The Framework for Safer Return
A Research-Based Community Initiative

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SAFER RETURN DEMONSTRATION EVALUATION
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This brief, the first in a series focused on Safer Return: A Research-Based Community Reentry Initiative, describes the conceptual framework underlying both the Safer Return program model and research approach. Safer Return, a multi-year, research-based action research demonstration was initiated in the East Garfield Park neighborhood of Chicago, Illinois in 2008. The demonstration aimed to address the reentry challenges faced by formerly incarcerated individuals and their families as well as communities affected by high rates of crime, incarceration, and recidivism. Located on the west side of Chicago, East Garfield Park is a high-density prisoner reentry community with high levels of economic and social disadvantage.1

The demonstration was designed to improve reentry and reintegration outcomes by augmenting and leveraging existing community-based public and private services designed to meet the individualized needs of returning and recently released former inmates and their families. Key services that were envisioned, subject to individualized needs, included: comprehensive case management; prerelease and transitional planning; soft skills to enhance employability, transitional employment opportunities, and job placement; housing; medical, mental health, and substance abuse treatment; and mentoring and other opportunities for engagement with community residents to build pro-social informal support networks for newly returned individuals and their families.

The project was codesigned by researchers at the Urban Institute (the Institute) and staff from the Safer Foundation, in consultation with other reentry experts, during a six-month planning grant in 2006. The planning, implementation of the demonstration model, and ongoing research have all been supported with funding from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.

Safer Foundation was the lead service agency, directly delivering some of the Safer Return services and overseeing the delivery of other providers who worked with Safer Return clients during the demonstration period. The Safer Foundation is the nation’s largest and oldest provider of employment services to persons with criminal records, and has designed or managed several reentry projects that received national attention (e.g., the Sheridan Initiative, Chicago Ready4Work, and the Joyce Foundation’s Transitional Employment Program).

The Institute has a considerable reentry research portfolio and is conducting the process, impact, and economic evaluation of Safer Return. The development of the Safer Return initiative was partially an outgrowth of the Institute’s work on the Returning Home project (La Vigne, Visher, and Castro 2004), some of which was focused on individuals returning to Chicago from state correctional facilities. As a result of that work and other studies, Institute researchers developed a keen interest in designing and testing a community-based reentry model that would reflect widely shared beliefs and evidence-based practices about successful methods to improve outcomes.

Safer Return started with the basic premise that, on three fundamental levels, necessary policies and procedures were lacking to support prisoner reentry:

1. On the individual and family level, the transition from prison life to community reintegration is not seamless and is often complicated; returning prisoners were ill-prepared to navigate routines in their home communities, and their families were similarly unprepared for their homecomings.
2. On the systems level, institutions both public (state, county, and city agencies) and private (service organizations) were ill-equipped to provide coordinated supports for this group of individuals. Without such supports, public safety, community stability, and individual life outcomes remained at risk.
3. On the community level, entire neighborhoods were unable to meet the complex needs of returnees; the communities were weakened both by the individuals’ criminal activities and their ensuing absence due to incarceration, and then burdened by their return.

From the outset, the research demonstration’s objective was to leverage community capacity, reform institutions, and address the needs of returning prisoners and their family members, while maintaining public safety. Specifically, Safer Return was planned to (1) identify and mitigate or resolve the key individual needs of formerly incarcerated persons (and, to a more modest extent, their families) by providing a suite of services, such as case management, employment, housing, and health, mental health,
and substance abuse treatment; (2) improve local conditions that presented barriers to successful reentry, including limited access to jobs, pro-social activities, and positive role models; and (3) introduce systemic reforms, such as comprehensive strength-based case management and neighborhood-based parole officers.

The Safer Return program and process evaluation activities operated from April 2008 through January 2013. Impact evaluation and economic analyses were extended into 2014 so the research team could capture post-program results. This report retrospectively describes the context in which Safer Return was developed, details the Safer Return program features as they were originally envisioned, and identifies key aspects of the original research design. In addition, while promoting other positive reentry outcomes, we describe the activities performed as part of the strategic planning process, existing evidence-based or promising programs examined for possible inclusion in Safer Return, features of the program model as it was initially conceptualized, and the proposed multi-method research design that uses a quasi-experimental approach and primary and secondary data collection to capture individual, family, and community results.

We anticipate that future reports will address how specific program elements were implemented, challenges encountered that gave rise to program modifications, lessons learned, and recommendations for improving reentry initiatives. Forthcoming reports will also highlight baseline, interim, and follow-up findings regarding individual and family outcomes, as well as community change over time.

The Impetus for Safer Return
For close to two decades, the United States has experienced growing prison populations and dramatic increases in the number of individuals released from prisons. The trend has not only created crises for state and local justice systems, but has also reverberated in the local communities that formerly incarcerated individuals call home. In Illinois in 2004, nearly 39,000 individuals returned home from prison after periods of incarceration, with 5,848 returning to only five zip codes in Chicago. This reality was especially troubling since communities within these five zip codes are widely recognized as disproportionately low income, crime ridden, and lacking both pro-social supports and necessary services. This combination of factors impedes successful transition for the formerly incarcerated and further stresses already fragile communities.

Most of those returning home were unprepared—as were their families, support networks, and communities—for the obstacles they would encounter with respect to becoming financially stable, productive members of society. Reintegration is a difficult process, and the criminal justice system had done relatively little to address the harm incarceration causes to the families, neighborhoods, and friends of returnees. Major obstacles included the complete absence of a formal reentry process for people leaving prison, and the dearth of targeted prerelease and postrelease services designed to meet the needs of both people leaving prison and their families or informal support networks. In any given month in Chicago, about 1,600 individuals were being released from prison. Most had neither a point of contact for services, nor a structured plan for making safe and smooth transitions from prison back into their home communities. Little thought and relatively few resources had been devoted to helping people transition from the structured prison system—which limits independent decision making and freedom of movement—to a free-world community.

Not only do formerly incarcerated persons and their families encounter various personal challenges upon reentry (Visher and Travis 2003), but the communities to which they return also exhibit a range of circumstances that can either facilitate or undermine the individuals’ and families’ successful negotiation of reintegration. Some neighborhoods and communities have resources that can be leveraged to support successful reentry, while others exhibit deficits such as high crime rates or substantial drug markets that represent real threats to the progress of returning individuals. Further, the policies and practices of existing institutions—law enforcement, community-based corrections, human services, and the business sector—and how they structure revocation decision making, service eligibility requirements, on-the-job or other employment training, and hiring play critical roles when individuals leave prison and return home.
Lacking adequate services and pro-social supports, many former inmates violate the conditions of their release or commit new crimes that threaten family stability, victimize their communities, and result in their return to prison, starting the process all over again. Several studies in the early to mid-2000s noted the grim chances for successful reentry. For example, a 1994 Bureau of Justice Statistics recidivism study of nearly 300,000 released prisoners in 15 states found that close to 68 percent had been rearrested for at least one serious misdemeanor or felony within three years of release. Of those rearrested, 47 percent had been convicted of new crimes and 52 percent were reincarcerated for either a new crime or a technical violation (Langan and Levin 2002). Similarly, in Chicago, an estimated 55 percent of released prisoners recidivated within three years, and the four-year recidivism rate for new criminal charges in the Cook County jail was 85 percent, excluding arrests for technical violations or populations with non-probationable offenses, such as murder or Class X felonies (Circuit Court of Cook County 2006).

However, by the middle of the last decade, national and local political views of reentry were undergoing marked changes. Candid discussions about the prisoner reentry process, including the challenges and opportunities for strategic decisionmaking and actions, were taking place at state and local government levels. Both the governor of Illinois and the mayor of Chicago identified reentry as a top policy concern and assigned staff to focus on this issue and to test innovative solutions. Additionally, valuable research resources were already devoted to studying prisoner reentry in Illinois and had generated critical knowledge about Chicago's reentry landscape. The Urban Institute undertook several studies on prisoner reentry in Illinois (see La Vigne et al. 2003; La Vigne et al. 2004; Visher, La Vigne, and Farrell 2003; Visher and Farrell 2005).

Against this backdrop, interest in conducting prisoner reentry action research in Chicago emerged (2005–07), spurred, in part, by a single question posed by the then-president of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation: What would it take to reduce recidivism in Chicago by 50 percent? Existing research and practice strongly suggested that a coordinated transition and reintegration process that recognized and strengthened the interplay of three core dimensions would be necessary to achieve major reductions in relapse and recidivism that had thus far eluded Chicago and other US communities: (1) individual prisoners and their family or household support systems; (2) institutional stakeholders in both the criminal justice system (including law enforcement, institutional and community-based corrections and supervision, and crime prevention functions) and the network of local service provision; and (3) the community with its informal support systems, such as faith-based organizations (FBOs) and concern for public safety. Early themes that emerged in exploratory discussions between the Institute and MacArthur Foundation staff included

- the opportunity to conceptualize a role for a justice intermediary (see the section on key components of the program model);
- the need to recognize the heterogeneous nature of offender populations with respect to risks, needs, and willingness to receive supportive services;
- the value of discharge and transition planning, as well as the continuity of care postrelease;
- the potential importance of intensive case management; and
- the need for a variety of institutional reforms, community engagement, and development of collaborative partnerships across institutional and organizational boundaries.

Conversations among MacArthur Foundation staff and Institute researchers were broadened to include leadership within Chicago's Safer Foundation. Of particular interest to both parties were the links Safer Foundation could broker given its existing partnerships with Illinois agencies and organizations that were deemed critical to a successful reentry initiative, including the Illinois Department of Corrections, the Illinois Prisoner Review Board, the Cook County judiciary, the Public Defender's Office, Adult Probation, the Chicago Police, the Illinois Department of Commerce and Economic Opportunities, the Illinois Department of Employment Security, the City of Chicago, the Governor's Office, several hundred employers, and many other service providers, ex-offender groups, and FBOs and CBOs (community-based organizations).
Subsequently, the Urban Institute and the Safer Foundation joined forces to design and implement a research demonstration that would strengthen the three core dimensions identified above.

### Strategic Planning for Safer Return

The initial conceptualization of the demonstration project was shaped by information gathering and synthesis of the research conducted jointly by both Safer Foundation and Institute staff (the research team) under the auspices of a MacArthur Foundation planning grant. This financial support enabled the team to convene a group of national and local reentry experts to identify needed reentry reforms. This guidance was combined with the Institute’s review of demographic and labor analytic reports. Additionally, we undertook more in-depth examination of the three high-density crime and reentry communities that were under consideration for selection as potential demonstration sites: East Garfield Park, West Englewood, and Aurora.

In each community, Safer Foundation staff met with elected officials, service providers, and the FBOs, as well as people with criminal records. To understand both the demographic and employment landscape, Institute and Safer Foundation staff conducted interviews with FBOs and CBOs to gain constructive community input, identify specific community-based strengths and effective service supports, and discern where there were gaps in the provision of services. The team also solicited input and support from other key stakeholders through the following methods:

- Meeting with local aldermen, state representatives, state senators, members of US Congress, and the mayors of Chicago and Aurora.
- Convening several focus groups with unique stakeholder groups, such as parole officers, recently released women, recently released men, service providers, and family and community members. For example, seven focus groups held with people with criminal records focused on their concerns and factors that might cause individuals and their families to either decline program assistance or disengage after enrollment; this dialog provided information on how best to achieve buy-in of potential Safer Return clients and their families for the proposed initiative. Focus groups that included mentors revealed recommendations for strengthening peer and group mentoring. A questionnaire completed by 15 Westside parole officers revealed the importance of communication between all stakeholders and parole officers.
- Forming Community Advisory Councils in each of the three candidate communities.
- Convening two advisory groups, including several meetings of the Safer Return National Advisory Board, and a roundtable of economic and research experts to guide the cost-benefit component of the evaluation.

To develop the Safer Return model, Safer Foundation and the Institute identified and contacted several programs cited in the literature, by advisors, or other informants familiar with innovative reentry interventions as exemplars of promising practices in 2006:

- **AIDS Foundation Houston** (Houston, Texas) was administering peer education programs using its *Wall Talk* curriculum, in prison settings. The model used a “train the trainers” approach to prepare prisoners as peer instructors who delivered health information in prison classrooms. Peer facilitators (inmate instructors) received 40 hours of training that covered basic communication skills and instruction on classroom management, as well as key substantive topics that constituted the core curriculum: HIV/AIDS 101; Sexually Transmitted Infections; Hepatitis A, B, and C; and Tuberculosis, Diabetes, and Staph Infections. Enticing features of this model included the possibility of improving the health knowledge and behavior of the peer instructors and prisoner students and, by extension, their families, as well as the potential for peer instructors to use these experiences to find gainful employment in health or social services, postrelease.
- **Civic Justice Corps** (Bend, Oregon) focused on furthering the health, safety, and livability of communities, while viewing people who were incarcerated and transitioning home as assets in this endeavor. Former prisoners were offered opportunities to be accountable for their
transgressions and simultaneously engage in “earned redemption” through voluntary participation in physical capital improvement projects that visibly benefited the public and specifically were projects that the community wanted and requested.

- **Framework for Breaking Barriers** (Oakland, California) was a video-based, cognitive skills training package, designed by Gordon Graham and Company, for use in home, workplace, or correctional settings. The underlying premise of the curriculum stipulated that people often rejected the idea that they may be basing their life decisions on incomplete or inaccurate information about themselves. In a step-by-step process, using a non-threatening teaching approach, participants were guided toward an understanding and acceptance of four educational values, including that: 1) current reality is the result of beliefs, habits, and attitudes individuals have adopted in the past; 2) one’s future is determined by beliefs, habits, and attitudes that are adopted today; 3) it is a possible to choose one’s beliefs, habits, and attitudes in order to reach one’s goals and visions; and 4) change is possible.

- **La Bodega de la Familia** (New York, New York), developed by Family Justice, used comprehensive family case management (FCM) as a mechanism for government and others to work with individuals returning from incarceration, family, and the community to create webs of support for individuals on probation (Sullivan et al. 2002). FCM used a strengths-based, client-driven, four-stage approach (initial contact; engagement and assessment; creating and implementing a family action plan; and transitioning from family case management to family self-sufficiency) to help clients and family members navigate within larger systems (e.g., criminal justice, child welfare, employment, health, and legal) to access treatment and services, maintain employment, tap existing networks for support, and create long-term family well-being and community safety.

- **Maryland Reentry Partnership Initiative** (REP) (Baltimore) included both prerelease and postrelease programming designed to prepare individuals to successfully reenter the community, and thereby reduce recidivism and enhance public safety through assessment, case management, substance abuse treatment, mental health counseling, vocational and occupational services, education, and other training (Roman et al. 2007). *Exit orientations* were a key REP feature: as inmates neared their release dates, members of the community and social service organizations went to the release center to speak with potential participants about the reentry process and services available to them.

- **Michigan Prison Reentry Initiative** (MPRI) (Lansing) was the Michigan Department of Correction’s program that was being demonstrated in three reentry centers across the state. At the time, it incorporated a multi-tiered model to reduce crime through personalized services and supervision of all offenders released into the nonprison community. The model included three stages: offender incarceration and imprisonment, offender transition (six months prior to parole), and reintegration (the postrelease parole period) and planning for aftercare (postparole) in the community. MPRI focused on individual assessment and services to offenders at each point of the described timeline with a goal of successful reintegration into the community. Parole officers acted as single points of contact in the prison and in the community, to ensure a balance of reentry planning, coordination of services, welcome home panels, postrelease support, and monitoring. Parole officers coordinated with state-funded community providers (e.g., treatment centers) and made subgrants to community-based organizations for a range of services (e.g., employment readiness and job placement).

- **Multnomah County African American Program** (AAP) — **Group Mentoring with Parole** (Portland, Oregon) provided specialized case management, including treatment, life skills, and job development training geared toward the culturally specific needs of African Americans involved with postprison supervision. AAP, together with Adult Community Justice promoted public safety and strived to reduce recidivism with adult offenders through a balance of supervision, services, and sanctions. Upon release from prison, participants in AAP met for two hours each week in a large-group format with their specialized parole officers. In addition to ensuring parole check-in and accountability, the group format was used for participant sharing,
updates, group feedback, and accountability. Former program graduates provided leadership for the discussion groups, shared personal stories, and offered resources and assistance; additionally, outside of the group, these peer leaders spent personal time mentoring and providing follow-up supports to those who were struggling with personal matters, including relapse. Portland police were involved in and supportive of the program. When participants either violated parole or were arrested for a new offense, the entire group was consulted on sanctioning decisions.

- **Oxford Houses** (Illinois, International) provided community-based group homes, where 5 to 15 individuals live together, paid for a rented home, and practiced self-government and substance abuse recovery principles. There was no professional staff living on site, making the model affordable. Although start-up funds for each home are required for items such as furniture and security deposits, the model is self-sustaining as residents shared the costs of rent and household expenses. Eventually, resident payments replenished start-up funds and additional houses could be started. The residents were able to engage in self-monitoring and mentorship, while living a mutual-help coexistence with peers in a democratic setting.

- **Sheridan** (Illinois) or “The Sheridan Experiment” was Illinois’s statewide approach to developing a model prison with a reentry component and postrelease supports (Reichert, Ruzich, and Campbell 2012). At the Sheridan prison, a minimum-security, 1,100 bed prison, Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) and its providers (Gateway, Treatment Alternatives for Safer Communities (TASC), Safer Foundation, Illinois Valley Community College, Illinois Manufacturing Foundation, and Home Builders, Inc.) provided in-prison drug treatment through a therapeutic model, clinical case management planning and resources, employment readiness, hard-skills training, educational resources, community connections, and prerelease planning with all providers and parole. In the community, Safer Foundation, TASC, parole, and community organizations provided housing, on-going treatment services, coordinated case management with parole, job placement, and job retention supports. Through joint-case staffings, prerelease in prison, and postrelease in the community, participants were afforded opportunities to plan for reentry and to access needed resources with an integrated group of providers.

- **Southside Initiative “Call Ins”** (High Point, North Carolina) was a community-based approach to crime reduction designed by David Kennedy and applied as a drug market intervention program while the Safer Return model was under development. Particular geographic drug markets were identified, and then all active drug dealers within the target area were identified by law enforcement. Using ordinary law enforcement techniques, criminal cases were prepared against each offender (including warrants that could be signed), but were not pursued. Instead, the model brought together law enforcement and community members to deliver three messages: (1) law enforcement stakeholders told the offenders they were out of the drug business and that they could be in jail already; however, despite how law enforcement had previously conducted its business, no one wanted to arrest them now; they were going to hear from others who want to help them; if they desisted, nothing more would be done, but, if they resumed drug dealing, they would immediately be arrested on the current charge and receive special prosecutorial attention to ensure conviction; (2) service providers told perpetrators and their families that any help they needed (e.g., drug treatment, education, job training and placement, and transitional assistance) would be provided; case managers who could actively work with these individuals and families were identified; and (3) community members, such as ministers, activists, and local residents, told the offenders that, while they are loved and cherished and the community needs them to succeed, their wrongdoings are destroying the community and they have to stop (Kennedy 2004).

- **Ready4Work** (Cook County, Illinois, and national) combined reentry counseling (case management), group mentoring, and job readiness and placement for people returning from prison to Cook County’s communities of highest reentry (Ready4Work n.d.). Safer Foundation developed partnerships with eight FBOs and CBOs in Cook County’s highest reentry communities and colocated services with these organizations to provide supports in the community. Safer Foundation provided reentry planning and counseling, as well as job readiness and placement. The FBO and CBO partners provided biweekly group mentoring. Local training providers and
community colleges provided hard-skills training, which were supported by program-provided stipends.

Safer Foundation and Institute staff conducted visits to most of the aforementioned programs to gain greater understanding of operations, as well as challenges and successful mitigation efforts.

Key representatives of most of the visited programs were later convened as a group to discuss operational features of their programs and how the core elements might be replicated or adapted for implementation in Safer Return. Subsequently, program experts from the aforementioned programs generated six commissioned papers that provided specific advice on how to adapt their experiences to Safer Return in Chicago. Ultimately, the decision was made to incorporate principles and practices of Civic Justice Corps, Framework for Breaking Barriers, Group Mentoring, La Bodega de la Familia, Maryland REP, and Oxford House into the Safer Return model.

Lastly, East Garfield Park was selected as the demonstration community for several reasons. Urban Institute analyses showed that just 6 of Chicago’s 76 communities accounted for more than one-third of all prisoners returning to Chicago in 2001 (La Vigne et al. 2004). As one of these six high-density prisoner reentry communities, East Garfield Park demonstrated a strong need for the type of enhanced, innovative reentry services that Safer Return intended to offer. Also, the considerable on-the-ground information gathering that Safer Foundation staff conducted solidified their perception that East Garfield Park presented a unique opportunity to leverage neighborhood partnerships toward potentially better reentry outcomes for formerly incarcerated individuals, their families, and the larger community.

**Key Components of the Safer Return Model**

The Safer Return design anticipated that the demonstration would focus on promoting successful reentry and reintegration by assessing individual needs, introducing system reforms, and improving local conditions.

- **Addressing key individual needs**, such as stable housing, substance abuse treatment, employment with opportunities for career advancement, and medical and mental health care of inmates awaiting release and those who had recently returned to the community after a period of incarceration. Program services would be voluntary and available to any adult returning to the targeted community, regardless of offense, criminal history, age, or gender. There was a clear understanding that not every participant would receive the same set of services; services would be recommended based on an individual’s risks and needs. Family members were regarded as secondary beneficiaries of the program who could receive limited assistance, particularly where family strengthening seemed a promising avenue for improving the outcomes for the Safer Return participants.

- **Introducing system reforms**, such as comprehensive case management, neighborhood-based parole officers, graduated sanctioning, and reward practices to reduce reincarceration for technical violations.

- **Improving local conditions** that present barriers to success for formerly incarcerated persons and their families, such as increasing access to prosocial activities and positive role models, redefining community norms that limit opportunities for reintegration, and increasing local employment opportunities.

Figure 1 presents the proposed model for Safer Return. The Safer Return model intended to reduce recidivism and reincarceration without sacrificing public safety, by implementing evidence-based and promising approaches to build capabilities, changing policies and practices that undermined success, and achieving strategic objectives. Central to the Safer Return model was the belief that returning individuals should not be treated in a vacuum, but rather supported in the context of their families, peer networks, and neighborhoods. To affect participants in meaningful ways, Safer Return expected to include families, employers, service providers, FBOs and CBOs, as well as volunteers from the targeted community.
The Justice Intermediary

One of the frequently cited challenges to promoting successful reentry and reintegration is the apparent lack of coordination and collaboration, not only from correctional facilities to community-based supervision and providers, but also among community-based public and private institutions that could forge more effective partnerships in providing seamless support for returning individuals and their families. To bridge gaps between portions of systems that have not historically worked well together, but could mutually benefit from enhanced collaboration and capacity building, some have tried using intermediaries.

Intermediaries have been successful in performing community development, mitigating the effects of urban poverty, facilitating welfare-to-work initiatives, and resolving problems associated with the homeless and other hard-to-serve populations whose needs transcend multiple institutional and service domains (Walker, private communications 2004; see also Walker, Gustafson, and Snow 2002; Walker 2002). In such settings, successful intermediaries demonstrated important characteristics: (1) projecting a dual customer perspective by simultaneously addressing both the supply and demand sides, focusing not only on meeting individual service needs, but also on affecting the policy, market, and community; (2) organizing key stakeholders and partnerships (e.g., CBOs and FBOs, local businesses, parole, police, human services, people with criminal records, and workforce development agencies) that can affect individual and system outcomes, and ensuring that core sectors are adequately represented (governance); (3) serving as a fiscal administrator (e.g., fund raising from multiple sources, distributing resources to appropriate community entities, and overseeing fiscal accountability); (4) serving as a consolidator to identify opportunities for collective action, engaging multiple stakeholders with similar needs to aggregate demands for services or training; (5) empowering residents to guide the initiative by using a community organizing approach to include them in planning, decision making, and implementation; and (6) assuming various advocacy roles at local, state, and national levels (Walker, private communications 2004; see also Walker et al. 2002; Walker 2002).

To meet the goals of Safer Return, the Safer Foundation elected to serve in a dual capacity, both as a justice intermediary and as a direct service provider. The justice intermediary was an innovative application of the intermediary concept.

As depicted in figure 1, the justice intermediary was at the hub in a broad network of relationships, partnerships, and institutional arrangements. Along these lines, the model was designed so that Safer Foundation would

- lead efforts to institute comprehensive, coordinated responses to the needs of formerly incarcerated individuals and their families;
- identify and coordinate the policy levers for institutional and systems reforms;
- facilitate and oversee local partnership formation within and across institutional domains, and the public and private sectors;
- provide training and technical assistance that would build community and institutional capacity, and forge a learning community;
- organize the selected community to support former prisoners and families in a variety of meaningful ways;
- advocate at neighborhood, city, and state levels for public and private policies and practices that would enhance opportunities for successful reentry and reintegration;
- serve as a fiscal administrator for partner organizations that received subcontracts to perform specific aspects of service delivery (e.g., family inclusive case management); and
- lead efforts to ensure the sustainability of Safer Return beyond the demonstration period.
Services to Individuals and Families

At the individual and family level, Safer Foundation would either directly provide or subcontract and oversee the nature and quality of comprehensive case management and a suite of wrap-around services recognized as crucial to reentry success: substance abuse treatment, employment readiness including both soft and hard skills training, placement in transitional and permanent employment, medical and mental health treatment, transitional housing, legal assistance, mentoring, and peer support groups. It was not expected that every participant would need the full complement of available services. Formerly incarcerated individuals were defined as the primary recipient of Safer Return services; families could receive limited assistance largely to enable them to provide better support for formerly incarcerated participants in Safer Return.

As justice intermediary, Safer Foundation planned to screen, provide training for, and monitor subcontractor organizations commissioned to provide other needed services to ensure that sufficient, high-quality, focused assistance would be available in a timely manner to meet the needs of individuals in the targeted community. However, the Safer Return demonstration was not expected to fund all needed services, since the model was set up to leverage existing services rather than introduce duplicative delivery systems. Additionally, the planning team hoped that some envisioned system reforms would improve collaboration and help identify where there were gaps in services that might need to be addressed.

Figure 1. Safer Return Model

Case Management

Reentry coaches (i.e., case managers) would be trained and expected to (1) reach out to eligible individuals and their families to offer assistance both prerelease and postrelease, (2) build customized reentry plans by working with individuals to assess their individualized strengths, needs for service and support, and priorities for accepting needed services, (3) link individuals to services that were identified in their reentry plans, and 4) monitor individual progress, including periodic reassessments and case planning to reflect any resolved issues or new needs for service needs. Families also would be able to
receive limited amounts of needed services through their connection to the reentry coaches. Following the La Bodega model, *family* was broadly defined to include relatives, close friends, and others who were significant sources of social support for the eligible individual participants.

Recruitment of individuals was expected to be facilitated by a partnership between Safer Return and IDOC through which eligible individuals—determined by anticipated return to East Garfield Park zip codes—would be identified 90 days prerelease and invited to attend small-group enrollment sessions. Key prerelease activities that were envisioned included screening and assessment, transitional and reentry planning, “welcome home” exit orientation, and greetings at the gate arrangements.

**Screening and Assessment** Safer Return anticipated using a newly revised intake tool that the Safer Foundation had recently developed, which included risk assessment measurements found in the Level of Service Inventory-Revised (LSI-R) and what staff perceived as the best alcohol (CAGE Screening Test for Alcohol Dependence), drug (Drug Abuse Screening Test [DAST]), and mental health (K6 Mental Health Screening Tool) treatment screens for the targeted population. For this demonstration, the expectation was that the intake instrument embedded in Safer Foundation’s AXIOM database would be revised to gather additional information on both criminal risks and family status. Family Justice and La Bodega de Familia staff would be subcontracted to develop additional family questions or items for the assessment. Also, the Maryland Reentry Project indicated willingness to help in developing a mini checklist tool that the welcome home exit orientation could use during prerelease meetings.

**Transitional and Reentry Planning** Reentry coaches would individually meet with program participants prerelease and with key family and household members in the community to develop individualized reentry plans based on strengths and needs assessments, as well as individual and family goals and objectives. Family and individual buy-in for the goals in the reentry plan was required to support and implement them. The individual and the family were coached to establish their own priorities. *The reentry plan was to provide the blueprint for service referrals/provision.* While the planning was to be a joint process, the reentry coach was expected to ensure that the plans were complete and did not leave out necessary activities or steps.

From the outset, Safer Foundation and the Institute recognized there likely would be some logistical hurdles due to the large number of prisons in Illinois and their distance from Chicago. IDOC agreed to consider prerelease transfer of Safer Return participants to community-accessible facilities, to the extent practical. Nonetheless, the planning team recognized that some of the meetings and communications between inmates and reentry coaches or Welcome Home panels might have to be conducted electronically, using video-teleconferencing.

**Welcome Home Panels/Exit Orientations** Approximately 45- to 60-days prior to returning home, eligible Safer Return participants would be expected to participate in Welcome Home panels/exit orientations, modeled on Maryland Reentry Partnership (REP), that offer a promising approach to helping prisoners make the physical and psychological transition from prison to the community. These group meetings would be attended by soon-to-be-released prisoners, family members (when feasible), reentry coaches, community service providers (particularly those identified in attending inmates’ reentry plans), and possibly community members, police, or parole officers. Some Welcome Home exit orientations might take place via video-teleconferencing. The purpose of these exit orientations was two-fold: (1) to deliver a message of support for individuals returning to the community (including the support of parole and police) and (2) to provide additional details on the specific services that are needed by particular individuals and families attending each meeting. Community service providers would positively communicate their intent to welcome returning individuals home, their willingness to help formerly incarcerated individuals take advantage of local opportunities for pro-social interaction to avoid recidivism, and their commitments to provide the kinds of assistance that would permit individuals to access needed services, engage in pro-social activities, and achieve self-sufficiency. Parole and police officers would explain that they see reentry supports as helpful for public safety, and that they support people reentering their communities, as long as such individuals remained free of criminal involvement.
Greetings at the Gate

Arrangements would be made, where feasible, to have the reentry coach or other individuals (such as family members or citizen volunteers) meet the former prisoner at the gates to provide support at the time of release.

Safer Return anticipated providing services for up to one year postrelease in two small site locations within the targeted community. Individual participants who failed to meet their specific reentry benchmarks in that timeframe would be invited to continue participating until they achieved those objectives. Reentry coaches would meet with participants either at the community office location or in the clients’ homes. Participants were expected to have more frequent contact during the initial postrelease period (at least weekly for the first two months), and then more limited contact as individuals became more self-sufficient and successful meeting benchmarks in their specific reentry plans. A 24-hour hotline was envisioned to enable participants to request immediate assistance in the event of a crisis.

Reentry coaches would have moderate resources at their disposal to intervene when participants experienced tangible barriers to successful reentry (such as work-related circumstances that impeded employment placement or retention). Critical supports that reentry coaches would be able to access and use, as needed included transportation passes for job interviews and the first two weeks of work, interview clothing vouchers, emergency funds for crisis situations (usually to be paid back by the participant), and steel-tipped boot, tool, and other workplace support vouchers. Safer staff estimated that each participant would require approximately $150 in supports of this nature.

Incentives and related supports and rewards have been found to generate steadier employment and increased wages for individuals who are low skilled and low earners (Holzer and Martinson 2005). Therefore, Safer planned to use its model program job placement incentive structure with Safer Return participants: at the critical employment benchmarks (30-, 60-, and 90-days), Safer Return participants would receive $25 gift cards. Additionally, at the 90-day benchmark, their photos would be taken and placed in a visible location, along with a write up on each person.

All participants would be expected to participate in special exit planning staffings, which would be held nine months after program engagement. During this time, strategies would be considered for those who had not yet met benchmarks and, if needed, additional resources would be brought to bear to achieve self-sufficiency benchmarks.

Wrap-Around Services

Wrap-around services would be made available either from Safer Foundation, subgrants to providers under the Safer Return Demonstration, or leveraged through existing community or local government services.

Career Planning and Employment

The program planning recognized that formerly incarcerated individuals are a heterogeneous population, some of whom have work skills, employment histories, and job-seeking networks they can draw upon, while others do not. Consequently, the program vision included three primary paths to employment: (1) pre-job preparation for those who needed to address nonemployment issues (e.g., substance abuse, mental illness, or anger management) before they entered the workforce; (2) transitional jobs that would be time-limited subsidized jobs, combining real work, skills development, and supportive services to help participants overcome barriers to employment; and (3) placement in permanent jobs. All program participants who lacked strong job histories would participate in job readiness workshops focused on how to look for jobs, prepare applications and resumes, conduct interviews, and monitor progress in interacting with one’s employer and other workers. The Oregon Civic Community Works model was to be adapted as a Civic Justice Corps, under which Safer Return participants—primarily those who lacked high school degrees, GEDs, or work histories and those returning from extensive periods of incarceration—would engage in community service projects as transitional jobs. The expectation was that these individuals would acquire skills, hold resume-building jobs, and provide needed community services. Such positions placed them in a real and visible role as people who were making active contributions to the community. These meaningful work service jobs would enable formerly incarcerated persons to build self-respect, while providing a form of restitution to
the victim, represented by the community and establishing new bonds between themselves and the community.

**Housing** This element was recognized as one of the most critical, and often unmet, needs at the point of reentry. Where substance abuse treatment was a significant issue, participants would be screened and placed into existing inpatient drug treatment centers or recovery homes, provided through partner resources leveraged from the Division of Alcoholism and Substance Abuse (DASA) and IDOC. For those who did not require significant residential treatment intervention, but had the need for stable drug- and crime-free housing, Safer Return intended to seed several Oxford Houses in the East Garfield Park neighborhood.

**Mentoring** Program participants were expected to be offered mentorship as a voluntary activity. The mentoring would take place largely in small-group settings that would include four clients and one mentor, using a culturally-relevant framework, focused on transformative relationship development, based on training from the Mentoring Center in Oakland, California. Community volunteers, some of whom would be formerly incarcerated individuals who had success reintegrating into the community and could provide peer support, would be recruited and supervised by FBOs and CBOs.

**Treatment for Substance Abuse and Mental Illness, and Other Health Services** The program would leverage existing resources in the local area. Persons with substance abuse or mental health issues would be referred to community-based treatment partners for assessment, creation of service plans, and treatment services, as needed. The Department of Public Health (IDPH) was expected to work with Safer Return to identify public health grantees to provide health services, including medical and dental check-ups for program participants. Reentry coaches were also expected to work with local healthcare providers as another avenue for serving individuals and families (particularly those lacking insurance) with special health issues, such as diabetes and HIV/AIDS.

**Legal Assistance** This service would be made available, as needed, for orders of protection, expungement, sealing, clemency, and other matters.

**Systemic Reforms**

At the *systems level* and under the leadership of the justice intermediary, Safer Foundation would press for criminal justice reforms, such as (1) the introduction of Welcome Home panels, comprised of service providers and citizens, that would outreach to prisoners prerelease and assist in connecting them to formal and informal community support networks; (2) neighborhood-based parole officers who would be dedicated to Safer Return parolees and able to engage in co-case management with the reentry coaches; (3) changes in parole decisionmaking, policies and practices, and implementation of graduated sanctioning and rewards to undercut the propensity to revoke technical violators, which contributes to high reincarceration rates; (4) enhanced prerelease transition and discharge planning and preparation; and (5) possible relocation of prisoners to central locations closer to home prior to release to facilitate more intensive prerelease preparation and more opportunity for connectedness to family and community support networks. Similarly, as the intermediary, Safer Foundation would facilitate service reforms, such as the introduction of a service cabinet comprised of professional and paraprofessional organizations that were interested in serving formerly incarcerated individuals and their families and households; and new or expanded services (e.g., transitional housing) to fill gaps in meeting the needs of this population.

**Enhanced Community Conditions**

At the *local and community level*, Safer Foundation would work with neighborhood representatives to (1) assess the local landscape for assets and deficits that could affect the overall success of the initiative, (2) determine what systems of informal support could be initiated or leveraged to assist those returning from prison to establish long-term and meaningful pro-social relationships within the immediate area, and (3) establish viable community justice partnerships that could effectively deter or respond to criminal behavior. In this regard, Safer Foundation began facilitating the formation of Community Advisory Councils during the planning grant, which was meant to serve multiple purposes as the project began in earnest, including identifying gaps in services and needed resources, setting priorities for community
action, providing community feedback and guidance to the justice intermediary, and, hopefully, recruiting residents to support Safer Return projects requiring citizen involvement (such as the Civic Justice Corps and mentoring).

Additionally, the vision for the model anticipated that the business community would be engaged to help develop and implement all employment services and to provide employment opportunities, as is Safer Foundation’s customary practice. It also was envisioned that FBOs and CBOs within East Garfield Park would be integrally involved in creating a seamless process of coordinated reentry. In particular, the model expected that such organizations would be engaged in preparing for welcoming people back to the communities, providing mentors, and acting as liaisons to formerly incarcerated persons and their families as they follow through with their reentry plans and adjust to life in their neighborhoods.

Lastly, the Safer Return model planned to adapt the Civic Justice Corps model to provide stipended transitional jobs to formerly incarcerated individuals, while engaging them, their families, and other community residents in neighborhood improvement projects, such as beautification initiatives or “public works” projects identified by the City of Chicago.

**Main Elements of the Research Design**

Safer Return was conceptualized as an action research demonstration: a rigorous evaluation design was envisioned to document program impacts, as described below. Executed by staff at the Institute, the research focuses on capturing individual, family, system, and community outcomes using a quasi-experimental design. A multi-method approach, including a process, impact, and economic evaluation of Safer Return, incorporates semistructured interviews, field observations, programmatic data, official government records, and surveys of formerly incarcerated persons, their family and social support members, and community members. West Englewood, another high-density prisoner reentry community in Chicago, was selected as the comparison community for the East Garfield Park demonstration site based on analysis of reentry rates, crime trends, land use patterns, and sociodemographic data and following discussions with key stakeholders. Formerly incarcerated individuals returning to West Englewood during the Safer Return demonstration timeframe constitute the comparison sample for Safer Return participants. Family members of both Safer Return participants and West Englewood study participants are included in the study, as well as community members in East Garfield Park and West Englewood. The evaluation is meant to answer some of the most critical questions about Safer Return:

- Does the Safer Return justice intermediary lead to more coordinated planning and integrated services among criminal justice agencies, community-based service providers, and other private-sector entities that offer formal and informal support?
- Do Safer Return participants receive better case management and more individualized and comprehensive services than comparison subjects?
- Do Safer Return participants demonstrate better outcomes than comparison subjects? That is, does Safer Return (1) reduce technical noncompliance, criminality, and reincarceration by offering pro-social opportunities combined with improved supervision and sanctioning alternatives; (2) improve self-sufficiency and quality of life through family and community involvement, mentoring and peer support groups, transitional and permanent employment, and housing; and (3) improve health by addressing substance abuse, mental illness, and medical treatment needs?
- Do the benefits derived from Safer Return exceed the costs?

The purpose of the process evaluation was to assess and report on Safer Return activities aimed at formerly incarcerated individuals and their families, criminal justice system policies and practices, formal and informal service delivery, and community outreach and mobilization. The planned impact evaluation assumed a strong quasi-experimental comparison of outcomes for returning prisoners who did and did not receive Safer Return reentry services during their first year of release from prison. The economic analysis is expected to consider the additional expenditures and resources required to operate a reentry program such as Safer Return, and the returns on this investment. The expectation was that results of the
evaluation would be useful to policymakers, practitioners, and researchers to guide future efforts to improve reentry outcomes.

The logic model displayed in the evaluation framework (figure 2) depicts the causal links that are embedded in the demonstration model: namely, that Safer Return will implement an intensive process of institutional and community reforms (column 3) facilitated by a justice intermediary (column 2) that will create significantly enhanced responses to formerly incarcerated persons, their families, and communities (column 4), resulting in both short- (intermediate) and long-term (end) impacts for participating individuals (column 5).

Anticipated data sources included

- two waves of participant surveys drawn from a sample of individuals in the Safer Return program and a sample of individuals released to the comparison community at 4- and 16-months postrelease;
- two waves of family surveys drawn from a sample of family members of Safer Return participants and family members of individuals released to the comparison community at 4- and 16-months postrelease;
- two waves of community member surveys in East Garfield Park and West Englewood;
- two waves of physical block ratings in East Garfield Park and West Englewood;
- program and cost data from the agencies providing services to Safer Return participants;
- semistructured interviews with Safer Return and other service provider staff;
- field observations of Safer Return program operations;
- electronic and hardcopy administrative/official records data from various government agencies; and
- program records from the Safer Foundation’s AXIOM database.

As noted above, the impact of Safer Return will be measured using a combination of administrative records and self-reported information. Since Safer Return was designed to offer services to every individual returning to East Garfield Park from prison, it was not deemed possible to survey all possible or actual participants. For that reason, the research design expected that two waves of individual surveys would be administered to samples of individuals returning to the treatment and comparison communities from prison (N=250 Safer Return participants and 250 comparisons returning to West Englewood). While the program intended to serve both returning males and females, the research sub-sample (i.e., survey sample) would be administered solely to males.

The baseline survey of former inmates would cover the participants’ sociodemographic characteristics and participation in prison programming, as well as their criminal justice, employment, education, housing, mental health and substance abuse, and family histories. The follow-up survey would examine changes in the participants’ criminal justice, employment, education, housing, mental health and substance abuse, and family contexts, as well as the extent and frequency of services received. Due to the breadth of information included in the survey instruments, these interviews were expected to take approximately an hour to an hour and a half to complete. Survey respondents would be eligible to receive incentives of up to $100: $40 per survey wave, $10 as a bonus for completion of both waves, and $10 if they contacted the Urban Institute or its survey subcontractor between waves to update their contact information.
Figure 2. Safer Return Evaluation Framework

ANTECEDENT FACTORS
- Formerly Incarcerated Persons
  - Demographic characteristics
  - Criminal history
  - Mental and physical health
  - Substance abuse
  - Education, training, and employment history
  - Family dynamics
  - Peer associations

Neighborhood Context
- Population characteristics
- Crime rates
- Local economy/employment rates
- Service availability
- Residential stability

Systemic Context
- Community-based criminal justice policies and practices
- Correctional policies and practices
- Health education
- Health and human services policies and practices
- CBO and FBO service availability and practices
- Adult education policies and practices
- Business sector policies and practices

JUSTICE INTERMEDIARY FUNCTIONS
- Identify and coordinate policy levers for systemic reforms
- Form local partnerships
- Build community and institutional capacity
- Organize the community
- Manage cases management
- Perform direct and subcontracted service provision, monitoring, and quality assurance
- Provide training and technical assistance to community providers and volunteers
- Provide advocacy
- Provide a fiscal administrator
- Fiscal administrator

PRE-RELEASE REFORMS
- Risk and needs assessments
- Discharge planning and transitional preparation
- Welcome Home Panels

COMMUNITY-BASED REFORMS
- Justice System
  - Neighborhood-based program officers
  - Revocation policy reform (graduated sanctioning)
  - Law enforcement partnerships (Kennedy model)
  - Parole and service provider coordination (Sheridan)
- Service Providers
  - Service cabinet
  - Community-based needs/strengths assessment
  - Comprehensive social network case management (La Bodega)
  - Wrap-around services
    - Employment readiness, transitional jobs, placement, and post placement support (Ready4Work)
    - Substance abuse treatment (Ready 4Work)
    - Health & mental health treatment
    - Transitional housing (Oxford House)
- Informal Networks
  - Community Advisory Council
  - Civic Community Works neighborhood improvement programs
  - Community mentoring and reentry peer support groups
  - Business sector

SYSTEM OUTPUTS
- Justice System
  - Transition and reentry preparation
  - Enhanced supervision and monitoring of compliance
  - Increased use of sanctioning as alternatives to revocation/incarceration
  - Reduction in arrests and other criminal justice costs
  - Coordination of parole and providers’ efforts
- Community Service Delivery
  - Wraparound services matched to individual/family needs and risks
  - Improved access to needed services (e.g., medical care, mental health care, and medications)
  - Reduced use of costly emergency health services
  - Improved treatment and service quality
  - Enhanced informal service network
  - Reduced barriers to employability
  - Increased employment opportunities, career pathways to living wage jobs
- Family Support
  - Reduced reliance on foster care or public support for kinship care
- Transfer Payments
  - Linkage to income support, public assistance, food stamps, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, Social Security Income, Earned Income Tax Credit, public housing, Medicaid

IMPACT AND ECONOMIC ANALYSES

NEIGHBORHOOD OUTCOMES
- Improved community well-being/collective efficacy
- Expanded service network and utilization
- Enhanced community development and capital
- Reduced crime and victimization
- Improved perception of community (e.g., safety)
- Improved community attitudes towards formerly incarcerated individual
- Increased civic involvement

INDIVIDUAL AND FAMILY OUTCOMES
- Crime/Substance Abuse
  - Increased supervision compliance/reduction in violations
  - Reduced criminal involvement
  - Reduced substance use, morbidity, and mortality
- Employment
  - Expanded job skills and credentials
  - Increased employment/job retention
  - Increased income/benefits from legal enterprises
- Health/Life Skills
  - Compliance with health treatment
  - Improved mental and physical health
  - Positive attitudes toward self and community
  - Improved life skills (e.g., anger management, money management)
  - Housing stability
  - Increased pro-social community involvement
- Family
  - Improved parenting/family skills
  - Parents spend more quality time with children
  - Reduced family conflict
  - Strengthened pro-social family ties
  - Family reunification or other indications of stability
  - Increased financial child support
  - Increased family finances

IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT

The Framework for Safer Return
Additionally, the Institute planned to survey participants’ family members (N=300, split evenly between the treatment and comparison cohorts, with survey administration during the same timeframes as the participant surveys). The family surveys would cover the family members’ sociodemographic characteristics, as well as their contact and interactions with the formerly incarcerated individuals, their receipt of services, and perceptions of family functioning and stability. The surveys are designed to take approximately 30–45 minutes to complete. Family members would be offered incentives of up to $65: $25 per survey wave, $10 as a bonus for completion of both waves, and $5 if they contact the Institute or its survey subcontractor between waves to update their contact information.

Community surveys were expected to be administered in person by teams of Safer Foundation clients trained by Urban Institute researchers. The study design included two waves of surveys with East Garfield Park and West Englewood residents, focusing on such topics as community members’ sociodemographic characteristics; their contact and interactions with the formerly incarcerated individuals in their neighborhood; their knowledge and receipt of services by Safer Return and other programs; and their perceptions of neighborhood stability and wellbeing, including perceptions of crime and community disorder, fear of crime, satisfaction with law enforcement, and perceptions of community services and service needs. The survey was designed to take approximately 30 minutes to complete. Residents who completed surveys would be given a token gift to show appreciation for their willingness to participate in the research effort.

Two waves of physical block ratings in East Garfield Park and West Englewood were also planned, during relatively the same timeframe as the community surveys. The purpose of these ratings would be to document an objective picture of the physical and social environment. Data collectors would be asked to systematically observe and record the presence of neighborhood physical characteristics that are part of the social environment, such as trash and litter services, defaced or missing street signs, abandoned cars, parking violations, presence or absence of public recreational activities, loitering, and illegal drug deals.

Other data sources include field observation and stakeholder interviews, as well as review of secondary documentation. For example, during routinely scheduled site visits (planned for several times per year), Institute researchers would conduct brief, semistructured interviews with Safer Return and service provider staff to gain in-depth understanding of the case management and other service delivery to program participants. These types of interviews would be scheduled with community members and volunteers, mentors, case managers, sector managers, job readiness trainers, work crew supervisors, and members of the Safer Return staff. Further, parallel interviews would be conducted with their counterparts who provide supports to the comparison group.

Additionally, discussions held during the planning period suggested that Safer Return staff and partner agencies that might provide services to the treatment group collected extensive data on program participants. The research team hoped that most of this information—particularly on intake assessments, discharge and reentry plans, case management, and service referrals—would be captured in Safer Return’s database. Institute researchers anticipated working with Safer Return staff to ensure that key data elements related to service delivery were being consistently tracked for all Safer Return participants.

Summary
This report has identified the program model and study design for the Safer Return research demonstration. Although exploratory conversations began in 2005 and planning began in earnest in 2006, the demonstration was not funded until 2007. After a four-month start-up phase during which logistical arrangements were made for core operations such as hiring and training staff, finalizing partnership roles and responsibilities for recruiting participants and service delivery, and establishing the Safer Return community office in East Garfield Park, the program began in early 2008 to outreach to inmates that IDOC identified as eligible for enrollment in the program based upon their pending release status and plans to live in East Garfield Park. Future reports planned for this series will focus on how the program and research were implemented, and the qualitative and quantitative findings from practitioner and researcher perspectives.
Notes

1. Shortly after implementation of Safer Return, service delivery in the demonstration community was expanded to include West Garfield Park. As a result, future reports on the implementation and impact of Safer Return refer to Garfield Park as the demonstration site.

2. In 2005, the Illinois Department of Corrections Offender Based Tracking System (IDOC CY05) documented that, in fiscal year 2004, approximately 70 percent of the state’s releases return to the City of Chicago and 32 percent of Chicago releases were released to five zip codes.

3. Assumes prisoners returning to Chicago were released equally throughout the year.

4. The Safer Return National Advisory Board, cochaired by Jeremy Travis, president of John Jay College of Criminal Justice of the City University of New York, and Diane Williams, president of the Safer Foundation, is comprised of senior officials from the government agencies that most impact the formerly incarcerated, national experts on reentry, and service providers.


11. The proposed Welcome Home Exit Orientations were expected to differ from existing Project Safe Neighborhood/Parolee Panels: they ideally would take place prerelease, not in the community, and the emphasis would be on providing access to formal and informal support networks, rather than a focus on law enforcement.

12. Parallel data would not be accessible for the comparison group.
References


