

Y2 Final Report: Evaluation of the Los Angeles Gang Reduction and Youth Development Program

Submitted to:

Los Angeles Mayor's Gang Reduction and Youth
Development Office

By:

The Urban Institute

Terence Dunworth, Ph.D.

David Hayeslip, Ph.D.

Megan Denver



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List of Acronyms

| | |
|--------|--|
| CIW | Community Intervention Workers |
| CM | Case Manager |
| GRYD | Gang Reduction and Youth Development |
| LAPD | Los Angeles Police Department |
| LAVITA | Los Angeles Violence Intervention Training Academy |
| RACR | Real Time Analysis and Critical Response |
| RD | Reporting District |
| RDD | Regression Discontinuity Design |
| SNL | Summer Night Lights |
| UI | Urban Institute |
| USC | University of Southern California |
| Y2 | Year 2 (of the evaluation) |
| YSET-I | Youth Services Eligibility Tool – Initial |
| YSET-R | Youth Services Eligibility Tool - Retest |

Executive Summary

Introduction

The Urban Institute in partnership with Harder+Company has been contracted by the Office of the Mayor of Los Angeles to conduct a multi-year evaluation of the Mayor's Gang Reduction and Youth Development Program (GRYD). This Executive Summary describes the key findings of the second year of the evaluation. The Year 2 evaluation builds upon the previous process and preliminary outcome findings reported in 2010.¹ In this Executive Summary, we first identify the main components of the GRYD program and then describe the sources and scope of data that comprise the foundation for the main report. Key findings are then presented. A brief conclusion follows.

The full report is organized around the primary components of the GRYD program. For detailed support of the key findings presented in the Summary, the reader is referred to the analyses that are presented in the main report, and the appendices that accompany it.

The Gang Reduction and Youth Development Program

The GRYD program was established in 2007. The mission of the GRYD office, as documented in its Comprehensive Strategy² is to reduce gang violence within the Los Angeles communities with the most need by:

- Promoting positive youth development;
- Addressing the root causes that lead youth to join gangs;
- Reducing gang involvement among young people already engaged in gangs;
- Improving the relationships between the community and law enforcement;
- Responding to gang violence when it occurs to decrease the likelihood of retaliation; and
- Increasing information-sharing, the coordination of services, and collaboration between communities and the GRYD Office.

To achieve these goals the GRYD office has developed and implemented or coordinated a range of programs across five components:

- Primary prevention;
- Secondary prevention;
- Intervention case management;
- Intervention violence interruption (crisis intervention); and
- Law enforcement engagement.

¹ Dunworth et al. (2010). *Evaluation of the Los Angeles Gang Reduction and Youth Development Program: Final Y1 Report*. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute. Available online: <http://www.urban.org/publications/412251.html>
See also individual zone profiles, available at: <http://www.urban.org/publications/412274.html>

² The Los Angeles Mayor's Office of Gang Reduction and Youth Development draft *Comprehensive Strategy to Reduce Gang Violence* (May 2011)

Needs assessments were commissioned by the Mayor's office in 2008 to identify the geographic areas in Los Angeles where gang activities and violence were documented to be most prevalent. Twelve zones were selected.³ Contracts with private sector prevention and intervention service providers were competitively selected for each of the zones during 2008 and 2009. The contracts have been re-competed or renewed on July 1 of each successive year.

Service delivery for prevention programs began in early 2009; intervention programs commenced later that spring. Since commencement, the programs have been in continuous operation and the number of youth receiving services and assistance is steadily growing.

In addition to the prevention and intervention programs, the GRYD office, in collaboration with other agencies and organizations, sponsors and organizes the Summer Night Lights (SNL) program, which addresses all five components of the GRYD program. SNL operates each summer from July 4th through Labor Day. Financial support for SNL comes from private sector contributors as well as from Los Angeles' city funds. Under the SNL program, for four evenings each week of the two-month period, local parks and recreation centers across the city host a range of activities including free meals, recreation, and other activities that are open to all members of the community. GRYD office Program Managers and teams of gang and violence intervention specialists are present at each location during the SNL hours of operation, working to extend the reduction of inter-gang conflict and violence beyond the two months of SNL. Los Angeles Police Department officers also participate, not only to help maintain security, but also to engage in non-law enforcement group activities with attendees.

SNL began with eight locations in 2008 and added new locations each year resulting in a total of 32 by 2011. Further expansion is contemplated for 2012.

Scope of the Year 2 Evaluation

The long term goals of the evaluation are to address each of the components of the GRYD program, and make assessments of the effectiveness of the GRYD program with respect to its objectives in each of those areas. The evaluation also seeks to measure crime longitudinally and geographically in order to document trends in gang activity and gang violence in GRYD zones, SNL locations, and the city at large. To accomplish these goals, the evaluation team focuses primarily on information drawn from GRYD's prevention and intervention programs, and on geographically-specific incident-level crime data extracted from the Los Angeles Police Department's data records.

GRYD's primary prevention, secondary prevention, and intervention programs are at different stages of development with respect to data systems and documentation of their activities. Generally speaking, the secondary prevention program is more extensively documented than either the primary prevention program or the intervention program. It has therefore been possible to conduct quantitative analysis of secondary prevention activities, but not of the activities in primary prevention or intervention. The chapters of the report covering primary prevention (Chapter III) and intervention (Chapter V) are therefore primarily qualitative.

³ The 2008 needs assessments are available online: <http://mayor.lacity.org/index.htm>

To develop that qualitative information, the evaluation team conducted interviews, focus groups and surveys with 689 individuals who were participants or stakeholders in the GRYD program. Respondent groups include: GRYD Program Managers; GRYD service providers in the primary and secondary prevention programs and in the intervention program; LAPD officers; school teachers and officials; community leaders; youth in the secondary prevention program; and parents of such youth. All aspects of the GRYD program, including SNL, were included in the topics covered across these surveys. Chapter II provide more detail on the scope of these evaluation activities. The opinions and views expressed are reported in Chapters III, IV and V. In addition, surveys were conducted directly by the GRYD office of the Gun Buy-Back program and SNL and salient points from these surveys are also reported.

The secondary prevention program, focusing on at-risk youth aged 10-15 who are not already gang members, had received more than 5,000 referrals by mid-April 2011. Three thousand of these referred youth (60%) were considered sufficiently at-risk to be eligible for GRYD services on the basis of GRYD's Youth Services Eligibility Tool (YSET). A sample of more than 900 of this group was given a retest, using a process developed and administered by the evaluation team. An additional sample of 248 youth, drawn from the 2,000 referrals that were below GRYD's eligibility threshold, also took the retest. The retests were administered not less than six months after the initial test. Changes in self-reported gang risk factors and delinquent/criminal behaviors were measured at both points in time. Chapter IV details the results and comparisons between the two groups.

LAPD provided crime data records from January 1, 2005 through December 31, 2010 and trend analysis of more than 1.2 million recorded criminal incidents is presented in Chapter VI. The chapter reviews Part I, Part II, and gang crime trends for the 12 GRYD zones, the 24 SNL areas that were in operation in 2010, and the city at large.

Key Year 2 Findings

The evidence to date on the extent to which the GRYD program achieved its objectives, as outlined in the GRYD office's *Comprehensive Gang Reduction Strategy*, are presented for each of the primary components of the initiative. In addition, crime and gang crime trends for the GRYD zones and SNL areas compared with the rest of the city outside these area boundaries are summarized below. The main report contains additional information, evaluation methodology details and interpretation caveats and cautions.

Primary Prevention

- GRYD stakeholders reported positive views about the effects of GRYD zone programs on community perceptions of community safety.
- GRYD stakeholders reported positive views about the effects of SNL programs on improving safety in SNL areas during the operation of the summer activities, but views of park safety were not as strong after SNL concluded.
- GRYD stakeholders were positive about the effects of SNL on improving the quality of life in parks during the operations of SNL, but views of the quality of life were not as strong after SNL concluded.

- GRYD stakeholders felt that GRYD programs had the effects of increasing both prevention services and intervention services in the targeted communities.

Secondary Prevention

- GRYD stakeholders were affirmative about the prevention program, asserting improvements in the key objectives of the secondary prevention program, including the availability of gang prevention services, the communication of alternatives to the gang life, and the increase of resistance by youth to pressures to join gangs.
- More than 60% of enrolled youth who were retested on YSET scored at levels that were below the at-risk threshold for admission to the program. In other words, more than half of the eligible at-risk youth who were enrolled in GRYD and retested six months later now had risk levels that would be considered ineligible.
- On average, enrolled youth showed substantial and statistically significant improvements on all seven attitudinal risk scales.
- Enrolled youth reported some reduction in delinquent, criminal, or gang-related behavior but these reductions were not statistically significant for all behavioral items. Thus, behavior change did not exhibit the same level of improvement as attitudinal change.
- Comparisons at retest between enrolled youth and youth who had not received services indicated that enrolled youth had greater positive change than the not-eligible youth, but that the differences in reported risky behaviors were not significant.

Intervention

- From July 2010 to April 2011 there were joint responses by the GRYD office, LAPD, and program community intervention workers to 321 violent crisis incidents, of which the majority were gang-related.
- GRYD stakeholders reported that they were in agreement that rumors had been dispelled following crisis incidents by dissemination of information by LAPD, GRYD staff, and intervention workers.
- GRYD stakeholders felt that GRYD staff has been able to effectively communicate with LAPD and intervention workers in response to crisis situations.
- GRYD stakeholders reported that LAPD officers have been able to effectively communicate with intervention workers during crisis situations.
- A large majority of surveyed stakeholders felt that the intervention training (LAVITA) improved intervention workers' roles in responding to crises.
- Perceptions were high among stakeholders about the effectiveness of LAPD, GRYD office and intervention workers on reducing community tensions, the likelihood of retaliatory incidents and gang conflicts following crises.
- Most of those surveyed were positive about the effects of SNL on presenting opportunities for peaceful engagement across gangs.

Gang Violence and Crime

- Part I and Part II crimes in GRYD zones and SNL areas generally decreased from January 2005 through December 2010, with declines being steeper following GRYD program implementation. However, areas in the rest of the city outside the zones and SNL locations saw the same general trends during the period.
- Gang-related crime manifested seasonality throughout the past six years, with increases through early in the summer when gang crimes peaked, followed by a decline through the end of the year.
- The overall six-year trend for gang-related crime in GRYD zones and SNL locations was curvilinear, with the peak occurring in mid-2007 after which gang crimes dropped steeply. A similar trend was observed in areas outside the GRYD zones and SNL areas but the post-implementation declines were not as sharp as what transpired within program areas. Overall, however the trends were quite similar.
- GRYD stakeholders generally attributed changes in gang violence that they had observed to GRYD and SNL programs.

Conclusions

In summary, the evidence reported in the Year 2 GRYD Evaluation Report points toward positive outcomes for the achievement of GRYD program component objectives. Outcomes for all component objectives have not yet been examined due to data limitations, but those examined were in the direction of what would be anticipated from GRYD program success.

The observed outcomes for crime were more mixed. Although gang-related crimes declined somewhat more steeply following implementation of GRYD prevention and SNL programs in those areas than the rest of the city, the overall crime trends since 2005 have been similar in targeted areas and in the rest of the city beyond GRYD program boundaries. In addition, gang crimes were rising and then peaked in 2007 before the implementation of GRYD programs and have been on the decline since that peak, although it does appear that the declines accelerated slightly following program implementation. This suggests that there are forces at work in Los Angeles that are having city-wide effects on crime levels, and that these effects were intensified around the same time the GRYD program began. It is also possible that the positive changes in risk levels for youth in the prevention program may to some extent be related to these unobserved city-wide factors.

Although participant and stakeholder opinions are affirmative, at-risk youth have shown great improvements, and gang crime has declined, unequivocal attribution of these findings to the GRYD program is currently unwarranted. The qualitative information in particular must be interpreted cautiously since a good deal of it is derived from GRYD program staff and service providers. Nonetheless, much of the evidence to date is positive and consistent with hypothesized GRYD program effects. During the third year of the evaluation, additional evidence will be gathered from residents of GRYD zones and SNL areas.

Chapter I

Introduction

Overview of the GRYD Program

The Gang Reduction and Youth Development (GRYD) program was established within the Los Angeles Mayor’s Office in the summer of 2007 to address the problem of gang crime and gang violence in Los Angeles in a comprehensive, collaborative, and community-wide manner. GRYD was also designed to build upon previous approaches and to integrate existing public and private sector services, not just to implement new programs to address gang issues. Early steps taken by the program produced community-based assessments that identified those locations where gang problems were endemic. This led to the establishment of 12 GRYD zones for full prevention and intervention activities, four additional “non-GRYD zones” for prevention, and five additional “non-GRYD zones” for intervention.⁴ In 2008 and early 2009, competitive solicitations resulted in awards to gang prevention and gang intervention service providers in those zones, and to the program’s current evaluation team. In the summer of 2008, eight locations were identified for the Summer Night Lights Program (SNL), which has since that time become a major element in the GRYD program. Additional SNL locations were added in 2009 (six), and in 2010 (10), making a total of 24 locations. Another eight locations were added in July 2011.

Further activities of the GRYD program include a Gun Buy-Back program, a GRYD Cabinet, Community Action Teams, a Community Education Campaign, a Violence Intervention Training Academy, interdisciplinary teams to work on individual cases, and the coordination of community-based activities involving law enforcement and other agencies.

To document and formalize this increasingly complex program, the GRYD office has developed a *Comprehensive Strategy to Reduce Gang Violence*⁵ which explains the key underlying assumptions for its multi-faceted model, specifies goals and objectives, documents the agencies and organizations are responsible for each component, incorporates how program element performance will be measured, and defines how “success” will be determined. The plan is also designed to broadly link the various components together in a comprehensive manner.

GRYD has seven major components as outlined in the GRYD Office’s Comprehensive Strategy:

- **Primary Prevention**
Community oriented activities intended to build resistance to gang activities. The Gun Buy-Back program, Community Action Teams, and the Community Education Campaign are examples of activities within this component.

⁴ The 12 GRYD zones are each allocated \$1,000,000 for prevention and \$500,000 for intervention. The four non-GRYD prevention zones receive \$375,000, and the five non-GRYD intervention zones each receive \$225,000. The evaluation is limited to the 12 GRYD zones.

⁵ The GRYD Office’s draft *Comprehensive Strategy* is briefly summarized in this chapter.

- **Secondary Prevention**
Youth and family oriented services intended to inhibit gang-joining in at-risk youth 10 to 15 years of age, who are not yet gang members. Services are provided by GRYD-funded provider agencies in each zone.
- **Intervention Case Management**
Activities by intervention specialists are focused on youth 14 to 25 years of age who are already in gangs, the objective being to encourage them to disengage from the gang life.
- **Community Intervention**
Immediate responses to gang-related violent incidents in GRYD communities are provided by Community Intervention Workers on a 24/7 basis. The objective is to help communities deal with the incidents, reduce the number and severity of retaliatory responses to incidents, promote inter-gang peace-making, and provide victim services.
- **Law Enforcement Engagement**
GRYD seeks to promote increased and more effective cooperation and coordination between LAPD patrol/gang unit officers with GRYD intervention staff and GRYD Program Managers, and to expand police-community interaction to generate greater trust and co-operation.
- **Suppression**
The GRYD office does not engage directly in suppression activities conducted by police, or collaborate with police in suppression, but seeks to coordinate prevention and intervention activities with police actions.
- **Summer Night Lights (SNL)**
SNL takes place in parks and recreational centers and provides free activities for community residents. It operates four nights a week from July 4th to Labor Day. SNL is technically not a separate component of GRYD, but rather it integrates elements of prevention, intervention and law enforcement into its summer park activities.

These seven main components are intended to address the mission of the GRYD Office and Comprehensive Strategy to reduce gang violence within the Los Angeles communities with the most need by:

- Promoting positive youth development;
- Addressing the root causes that lead youth to join gangs;
- Reducing gang involvement among young people already engaged in gangs;
- Improving the relationships between the community and law enforcement;
- Responding to gang violence when it occurs to decrease the likelihood of retaliation; and
- Increasing information-sharing, the coordination of services, and collaboration between communities and the GRYD Office.

Objectives and Scope of This Report

This evaluation report focuses on GRYD program activities from July 2010 through mid-April 2011. It is a supplement to earlier reports.⁶ It expands previous process evaluation and preliminary outcome findings with additional information and evidence collected from July, 2010 through mid-April 2011. An assessment is made of the contribution that the growing body of evidence makes towards determining whether the GRYD program is working, but the report should not be interpreted as a final assessment of that issue. The evaluation is ongoing, and additional evidence is being gathered on the topics covered in this report.

Organization of the Report

This report does not address all areas of the GRYD program in equal depth because information development is not yet sufficiently advanced in some areas for full evaluation assessments to be justified. The following topics are covered:

Chapter II Data and Methods

This chapter reviews the data collection processes and statistical methods used throughout the report. More detailed method discussions are included within each chapter's content and supplemented by technical explanations on select topics in the Appendixes.

Chapter III Primary Prevention

The primary prevention chapter provides an overview of the objectives of primary prevention and brief descriptions of the Gun Buy Back program, the GRYD Cabinet, Community Action Teams, the Community Education Campaign and SNL. Outcome indicator findings associated with community perceptions of safety and improved access to gang prevention and intervention services are also presented.

Chapter IV Secondary Prevention

This chapter includes an analysis of the GRYD program's procedures for determining which at-risk youth will receive services, an assessment of the effects of the services on the attitudes and behaviors of a sample of youth enrolled in the program, and a comparison of those effects with a sample of youth not involved in the program. Also included is an overview of youth and parent perceptions of their experiences in the GRYD prevention program. Perceptions of stakeholders about gang membership, joining and leaving are also presented.

⁶ Dunworth et al. (2010). *Evaluation of the Los Angeles Gang Reduction and Youth Development Program: Final Y1 Report*. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute. Available online: <http://www.urban.org/publications/412251.html>. See also individual zone profiles, available at: <http://www.urban.org/publications/412274.html>.

Chapter V**Intervention**

The intervention chapter provides an overview of the objectives of this component of the GRYD strategy and brief descriptions of Gang Interruption activities, the Los Angeles Violence Intervention Training Academy (LAVITA), and Intervention Case Management. Outcome measures explored are community response activity, stakeholder perceptions concerning rumor control, improved working relationships, improved intervention worker roles due to LAVITA, and peacemaking.

Chapter VI**Crime Trends**

This chapter includes longitudinal analyses of Part I, Part II, and gang crime in Los Angeles by GRYD zones and SNL areas from January 2005 through December 2010. Comparisons are drawn between GRYD and SNL area crime and other parts of Los Angeles. Summaries of stakeholder views of the effects of GRYD and SNL on gang violence are also provided.

Chapter II

Data and Methods in Y2 Evaluation

A variety of qualitative and quantitative data were collected over the course of the second year of the evaluation. These can be categorized as: individual-level participant data, GRYD stakeholder perception, and macro-level crime incident data. In addition, where relevant, program administrative records and GRYD office internal assessment reports are cited.

The individual-level data consists of an analysis of the Youth Services Eligibility Tool (YSET) data at baseline and approximately six months later. As Chapter IV details, the analysis considers both youth enrolled in GRYD prevention programs (n=902) and those that were deemed as not eligible for enrollment (n=248). Measures include changes in risk factors associated with joining a gang and delinquent/criminal behaviors over time.

The crime analysis data were obtained from LAPD’s crime incident records management system and includes city-wide crime incident records from January 2005 through December 2010. See Chapter VI and Appendix I for a more detailed methodology of this analysis.

Finally, the perception data were obtained from prevention program participants, parents of program participants, service providers, GRYD office Program Managers, LAPD gang officers, Intervention Case Managers (CMs), Community Intervention Workers (CIWs) and several agency and organization representatives who interact with the GRYD program to varying degrees (including school officials and community leaders). Interpretations of these data are found throughout the report and are summarized in the relevant chapters. A summary of the data sources is presented in Table 2.1. For more detailed information, such as response rates for a specific data source or question-specific responses for individual stakeholder groups see the appropriate Appendix.

It should be noted that not all stakeholder groups were asked the same questions and therefore different totals will be observed for different outcome indicator findings across

Table 2.1 – Information Sources for Community Perspectives

| Sources of Information | Who participated | Type of data collected |
|------------------------|---|---|
| Prevention Youth | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ A random selection of youth who had completed a YSET initial and retest interview (n=125) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ In-person interviews were conducted in English or Spanish, as appropriate |

Table 2.1 (continued)

| Sources of Information | Who participated | Type of data collected |
|---|--|---|
| <p>Parents</p> <p>GRYD Office Program Managers</p> <p>LAPD officers</p> <p>Provider Surveys</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Prevention agencies assisted in recruiting 6 to 12 parents/guardians of enrolled GRYD clients to participate in focus groups in each zone. The first set of focus groups involved convenience sampling from providers; for the second set, the evaluation team randomly selected enrolled clients and prevention agencies were asked to recruit the parents from that selection. Overall, 125 parents participated in 20 focus groups ■ This included eight GRYD Office Program Managers and one supervising Program Manager ■ LAPD gang unit officers (n=40) who worked with the GRYD and SNL programs; contact information was provided by the GRYD office ■ 197 prevention and intervention provider staff (primary and subcontractor) in GRYD zones. Those surveyed include Executive Directors, Case Managers, Program Directors, Program Coordinators, Community Intervention Workers, Program Assistants, Counselors/Therapists, Psychologists, Youth Advocates, Family Advocates, Data Coordinators/Administrators, Teachers, and Instructors/Coaches | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Focus groups were conducted in English and Spanish, as appropriate. ■ All nine participated in a focus group and short surveys ■ Online survey ■ Online survey |
| <p>Intervention Case Management</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ The evaluation team requested interviews with two Case Managers from each lead intervention agency in all 12 GRYD zones; 23 intervention Case Managers participated | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ The 23 participants were surveyed in teams of two (where applicable) in their respective GRYD zones; they also participated in short surveys |

| Table 2.1 (continued) | | |
|----------------------------------|---|--|
| Sources of Information | Who participated | Type of data collected |
| Community Intervention | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The evaluation team requested interviews with two Community Intervention Workers from each lead intervention agency in all 12 GRYD zones; 23 Community Intervention Workers participated | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The 23 participants were surveyed in teams of two (where applicable) in their respective GRYD zones; they also participated in short surveys |
| School Officials | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> School personnel who have worked directly with GRYD Office or program staff (n=60); this included principals, assistant principals, deans, counselors, teachers, probation officers, social workers, parent and community representatives, liaisons, office technicians, school police officers, and coordinators | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Phone or in-person interviews (depending on the respondent's preference) |
| Community Leaders | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Community leaders interviewed (n=48) included non-GRYD service providers in the community, parent liaisons,⁷ local business owners, active residents,⁸ and/or faith leaders who were identified through GRYD service providers or GRYD Program Managers as key players in the community | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Phone or in-person interviews (depending on the respondent's preference) |
| Guy Buy-Back Participants | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Postcard surveys were piloted at two Gun Buy-Back sites through convenience sampling (n=289) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The postcard surveys were completed in person or by mail |

chapters. In addition, given the volume of perception data, not all items are presented or discussed in the main text of the report. However, full survey findings are presented in the Appendixes for reader reference.

The number of interviews and surveys conducted in each GRYD zone are listed in Table 2.2. Note that three respondent types are not included in the chart below. First, GRYD

⁷ None of the community leaders identified themselves as the parents of GRYD youth. Instead, this category refers to those who connect community organizations or institutions (such as schools) with parents in the community.

⁸ "Active residents" includes social workers, those affiliated with local media, those involved in community recreation centers, those on community advisory boards, and other liaisons.

Program Managers sometimes transferred from one GRYD zone to another, so they have experiences from multiple sites. Some also covered non-GRYD zones and one was a supervisor for the Program Managers. All 12 zones were represented by the nine Program Manager respondents. In addition, the Intervention CM and CIW focus groups and surveys are not reported in Table 2.2. However, each zone had two respondents except for Southwest II (which had one). Third, Gun Buy-Back participants were targeted in two Gun Buy-Back program sites, not across GRYD zones.

Table 2.2 – Focus Groups, Interviews and Surveys

| Zones | Youth Interviews | Parents (focus group sessions) | LAPD Surveys | Provider Surveys | School Official Interviews | Community Leader Interviews |
|------------------------------|------------------|--------------------------------|--------------|------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 77 th Division II | 9 | 17 (2) | 8 | 15 | 4 | 4 |
| Baldwin Village | 15 | 14 (2) | 4 | 10 | 4 | 3 |
| Boyle Heights | 10 | 7 (2) | 1 | 15 | 6 | 4 |
| Cypress Park | 13 | 6 (1) | 2 | 19 | 6 | 6 |
| Florence Graham | 5 | 0 (0) | 5 | 5 | 4 | 3 |
| Newton | 11 | 6 (2) | 4 | 8 | 4 | 4 |
| Pacoima Foothill | 14 | 23 (2) | 3 | 38 | 5 | 5 |
| Panorama City | 9 | 8 (2) | 2 | 20 | 6 | 4 |
| Ramona Gardens | 9 | 7 (2) | 2 | 20 | 6 | 3 |
| Rampart | 10 | 10 (2) | 2 | 21 | 7 | 5 |
| Southwest II | 6 | 6 (1) | 4 | 12 | 4 | 4 |
| Watts Southeast | 14 | 21 (2) | 3 | 14 | 4 | 3 |
| TOTAL | 125 | 125 (20) | 40 | 197 | 60 | 48 |

Note: When more than one focus group was conducted in a zone, different participants were involved in each group. One Intervention CM and one CIW per zone participated in interviews and short surveys.

The following chapters contain multiple sources of information in an attempt to create a holistic understanding of perceptions of changes in GRYD zones, impacts of the GRYD program, and impacts of SNL. Each data source is separated into its own section for the reader’s convenience and some sections cover source-specific themes, but they are generally structured similarly. When respondents were involved in GRYD or SNL in more than one zone, they reported separately for each zone in which they worked. Because of this, the number of responses tallied in the tables presented will sometimes exceed the total number of respondents.

Chapter III

Primary Prevention

Introduction

The *Primary Prevention* component of the comprehensive gang reduction and youth development strategy is oriented toward communities. In particular, this component seeks to provide activities and services that are designed to build community level resistance to gang membership risk factors and gang violence.

This chapter provides an overview of the objectives of primary prevention and descriptions of the basic activities of each of its four main components: the Gun Buy-Back Program, the GRYD Cabinet; GRYD Community Action Teams, and the Community Education Campaign. In addition, SNL is discussed because of its community orientation. It should be noted, however, that SNL is inclusive of all GRYD strategy prongs, not just primary prevention but also secondary prevention, intervention, and law enforcement engagement.

Relevant evaluation findings are then presented for the primary prevention component. Outcome indicator findings are drawn from two sources. The first source was local stakeholder surveys that were conducted in GRYD zones and SNL locations. Those surveyed included GRYD Program Managers, LAPD gang officers, program service providers, Intervention CMs and CIWs. The second source was interviews of staff and teachers in GRYD zone schools and community leaders. Some of the same questions about primary prevention outcomes were asked in both the interviews and the surveys. However, more wide-ranging topics were discussed in the interviews given their interactive framework. These have been separately reported to the GRYD Office.

Responses to common questions across these groups were aggregated and are presented as summary outcome indicators for primary prevention. Item-specific responses for each group are presented in this report's appendixes. Changes in Part I/II crime⁹ and gang-related crime occurring in GRYD zones and SNL locations are presented separately in Chapter VI. In addition, the GRYD Comprehensive Strategy for the coming year calls for surveys of community residents to supplement the kind of survey/interview results that are presented in this report.

Primary Prevention Objectives

As noted above, the overarching purpose of primary prevention is to increase community resiliency to risk factors associated with gang membership and violence. To do so this component seeks to achieve the following objectives (some of which are also objectives of other GRYD components);¹⁰

⁹ Throughout this report, Part I and Part II crimes refer to crime types categorized in the Uniform Crime Reports. See the Federal Bureau of Investigation's website for more information: <http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/ucr>.

¹⁰ Program goals, objectives and activities descriptions include material from the draft (May 2011) GRYD Office *Comprehensive Strategy to Reduce Gang Violence*.

- Improved community perceptions of safety.
- Improved access to gang prevention/intervention services.
- Improved perceptions of trust and credibility between the police and the community.
- Improved community resident levels of trust and shared values/identity with others in the community.
- Improved community residents' connection to other community residents along the family life cycle.
- Improved communication and collaboration among community Service Providers.

Primary Prevention Components

The Gun Buy-Back Program

The Gun Buy-Back Program is designed to engage communities throughout Los Angeles by providing an opportunity for local residents to anonymously turn in firearms to the police. GRYD Office staff partner with the LAPD to operate drop-off locations throughout the city each year on Mother's Day. GRYD contracted prevention and intervention agencies also partner with the GRYD Office and LAPD. The local media outlet KCBS/KCAL 9 is a program sponsor and a community-wide education campaign calling for the end of gang and gun violence features nightly media segments that examine the effects of gang and gun violence prior to the start of the program.

These yearly events mark the beginning of the GRYD summer violence reduction effort and serve as the kick off for the SNL program each summer.

The GRYD Cabinet

The GRYD Cabinet is made up of key leaders from county and city agencies as well as representatives from each GRYD zone. It is charged with targeting zone communities by coordinating and collaborating to provide services and programs that engage all residents across the family life cycle. It also seeks to provide positive developmental opportunities for youth and young adults, match agency resources to the magnitude of gang problems in the zones, and attempts to renew hope for communities troubled by gang problems.

GRYD Community Action Teams

GRYD Community Action Teams are led by GRYD Office Program Managers and are intended to create and support community-based working groups that target GRYD zone communities with primary prevention activities. In particular, they seek to strengthen protective factors associated to preventing gang membership and violence, ranging from pre-natal care to death.

Community Education Campaign

The Community Education Campaign targets community members and school professionals and staff at elementary, middle, and high schools in and around the GRYD zones. Through school-based forums GRYD staff present information to the community and schools to increase knowledge and awareness of gang risk factors and gang-joining. School staff and

community members are urged to refer youth they believe are at risk for gang-joining to their local gang prevention provider and referral forms to do so are distributed during these community education forums. Over two phases in 2010 and 2011, presentations were made to 44 schools in the GRYD zones.

Summer Night Lights

As noted above, SNL is not limited to primary prevention; rather, it is designed to incorporate all of the elements of the GRYD comprehensive approach. However, because of its community-wide focus and the fact that many of its outcome indicators overlap with the four primary prevention programs, it is discussed in this chapter. It should be pointed out that the GRYD Office recently conducted its own internal evaluation of SNL, the results of which are available from the GRYD Office (*Summer Night Lights Evaluation: 2010 Evaluation Report*).

SNL is based upon the 2003 “Summer of Success Baldwin Village Program” at Jim Gilliam Park. SNL integrates gang prevention, intervention, community, and law enforcement strategies to address violence in parks and recreational centers for eight weeks during the summer (July 4th through Labor Day). Programming is extended to communities and their residents from seven P.M. until midnight, Wednesday through Saturday when potential for violent crime is at its highest in the city. SNL began in 2008 at eight recreation and parks facilities, expanded to 16 sites in 2009, to 24 in 2010 and most recently to 32 locations in 2011.

Numerous organizational partners participate in SNL including city agencies, non-profits, the faith-based community, local foundations, and businesses.

As stated in the GRYD Office *Comprehensive Gang Reduction Strategy*, the core SNL components are:

- Extended Programming: Includes a variety of activities such as the provision of meals, cooking classes, athletic programming, arts programming and other skill-based programs (primary prevention).
- The Youth Squad: At-risk youth from the community are hired to help plan and implement SNL summer activities and to act as community liaisons in 10 person teams (secondary prevention).
- Intervention: CIWs engage in proactive peace-making activities as well as violence interruption throughout SNL (intervention)
- Law Enforcement/Community Engagement: LAPD is an active participant at SNL through sports, cooking, and arts activities as well as community interactions (enforcement).

According to the GRYD Office, an estimated 710,000 visits were made to the 24 sites in 2010 and on average almost 11,000 people were served meals each night. In addition, SNL created more than 1,000 summer jobs for youth, community members, leaders and businesses in neighborhoods within and surrounding the park sites.

Primary Prevention Outcome Indicators

Community Perceptions of Safety

In 2011, 2,066 firearms were turned in across six Gun Buy-Back locations. Drive-up participants were handed a survey by GRYD staff about their experience with the program and asked to fill out the survey while they waited or to mail in the pre-paid postcard within the next week. There were 289 respondents to the survey. The GRYD office reports that 90% of those responding felt that the community would be safer because of the event. In addition, 98% felt “very comfortable” or “somewhat comfortable” participating in the event and 97% felt that it was “very easy” or “somewhat easy” to participate. Most participants (89%) said they learned about the program from the local media.

In the stakeholder surveys and interviews conducted in GRYD zones by the evaluation team, two questions specifically addressed GRYD program effects on the community’s sense of safety and what changes had taken place from 2009 to 2010, two that asked about perceptions of SNL programming on improving safety in the parks and two that asked about how SNL may have affected the quality of life in the community. The summary results of responses across stakeholder groups (GRYD Program Managers, Prevention Providers, CIWs, LAPD, community leaders, and school officials) are presented in Table 3.1. Not all groups were asked every question, hence the different total number of responses presented in the tables.

When asked about the effects of GRYD on the community’s sense of safety, over three times as many respondents indicated “high” (29.3%) or “very high” (10.9%) effects as said “low” (9.1%) or “very low” (1.8%). Moderate effects were suggested by 39.5% of all respondents. Within these aggregates, GRYD Program Managers were most affirmative about improvements in the community’s sense of safety (81.9% “high” or “very high”) compared with 35% to 45% of LAPD gang officers, Service Providers, Case Managers and CIWs responding “high” or “very high.”

Table 3.1 – Summary of Stakeholder Perceptions of the Effects of GRYD on Community Sense of Safety

| | Very Low | Low | Moderate | High | Very High | Don’t Know |
|--|------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|------------|
| Effects of GRYD on Community Sense of Safety in 2010 (N=276) | 5 1.8% | 25 9.1% | 109 39.5% | 81 29.3% | 30 10.9% | 26 9.4% |
| Changes in Community Sense of Safety 2009-2010 (N=384) | 25 6.5% | 61 15.9% | 108 28.1% | 108 28.1% | 45 11.7% | 37 9.6% |

Of the 384 respondents to the question about changes in community sense of safety between 2009 and 2010 28.1% said that the effects of GRYD were “high” and 11.7% responded “very high.” About half as many (22.4%) responded “very low” or “low.” Again Program

Managers had the most positive perceptions (54.5% “high,” 27.3% “very high”) whereas CMs tended to be more negative (9.5% “very low,” 28.6% “low”). In summary, across all respondents, 39.8% reported high or very high effects, 22.4% reported moderate effects, and 22.4% reported low or very low effects.

Results for the survey questions on changes in perceptions about SNL effects on community safety are presented in Table 3.2. A large majority of all respondents felt that SNL programs had “high” (37.6%) or “very high” (30.8%) effects on safety in the parks during the summer of 2010. CIWs were overwhelmingly positive about SNL effects on safety (52.2% “high” and 43.5% “very high”) and LAPD Gang Officers, Service Providers, CMs and Community Leaders also have large majorities indicating positive effects. School staff generally reported not knowing whether there was an effect (54.5%).

Respondents were not as positive in their views of the effects of SNL after the summer was over, however. For outcomes after SNL 2010, the “very high” or “high” responses together declined to 36.1% of the total. Those holding “very low” or “low” views increased to 10.2% of the total. CIWs held the most affirmative perceptions and 65.5% school staff indicated that they did not know whether SNL effects continued after the programs ended or not.

Table 3.2 – Summary of Stakeholder Perceptions of the Effects of SNL on Improved Safety in SNL Parks

| | Very Low | Low | Moderate | High | Very High | Don’t Know |
|--|-----------------|------------|-----------------|--------------|------------------|-------------------|
| SNL Improved Park Safety During 2010 (N=364) | 5 1.4% | 6 1.6% | 51 14.0% | 119 37.6% | 112 30.8% | 71 19.5% |
| Improved Park Safety Following 2010 (N=363) | 12 3.3% | 25 6.9% | 104 28.7% | 102 28.1% | 29 8.0% | 91 25.1% |

Respondents were also asked about their views of how SNL may have affected the quality of life in SNL parks, the results of which are presented in Table 3.3. A majority of all respondents were affirmative about the impacts of the programs offered during the summer of 2010 on the quality of life (33.0% “high” and 27.2% “very high”). CIWs were overwhelmingly positive in their views (91.3% responded “high” or “very high”) followed by CMs (77.8% for “high” or “very high”). Majorities of all the other groups were also positive, with the exception of school staff where over half responded that they did not know.

Views of the effects of SNL on quality of life after the summer 2010 programs declined somewhat. Only 27.6% rated the effects on the quality of life as “high” and 8.5% said “very high.” However, this was nearly three times the number that ranked the effects as “low” or “very low.” Nearly a quarter of all respondents felt that the effects were “moderate” and a quarter did not know. CIWs once again held the most positive views (47.8% “high” and 4.3% “very high”). Over 58% of school staff responded that they did not know.

Table 3.3 – Summary of Stakeholder Perceptions of the Effects of SNL on Improved Quality of Life in SNL Parks

| | Very Low | Low | Moderate | High | Very High | Don't Know |
|--|-----------------|------------|-----------------|--------------|------------------|-------------------|
| SNL Improved Quality of Life During 2010 (N=364) | 6 1.6% | 9 2.5% | 59 16.2% | 120 33.0% | 99 27.2% | 71 19.5% |
| Improved Quality of Life Following 2010 (N=366) | 16 4.4% | 31 8.5% | 98 26.8% | 101 27.6% | 31 8.5% | 89 24.3% |

Improved Access to Gang Prevention/Intervention Services

GRYD Program Managers, LAPD gang officers, CMs, CIWs, school staff and community leaders were also asked about their views on the effects of GRYD programming on access to prevention services and intervention services in 2010. The summary findings are presented in Table 3.4. Nearly the same proportions suggested that GRYD programming had resulted in “high” or “very high” effects on the provision of both prevention services (39.0% and 20.5%) and intervention services (39.3% and 21.5%). More than 70% of the Program Managers and CIWs felt that the effects on access to prevention services were either “high” or “very high.” The majorities of all the other groups were similarly positive. In contrast, over 80% of all of the Program Managers, CMs and CIWs rated as either “high” or “very high” the impact of GRYD on access to intervention services. Sixty-three percent of community leaders and about half of LAPD gang officers and school staff were similarly positive about GRYD effects on intervention access.

Table 3.4 – Summary of Stakeholder Perceptions of the Effects of GRYD Programming on Access to Services

| | Very Low | Low | Moderate | High | Very High | Don't Know |
|--|-----------------|------------|-----------------|-------------|------------------|-------------------|
| Impact on Increasing Access to Prevention Services (N=200) | 5 2.5% | 10 5.0% | 43 21.5% | 78 39.0% | 41 20.5% | 23 11.5% |
| Impact on Increasing Access to Intervention Services (N=211) | 5 2.4% | 11 5.2% | 40 19.0% | 83 39.3% | 46 21.8% | 26 12.3% |

Conclusion

GRYD stakeholders, including Program Managers, LAPD gang officers, service providers, CMs, CIWs, school staff and community leaders consistently reported high positive effects of primary prevention GRYD programs on the community. These included community perceptions of safety and quality of life, as well as improved access to both prevention and intervention

programming in the community. Surveys of participants in the Gun Buy-Back program also suggested improved perceptions of community safety have resulted. During the coming year, community residents will also be surveyed to obtain their views of the GRYD program.

Chapter IV

Secondary Prevention

Introduction

This chapter reviews GRYD's secondary prevention program, which provides services to at-risk youth aged 10 to 15 and the families of those youth.

We focus first on the youth who were referred to the prevention program between the program's inception in 2009 and mid-April 2011. The Youth Services Eligibility Tool - the program's method of determining which referred youth will be offered services and which will not - is described. The results of the program's measurement of gang-joining risk for these youth are documented, along with the program's decisions concerning which youth would be offered services and which would not.

We then present an analysis of changes in risk levels for a sample of 902 youth who did receive services. Comparisons are made for those outcomes with a sample of 248 youth who did not receive services. That section concludes by reporting on the views of the program held by participating youth and parents, as developed in interviews and focus groups.

We then report the views on the effects and effectiveness of the program expressed in interviews and surveys conducted in each of the GRYD zones with GRYD Program Managers, LAPD gang unit officers, GRYD service providers, school personnel, and community leaders.

A concluding section summarizes the findings.

The Youth Services Eligibility Tool

Youth 10 to 15 years of age are referred to prevention service providers in each GRYD zone from a variety of sources; schools, law enforcement agencies, social service agencies, and parents. From the start of the GRYD prevention program in 2009 to May 2011, more than 6,000 at-risk youth had been referred to the program. The sources of referrals in each of the 12 GRYD zones are presented in Table 4.1.

The table illustrates that 42% of the referrals were made by school staff, and 6% were made by police or probation officers. This is to be expected since those sources have personal involvement with youth that are having difficulties. What is perhaps surprising is that 40% of the youth coming to the program were referred by family members, by peers, or decided on their own to approach the GRYD service agency directly. This suggests a high level of community awareness of the prevention program, across all of the zones.

Table 4.1 – GRYD Prevention Program Referral Sources as of May 2011

| GRYD Zone | Referral Source | | | | Total |
|------------------|-----------------|------------------------|------------------------------|-------|-------|
| | School | Family, Self, or Peers | Law enforcement or probation | Other | |
| 77th Division II | 312 | 137 | 18 | 23 | 490 |
| Baldwin Village | 76 | 179 | 81 | 54 | 390 |
| Boyle Heights | 272 | 134 | 21 | 37 | 464 |
| Cypress Park | 211 | 164 | 26 | 69 | 470 |
| Florence-Graham | 142 | 67 | 1 | 7 | 217 |
| Newton | 118 | 500 | 3 | 105 | 726 |
| Pacoima/Foothill | 225 | 194 | 46 | 75 | 540 |
| Panorama City | 143 | 142 | 75 | 52 | 412 |
| Ramona Gardens | 129 | 152 | 26 | 42 | 349 |
| Rampart | 287 | 62 | 10 | 143 | 502 |
| Southwest II | 170 | 94 | 5 | 33 | 302 |
| Watts/Southeast | 141 | 313 | 8 | 28 | 490 |
| Totals N | 2501 | 2409 | 379 | 719 | 6008 |
| % | 42% | 40% | 6% | 12% | 100% |

Referred youth are all believed to be in need of help by those making the referrals. However, GRYD program resources are finite and a program decision was made at the outset that services could be offered only to those youth who are at highest risk of joining a gang and engaging in criminal or delinquent behavior. To make this determination, GRYD gang prevention agencies in each of the 12 zones interview referred youth. A key component of this process is the administration by the GRYD provider of YSET, an attitudinal and behavioral survey developed by researchers at the University of California (USC).

YSET utilizes nine measurement scales. Seven are attitudinal; two are behavioral. Each scale consists of a number of items to which youth are asked to respond during an introductory interview.¹¹ The scales, the number of items in each scale, and the range of possible responses to the items in a scale are presented in Table 4.2

¹¹ There have been some adjustments to the factors and the items in YSET since the program commenced, but the general principles and structure of the risk measurement approach have been consistent.

Table 4.2 - Structure of the YSET Risk Scales

| Risk Scales | | Scale Structure | | | |
|-------------|--|-----------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|---|
| | | Number of Items | Low-High Range of Responses | Maximum Possible Risk Score | Risk Threshold Score if 12 yrs old or younger |
| A | Anti-Social/Pro-Social Tendencies | 6 | 1 - 5 | 30 | 16 |
| B | Parental Supervision | 3 | 1 - 5 | 15 | 7 |
| C | Critical Life Events | 7 | 0 - 1 | 7 | 4 |
| DE | Impulsive Risk Taking | 4 | 1 - 5 | 20 | 14 |
| F | Neutralization | 6 | 1 - 5 | 30 | 19 |
| G | Negative/Positive Peer Influence | 5 | 1 - 5 | 25 | 10 |
| H | Peer Delinquency | 6 | 1 - 5 | 30 | 12 |
| IJ | Self-Reported Delinquency or Substance Abuse | 17 | 0 - 1 | 17 | 4 |
| T | Family Gang Influence | 2 | 0 - 2 ¹² | 2 | 2 |

Most scales consist of questions with five response options on each question, rank ordered from low to high risk. A value of 1 is assigned to the lowest risk response and a value of 5 is assigned to the highest risk response. To obtain a score for a respondent on any scale, the responses to the items on that scale are summed. The result is then compared with the risk threshold for the scale to determine if the youth is at-risk with respect to that scale. On Scale A, for instance, which has a maximum possible risk score of 30 (6 items, with 5 being the highest risk response on each item), a youth between the ages of 10 and 12 is considered at risk with a score of 16 or more. The same approach is used on each scale that has items with a risk range of 1 to 5 (Scales B, DE, F, G, and H).

Thus, the score for each youth on each item is calculated by assigning 1 to the lowest risk response for a single item within a risk scale (e.g., “Strongly Agree” on Item 2 – “I do as I am told”) and 5 to the highest risk response (e.g., “Strongly Agree” on Item 6 – “I take things that are not mine from home, school, or elsewhere”).

For scales that have questions with Yes/No responses, the range is 0 (no) to 1 (yes). This produces a lower maximum risk score but the logic of the risk decision is the same. On Scale C, Critical Life Events for instance, a score of 4 puts a 12-year-old above the at-risk threshold.

There are modest upward adjustments in the risk threshold for older youth (13 to 15 years of age) on some of the scales. However, the same decision rules are applied.

¹² The two items in this scale are open-ended quantitative questions; however, the scoring structure assigns 0, 1, or 2 points for this scale overall, based on responses to the two items.

A youth is deemed Eligible or Not-Eligible for GRYD services based on the number of scales for which the youth has scores above the at-risk threshold. A youth who is at-risk on four or more scales is deemed Eligible.

To get to the decision point on each youth who takes the YSET interview, the provider agency sends the responses given by the youth to a USC team for scoring. The USC team calculates the scores, makes the eligibility determination, and returns the information to the originating provider agency using a feedback report that identifies for each scale whether the youth is above or below the at-risk threshold.¹³

The provider may challenge the USC decision and submit evidence supporting the challenge to an independent review team. The review team has the authority to change the eligibility classification made by USC. This has resulted in some youth being offered services even though their YSET results were below the risk threshold. The provider then seeks to enroll Eligible youth in the GRYD prevention program, develops a case plan for those who do enroll, and begins service delivery.

The Retesting Process

To measure change, if any, in risk propensity for each Eligible youth as services are being provided, prevention agencies began re-testing youth in late 2010 using the same YSET scales contained in the initial eligibility interview. To distinguish between these two tests from this point on, the initial YSET is termed YSET-I and the retest YSET is termed YSET-R.

The intent of the GRYD office is for providers to administer the YSET-R to all youth at six-month intervals after enrolling in the GRYD program. Providers have not yet reached that goal but are currently working through retests of the backlog of youth who have been in the program longer than six months. The YSET-R forms are sent to the evaluation team for analysis and scoring. This is conducted in exactly the same manner as the USC initial scoring. Results are then returned to the originating provider. This information is expected to aid providers in determining how to adjust service provision on a case-by-case basis on evidence-based grounds, and has the potential to help determine which types of services are or are not effective.¹⁴ In addition, this measurement of change in risk can help to decide when a youth can be “graduated” from the GRYD program.¹⁵

Table 4.3 presents counts of the number of youth tested for GRYD eligibility for each of the 12 GRYD zones. From program inception through approximately April 15th, 2011¹⁶, more

¹³ Youth who are already gang members are considered Not-Eligible for prevention services and are referred to GRYD’s intervention program (discussed below in Chapter 5).

¹⁴ Assessment of services requires information on which specific kinds of services each youth receives and how much service is provided. The program plans to collect this kind of information next year (beginning July 1, 2011), and it will be incorporated into future evaluation reports.

¹⁵ Beginning July 1, 2011, the GRYD program is implementing a structured process to assess whether youth receiving services manifest a sufficiently reduced risk level to move out of the program.

¹⁶ To permit analysis by the report delivery date, April 15th was selected as a cut-off point for retests that would be included. This accounts for the difference in total youth tested for eligibility in Table 4.3.

than 5,000 youth had been screened for eligibility, with almost 3,000 being deemed Eligible and slightly more than 2,100 being deemed Not-Eligible.

The table also presents zone-by-zone counts of the retests conducted between November 2010 and mid-April 2011, a total of 1,150 (902 originally declared Eligible and subsequently Enrolled in the GRYD program, and 248 declared Not-Eligible).¹⁷ Initial testing (YSET-I) and retesting (YSET-R) are ongoing processes and the cumulative number of tests/retests is increasing steadily. Future reports will integrate these additional tests.

Table 4.3 – Summary of Eligibility Testing by GRYD Zone

| Zone | # of Youth Tested for Eligibility Through April 15 2011 | # Deemed Eligible for Services | # Deemed Not-Eligible for Services | # of Enrolled Youth Re-tested by April 15 2011 | # of Not Eligible Youth Re-tested Through April 15 2011 |
|------------------|---|--------------------------------|------------------------------------|--|---|
| 77th Division II | 483 | 379 | 104 | 97 | 41 |
| Baldwin Village | 378 | 248 | 130 | 97 | 47 |
| Boyle Heights | 453 | 233 | 220 | 86 | 8 |
| Cypress Park | 458 | 272 | 186 | 115 | 6 |
| Florence-Graham | 214 | 116 | 98 | 10 | 5 |
| Newton | 713 | 360 | 353 | 82 | 34 |
| Pacoima/Foothill | 520 | 250 | 270 | 160 | 40 |
| Panorama City | 379 | 188 | 191 | 30 | 12 |
| Ramona Gardens | 372 | 220 | 152 | 28 | 3 |
| Rampart | 478 | 286 | 192 | 71 | 52 |
| Southwest II | 308 | 215 | 93 | 65 | 0 |
| Watts/Southeast | 452 | 251 | 201 | 61 | 0 |
| TOTAL | 5,208 | 3,018 | 2,190 | 902 | 248 |

The following section analyzes the aggregated changes in the nine Risk Scales for the Enrolled and Not-Eligible youth who had completed a YSET-R by mid-April 2011.¹⁸ The Attitudinal Scales and the Behavioral Scales are discussed separately. To avoid the possibility of misinterpretation and/or distortion that might occur due to the low numbers of completed YSET-Rs in some GRYD zones, results have been aggregated and are presented as a composite for the GRYD program as a whole. In future reports, as and when providers in low-reporting

¹⁸ Some youth declined to respond to some YSET questions, resulting in counts below 902 and 248 in some of the charts.

zones increase their retest numbers, zone-specific analyses of risk change will be conducted (targets for each zone of 100 retests of Eligible youth and 50 of Not-Eligible youth were established as the threshold for zone-specific analysis in this report).


Youth Enrolled in the GRYD Prevention Program

The average YSET-I and YSET-R scores on the seven Attitudinal Risk Scales are depicted in Figure 4.1 for the 902 GRYD Enrolled youth who had been re-tested by mid-April.

The upper bar for each scale presents the average score on the YSET-I; the lower bar presents the average score on the YSET-R. The differing lengths of the two bars depict the change from initial test to retest.

The data presented in the figures permit comparison of average YSET-I and YSET-R scores for Enrolled youth and whether the amount of change is statistically significant (an asterisk presented with the percentage change numbers indicates statistical significance at the .05 level, the common standard for concluding that observed change is not due to chance).

Figure 4.1 - Average Change in Self-Reported Risk Scale Scores For 902 GRYD Enrolled Youth, YSET-I to YSET-R



*Statistically significant, $p < .05$

Source: Youth Services Eligibility Tool (YSET-I= initial, YSET-R=re-test)

Figure 4.1 demonstrates not only that the risk level changes reported for youth receiving services are not due to chance, but also that they are substantial for every scale. Risk levels on nearly all scales declined by more than 20%. The average YSET-I score on the antisocial/prosocial risk scale, for example, was 18 and at re-test the same set of youth averaged a score of 14, which represents a 23% reduction in antisocial tendencies. The change would also put the average youth below the at-risk threshold for the scale. There were similar reductions in all the other attitudinal scales, and all were statistically significant.

Comparison of Enrolled Youth to Not-Eligible Youth

The calculations displayed in Figure 4.1 for enrolled youth were replicated for the 248 Not-Eligible youth who were retested. The changes in risk scores from YSET-I to YSET-R are presented in Figure 4.2, which permits a direct comparison of risk change for the Enrolled and Not-Eligible groups. The results are striking.

Not-Eligible youth also showed improvements across six of the seven scales presented, the exception being the peer influence scale where there was a very small deterioration. However, across all of the YSET Risk Scales the improvements for Enrolled youth are far greater than for Not-Eligible youth, generally of a magnitude of three to five times larger. Further, most changes for Not-Eligible youth were below acceptable statistical significance levels, indicating that the observed changes could have been the result of chance variation.

Caution is needed when considering how to interpret this comparison. Not-Eligible youth of necessity have lower scores than Eligible youth on these scales (else they would not be deemed Not-Eligible). They therefore have less room for improvement and a simple comparison of the magnitude of change may be misleading. We return to this issue below in the section entitled Regression Discontinuity.

Changes in Reported Behavior – Enrolled Youth

In addition to the seven scales discussed above, both the YSET-I and YSET-R contained 20 items that asked youth to report previous involvement in delinquency and use of illicit or prohibited substances. Each item was asked in three ways: whether the youth had *ever* engaged in the given behavior; whether the youth had engaged in the given behavior in the *past six months*; and if the youth was a gang member, whether the youth had engaged in the behavior *with other gang members*. These questions were repeated at re-test to determine if the youth consistently engaged in delinquency or if, after receiving services, reduced the level of such behaviors.

The behavioral response items can be grouped into the following four categories:

- Gang related activities (four questions);
- Violent criminal behavior (four questions);
- Substance Use or Abuse (four questions); and
- Non-violent delinquent behavior (nine questions).

Here we look at the self-reported responses of violent and gang-related behaviors occurring in the six months prior to each interview.

The figures below compare these categories between the YSET-I and YSET-R for Enrolled youth. Within each chart, the specific YSET items for the given category are presented. The bars depict the number of youth reporting that they engaged in the stated behavior during their initial interview (YSET-I, or top bar) and at re-test (YSET-R, or bottom bar). The difference between YSET-I and YSET-R percentages is noted in the charts.


Comparisons between Enrolled youth and Not-Eligible youth are more problematic for the Behavior Scales because of the low numbers of Not-Eligible youth who reported engaging in

the different kinds of behaviors. We have established a response level of 25 youth as the criterion for inclusion of responses by Not-Eligible youth.

Changes in Gang-Related Behavior

Figure 4.3 presents the changes in self-reported gang-related behaviors. Nearly 150 of the 902 Enrolled youth reported that they had engaged in gang fights prior to GRYD participation, but this number declined by 47.3% on the retest. Almost half of Enrolled youth said that they had hung out with gang members on the initial screen, but 35% fewer reported doing so on the retest. Only about 10% of all Enrolled youth said that they had participated in gang activities in the six months prior to the initial interview, and this dropped by almost half on the retest. In contrast, reports of being a member of a gang increased between the initial screen and retest but this change was very small in comparison to the total number of youth screened – a change from nine to 14 youth out of over 900.

Figure 4.2
Average Change in Self-Reported Risk Factor Scores
GRYD Enrolled Youth and Not-Eligible Youth,
YSET-I to YSET-R




Source: Youth Services Eligibility Test (YSET I = initial screen, YSET R = retest)

* Statistically significant $p < .05$

Figure 4.3
Percent Change in Self-Reported Gang-Related Behavior
GRYD Enrolled Youth, YSET-I to YSET-R

N=902




*Statistically significant, p<.05
 Source: Youth Services Eligibility Test (YSET I = initial screen, YSET R = retest)

Changes in Violent Criminal Behavior

The four items about violent criminal behaviors are presented in Figure 4.4. There were declines in the numbers reporting that they had engaged in violent activities in the six months prior to the initial screen and retest across all four behaviors. The largest change was for “hitting someone to hurt them.” Over half of the Enrolled youth reported “yes” to this question while only about a quarter did so on the retest, a 53.2% decrease. Very few acknowledged that they had “attacked someone with a weapon” or “used force to steal:” less than 20 out of the 902. Nonetheless there were decreases on both items – 8.1% for attacking with a weapon and 26.3% for using force to steal. 160 Enrolled youth reported they “carried a hidden weapon” in the six months prior to YSET-I but this dropped to 107 for the six months prior to YSET-R: a decline of 33.1%.

Figure 4.4
Percent Change in Self-Reported Violent Criminal Behavior
GRYD Enrolled Youth, YSET-I to YSET-R




*Statistically significant, $p < .05$
 Source: Youth Services Eligibility Test (YSET I = initial screen, YSET R = retest)

The responses by Not-Eligible youth on the same items generally reported much lower levels of participation in gang activities, substance use/abuse, violent crimes or non-violent crimes, which contributed of course to their preclusion from the GRYD prevention program. Across all four groupings, there were only four YSET items where 25 or more Not-Eligible youth said that they had engaged in a particular behavior. Such low numbers mean that these items, and percentage change calculations, are unreliable. For example, a change from one youth saying "yes" on the YSET-I to three saying "yes" on the YSET-R yields a 200% difference. As a result of the inherent unreliability associated with such low response frequencies for Not-Eligible youth, only the five items with more than 25 responses are presented for comparison purposes.

Figure 4.5 indicates that there was a slight increase in the number of Not-Eligibles indicating that they had hung out with gang members in the six months prior to YSET-R compared with YSET-I: a 5.3% increase. There was also an increase in the number of Not-Eligibles reporting that they had skipped class: a 52.9% increase. The direction of change for this item was opposite of what was reported by Enrolled youth. For the other behavioral items, the numbers of responses for Not-Eligibles declined. "Hit to Hurt Someone" showed a 30.2% decrease, "Avoided paying for things such as movies or bus/subway rides" showed a 30.6% decrease and "Damaged Property" was down by over half.

Figure 4.5
Percent Change in Self-Reported Gang-Related Behavior
Not-Eligible Youth, YSET-I to YSET-R
 Items with Over 25 Responses

N=248



Source: Youth Services Eligibility Test (YSET I = initial screen, YSET R = retest)

A comparison of the item changes noted in Figure 4.7 with those shown previously for Eligible youth is informative (negative scores indicate improvement, positive scores indicate deterioration):

- Hanging out With Gang Members -35% Enrolled +5.3% Not-Eligible
- Hit to Hurt Someone -53.2% Enrolled -30.2% Not-Eligible
- Skipped Class -29% Enrolled +52.9% Not-Eligible
- Avoided Paying -31.6% Enrolled -30.6% Not-Eligible
- Damaged Property -58% Enrolled -52.8% Not-Eligible

For each item, the Enrolled youth report substantially improved behavior. Not-Eligible youth also report improved behavior on three items (at levels roughly comparable to Enrolled youth on two of them), but on the other two items they move substantially in the other direction.

As noted earlier, it is difficult to be confident about this comparison because of the small numbers involved on the Not-Eligible side of the analysis, and because the Not-Eligible changes are not generally statistically significant. To further address this difficulty, we

conducted a more rigorous test which is reported below in the section on Regression Discontinuity.

Changes in Eligibility

The objective of the prevention program is to take youth who are at risk of joining gangs and participating in gang-related activities and, through the provision of services, help them to change. A key question therefore is whether youth considered Eligible on the initial YSET-I would also be considered eligible based on their scores on the YSET-R. In addition, it is important to know whether youth not receiving services because of low scores on the YSET-I have continued to score below the at-risk threshold or whether the retest indicates that they are above the threshold.

To assess these questions, each of the retests we conducted was scored using the USC at-risk standards (see above for details), and a determination of Eligibility/Non-Eligibility was made. For the Enrolled youth who were retested, the findings are presented in Table 4.4. Results for Not-Eligible youth are presented in Table 4.5.

Table 4.4 – Changes in Eligibility at Retest for Enrolled Youth

| | Total Eligible on YSET-I | Still Eligible at YSET-R | Changed to Not-Eligible at YSET-R |
|------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 77th II | 95 | 31 | 64 |
| Baldwin Village | 96 | 20 | 76 |
| Boyle Heights | 77 | 20 | 46 |
| Cypress Park | 112 | 35 | 77 |
| Florence-Graham | 8 | 2 | 6 |
| Newton | 79 | 33 | 46 |
| Pacoima/Foothill | 138 | 69 | 69 |
| Panorama City | 27 | 7 | 20 |
| Ramona Gardens | 26 | 10 | 16 |
| Rampart | 67 | 24 | 43 |
| Southwest II | 65 | 28 | 37 |
| Watts/Southeast | 57 | 25 | 32 |
| Total N | 847 | 304 | 532 |
| % | 100.0% | 35.9% | 62.8% |

Note: Thirty-one youth were flagged for gang membership across the 12 zones; since this section does not incorporate a discussion of the challenge process, these cases are removed from the table.

As the findings reported earlier in this chapter have intimated, a significant percentage of retested enrolled youth had at-risk scale scores on their retest that would have made them ineligible for GRYD prevention services had they scored at the same level on their YSET-I. More than 60% of the total retested at ineligible levels. Though there was variation between zones, no zone had less than a 50% improvement rate.

Table 4.5 – Changes in Eligibility at Retest for Not-Eligible Youth

| | Total Not-Eligible on YSET-I | Still Not-Eligible at retest | Changed to Eligible at retest |
|------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 77th II | 40 | 35 | 5 |
| Baldwin Village | 47 | 46 | 1 |
| Boyle Heights | 8 | 6 | 2 |
| Cypress Park | 5 | 5 | 0 |
| Florence-Graham | 5 | 3 | 2 |
| Newton | 33 | 27 | 6 |
| Pacoima/Foothill | 39 | 31 | 8 |
| Panorama City | 11 | 10 | 1 |
| Ramona Gardens | 2 | 2 | 0 |
| Rampart | 51 | 40 | 11 |
| Southwest II | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Watts/Southeast | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total N | 241 | 205 | 36 |
| % | 100.0% | 85.1% | 14.9% |

Note: One youth was flagged for gang membership across the 12 zones; since this section does not incorporate a discussion of the challenge process, this case is removed from the table.

Changes from non-eligibility to eligibility were not as pronounced but 36 of the 242 youth - 15% of the originally Not-Eligible total - retested Eligible.

These findings raise obvious questions about the prevention program. Should enrolled youth who retest below at-risk thresholds be “graduated” from the program? Should Not-Eligible youth who retest above at-risk thresholds be admitted into the program? And how much time should pass before these changes become stable and reliable (as to not undo positive progress for a youth)? Such programmatic challenges are currently being explored through the GRYD program’s newly developed Reassessment Program. Future retesting is being built into that decision-making process.

A Regression Discontinuity Comparison of Enrolled and Not-Eligible Youth

This section describes findings from applying a Regression Discontinuity Design to assess the effects of GRYD’s Prevention Program on the attitudes and self-reported delinquency of youth who Enrolled in the program and were subsequently retested.

As noted earlier, a major challenge for the evaluation is to identify a group of youth who are similar in demographics and behavior to the youth receiving prevention services, but who are not themselves receiving such services. If such a group could be identified and if information about the youth in the group could be developed, comparisons between the two groups could help determine whether changes in the GRYD youth are a consequence of services received.

The optimal approach - a randomized design in which youth referred to the GRYD program would be randomly assigned to an experimental group (getting services) or to a control group (not getting services) - was declared infeasible for ethical reasons at the beginning of the GRYD Program. Further, because of insurmountable practical and privacy/security difficulties, finding such a group from the general population of Los Angeles youth was also ruled out. We have therefore focused on the possibility of comparing Eligible youth to Not-Eligible youth within the GRYD program.

The Regression Discontinuity design we report here is one possibility for doing that. Though not a perfect solution to the comparison group problem, it has the value of generating supplementary evidence that can contribute to our understanding of program effects.¹⁹ Thus, the results we present should not be considered dispositive of the question of attribution of GRYD effects.

Table 4.6 describes a sample of 1,119 youth who were either Not-Eligible or Eligible and Enrolled and who have been retested.²⁰

Table 4.6 – GRYD Enrolled and Not-Eligible Youth by Number of High-Risk Factors Identified by the Initial YSET Interview

| Number of High-Risk Factors | Number of Youth in Category | Number Enrolled in GRYD | Percent Enrolled in GRYD | Number Not-Eligible | % Not-Eligible |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------|----------------|
| 0 | 69 | 4 | 6% | 65 | 94% |
| 1 | 70 | 7 | 10% | 63 | 90% |
| 2 | 88 | 18 | 20% | 70 | 80% |
| 3 | 93 | 62 | 67% | 31 | 33% |
| 4 | 125 | 119 | 95% | 6 | 5% |
| 5 | 201 | 200 | 100% | 1 | 0% |
| 6 | 212 | 210 | 99% | 2 | 1% |
| 7 | 142 | 141 | 99% | 1 | 1% |
| 8 | 76 | 76 | 100% | 0 | 0% |
| 9 | 43 | 43 | 100% | 0 | 0% |
| TOTALS | 1119 | 880 | 79% | 239 | 21% |

As discussed earlier in this chapter, referred youth who had 3 or fewer risk factors on the YSET scale or who reported being in a gang were deemed Not-Eligible for prevention services unless a successful appeal was made. Gang members are referred to GRYD’s Intervention program. Youth who had four risk factors or more have been considered Eligible. However, an appeals process can facilitate changes in the initial eligibility finding. As Table 4.6

¹⁹ See Appendix H for an expanded discussion of the regression discontinuity approach.

²⁰ Missing data on some items caused the exclusion of 22 Enrolled cases and 9 Not-Eligible cases, resulting in a total number of 1,119 cases.

shows, some youth with scores less than 3 were enrolled and some youth scoring above 5 are recorded as being Not-Eligible.

To accommodate this discontinuity in the “probability” of enrollment at a total risk score of four, a variant of the standard regression discontinuity design can be applied to assess the effectiveness of GRYD at improving attitudes and behavior for Enrolled youth compared with Not-Eligible youth. The approach compares enrolled and Not-Eligible youth whose scores clustered around the four risk factor cut-point.

Findings

The effects of GRYD on a total of 10 attitudinal and behavioral scales were analyzed. These include the following:

Attitudinal Scales: Antisocial, Parental Supervision, Critical Life Events, Impulsive Risk Taking, Neutralization, Peer Influence, and Peer Delinquency.

Behavioral Scales: Self-report delinquency scales computed separately for Substance Abuse/Use, Gang-related Behavior, Violent Criminal Behavior, and Non-violent Criminal Behavior.

The criterion (outcome) measures of interest were changes in these scales between the YSET-I and YSET-R. If the GRYD services were helping the youth, then we should find that scores on the scales reduce between the initial and re-administration of the YSET. However, to confirm that any changes are more likely to be a result of GRYD and not any other factors (e.g., aging of the youth), the reduction, if any, must be larger in magnitude than is observed for the Not-Eligible youth. In other words, if the difference between the YSET-I and YSET-R for the Not-Eligible youth is found to be no different than for the Enrolled youth, then the GRYD program is performing no better than business-as-usual. Because the assignment of youth to the Eligible and Not-Eligible groups is based, in part, on these risk scales, and because there is a substantial variation in the degree of risk observed across youth (some are just above or just below the cut point while others manifest a much greater distance from the cut point) a simple comparison of their scale scores is not very instructive. However, if we can compare the change in the risk scores for Not-Eligible youth just below the cut point and for Enrolled youth just above the cut point, then we can derive credible inferences about the effectiveness of GRYD services—at least in improving the outcomes of the marginal youth.

For each of the outcomes considered, two different versions of change between the Initial YSET (I) and the Retest YSET (R) were constructed: a difference and a ratio. Because the scales are an additive sum of underlying responses, there is a natural range for each scale. The lowest possible value for any scale is 0. Therefore, individuals who score low on at the initial assessment cannot score much lower on the re-assessment. As a result, computing the difference between the R and I scores biases the analysis towards finding larger differences among those who are at higher risk than those at lower risk—precisely the groups who are Enrolled for GRYD. As a robustness check, therefore, we also created ratio measures of the

change in the score that measure the percentage change in the reassessment risk scale (relative to the initial assessment).²¹

Table 4.7 presents the estimates of the fuzzy regression discontinuity design analysis for changes in the six attitudinal scales analyzed. A total of 1,119 youth had comparable and available data on the attitudinal scales, enrollment/eligibility status, and their YSET-I based total risk score. The YSET-I based risk scores are used as the S_i variable and the cut-point is set at four in all of these analyses. A cut-point of four is appropriate because, as Table 4.7 shows, the probability of enrollment was almost 100% at a total risk score of four.

Table 4.7 – Regression Discontinuity Results Comparing GRYD Enrolled Youth and Not-Eligible Youth on Changes in their Attitudinal Scales

| | Attitudinal Scales | | | | | | |
|---------------------------|--------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|------------------|----------------|--------------------|
| | Antisocial | Parental Supervision | Critical Life Events | Impulsive Risk Taking | Neutra- lization | Peer Influence | Peer Delinq- uency |
| Sample Size Used | 1,119 | 1,119 | 1,119 | 1,119 | 1,119 | 1,119 | 1,119 |
| Percent Enrolled | 79% | 79% | 79% | 79% | 79% | 79% | 79% |
| Percent Not-Eligible | 21% | 21% | 21% | 21% | 21% | 21% | 21% |
| Average Change | | | | | | | |
| Difference (R-I) | -3.52 ** | -2.32 ** | -1.39 ** | -2.88 ** | -3.85 ** | -2.33 ** | -1.78 ** |
| Ratio (R/I) | -0.18 ** | -0.23 ** | -0.30 ** | -0.23 ** | -0.19 ** | -0.26 ** | -0.14 ** |
| Modeled Change | | | | | | | |
| Difference | | | | | | | |
| Unconditional | -5.48 ** | -3.91 ** | -1.79 ** | -4.17 ** | -5.42 ** | -3.78 ** | -2.84 ** |
| RegDisc (Linear) | -3.10 ** | -0.18 | -1.19 ** | -3.23 ** | -4.01 ** | -0.87 | 1.12 |
| RegDisc (Flexible) | -2.69 ** | -0.11 | -0.98 ** | -1.87 ** | -2.89 ** | -0.11 | 0.48 |
| Ratio | | | | | | | |
| Unconditional | -0.29 ** | -0.43 ** | -0.39 ** | -0.32 ** | -0.28 ** | -0.45 ** | -0.25 ** |
| RegDisc (Linear) | -0.20 ** | -0.10 * | -0.31 ** | -0.28 ** | -0.26 ** | -0.17 ** | -0.04 |
| RegDisc (Flexible) | -0.18 ** | -0.09 | -0.17 ** | -0.16 ** | -0.18 ** | -0.06 | -0.09 * |

NOTE: ** indicates a statistical significance level of $p \leq .05$ and * indicates a level of $p \leq .10$

Of the 1,119 youth in the sample, 79% were enrolled in GRYD and 21% were Not-Eligible. The sample includes youth who may have scored above the cut-point but were not enrolled or scored below the cut-point and were enrolled. A direct comparison of the attitudinal scale differences and ratios between the enrolled and the Not-Eligible youth shows statistically significant decreases on all the scales. For example, the number -3.52 under the Antisocial column suggests that the decrease in risk as measured by the antisocial scale for the

²¹ The difference measures are computed as Difference = R – I and the ratio measures are computed as Ratio = R/I. Because the scales can have a value of 0, the ratio versions were operationalized as Ratio = (1+R)/(1+I) to avoid getting missing values because of dividing by 0.

Enrolled youth between R and I was greater than the decrease in the antisocial scale of Not-Eligible youth between R and I by an average 3.52 units. The mean Antisocial scale for the Not-Eligible youth dropped from 13.08 at YSET-I to 12.43 at YSET-R. The mean Antisocial scale for the youth Enrolled in GRYD, on the other hand, dropped from 18.07 at YSET-I to 13.90 at YSET-R. Therefore, the Antisocial scale of the Enrolled youth dropped by $(18.07 - 13.90) - (13.08 - 12.43) = 3.52$ units more than the drop in the Antisocial scale of the Not-Eligible youth. This number is the difference between *averages* for each of the two groups—Not-Eligible and Enrolled youth—where the members of each group have differing risk levels. Consequently, in a simple comparison of change between the two groups, there is a potential for confounding the effectiveness of GRYD with varying reductions in the Antisocial scales for youth at different initial risk levels. The Regression Discontinuity Design attempts to address the potential for confounding these competing effects.

The set of estimates presented under the Modeled Change part of the table accounts for the cross-overs and those denoted as RegDisc provide the effects of GRYD at the margin (point of discontinuity) where the Not-Eligible and Enrolled youth are more comparable.

As noted, the actual enrollment has cross-overs (some youth below the cut point are Enrolled, some above it are not), that may dilute the GRYD effects that can be derived from the analysis. This is evident from the fact that the unconditional estimates under the Modeled Change section are typically larger in magnitude than the Average Changes in the difference and the ratios. The Regression Discontinuity estimates (listed in rows labeled as RegDisc) are those that account for the cross-overs and compare youth at the point of discontinuity only. The difference between RegDisc (Linear) and RegDisc (Flexible) is merely the functional form of the $g(\cdot)$ function in the analysis—the linear form or a flexible form. The row presented in bold face font provides the most conservative estimates and is what we use to derive inferences about the performance of GRYD. This helps to guard against overstating GRYD effects. Nevertheless, several encouraging findings are worth highlighting.

- First, enrollment in the GRYD program typically reduces the attitudinal scales between I and R by a larger magnitude than the change for similar youth who did not receive GRYD services. The largest and most significant (statistically) reductions are in the Antisocial, Critical Life Events, Impulsive Risk Taking and Neutralization scales. For the Parental Supervision, Peer Influence, and Peer Delinquency attitudinal scales, the effects are statistically insignificant (the reductions are indistinguishable between the GRYD Enrolled and the Not-Eligible youth at the margin).
- Second, there are few qualitative differences in the findings between the difference and ratio versions of the change between the YSET-R and YSET-I scales. Typically, when one is statistically and substantively significant, the other is as well.
- Third, though the flexible functional form versions of the models provide more conservative estimates of the effects of the GRYD program than the linear versions, the effects are still statistically significant for five of the seven non-behavioral scales – Parental Supervision and Peer Influence are the exceptions. Peer Delinquency under the

ratio model is another type of exception—the linear version provides a statistically insignificant finding but the flexible version provides the opposite. It is possible that Parental Supervision and Peer Delinquency are resistant to the effects of GRYD services because neither parents nor peers are likely to experience attitudinal changes simply because GRYD provides services to the youth.

Table 4.8 presents the same results for the self-report delinquency and substance abuse scales. The notations in this table are the same as in Table 4.7. Here, the results are less encouraging. The regression discontinuity analysis suggests that the GRYD Enrolled youth do not, in general, manifest statistically significant larger changes in their self-reported delinquent behavior than similar Not-Eligible youth. The one exception is a reduction in gang-related behavior using the difference measure with the flexible functional form specification. However, even this reduction is only statistically significant at a 90% confidence level.

Table 4.8 – Regression Discontinuity Results Comparing GRYD Enrolled Youth and Not-Eligible Youth on Changes in their Self-report Delinquency Scales

| | Self-report Delinquency Scales | | | |
|----------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|
| | Substance Abuse/Use | Gang-related Behavior | Violent Criminal Behavior | Non-violent Criminal Behavior |
| Sample Size Used | 600 | 1,032 | 1,046 | 1,028 |
| Percent Enrolled | 81% | 78% | 79% | 79% |
| Percent Not-Eligible | 19% | 22% | 21% | 21% |
| Average Change | | | | |
| Difference (R-I) | -0.09 | -0.38 ** | -0.33 ** | -1.00 ** |
| Ratio (R/I) | 0.04 | -0.16 ** | -0.14 ** | -0.25 ** |
| Modeled Change | | | | |
| Difference | | | | |
| Unconditional | -0.18 * | -0.44 ** | -0.48 ** | -1.46 ** |
| RegDisc (Linear) | 0.41 | -0.15 | -0.06 | 0.34 |
| RegDisc (Flexible) | 0.26 | -0.24 * | -0.06 | 0.12 |
| Ratio | | | | |
| Unconditional | -0.02 | -0.16 ** | -0.22 ** | -0.42 ** |
| RegDisc (Linear) | 0.23 | -0.05 | -0.03 | -0.11 |
| RegDisc (Flexible) | 0.14 | -0.11 | -0.02 | -0.14 |

NOTE: ** indicates a statistical significance level of $p \leq .05$ and * indicates a level of $p \leq .10$

Upon closer examination of Table 4.8, these findings are not surprising. The number of youth in the analysis who had sufficient data to conduct the analysis for the substance abuse scale was only 600. Moreover, a larger proportion of this sample (82%) was Enrolled. This suggests that the missing data on the substance abuse scales came more from the Not-Eligible youth than the Enrolled youth. As a result, even a comparison of the average change between

the YSET-R and YSET-I do not yield a statistically significant difference between the Enrolled and Not-Eligible youths for this scale. For the remaining scales—Gang-related Behavior, Violent Criminal Behavior, and Non-violent Criminal Behavior—the average comparisons produce estimates that suggest Enrolled youth did better than the Not-Eligible. However, compared with the attitudinal scales in Table 4.6, the magnitude of the differences are very small. Indeed, after accounting for the cross-overs and making comparisons only at the margin (at the point of discontinuity), there seem to be no differences between the Enrolled and similar Not-Eligible youth in terms of the changes in their self-report delinquent scales.

A cautionary note should be interjected here. The regression discontinuity design is a localized design that provides estimates only at the point of discontinuity. Hence, unless one makes the assumption that the effects of GRYD are fixed across all risk levels (highly improbable in our view), one cannot definitively assert, based on the regression discontinuity design results generated from the 1,119 youth, that there is no effect of GRYD on all Enrolled youth for the self-report delinquency scales. It is possible that the GRYD program is effective in reducing delinquent acts among higher-risk youth (e.g., those with seven or eight risk factors). The regression discontinuity design does not permit us to answer that question as it only compares youth on or about the cut point level. As additional retest data is generated by providers, it will become more feasible to conduct analysis by risk level. At that point, further insight into the effects of the prevention program will be possible.

The reader should also be cautioned about the results reported pertaining to the Behavioral Scales. The regression discontinuity design analysis compares the change in R and I scale levels between the Enrolled and Not-Eligible youth but the number of youth in the Not-Eligible groups are relatively small (239). In addition, few of them have responded positively to some of the individual items that comprise the scales, thereby making it difficult to construct robust differences between the R and I responses for all individual items/questions. However, combining the several questions to create scales provides sufficient data to produce differences between the R and I scales that are reported and to compare these changes with those for the Enrolled youth. In short, with the exception of the Substance Abuse Behavior Scale, the remaining three aggregated Behavioral Scales provide sufficient data to conduct the regression discontinuity design analysis.


Robustness Checks

As noted earlier in this section, the robustness of the regression discontinuity design method rests on a few assumptions that ought to be checked. Here we present robustness checks on two issues. First, we need to ensure that the probability of enrollment does in fact display a discontinuity at or about the four risk factors cut-point. Second, we need to ensure that other variables do not possess a discontinuity at that point. Violation of either of these conditions would render some of the findings reported earlier suspect.

Figure 4.6 plots the average of several series over the range of possible values for the number of risk factors. The %-GRYD Enrolled series (from Table 4.6) is the only one that displays a dramatic discontinuity. The other series included in this plot—percent male, percent Black, percent Latino, average age, and average grade of the youth—all appear to vary smoothly

across the range.²² This suggests that the results presented in Tables 3.3 and 3.4, whether encouraging or discouraging, are not a result of sharp changes in demographic factors that might be related to the outcomes analyzed.

Figure 4.6 – Variation in the Percent of GRYD Enrolled and Demographic Factors Across the Range of Values of the Number of Risk Factors



Participant and Stakeholder Perceptions of the Prevention Program

To obtain information on the views of the families and youth who are receiving prevention program services one-on-one interviews were held with youth in the program, and focus groups were held with parents or caretakers of youth.

In addition, surveys and interviews were conducted with GRYD Program Managers, prevention service providers, Intervention CMs, CIWs, school teachers, and community leaders.

²² Percent male, percent Black, percent Latino, and the enrollment rate are measured on the left y-axis, while the average age and average grade variables are measured on the right y-axis of Figure 4.8.

We first present the views of the youth and parents, and then summarize the opinions of the other groups of respondents.

Youth and Parents in the Prevention Program

The number of interviews and focus groups are presented in Table 4.9. A total of 125 youth were interviewed by evaluation team staff, some from every GRYD zone. Twenty focus groups were held, at least one from every zone. The interviews and focus groups were arranged by provider agencies, but no provider staff were present when the interviews and meetings took place.

Table 4.9 – Youth Interviews and Parent Focus Groups

| Zones | # of Youth Interviews | # of Parent Focus Group Participants (Sessions in parentheses) |
|------------------|-----------------------|---|
| 77th Division II | 9 | 17 (2) |
| Baldwin Village | 15 | 14 (2) |
| Boyle Heights | 10 | 7 (2) |
| Cypress Park | 13 | 6 (1) |
| Florence-Graham* | 5 | ---- |
| Newton | 11 | 6 (2) |
| Pacoima/Foothill | 14 | 23 (2) |
| Panorama City | 9 | 8 (2) |
| Ramona Gardens | 9 | 7 (2) |
| Rampart | 10 | 10 (2) |
| Southwest II | 6 | 6 (1) |
| Watts/Southeast | 14 | 21 (2) |
| TOTAL | 125 | 125 (20) |

*The Florence-Graham GRYD prevention provider stopped providing services in early 2011, and data collection for this zone ceased at this time.

Gang Activities and Perceptions of Safety in GRYD Zones

A large majority of interviewed youth reported that gangs cause problems for them individually and their communities, and “do nothing good for kids.” According to these participants, gang member activities include smoking, drinking, stealing, tagging (graffiti), using and/or selling drugs, fighting, shooting, and killing. There were a few exceptions; a handful of interviewed youth mentioned that they were not aware of gangs or had not seen them in their

neighborhood, and a few youth reported that gangs do not create problems for them personally. Several of the interviewed youth even reported on the benefits of gangs, primarily for protection. As one respondent noted, “They keep other gangs from coming into our neighborhood. They kind of protect the neighborhood.”

Parent perceptions of gangs and safety in the GRYD zones and personal experiences with gangs varied widely; while some reported not knowing much about gangs outside of the media, others were conscious of the need for color neutrality in their children’s clothing, had children involved in using or buying marijuana, and one respondent reported her son was shot in the neighborhood. There was a general consensus that most youth (both their own children and other youth in their communities) do not want to join a gang to engage in violence, but there are other specific reasons for doing so. As one respondent summarized, “I think that desire to be in a gang per se is not the thing, but it’s about belonging to a group and they think it’s fun, and maybe they are going to gain respect.”

Prevention Services for Youth and Parents

According to interviewed youth, the vast majority have participated in GRYD field trips (including trips to the movies, theme parks, or sporting events). Other popular activities include tutoring or homework assistance in their programs, life skills classes or peer groups, and enrichment classes (such as dance, art, and chess games). In addition, the majority indicated that their parents/guardians were involved in GRYD. (“Involvement” usually included speaking with the youth’s CM and attending events, although approximately 1 out of 10 youth also reported that a parent was involved in parenting classes and/or received counseling).

Programs the youth participated in, such as counseling, field trips, gender-specific sessions (such as Girls Today, Women Tomorrow), mentoring, or interactions with their CM were viewed by parents as positively shaping the youth’s attitude, and subsequently their behaviors. Even when parents did not personally participate in GRYD programming, they expressed that their children were learning to build communication skills, improve their self-esteem, control their anger, and channel emotions positively, and overall had positive attitudinal changes, all of which strengthened their family interactions. Importantly, the GRYD prevention program was designed to not only help participating youth, but to also strengthen their families and provide family-based services. When asked about positive changes in their children, parents seemed to reflect the most on improved parent-child relationships in the focus groups.

Likewise, parents who participated in parenting classes or counseling felt they were provided valuable skills to help them communicate and interact positively with their children. Some parents reported learning how to motivate and teach their children through mutual respect and parenting strategies instead of the previous punishment tactics they previously used. These GRYD programs seemed to serve as a support system for parents struggling to connect with their children; for example, one focus group discussed the importance of learning how to recognize certain things about their children, such as how to know if they are becoming involved with drugs or gangs. Especially when both parents and youth reportedly had positive experiences in the GRYD program, there appeared to be increased trust, communication, patience, and bonding.

Views on GRYD's Impact on the Community

When asked whether GRYD has had any impact on their neighborhoods, there was a divide between youth who thought GRYD had a positive impact on their neighborhoods and those who did not. Youth indicating the program did not have an effect often reported that knowledge of the program is not widespread and that they have noticed low youth participation in their neighborhood (and therefore they felt the program itself could not have an effect) or youth expressed that although individuals might be positively impacted, they were skeptical that the overall community was benefiting. Youth who did report a positive community impact suggested that the attitudes and behaviors of participating youth are changing. Specifically, youth commented that “kids will stay out of trouble because [GRYD] is the place to be,” and that the program keeps youth “busy” and “off the streets.” These respondents noted that this shift in attitudes reduces fighting and violence and makes the neighborhood “calmer.”

Parents reported that because of the GRYD program, they are more knowledgeable and proactive when it comes to their community. Parents stated that “we have become more proactive and are not afraid to call the police” and “thanks to the program, we have become more aware of what is going on and what we can do about it.” In addition, parents noted that the GRYD program has provided an alternative to gangs for youth. Similar to the youth respondents, parents also indicated that GRYD gives youth a place to spend their time off the streets and engaging in positive activities.

Awareness of SNL

Youth in the GRYD program and parents who had children in GRYD were interviewed individually and in focus groups (respectively) to see how familiar high-risk youth and their families were with the program. Over half of interviewed youth indicated they were not familiar with SNL,²³ and of those who did hear of the program, a little over half reported attending. Those who were familiar with SNL reported that the benefits of the program were giving youth and residents something positive to do in the neighborhood (or “keep them busy”) and bringing neighbors together. As one youth described, “It kind of gives you a sense of who lives close to you and it is not all bad.”

Although some parents had reported hearing of SNL, many focus group participants had not. One parent reported that her daughter worked at one of the SNL parks and very few parents reported attending SNL (and when they did, it was often irregularly). Therefore, they did not have many opinions on the program or the program’s effect.

GRYD Prevention Youth and the Future

A common theme that arose in youth interviews and parent focus groups was the future of GRYD youth. When describing the program, interviewed youth often discussed immediate benefits of GRYD, such as helping them with their homework. However, many also noted that

²³ However, it should be noted that approximately 2 out of 10 interviewed youth also did not seem to recognize the term “GRYD.” Instead, they referred to the specific agency they received services from or the specific programs they attended. Therefore, this may be an overestimate of a lack of awareness.

GRYD was helping them prepare for high school or college. One respondent explained that “they focus on a positive future and help us figure out what we want to do with our lives.” When asked about changes in GRYD youth, parents also noted that their children seem to be thinking about the future more. Parents reported that CMs were providing youth with information on college options and the application process, advice on staying out of prison and staying out of gangs, and advice with reaching goals and finishing high school. One respondent in a focus group reported that after probing his great-grandson about his future, the youth announced “going to jail.” The respondent expressed relief that the youth was now exposed to positive activities that provided new options, opportunities, and norms.

Stakeholder Views of the Prevention Program

A total of 399 surveys and interviews were conducted with community leaders, members of city agencies involved in or with direct knowledge of the GRYD program, and school teachers/officials. A wide variety of questions and topics were covered. Item specific responses are reported in the Appendixes. Here we concentrate on three critical issues pertaining to the prevention program:

1. Has the program increased gang prevention services and improved access to those services?
2. Has there been an increase in the awareness of youth, family, and community of alternatives to gangs?
3. Has the program helped to deter and reduce gang joining?

The results are presented in Table 4.10. Each of the 12 GRYD zones was represented in the surveys and interviews. All respondents were asked to report their views on a 5-point scale: very positive, positive, moderate or neutral, negative, or very negative. We present the positive and negative responses in the table.

With respect to Access to Gang Prevention Services, and Increasing Awareness of Alternatives to the Gang Life, substantial majorities of respondents in every group reported positive or very positive views of the program’s effects. Opinions about Reducing the Risk of Gang Joining are also far more positive than negative for all groups except LAPD gang officers, who split evenly between the positive and negative ends of the scale.

Though some caution is needed in interpreting these results, given that many of the respondents are engaged in the program and so can be expected to have an “insider” view of its effects, the findings are still impressive. None of the groups were under any pressure to respond in any particular way, and the interviews and surveys were conducted by evaluation team members without the participation of any other GRYD officials. Respondent identities have not been connected to their responses in any record.

Table 4.10 – Stakeholder Perceptions of Prevention Program Effects on Gang Issues

| | | Improving Access to Gang Prevention Services | | Increasing Awareness of Alternatives to the Gang Life | | Reducing Risk of Gang Joining | |
|--|---------------------------------------|--|---------------------------|---|---------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------|
| Stakeholder Groups | Total Number of Surveys or Interviews | Positive or Very Positive | Negative or Very Negative | Positive or Very Positive | Negative or Very Negative | Positive or Very Positive | Negative or Very Negative |
| GRYD Program Managers | 8 | 8 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 7 | 0 |
| LAPD Officers | 40 | 16 | 8 | 15 | 7 | 8 | 8 |
| Community Intervention Workers | 23 | 17 | 1 | 13 | 1 | 5 | 1 |
| Intervention Case Managers | 23 | 14 | 0 | 15 | 1 | 9 | 1 |
| Prevention Service Providers | 197 | n/a | n/a | 116 | 8 | 81 | 15 |
| Teachers | 60 | 33 | 3 | 30 | 3 | 20 | 3 |
| Community Leaders | 48 | 26 | 6 | 29 | 5 | 20 | 8 |
| Totals N | 399 | 114 | 18 | 226 | 25 | 150 | 36 |
| % | 100.0% | 56.4% | 8.9% | 56.6% | 6.3% | 37.6% | 9.0% |
| NOTE: Prevention Service providers' judgments of their own service delivery are not reported. The 197 service provider respondents are therefore not included in the calculation of percentage figures for total responses under that issue. | | | | | | | |

Conclusion

YSET is the gatekeeper for the GRYD prevention program, determining which youth are at-risk of joining a gang and are eligible for prevention services. Changes in risk levels are therefore a key evaluative Scale for the prevention program.

When comparing average initial/retest scores for Enrolled youth, every Attitudinal Risk Scale had substantial and statistically significant declines. Enrolled youth also displayed changes on behavior scales, with some drops in reported gang activities, hanging out with gang members, being involved in gang fights, hitting someone to hurt them, and a few other items in the violent criminal behavior category. While selling drugs reportedly increased, other non-violent criminal and delinquent behaviors also decreased.

Not-Eligible youth also manifested drops in risk as measured by six of the seven attitudinal scales, but the declines were much smaller than evidenced by the Enrolled group, the latter showing improvements at three to five times greater levels. In addition scores for the Not-Eligible group did not generally meet acceptable statistical significance levels.

In both the original and the retest YSETs, Not-Eligible youth on average reported considerably lower frequencies than Enrolled youth for participation in gang activities, substance use/abuse, violent crimes and non-violent crimes (which, of course, contributed to the ineligibility decision in the first place). These low frequencies, combined with the fact that some youth in both groups scored at the extremes of either low risk or high risk, made a direct comparison with Enrolled results unjustifiable for most items.

However, a regression discontinuity design was employed to compare Enrolled and Not-Eligible youth whose YSET-I risk levels were clustered around the at-risk threshold, thus permitting a methodologically stronger comparison of more similar youth from the two groups. The findings confirmed that differences in risk reduction between the Enrolled and the Not-Eligible youth were statistically significant and substantial on the Antisocial, Critical Life Events, Impulsive Risk Taking, and Neutralization scales. The differences were not significant on the Parental Supervision, Peer Influence, and Peer Delinquency attitudinal scales, and Enrolled youth did not report changes in delinquent behavior that were significantly greater than reported by Not-Eligible youth, with the exception of a reduction in gang-related behavior. As was noted in the discussion, the Regression Discontinuity results should be considered as supplementary, not dispositive, with respect to considerations of attribution of effects. However, the analysis is consistent with the simple comparisons of change presented in the bar charts.

Interviews and focus groups were conducted with a sample of youth receiving prevention services and parents of such youth. These disclosed largely positive views about program effects. Respondents reported improvements in youth attitudes and indicated a link between these positive changes and strengthened family bonds and interactions. Behavioral changes were attributed to either increased parental involvement or to positive youth attitudinal changes

GRYD program staff, service providers, LAPD gang officers, school officials, and community leaders all contributed observations about the GRYD prevention program through interviews and surveys. These were overwhelmingly positive.

Chapter V

Intervention

Introduction

The *Intervention* component of the comprehensive gang reduction and youth development strategy is primarily oriented toward two focal points for intervention. The first is gang-involved youth between 14 and 25 years old and the other is gang violence interruption and proactive peace-making in the community.

This chapter provides an overview of the objectives of the intervention component and descriptions of the basic activities of each of its three primary programs: Gang Violence Interruption, Los Angeles Violence Intervention Training Academy (LAVITA), and Intervention Case Management.

Relevant evaluation findings are then presented for the intervention component. The outcome indicator findings are drawn from two sources. The first is administrative statistics compiled by the GRYD office about intervention activities. The second is local stakeholder surveys that were conducted in GRYD zones and SNL locations. Those surveyed included GRYD Program Managers, LAPD officers, Intervention CMs and CIWs. It should be noted that intervention was not an evaluation priority for the GRYD Office during Year 2 and thus only limited preliminary survey information is available for this component. However, enhanced outcome data collection for intervention programs is planned for Year 3 of the evaluation, consistent with GRYD office priorities.

Responses to common questions across the surveyed groups were aggregated and are presented as summary outcome indicators for intervention. Item specific responses for each group are presented in this report's Appendixes. Changes in Part I/II crime and gang-related crime occurring in GRYD zones and SNL locations that might be associated with intervention activities are presented in Chapter VI.

Intervention Objectives

The overarching purpose of intervention is to disrupt gang-related violence and other effects on local communities, and to guide gang-involved youth to activities and community services that provide alternatives to the gang life. To do so this component seeks to achieve the following objectives:²⁴

- Respond as quickly as possible to violent incidents in the community.
- Engage in "rumor control" in the community following such incidents.
- Reduce the retaliation that often occurs after a gang-related incident.
- Improve relationships between law enforcement, CIWs and GRYD staff.
- Improve the knowledge base and professionalism of CIWs.
- Maintain and/or increase proactive peace-making activities between gangs.

²⁴ Program goals, objectives and activities descriptions include material from the draft GRYD Office *Comprehensive Strategy to Reduce Gang Violence* (May 2011).

- Identify services for gang-involved youth that will help to improve family relationships, increase the ability to solve problems without violence and criminal behavior, and promote behavior changes that result in less gang-involvement/violence and more pro-social activities.

Intervention Activities

Gang Interruption

Crisis intervention is defined as responding as quickly as possible to an incident to prevent further violence. Upon respond to a violent crisis, police call the GRYD office and CIWs are notified through the Real Time Analysis and Critical Response (RACR) Division of LAPD using BlackBerry devices. Regardless of the time of day, those contacted must respond within 30 minutes. After sharing information, joint decisions are made regarding the appropriate course of action to diffuse tensions, reduce further potential violence, and serve victims and their families.

Additional gang interruption activities are designed to build relationships and communication paths among GRYD staff, LAPD, and communities to control rumors and reduce the likelihood of retaliation following a violent incident. This is to take place through the dissemination of accurate information throughout a community as quickly and widely as possible after an incident. Although GRYD staff, LAPD gang officers and CIWs collaborate, they each have different roles in controlling rumors and intervening in violent crisis situations. For example, GRYD staff seeks to coordinate immediate services for victims' families and coordinate with city and neighborhood organizations, LAPD is responsible for crime scene stabilization and investigation, and CIWs engage in "street mediation" to diffuse or de-escalate further violence. To facilitate effective control and response all three meet bi-weekly to assess victim family needs and to monitor hot spots and other violence indicators. Proactive peacemaking activities, neighborhood interface and engagement, and serving on GRYD Community Action Teams are part of the triad's responsibilities.

Los Angeles Violence Intervention Training Academy (LAVITA)

LAVITA is part of the Advancement Project's Peace Academy. It provides training for CIWs in five core areas: direct practice, program development, applied theory, concrete tasks, and broader policy implications. The goal of this training is to professionalize CIWs and to provide them with the necessary skills to communicate effectively with other responders, gang-members, victims, their families and the community.

LAVITA was launched in March 2010 and is currently offered to CIWs contracted through the GRYD program. It is a 14-week class totaling 140 hours of training.

Intervention Case Management

Gang-involved individuals between 14 and 25 years old are targeted for GRYD intervention case management services. The role of intervention CMs is to serve as a broker for services, not to actually provide services themselves. As such, they may make referrals for

counseling, career/job training or placement, educational activities, tattoo removal, arts and cultural events and other pro-social activities.

Intervention CMs interact with clients, families, other intervention workers (both other CMs and CIWs), schools and other referral agencies or community organizations. An important function for CMs is to also coordinate with prevention providers when working with at-risk youth for whom prevention services alone are considered insufficient, and who require special attention. The GRYD office has developed interdisciplinary teams to address such situations. The underlying premise of these interdisciplinary teams is that the joint efforts of different types of specialists will be more effective than acting alone. The teams can make decisions about how to best work with youth and whether prevention services or a transition to intervention case management (or some combination of both) is most suitable.

Intervention Outcome Indicators

Crisis Response

Between July 1, 2010 and April 30, 2011 a total of 643 LAPD notifications for shootings were sent to the GRYD office. Of these, 247 (38%) were gang-related shooting incidents in GRYD zones, 210 (33%) were gang-related incidents outside of the GRYD zones and 186 (29%) were non-gang related incidents in these areas. GRYD Program Managers and CIWs responded to 321 total incidents during this time – 50% of the total number of shooting notifications. Characteristics of the 643 incident include the following:

- There were a total of 713 victims.
- There were a total of 75 homicides within the GRYD zones.
- There were 66 homicides outside of the GRYD zones.
- Twenty-two of the incidents were both domestic violence and gang-involved.
- Twenty-four of the incidents involved Black/Brown conflict.
- Seventy-one of the incidents involved minors.

Rumor Control

GRYD Program Managers, LAPD gang detectives and CIWs were asked about their perceptions of the effects of GRYD programs on dispelling rumors in the community that surrounded violent crisis incidents. The summary results are presented in Table 5.1. The vast majority of the 94 respondents to this question agreed or strongly agreed that the interactions among LAPD, GRYD and CIWs had increased information dissemination to dispel rumors (34.8% “agreed” and 53.3% “strongly agreed”). These positive perceptions were strongest among Program Managers (100%) but the other three groups held only slightly less positive views (about 86% for each).

Table 5.1 – Summary of Stakeholder Perceptions of the Effects of Information Dissemination on Dispelling Rumors

| | Strongly Disagree | Disagree | Neither Agree or Disagree | Agree | Strongly Agree | Don't Know |
|--|-------------------|-----------|---------------------------|-------------|----------------|------------|
| The interaction between LAPD, GRYD staff, and intervention workers has increased the dissemination of information to dispel rumors throughout the community (N=92) | 3 3.3% | 3 3.3% | 5 5.4% | 32 34.8% | 49 53.3% | 0 |

Improving Relationships between GRYD Program Participants

Intervention engages personnel from three separate groups - Law Enforcement, Community Intervention Workers and GRYD Staff. A key requirement for effective operation of the intervention program is that these groups work well together.

Table 5.2 presents the results of surveys of Program Managers, LAPD gang detectives, CMs and CIWs about how well GRYD is able to communicate with LAPD and CIWs in crisis response situations, as well as how well LAPD is able to communicate with intervention workers. Respondents mostly agreed (28.6%) or strongly agreed (58.2%) that GRYD staff was able to effectively communicate and work with LAPD in crisis response. Little variation was displayed in the positive views across the four stakeholder groups.

Respondents voiced similarly positive views about the relationship between GRYD and intervention workers: 22.6% agreed and 62.4% strongly agreed. LAPD reported less positive views, but a majority still agreed or strongly agreed (67.5%). Almost four out of five respondents agreed or strongly agreed that LAPD is able to work effectively with intervention workers. The most positive support for this came from Program Managers, followed by LAPD gang officers.

Table 5.2 – Stakeholder Perceptions of Communications between Law Enforcement, CIWs, and GRYD Staff

| | Strongly Disagree | Disagree | Neither Agree or Disagree | Agree | Strongly Agree | Don't Know |
|---|-------------------|-----------|---------------------------|-------------|----------------|------------|
| GRYD staff is able to effectively communicate and work with LAPD in response to a crisis (N=91) | 4 4.4% | 3 3.3% | 5 5.5% | 26 28.6% | 53 58.2% | 0 |

| | | | | | | |
|---|-----------|-----------|-----------|-------------|-------------|-----------|
| GRYD staff is able to effectively communicate and work with intervention workers in response to a crisis (N=93) | 5 5.4% | 0 | 2 2.2% | 21 22.6% | 58 62.4% | 7 7.5% |
| LAPD is able to effectively communicate and work with intervention workers in response to a crisis (N=94) | 5 5.3% | 5 5.3% | 9 9.6% | 28 29.8% | 47 50.0% | 0 |

Improve Knowledge Base and Professionalism of Community Intervention Workers

The knowledge and professionalism of CIWs was not directly measured during this year of the evaluation. However, Program Managers, LAPD, and CIWs were asked about their perceptions of the effects that the LAVITA training had on improving intervention worker’s role responding to violent crisis incidents. Most respondents either agreed (22.8%) or strongly agreed (44.3%) that LAVITA has improved the CIW’s role, as seen in Table 5.3. Program Managers were strongest in their agreement (90.0%) while only 54% of the gang detectives felt the training had improved intervention worker response.

Table 5.3 – Summary of Stakeholder Perceptions of LAVITA Improving Intervention Worker’s Role

| | Strongly Disagree | Disagree | Neither Agree or Disagree | Agree | Strongly Agree | Don’t Know |
|--|-------------------|-----------|---------------------------|-------------|----------------|-------------|
| The LAVITA Training Academy has improved intervention worker’s role in responding to crisis incidents (N=70) | 4 5.7% | 1 1.4% | 5 7.1% | 16 22.8% | 31 44.3% | 13 18.6% |

Maintain and/or Increase Proactive Peace-Making Activities

Six survey items asked GRYD stakeholders about the effects of GRYD zone and SNL activities on reducing tensions, gang retaliation, conflict reduction, and opportunities for peaceful engagement across gangs. The results are presented in Table 5.4. The large majority of respondents suggested that the effect of GRYD on reducing tensions in the community was either high (33.0%) or very high (55.3%). This view was strongest among CMs and not as strong among gang detectives, although 81% of them still rated the effects as high or very high. However, the views about the effects of GRYD on reducing retaliation were not as positive:

25.0% responded “high” and 34.8% said “very high.” CMs and CIWs were more negative about program effects, while conversely all of the Program Managers and 78.4% of the police responded that the effects on retaliation were high or very high.

A slight majority (53.7%) of respondents indicated that they felt gang conflict was reduced during the 2010 SNL program. However, a large proportion of school staff (60%) stated that they did not know. The rest of the groups generally had majorities responding high or very high. The perceived effect of SNL on gang conflicts after SNL fell to 19.0% in support across stakeholder groups (15.3% “high” and 3.7% “very high”) and none of them had a majority responding that effects were high or very high.

Table 5.4 – Stakeholder Perceptions of the Effects of Proactive Peacemaking

| | Very Low | Low | Moderate or About the Same | High | Very High | Don't Know |
|--|-----------------|-------------|-----------------------------------|--------------|------------------|-------------------|
| The interaction between LAPD, GRYD staff, and Community Intervention Workers has been effective in reducing tensions in the community following a crisis incident (N=94) | 4 4.3% | 1 1.1% | 5 5.3% | 31 33.0% | 52 55.3% | 1 1.1% |
| The interaction between LAPD, GRYD staff, and Community Intervention Workers has reduced the likelihood of retaliatory incidents (N=92) | 10 10.9% | 10 10.9% | 16 17.4% | 23 25.0% | 32 34.8% | 1 1.1% |
| Effects of 2010 SNL reducing conflict between gangs (N=365) | 13 3.6% | 10 2.7% | 66 18.1% | 110 30.1% | 86 23.6% | 80 21.9% |
| Effects of 2010 reducing conflict between gangs afterwards (n=215) | 12 5.6% | 26 12.1% | 44 20.5% | 33 15.3% | 8 3.7% | 92 42.8% |
| Effects of 2010 SNL presenting opportunities for peaceful engagement across gangs during 2010 (N=129) | 6 4.6% | 11 8.5% | 31 24.0% | 38 29.5% | 26 20.2% | 17 13.2% |
| Effects of SNL presenting opportunities for peaceful engagement across gangs afterwards (N=127) | 15 11.8% | 23 18.1% | 39 30.7% | 21 16.5% | 7 5.5% | 22 17.3% |

Similar results were found for perceived effects of SNL on opportunities for peaceful engagement. Approximately half of all respondents suggested there were high or very high effects on opportunities for peacemaking during the 2010 SNL, and only 22% of all respondents were positive about such effects after the 2010 SNL program concluded.

Provide Case Management Services to Gang-Involved Youth

Case management functions are intended to provide gang-involved youth with links and connections to services that will help to improve Family Relationships, enhance youth ability to solve problems, and promote behavior changes that will bring about a reduction in gang-involvement/violence and an increase in pro-social activities.

At present, there is limited information on the number and type of services that gang-involved youth have received through the GRYD intervention program. More formal data gathering systems are being implemented during the coming year, and these will be integrated into the evaluation as they are.

Conclusion

At present, only limited outcome intervention evaluation findings are available. However, surveys of GRYD stakeholders including Program Managers, LAPD gang officers, service providers, CMs, CIWs, school staff and community leaders provided some evidence of positive effects of intervention GRYD programs. These included crisis response; rumor control; communications between GRYD, LAPD and CIWs; effects of intervention worker training; and effects on reducing community tensions and retaliation. The effects of 2010 SNL activities on gang conflicts and presenting opportunities for peaceful engagement were also somewhat positive, but there was not as much consensus among stakeholders. In addition, the effects of 2010 SNL effects on gang conflict and opportunities for peaceful engagement were not viewed as positively after SNL summer activities ended.

Chapter VI

Gang Violence and Crime

Introduction

The key goal of the GRYD program is to reduce gang violence and crime. It is hypothesized that primary prevention, secondary prevention, intervention, and law enforcement suppression will in combination contribute to less violence between and within gangs and a decline in crime, most particularly gang-related crime, in and around the GRYD zones and SNL areas in the City of Los Angeles.

This chapter first examines crime trends from January 2005 to December 2010 and assesses whether there were demonstrated reductions in gang-related and other Part I/II crime after the commencement of SNL and GRYD programs in 2008 and 2009, respectively. Comparisons are made between GRYD/SNL and other parts of Los Angeles to assess whether the changes after implementation of GRYD and SNL were different in the program areas than elsewhere in the city. Second, the chapter considers whether GRYD stakeholders perceive that changes in the levels of gang-related violence might be attributed to GRYD zone and SNL programs.

Crime Data

The findings presented in this section are derived from analyses of LAPD's city-wide crime incident records from January 2005 through December 2010. LAPD reporting districts (RDs) for the 12 GRYD zones and the 24 SNL locations were identified and used to extract crime incident data from city-wide totals, producing separate counts for GRYD and SNL. However, it should be noted that there is substantial overlap of the boundaries of the GRYD zones and SNL areas as defined by the GRYD office.

It is also important to note that the numbers of gang crimes are derived from LAPD's system of identifying gang crimes, which is a matter of experience, judgment, and practice by LAPD officers and staff. In fact, despite the best good-faith efforts (which we believe characterize the LAPD approach to this issue), there are likely to be some incidents classified as gang-related that are not, and others not classified as gang-related that are. Our view is that the identified gang crimes are more likely to be an underestimate than an overestimate, but we have no satisfactory way of estimating the extent of the underestimation.

In addition, the extent of gang crime in communities is not fully captured by the number of reported crimes. It is highly probable that a significant though unknown number of gang-related crimes are not reported to the police due to fear of retaliation, a lack of faith that the police response will produce positive results, and other reasons (these factors also inhibit the reporting of other types of crimes as well). It is also the case that criminal acts are not the only source of negative influences on community perceptions of safety and wellbeing. For example, community residents interviewed as part of the evaluation reported that they and their children were threatened and intimidated by gang members in contexts where no reportable crime occurred.

Citywide Crime Trends: January 2005 – December 2010

The total number of Part I and Part II crimes reported to LAPD from January 1, 2005 to June 30, 2010, was 1,272,651. A subset of 55,802 (4.4%) were designated gang crimes by LAPD. Of the citywide totals, the 12 GRYD zones and the 24 SNL areas together had 286,427 Part I and Part II crimes with 21,826 (7.6%) being designated gang crimes. In contrast, gang crimes were only 3.4% of all Part I/II crimes in all areas of the city outside the zone and SNL area boundaries. In addition, gang crime is more prevalent in the GRYD zones and SNL areas: 39.1% of all gang crime in the entire city.


Table 6.1 – Crimes Reported to LAPD from January 2, 2005 to December 31, 2010

| Geographic Area | All Part I and Part II Crimes | Gang Related Subset of Part I/II Crimes | Gang Crimes as % of All Crimes |
|---|-------------------------------|---|--------------------------------|
| City-Wide | 1,272,651 | 55,802 | 4.4% |
| 12 GRYD Zones and 24 SNL Areas | 286,427 | 21,826 | 7.6% |
| Areas Outside GRYD Zones and SNL Areas | 986,224 | 33,974 | 3.4% |
| Source: LAPD Computerized Crime Incident Records System | | | |

Figure 6.1 plots monthly frequencies of all Part I and Part II crimes reported in Los Angeles from January 1, 2005, through December 31, 2010. At the beginning of the period, approximately 20,000 crimes were reported. Over time, this number gradually declined and by the end of 2010, the monthly numbers approximated 13,000. Although Part I and Part II crimes tend to increase each year in the early summer and then decline later in the year, the six-year trend is nonetheless one of a gradual linear decline in overall crime.

This pattern is consistent with the general reduction in crime levels that virtually all US cities have experienced over this period of time. The six years covered by the data coincide with a national trend of declining crime begun in the mid-1990s after crime of all kinds peaked between 1992 and 1994.

Figure 6.1
City of Los Angeles
Part I and Part II Crimes
January 2005 to December 2010



Source: LAPD citywide crime incident records January 2005 – December 2010

In July 2008, the city began the SNL program at eight locations in Los Angeles to provide activities, food and programs for children, youth, and families living in neighborhoods judged to have a history of high crime and violence. Six additional locations were added in 2009 and 10 more were added in 2010.²⁵ For eight weeks each summer, beginning in July, SNL provides programming in city parks and recreational centers, four days a week from 7 p.m. to midnight. We used July 2008 as the starting point for the SNL analysis.


Most of the 12 GRYD zones began the provision of prevention services in January 2009 and this served as the zone analysis starting point for the zone analysis. Intervention services for most zones were initiated in April 2009. These implementation milestones are highlighted in the following GRYD zone analysis figures.

Although the overall trend in Part I and Part II can be interpreted as generally declining one, modest yearly seasonal trends in Part I/II crimes were nonetheless present throughout the six-year period. In addition, there was a slight downward curvilinear trend over the entire period. A more detailed presentation of the seasonality and curvilinear trend are included in Appendix I.

²⁵ Locations in Parks and Recreation Centers by years of operation are as follows: 2008 to 2010 - Cypress, Glassell, Hubert Humphrey Memorial, Jim Gilliam, Mount Carmel, Ramon Garcia, Ramona Gardens, Ross Snyder; 2009 and 2010 – Imperial Courts, Jackie Tatum Harvard, Jordan Downs, Lemon Grove, Nickerson Gardens; 2010 - Costello, Delano, Highland Park, Lake Street, Martin Luther King Jr. Therapeutic, Normandale, Sepulveda, Slauson, South Park, Valley Plaza, Van Ness.

Figure 6.2 plots Los Angeles gang-related crime, as identified by LAPD. Approximately 800 such crimes on average were documented monthly in 2005. Though there were monthly fluctuations, gang crimes were relatively stable that year. However, starting in 2006, a seasonal pattern in gang crimes became evident with increasing crimes from the beginning of the year through the early summer followed by decreases until the end of the year. This pattern is repeated at different levels in all years. The largest numbers of gang crimes were observed in May 2006 and 2007, when nearly 1,000 were observed citywide. However, after the 2007 peak, gang crime declined each year. By the end of 2010 there were approximately 450 crimes per month.

Figure 6.2
City of Los Angeles
Gang-Related Part I and Part II Crimes
January 2005 to December 2010



Source: LAPD citywide crime incident records January 2005 – December 2010

Gang crime incident maps for 2007 and 2010 are presented in Figures 6.3 and 6.4. The year 2007 was chosen since the overall citywide trend data showed 2007 as being the peak of the six-year series. The year 2010 is the last year of LAPD data available to date for analysis. Each dot on the maps represents a single gang-related crime incident as reported to LAPD and identified in its records management system. They do not represent the overall “hot spots” for gang crime since multiple incidents can overlay each other in these representations. Nonetheless they do show a clear representation of the spatial distributions of gang crimes in the city and changes in those location distributions changed over time. Overlaid upon each map are the boundaries, as defined by the GRYD Office, of the 12 GRYD Zones and the 24 SNL areas implemented from 2008 to 2010. The specific areas are identified in the map legends.

Figure 6.3
City of Los Angeles
Gang-Related Crime Incidents
2007 Spatial Distribution





Figure 6.4
City of Los Angeles
Gang-Related Crime Incidents
2010 Spatial Distribution



As noted previously, a large proportion of gang crime incident locations for the City of Los Angeles are within the boundaries of either the GRYD zones, SNL areas, or both. In addition, many additional incident locations are within a mile of each area's boundaries. A comparison of the spatial patterns of 2007 to 2010 clearly shows that the number of places where gang crime incidents are taking place has diminished substantially. This is readily apparent for a number of the individual GRYD Zones and SNL areas, but probably more easily seen for areas outside. For example, in the southernmost part of the city the concentration of incident locations declined, as did those just north of Baldwin and to the northwest areas where gang incident locations were somewhat dispersed.

How to Interpret the Crime Trend Charts

For the GRYD zone and SNL crime charts the monthly frequencies of Part I/II and gang-related crimes are plotted from January 2005 through December 2010. These monthly frequencies are highlighted in red. On each chart, the monthly frequencies of Part I/II and gang-related crimes for all other areas outside of the zones and SNL areas are similarly presented and are highlighted in blue. The left vertical axes are the number of program area crimes per month and the right vertical axes are the number of crimes per month outside both the zones and SNL areas. Both scales have been standardized so that each interval represents approximately a 10% change in crime, and trend lines are comparable.

The solid straight lines on the graphs summarize the linear trends²⁶ of the fluctuating monthly crime frequencies and can be visually compared within graph and between graphs. For instance when the slopes of the pre- and post-implementation trend lines are different the rate of decline (or increase) is different.

As noted earlier, and detailed in Appendix I, there is clear seasonality for Part I/II crime and even more so for gang-related crimes over the study period. In addition, gang crimes rose until May 2007 and then began declining well before GRYD programs began. Because of this, the crime trend figures present three linear estimates. The first is from January 2005 through May 2007, the second is from May 2007 until program implementation, and the last is for post-implementation through December 2010. This was done to compare trends from 2007 to program commencement with those that were observed after program commencement.²⁷ The choice of linear estimates was made for ease of visual interpretation and the fact that on average the changes over the selected comparison periods demonstrated near linear characteristics despite the overall curvilinear trend for the entire six-year series.

Notes on each of the graphs state percentage changes between the start and end points for each trend line as well as the average monthly changes in either Part I/II or gang-related crimes for the period. These are also directly comparable within and between graphs.

²⁶ Calculated using linear regression, which is described more in detail in Appendix I.

²⁷ Selection of trend comparison points can greatly influence the results given the large month-to-month upward and downward spikes in crime and need to be interpreted with caution. See Appendix I for additional details.

GRYD Zone Crime Trends

Figure 6.5 documents that between January 2005 and May 2007, Part I/II crime in the GRYD zones increased 1.8%, from a monthly average of approximately 2,800 to approximately 2,900. The average number of crimes increased 1.8 crimes per month. This was followed by a sharp decline from May 2007 until January 2009, when GRYD programs commenced. Over the period Part I/II crimes declined 14.9% with an average monthly decrease of 21.8 crimes. After GRYD implementation, this downward trend continued with a negative change of 21.6% and an average reduction of 23.2 crimes per month.

In all Los Angeles areas outside GRYD and SNL, Part I and Part II crimes declined from January 2005 through May 2007 by 5.6% or 29.2 crimes per month on average. This decline continued at a smaller rate from May 2007 until the beginning of GRYD programs in January 2009. During the post-implementation period the rates of decline for GRYD zones and elsewhere, represented by the slopes of the trend lines, are very similar, although the percentage change is slightly higher for non-GRYD areas.

Figure 6.5
The Twelve GRYD Zones Combined
Part I and Part II Crimes – Pre/Post GRYD
GRYD Zones and Locations Outside SNL and GRYD
January 2005 to December 2010





Figure 6.6 shows a different picture for gang-related crime. From January 2005 through May 2007 gang-related crimes in GRYD zones increased 29.9% or on average two crimes per month. In areas outside GRYD and SNL, it increased 28.9% or 2.9 crimes per month. From May 2007 until the implementation of GRYD programs in January 2009, gang crimes declined at nearly the same rates. It declined by 18.7% in the GRYD zones and declined by 20.1% in the areas outside. After implementation, gang-related crimes declined sharply in the GRYD zones, with a 32% decrease observed, or about three crimes per month. Gang crime in areas outside GRYD and SNL also declined after the implementation of GRYD. However, the 29.5% decrease was not as large as it was in the zones and the slope of decline is steeper for the zones than for

other areas in the city. Nonetheless, the similar post-2007 trends suggest that numerous factors may be influencing gang crime patterns and may have in fact begun affecting gang crimes before GRYD programs were implemented.

Figure 6.6
The Twelve GRYD Zones Combined
Gang-Related Part I and Part II Crimes – Pre/Post GRYD
GRYD Zones and Locations Outside SNL and GRYD
January 2005 to December 2010




The left vertical axis represents GRYD gang crimes and the right vertical axis represents areas outside SNL and GRYD. Both have been standardized with each interval representing approximately a 10% change in crime.

SNL Area Crime Trends

Figure 6.7 presents Part I and Part II crimes in the 24 SNL areas and areas outside the GRYD zones and SNL locations. The trends from January 2005 through May 2007 depict declining monthly levels of Part I/II crime for both SNL areas and areas outside SNL and GRYD zones. The slopes of the trend lines are very similar, as are percentage changes: down 3.1% for SNL and down 5.6% for areas elsewhere in the city. From May 2007 until July 2008 when SNL began, the trend for areas outside of SNL was similar to the earlier period with a 7.3% decline. However, for SNL areas, after a spike in the early summer of 2007 Part I/II crimes dropped more steeply than elsewhere with an 11.8% decrease. After implementation Part I/II crimes went down at nearly the same pace for the two areas: 25% in SNL and 28.7% in other parts of the city.


Figure 6.7
Summer Night Lights
Part I and Part II Crimes – Pre/Post SNL
SNL Areas and Locations Outside SNL and GRYD
January 2005 to December 2010



The left vertical axis represents SNL gang crimes and the right vertical axis represents areas outside SNL and GRYD. Both have been standardized with each interval representing approximately a 10% change in crime.

Figure 6.8 also shows a different picture for gang-related crime in SNL areas. From January 2005 through May 2007, gang crimes were increasing in both the SNL areas and areas outside the zones and SNL areas, although it rose less steeply inside SNL areas (+11.2% vs. 18.3%). From May 2007 until the implementation of SNL programs in July 2008, gang crimes fell, but at a higher rate for the other areas of the city than in SNL areas (19.5% vs. 13.0%). However, after SNL implementation, the decline in gang crimes went from minus 2.1 per month to minus 2.9 per month. While the monthly average number of gang crimes also decreased post-implementation in other areas of the city, the proportional decline was larger in SNL than elsewhere (37.2% vs. 33.6%). But again, given the pre-implementation declines and similar trends since 2007, it also appears that other factors may have begun affecting gang crime before and after SNL.

Figure 6.8
Summer Night Lights
Gang-Related Part I and Part II Crimes
SNL Areas and Locations Outside SNL and GRYD Zones
January 2005 to December 2010



Stakeholder Perceptions of Gang Violence Reduction

GRYD Program Managers, LAPD gang officers, prevention service providers, CMs, CIWs, school staff and community leaders were asked about their perceptions of the impact of GRYD programs, including SNL, on gang violence in GRYD zones and SNL areas. Responses to common questions across the surveyed groups were aggregated and are presented as summary outcome indicators in the following tables.

Table 6.2 presents the results of asking stakeholders about the changes in gang violence levels in 2010. The responses were positive across all the groups surveyed. Of the 278 respondents, 22.7% felt that violence was “much lower” and 42.9% said it was “lower,” compared with 4.7% who thought it was “higher” and 1.1% who said it was “much higher.” The “about the same” category accounted for 23.0% of responses and 5.8% responded that they did not know. The most favorable views were held by GRYD Program Managers (100% “much lower” or “lower”) and CMs (90.5%), while gang officers responded “much lower” or “lower” in 71.5% of the cases.

Table 6.2 – Summary of Stakeholder Perceptions of GRYD Zone Changes in the Level of Violence in 2010

| | Much Lower | Slightly Lower | About the Same | Slightly Higher | Much Higher | Don't Know |
|--|-------------|----------------|----------------|-----------------|-------------|------------|
| The level of GRYD zone gang violence in 2010 (N=262) | 63 22.7% | 119 42.9% | 64 23.0% | 13 4.7% | 3 1.1% | 16 5.8% |

Table 6.3 presents the views of stakeholders about the effects that GRYD programs had on decreasing the level of gang violence in 2010. About a third of the respondents said they felt that GRYD effects were “very high” (9.7%) or “high” (28.1%) and slightly over a third (37.5%) suggested that the effects were “moderate.” Less than 12% responded with “very low” or “low” while 13.1% said they did not know. Program Managers and CMs were the most positive about the effects of GRYD on reducing gang violence while 41.4% of school staff replied that they did not know.

Table 6.3 - Stakeholder Perceptions of GRYD Zone Programs Effects on Gang Violence in 2010

| | Very Low | Low | Moderate | High | Very High | Don't Know |
|---|------------|------------|--------------|--------------|------------|-------------|
| Effects of GRYD decreasing the level of gang violence in GRYD Zones in 2010 (N=381) | 11 2.9% | 33 8.7% | 143 37.5% | 107 28.1% | 37 9.7% | 50 13.1% |

Table 6.4 presents findings on stakeholder views of the effects of SNL on gang violence both during the program in 2010 and following its completion. Among all respondents, 15.5% indicated that they thought SNL had “very high” and 27.4% said “high” impacts on gang violence during the summer of 2010, which was about three-and-one-half times the number that indicated “much lower” or “lower” effects. Moderate effects were cited by 26.8% and about one in five responded that they did not know. Majorities of CMs, CIWs and community leaders reported high perceived effects, but only 38% of the police surveyed held similar views.

Consistent with other outcome results associated with views of what happened following SNL, stakeholder perceptions were less positive about the longer term effects of SNL on gang violence. The proportion responding either “high” or “very high” dropped to 23.8% and those saying “very low” or “low” increased to 19.3%. Almost 10% more respondents indicated “moderate” for the effects after SNL compared with during SNL. The variation across the different stakeholder groups was similar to what was observed for the effects during 2010 SNL question.

Table 6.4 - Stakeholder Perceptions of SNL Programs Effects on Gang Violence

| | Very Low | Low | Moderate | High | Very High | Don't Know |
|---|------------|-------------|--------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Effects on reducing inter-gang violence during 2010 SNL (N=310) | 16 5.2% | 19 6.1% | 83 26.8% | 85 27.4% | 48 15.5% | 59 19.0% |
| Effects on reducing inter-gang violence after 2010 SNL (N=306) | 25 8.2% | 34 11.1% | 109 35.6% | 57 18.6% | 16 5.2% | 65 21.2% |

Conclusion

When interpreting the analysis of crime trends, it is important to realize that there is some geographic overlap in the locations of the GRYD zones and SNL areas in the City of Los Angeles, as illustrated in maps presented earlier in this chapter. In addition, these areas are generally located where gang crime is most concentrated. Given the overlaps and area locations, there may be synergistic impacts on gang activities that could make the combined effects of the two programs on crime greater than if they had been operating alone.

Part I and Part II crime citywide followed a yearly seasonal pattern of rising crime through early summer followed by decrease through the end of the year. There was also a very slight downward curvilinear trend from January 2005 through December 2010. This general declining trend was consistent with the general reduction in crime levels experienced in most U.S. cities during the same period. In the GRYD zones, Part I and Part II crimes increased modestly from 2005 through 2007 and then declined. However, post-implementation trends were similar to other areas in the city outside the zones and SNL areas. Trends for SNL Part I and Part II crimes more closely mirrored the overall citywide patterns with declines throughout the six-year period. Post implementation trends were also similar for SNL areas and locations outside the zones and SNL, although the decline was slightly steeper for the outside areas.

Citywide gang-related crime patterns showed month-to-month peaks and valleys and more marked yearly seasonality. Gang crimes consistently increased each year in the spring, peaked by early summer and then declined through the end of the year. A more pronounced curvilinear trend existed over the six year period for gang crimes. Gang crime rose through the late spring/early summer of 2007 when it peaked. Thereafter, gang crime declined sharply to levels well below 2005. Gang crime in the GRYD zones mirrored trends for the city as a whole, rising from 2005 through 2007 and then dropping steeply. Post-implementation trends showed that gang crime declined at a faster pace in the zones than in areas of the city outside the zones and SNL areas. Similar gang crime patterns were observed for SNL areas. Post-implementation declines for SNL areas were also steeper than for other areas of the city outside the zones and SNL areas. Spatial representations of gang crime incidents confirm the reductions of gang crimes in the GRYD zones, SNL areas and locations outside of them both.

The analysis of crime trends suggests that the declines, particularly for gang-related crime, began before the actual implementation of GRYD programs in either the GRYD zones or SNL areas. This suggests that other factors may have been affecting gang criminal activity. However, the declining trends that started in 2007 appeared to accelerate after GRYD program implementation in both the zones and SNL areas, which also suggests an additive effect associated with GRYD program activities.

It needs to be stressed that there are numerous caveats associated with the presented analysis of the trends in crime data in Los Angeles. Readers are referred to Appendix I for more details. Moreover, no unequivocal attributions of cause and effect between GRYD programs and crime trends can be made based upon the comparisons presented.

However, the analysis of GRYD stakeholder survey findings did reveal modest support for the view that GRYD zone and SNL programs were in fact instrumental in reducing gang

violence during 2010. Views of the effects of SNL after the conclusion of the program in 2010 showed the modal response to be moderate and the other categories nearly evenly distributed across other categories.