</td>
<td>76.9535</td>
<td>Camera</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39 City Hall</td>
<td>4310 Gallatin Street</td>
<td>Hyattsville</td>
<td>MD</td>
<td>20781</td>
<td>38.95308</td>
<td>-76.942</td>
<td>Wireless High Site</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 UTC Student Center</td>
<td>6510 Belcrest Road</td>
<td>Hyattsville</td>
<td>MD</td>
<td>20781</td>
<td>38.96827</td>
<td>76.9521</td>
<td>Wireless High Site</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 Potential High Site for West Hyattsville</td>
<td>3018 Hamilton Street</td>
<td>Hyattsville</td>
<td>MD</td>
<td>20782</td>
<td>38.95606</td>
<td>76.9646</td>
<td>Wireless High Site</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8. Appendix B – Camera location Site Visit Documentation

The sections that follow contain camera placement and image information and documentation gathered during the site visits to each of the identified camera locations.
8.1. Camera Location as a Layer on GIS Map
8.2. Camera Location and Crime Data as Layers on GIS Map

Legend – Based on data provided by the City of Hyattsville Police Department - 2007 Semi-Annual Burglary, Vehicle Theft and Robbery- Citizen

- ▲ BURGLARY
- ▄ VEHICLE THEFT
- ● ROBBERY - CITIZEN
8.3. Camera Location Visual Assessment and Logistics Presentation

Please note that all photos for the attached slides were taken from ground level and attempt to accurately represent the areas of interest described for each location. Actual camera mounting will place the cameras at greater height and will alter the angles depicted. In some cases there are areas noted not captured in the photos but will be available to the cameras once installation is complete.
Appendix 8.3

City of Hyattsville
Camera Placement Data -
Field of Vision and Logistics Study

Hyattsville, MD
October 15, 2007
1. Northwestern HS – 7000 Adelphi Rd

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Northwestern HS – 7016 Adelphi Rd</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lat</td>
<td>38.97682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lon</td>
<td>-76.95286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Cameras</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area of Interest</td>
<td>PTZ of Northwestern High School Parking lot.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential Mounting Asset</td>
<td>Pepco Pole - 613416-3524</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. The Mall at Prince George’s – JC Penny’s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>3401 Toledo Terrace</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lat</td>
<td>38.96994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lon</td>
<td>-76.991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Cameras</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area of Interest</td>
<td>PTZ of parking lot behind JC Penney's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential Mounting Asset</td>
<td>Corner of Macy's or Lot Lighting</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. The Mall at Prince George’s – Macy’s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>3401 Toledo Terrace</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lat</td>
<td>38.96953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lon</td>
<td>-76.9569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Cameras</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area of Interest</td>
<td>PTZ of parking lot behind Macy’s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential Mounting Asset</td>
<td>Corner of Target or Lot Lighting</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. The Mall at Prince George’s – Target

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>3401 Toledo Terrace</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lat</td>
<td>38.97682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lon</td>
<td>-776.95286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Cameras</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area of Interest</td>
<td>PTZ of parking lot behind Target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential Mounting Asset</td>
<td>County or State Traffic poles</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. Belcrest Rd & Toledo Rd

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>6586 Belcrest Rd – (Belcrest Rd &amp; Toledo Rd)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lat</td>
<td>38.9697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lon</td>
<td>-76.95381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Cameras:</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area of Interest</td>
<td>PTZ of intersection of Belcrest Rd and Toledo Rd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential Mounting Asset</td>
<td>County or State Traffic poles</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. Toledo Rd & Adelphi Rd

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Toledo Rd &amp; Adelphi Rd</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lat</td>
<td>38.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lon</td>
<td>-76.9491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Cameras</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area of Interest</td>
<td>PTZ of Toledo road and Adelphi Rd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential Mounting Asset</td>
<td>County or State Traffic poles</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7. Home Depot

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>6607 Adelphi Rd – (Home Depot)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lat</td>
<td>38.96733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lon</td>
<td>-76.9677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Cameras</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area of Interest</td>
<td>PTZ fixed monitoring ingress and egress of cars on rt410 in and out of City and the Home Depot lot (not shown in pictures)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential Mounting Asset</td>
<td>Pole may need to be installed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8. Main entrance at The Mall at Prince George’s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Main entrance Prince George Plaza</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lat</td>
<td>38.96645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lon</td>
<td>-76.95773</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Cameras:</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area of Interest</td>
<td>PTZ Camera monitoring ingress and egress to Metro station and PGP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential Mounting Asset</td>
<td>Top corner of Circuit City</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9. Hyattsville Metro Walkway

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Hyattsville Metro Walkway</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lat</td>
<td>38.96639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Cameras:</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area of Interest</td>
<td>PTZ monitoring ingress end egress from metro walkway through Metro Shops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential Mounting Asset</td>
<td>Inside of stairwell or under the overhang facing the Metro Walkway entrance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
10. Between Circuit City and Metro Station

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Between Circuit City and Metro Station</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lat</td>
<td>38.96589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lon</td>
<td>-76.96526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Cameras:</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area of Interest</td>
<td>PTZ monitoring from Metro station to Metro Shops walkway.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential Mounting Asset</td>
<td>Overhang of Metro Shops Sign</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
11. Other side of Metro Station PGP

Note: This camera is mounted on top of a garage and will be in a fixed position monitoring the WAMATA parking lot.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Other side of Metro Station PGP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lat 38.96496</td>
<td>Lon -76.95533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area of Interest</td>
<td>Semi PTZ monitoring WAMATA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential Asset Mounting</td>
<td>Top of MCF Garage</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
12. SR 410 & Belcrest Rd

Location SR 410 and Belcrest Rd
Lat 38.96667 Lon -76.95424 No. of Cameras: 2
Area of Interest PTZ cameras monitoring the intersection of SR410 and Belcrest Rd.
Potential Mounting Asset County or State Traffic poles
13. Queens Chapel & RT 410

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Lat</th>
<th>Lon</th>
<th>No. of Cameras</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6293 41st Ave (Queens Chapel &amp; RT 410)</td>
<td>38.96596</td>
<td>-76.9483</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Area of Interest: PTZ monitoring intersection of Queens Chapel Rd and RT 410

Mounting Asset: County or State Traffic poles
14. Stairs From Park on Oliver behind Metro Station.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>6101 Jamestown Rs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lat</td>
<td>38.96418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lon</td>
<td>-76.995584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Cameras</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area of Interest</td>
<td>Semi-fixed PTZ camera monitoring ingress and egress to park to Metro Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential Mounting Asset</td>
<td>Light pole on WAMATA Garage Roof.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
15. Queens Chapel and Belcrest Rd

Location Queens Chapel and Belcrest Rd
Lat 38.96397 Lon -76.95169 No. of Cameras: 1
Area of Interest PTZ camera monitoring intersection of Queens Chapel and Belcrest Rd and Hyattsville Fire Dept (not shown in pictures)
Potential Mounting Asset County or State Traffic poles

- Location: 5654 Ager Rd – (Ager Rd & Metro Station)
- Lat: 38.96825
- Lon: -76.96847
- No. of Cameras: 1
- Area of Interest: PTZ camera monitoring ingress and egress to West Hyattsville metro station.
- Potential Mounting Asset: Light pole on WAMATA Property
## 17. West Hyattsville Metro Entrance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>West Hyattsville Metro Entrance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lat</td>
<td>38.9532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lon</td>
<td>-76.96576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Cameras</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area of Interest</td>
<td>PTZ camera monitoring back entrance of West Hyattsville Metro Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential Mounting Asset</td>
<td>Light pole on WAMATA Property</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
18. Hamilton St & Ager Rd

Location: 2929 Hamilton St – (Hamilton St & Ager Rd)
Lat: 38.95564   Lon: -76.9656   No. of Cameras: 1
Area of Interest: PTZ camera monitoring intersection of Hamilton St and Ager Rd.
Potential Mounting Asset: Pepco pole - 809408-6074
19. Hamilton St & 31st Ave

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>3113 Hamilton St – (Hamilton St &amp; 31st Ave)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lat</td>
<td>38.95564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lon</td>
<td>-76.9656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Cameras</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area of Interest</td>
<td>PTZ camera monitoring intersection of Hamilton St and Ager Rd.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential Mounting Asset</td>
<td>Pepco Pole - 80408-6767 (Or County or State Pole)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
20. Queens Chapel Center Parking

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Queens Chapel Center Parking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lat</td>
<td>38.96668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lon</td>
<td>-76.96211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Cameras:</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area of Interest</td>
<td>PTZ monitoring back parking lot of Queens Chapel Center Parking.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential Mounting Asset</td>
<td>Pepco Pole - 810409-6803</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
21. Hamilton Street and Queen’s Chapel Rd

Location 3406 Hamilton Street
Lat 38.95547  Lon -76.96229  No. of Cameras: 1
Area of Interest PTZ camera monitoring intersection.
Potential Mounting Asset Pepco Pole - 810408-6976
22. Hamilton Street and Queen’s Chapel Rd

Location 3406 Hamilton Street

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lat</th>
<th>Lon</th>
<th>No. of Cameras:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>38.95547</td>
<td>-76.96229</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Area of Interest: PTZ camera monitoring intersection.

Potential Mounting Asset: Pepco Pole - 0408-6767
23. West Hyattsville Metro Station Path Entrance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>5328 Queens Chapel Rd – (Metro Station Entrance)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lat</td>
<td>38.96255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lon</td>
<td>-76.96625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Cameras:</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area of Interest</td>
<td>Path from park to back path to Metro Station.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential Mounting Asset</td>
<td>Pepco Pole - 809407-5374</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## 24. Hamilton St & 38th Street

**Location**: 3828 Hamilton St – (Hamilton St & Rt 208)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lat</th>
<th>38.95321</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lon</td>
<td>-76.95445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area of Interest</td>
<td>PTZ monitoring intersection and 7/11.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential Mounting Asset</td>
<td>County or State Traffic poles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Cameras:</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
25. Baltimore and Madison Ave

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>5830 Baltimore Ave.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lat</td>
<td>38.94692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lon</td>
<td>-76.94116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Cameras</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area of Interest</td>
<td>PTZ monitors intersection up to DeMatha High School.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential Mounting Asset</td>
<td>County or State Traffic poles</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
26. Baltimore Ave & Hamilton St

Location: 5360 Baltimore Ave – (Baltimore Ave & Hamilton St)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lat</th>
<th>Lon</th>
<th>No. of Cameras</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>38.95869</td>
<td>-76.93994</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Area of Interest: PTZ cameral monitoring intersection.

Potential Mounting Asset: County or State Traffic poles
27. Baltimore Ave and Gallatin St

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>4396 Gallatin St</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lat</td>
<td>38.95426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lon</td>
<td>-76.94039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Cameras:</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area of Interest</td>
<td>PTZ monitoring intersection of US1 and Gallatin St.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential Mounting Asset</td>
<td>Roof of Franklins</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
28. Train Overpath

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>4973 Baltimore Ave – Train Over path</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lat</td>
<td>38.95215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lon</td>
<td>-76.93962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Cameras:</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area of Interest</td>
<td>PTZ camera monitoring the overpass and the city parking lot located behind Franklins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential Mounting Asset</td>
<td>Light Pole on train over-path</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
29. County Court House

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>5000 Block Rhode Island Ave</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lat</td>
<td>38.94996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lon</td>
<td>-76.942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Cameras:</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area of Interest</td>
<td>PTZ monitoring ingress and egress into Court house and Rt 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential Mounting Asset</td>
<td>Pepco Pole - 916406 - 3957</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
30. Baltimore Ave & Arundel Pl

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>4507 Arundel Place – (Baltimore Ave &amp; Arundel Pl)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lat</td>
<td>38.94692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lon</td>
<td>-76.94116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Cameras</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area of Interest</td>
<td>PTZ monitoring intersection of Baltimore Ave and Arundel Pl</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential Mounting Asset</td>
<td>Pepco Pole - 811670 or C&amp;PBC 11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
31. Public Works Yard

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Public Works Yard – (4699 Arundel Pl)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lat</td>
<td>38.94692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lon</td>
<td>-76.94116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Cameras:</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area of Interest</td>
<td>PTZ monitoring the Public Works Yard.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential Mounting Asset</td>
<td>Corner of Building looking into lot</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
32. Giant Parking Lot

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Giant Parking Lot – 6261 Editor’s Park Dr</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lat 38.94692</td>
<td>Lon -76.94116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Cameras: 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area of Interest</td>
<td>PTZ camera monitoring the Giant Parking Lot.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential Mounting Asset</td>
<td>Light Pole near sidewalk looking into Giant Lot</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
33. School behind Giant

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>School behind Giant – (6101 Editor's Park Drive)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lat</td>
<td>38.94692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lon</td>
<td>-76.94116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Cameras</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area of Interest</td>
<td>PTZ camera monitoring Editors Dr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential Mounting Asset</td>
<td>Unmarked Light Pole near WAMATA fence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
34. City Hall - Northeast

Location 4310 Gallatin St
Lat 38.94692 Lon -76.94116 No. of Cameras: 1
Area of Interest PTZ monitors City Hall lot and Gallatin St.
Potential Mounting Asset City Hall roof
35. City Hall - Southwest

Location 4310 Gallatin St
Lat 38.94692
Lon -76.94116
No. of Cameras: 1
Area of Interest PTZ monitors back corner of City Hall to Gallatin.
Potential Mounting Asset City Hall roof
36. Arts District Development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>5488 Baltimore Ave – (Arts District Development)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lat</td>
<td>38.95426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lon</td>
<td>-76.94039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Cameras</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area of Interest</td>
<td>PTZ monitoring constriction of new arts district.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential Mounting Asset</td>
<td>Pepco Pole - 816408-9156</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
37. UTC Walkway

Location 6479 Belcrest
Lat 38.95426
Lon -76.94039
No. of Cameras: 1
Area of Interest PTZ monitoring constriction of new arts district.
Potential Mounting Asset Roof of Target
38. Parking lot north of UTC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>6725 Belcrest Rd</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lat</td>
<td>38.95426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lon</td>
<td>-76.94039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Cameras</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area of Interest</td>
<td>PTZ monitoring of pedestrian traffic along 6700 block of Belcrest Rd.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential Mounting Asset</td>
<td>Unidentified</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>