RESEARCH REPORT

Implementing Youth Violence Reduction Strategies

Findings from a Scan of Youth Gun, Group, and Gang Violence Interventions

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In 2018, the Urban Institute received funding from the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) and the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) to develop a guide for using research-based practice to reduce youth gun and gang/group violence. It is intended to inform local government, law enforcement, and community-violence-intervention stakeholders as they implement new strategies and refine existing ones to reduce youth gang/group and gun violence in their communities. The primary audience for the guide—and for this scan of interventions—is the leadership of local government bodies (e.g., mayors, county executives, county commissioners, youth violence reduction task forces) because their decisions greatly influence whether violence reduction practices are successfully implemented and sustained. We frame the findings in this report with this audience in mind, although we hope and expect they will be of broader use and interest to any entity involved in designing and implementing violence reduction efforts—including community-based organizations serving youth and young adults—as well as community stakeholders, policymakers, professionals, and researchers working on youth group and gun violence.

We used a narrow scope for this project consistent with the interest of the NIJ and the OJJDP, focusing on strategies and approaches explicitly intended to reduce gun-related violence committed by young people between the ages of 10 and 25 who may also be associated with gangs/groups (box 1), including interventions that solely or primarily serve youth.\(^1\) We did not focus on all strategies designed to reduce youth violence, nor on gang prevention and intervention efforts not expressly intended to reduce gun violence and homicide. Based on this framing, we focus on interventions that are immediate responses to an acute problem, rather than those that address risk factors associated with violence broadly.

The Urban research team conducted the following two core tasks, which resulted in the practice guide and two accompanying reports:
A review of literature on violence reduction strategies. Urban identified and synthesized research on the implementation and impact of relevant violence prevention, reduction, and control strategies. The findings from the research synthesis can be found here.

A scan of practices designed to reduce violence. With input from a group of subject-matter experts advising the project, the NIJ, and the OJJDP, Urban identified 14 innovative violence reduction interventions including focused deterrence interventions, public health interventions, and Spergel Model of Gang Intervention and Suppression/OJJDP Comprehensive Gang Model interventions. Urban worked with leadership from each intervention to collect program materials, observe activities, and interview intervention leadership and staff, community partners, law enforcement and justice system personnel, and program participants.

In this report, we describe findings from the scan of practice related to the key components of implementing violence reduction programs, and the barriers to and facilitators of implementation. We do not provide recommendations in this report because we do so in the accompanying practice guide. This report contains the following five sections:

- an overview of Urban’s project and key project activities, including the research synthesis and scan of practice
- a brief summary of key gaps in the knowledge base about implementing violence reduction strategies
- a description of the methodology, data collection activities, and thematic analysis used for the scan of practice, and of modifications made in response to the COVID-19 pandemic
- findings based on the data collected through the scan pertaining to the implementation of violence reduction strategies
- a conclusion summarizing the scan of practice and key findings

BOX 1

A Note on Language: “Gangs” and “Groups”

Though there are various definitions of gangs in federal and state statutes, there is not a universal definition of the term gang used throughout the field. We approach the use of the word gang with caution because our interviews with practitioners surfaced concerns about the term’s detrimental and labelling aspects (including real impacts such as being included in gang databases or subject to gang
enhancements in sentencing and the impacts of framing young people as dangerous threats to be controlled). Furthermore, some prominent organizations in the youth gun violence prevention field, like the National Network for Safe Communities, avoid the term gang in favor of group because many collections of people that contribute to violence are excluded by the statutory definition and they find that using gang as an umbrella term is therefore unnecessary and unhelpful. In recognition of this, we use the term group in lieu of or alongside “gang” in this guide where appropriate. We use the term gang, however, when referencing specific interventions that use it (e.g., the Gang Reduction Initiative of Denver) or characterizing areas of research and practice that are oriented toward it, such as OJJDP’s Comprehensive Gang Model. We also seek to use people-first language throughout this guide to foreground the humanity of young people involved in gangs and groups and at high risk of perpetrating and being victimized by gun violence.

Notes:


Problem Statement

Group and gun violence perpetrated by youth and young adults is a destructive problem for some communities, particularly those characterized by historically high levels of concentrated disadvantage and community disinvestment (Graif et al. 2014; MacDonald and Gover 2005). In response to this challenge, community-based organizations, local governments, and law enforcement and justice agencies across the country have designed and implemented various interventions to prevent, reduce, and control youth group and gun violence (Abt 2017; NCPC 2007; Wong et al. 2012). As we found in our research synthesis (Matei et al. 2021), however, research about different violence reduction models is limited and the findings are mixed in several ways. First, some well-known violence reduction approaches (e.g., focused deterrence) have been more extensively researched than others (e.g., community-led mediation, public health approaches, faith-based approaches). Moreover, the evidence on some approaches (e.g., focused deterrence) is positive overall but is mixed for others (e.g., public health and Comprehensive Gang Model approaches). In addition, though research has shown that effective programs engage in activities such as case management, service provision, enhanced surveillance, outreach, and public education campaigns, little is known about the extent to which these are effective for reducing violence. Lastly, research has shown that the interventions with promising outcomes are most commonly those that are led by law enforcement and involve the community, but
more can be done to strengthen the relationships between law enforcement and communities. Importantly, we derived these takeaways from a research base weighted toward interventions led by law enforcement and/or the federal government, because those interventions tend to be well funded and well evaluated. Through our scan of practice, we intended to help fill the above gaps and limitations in the research base and elevate program stakeholders’ perspectives on how to best implement violence reduction strategies.

Methodology

Urban’s scan of practice was designed to document a convenience sample of interventions focused specifically on reducing youth group and gun violence and to understand the interventions’ goals, structures, implementation considerations, and correlates of perceived success. The interventions comprised strategies and approaches explicitly intended to reduce gun-related violence committed by young people between the ages of 10 and 25 who may also be associated with gangs/groups, including interventions that solely or primarily serve youth. We aimed to include interventions falling within three categories of gun violence reduction strategies: focused deterrence, public health strategies, and Comprehensive Gang Model strategies (box 2). We also included interventions that fell outside these categories.

BOX 2

Three Types of Gun Violence Reduction Strategies

The focused deterrence model includes enforcement and resource-driven responses. In a focused deterrence intervention, partners demand that people affiliated with a particular group desist from specified behaviors harmful to the community (e.g., gun violence, intimate partner violence, open air drug market activity) and promise to support them if they desist and use enhanced, targeted enforcement if they do not. The Group Violence Intervention is the focused deterrence approach applied to gun violence. This message is delivered in advance of any Group Violence Intervention actions taken. This can be done in call-in meetings of individuals in groups that are involved in active conflicts, with the threat of sanctions applied to entire groups, or in individual custom notification meetings with particularly individuals at high-risk. The robustness of the service and support engagement can vary considerably in focused deterrence efforts, with some having robust outreach, case management, and service connection components, and others having more modest service provision through referrals to community-based organizations and other resource avenues. (Example: Ceasefire)
The public health model understands violence as a public health problem and thus asserts that it needs a multi-layered solution focused not just on individuals, but also on societal factors influencing their behavior. Public health interventions emphasize prevention but also rely on outreach workers to speak with current group members. They operate outside of law enforcement and include no threat of punishment via law enforcement. (Example: Cure Violence)

The Comprehensive Gang Model

This model is a data-driven, strategic response designed to change youth’ behaviors to reduce gang-related violence, especially in neighborhoods with high incidences of gang-related violence. It is a highly adaptive framework based on an assessment of local problems and priorities and may overlap with both focused deterrence and public health approaches. It emphasizes accountability and centers on the collaboration of stakeholders such as probation, law enforcement, social service providers, and grassroots and faith-based organizations. Outreach workers, who may also be credible messengers, are a central aspect of the model. It draws on five main strategies that can be implemented in parallel or sequentially: community mobilization, opportunities provision, social intervention, suppression, and organizational change.

Site Selection

In December 2019, Urban researchers developed a matrix of prospective interventions, drawing on our knowledge of programs and organizations that work to reduce group and gun violence. The matrix included more than 30 interventions and intervention components, such as focused deterrence, public health, and Comprehensive Gang Model interventions; hospital-based violence intervention programs; mediation; and case management. Urban also categorized the interventions by jurisdiction to identify areas where multiple strategies occurred (“innovation clusters”). In December 2019, Urban shared an initial version of the matrix with the NIJ, the OJJDP, and a group of subject-matter experts advising the project to collect their feedback and recommendations for additional interventions. Synthesizing and drawing on that feedback, Urban developed inclusion criteria to vet and select sites for the scan of practice. We used the following criteria to ensure the scan included a range of violence reduction approaches in a variety of contexts:

- **Region**: we aimed to have all regions of the United States represented.
- **Jurisdiction type**: we included large, midsize, urban, suburban, exurban, and rural jurisdictions.
- **Expert recommendations**: we prioritized sites that multiple experts recommended as innovative or critical to include.
- **Type of intervention**: we ensured three main intervention categories (focused deterrence, public health, and Comprehensive Gang Model) were represented.

- **Jurisdictions fielding multiple interventions**: we prioritized places where multiple strategies were implemented to learn from the interactions of different interventions.

- **Intervention start date**: we wanted a mix of interventions in the earlier stages of implementation and those that had already been implemented and may have evolved.

- **Amount of research on the intervention**: to fill gaps in the knowledge base, we aimed to mostly include interventions that had not been researched.

We applied these criteria to our initial matrix of interventions and compared all of the interventions' attributes, recognizing that not all interventions satisfied all the criteria. Through this process, we narrowed our list of potential interventions, which represented the criteria in as balanced a manner as possible, and we shared the list of 15 interventions with the NIJ, the OJJDP, and the group of subject-matter experts in March 2020. We finalized the list of interventions with the NIJ and the OJJDP, and all but four participated in our study. We worked with the NIJ and the OJJDP to identify 3 replacement interventions, and we ultimately included 14 in the scan. The final list is shown in box 3 and a map of intervention locations is shown in figure 1. This group of interventions is a convenience sample representing different approaches and is intentionally varied; therefore, the list is not necessarily representative of all the violence reduction strategies. In addition, because some interventions we aimed to include declined or were unable to participate, we were not able to fully represent the above criteria, especially regional representation. For additional information about the interventions, please see the summary profiles for each program in appendix A.

**BOX 3**

**Interventions to Reduce Youth Group and Gun Violence Included in Urban’s Scan of Practice**

- **Ceasefire Oakland** (Oakland, California)
- **City of Milwaukee Office of Violence Prevention** (Milwaukee, Wisconsin)
- **City of Los Angeles Mayor’s Office of Gang Reduction and Youth Development (GRYD)** (Los Angeles)
- **Crisis Management System** (New York)
- **Cumberland Collective to Help Reverse Inequality and Violence Everywhere (CC THRIVE)** (Cumberland County, New Jersey)
- **Gang Reduction Initiative of Denver (GRID)** (Denver)
- **Mayor’s Office of Gang Prevention and Intervention** (Houston)
- **Project Imagine** (Danville, Virginia)
- **Project Longevity** (New Haven, Connecticut)
- **Richmond Office of Neighborhood Safety (ONS)/Peacemaker Fellowship®** (Richmond, California)
- **Safe Streets** (Baltimore)
- **San Francisco Wraparound Project** (San Francisco)
- **Stockton Gun-Violence Reduction Model (Ceasefire)** (Stockton, California)
- **TenPoint Coalition** (Indianapolis)

**FIGURE 1**
Locations of Violence Reduction Interventions Included in This Scan of Practice

**Data Collection Activities**

Urban originally planned to collect data through field visits to five interventions and through telephone interviews and other remote methods with the remaining ones. This plan was modified, however,
because of changes the programs made in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, pandemic-related travel restrictions, and the social demonstrations that followed high-profile incidents of police violence that altered some communities’ activities.

The pandemic forced the interventions to adapt their operations and service provision. Many of the organizations shifted their focus and energy to supporting community members impacted by the pandemic and assisting with pandemic-related efforts, such as by distributing personal protective equipment. Furthermore, many of the organizations and communities were actively involved in the nationwide protests against police brutality and calling for reforming and/or divesting from police in summer and fall 2020. Moreover, many of these communities experienced increases in gun violence and other violent incidents during that period. Because of these events, organizations wanted and needed to invest their time and resources in responding to these challenges. Because gun violence and COVID-19 disproportionally impact communities of color, the distressed neighborhoods where the violence reduction initiatives in our study are focused have also been disproportionately impacted by the pandemic, the economic recession, death, and increases in violence (Everytown for Gun Safety 2021).

Despite these challenges, 11 of the programs included in our initial matrix were willing to engage with the research team; 4 were understandably focused on responding to these challenges and did not participate in the scan, and we replaced these 3 new interventions. We collected data from September 2020 through May 2021, and all activities were conducted virtually because of COVID-19 travel restrictions. Activities included the following:

- We collected and reviewed program materials including strategic plans, program manuals, and performance reports.
- We observed program activities including a call-in meeting and a meeting with program partners.
- We interviewed 105 stakeholders who designed, developed, and implemented gun violence reduction strategies (table 1). Stakeholders included intervention leaders and local government officials (n = 11), intervention staff (n = 45), community partners and members including representatives from neighborhood associations and the clergy (n = 32), law enforcement and probation officers (n = 16), and program participants (n = 1).
TABLE 1
Number of Stakeholders Interviewed in Urban’s Scan of Practice, by Violence Reduction Intervention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervention</th>
<th>Number of stakeholders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ceasefire Oakland (Oakland, CA)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Los Angeles Mayor’s Office of Gang Reduction and Youth Development (GRYD) (Los Angeles)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Milwaukee Office of Violence Prevention (Milwaukee, WI)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis Management System (New York)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumberland Collective to Help Reverse Inequality and Violence Everywhere (CC THRIVE) (Cumberland County, NJ)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gang Reduction Initiative of Denver (GRID) (Denver)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor’s Office of Gang Prevention and Intervention (Houston)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Imagine (Danville, VA)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Longevity (New Haven, CT)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richmond Office of Neighborhood Safety (ONS)/Peacemaker Fellowship® (Richmond, CA)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe Streets (Baltimore)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco Wraparound Project (San Francisco)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockton Gun-Violence Reduction Model (Ceasefire) (Stockton, CA)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TenPoint Coalition (Indianapolis)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Urban research team.

Thematic Analysis

The Urban research team systematically analyzed the qualitative information collected through the observations and interviews. We developed a deductive coding scheme based on the interview protocol that included nine domains: local context, populations of focus and geographic area, intervention design and structure, staffing and leadership, services, partnerships, relationships with law enforcement, data and measurement, and sustainability. We coded to subdomains, analyzed data to identify themes within the subdomains, and grouped findings by nine main domains (table 2).
TABLE 2
Coding Scheme Used for Interviews with Violence Reduction Intervention Stakeholders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Subdomains</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local context</td>
<td>- Community makeup&lt;br&gt;- Community strengths&lt;br&gt;- Drivers of gun violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Populations of focus and geographic area</td>
<td>- Eligibility criteria&lt;br&gt;How the intervention identified its priority areas and defined, applied, and modified its eligibility criteria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention design and structure</td>
<td>- Background on the intervention type and mission&lt;br&gt;- Intervention funding&lt;br&gt;- Structure of the intervention&lt;br&gt;- Approaches/orientation to the work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staffing and leadership</td>
<td>- Intervention leaders&lt;br&gt;- Description of roles and staff positions and key skills and characteristics&lt;br&gt;- Staff relationship building with the population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>- Intervention services/activities&lt;br&gt;- Partner services/activities&lt;br&gt;- Dosage of services/activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnerships</td>
<td>- Types of partner organizations and how violence reduction strategies identified and incorporated partnering organizations&lt;br&gt;- Communication and coordination across partners&lt;br&gt;- Partnerships with other antiviolence efforts, including how the organization and/or intervention interfaced with local law enforcement and supervision agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationships with law enforcement</td>
<td>- Information sharing with law enforcement personnel&lt;br&gt;- Communication and coordination with law enforcement personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data and measurement</td>
<td>- How the intervention collected and used data to inform implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability</td>
<td>- Key factors intervention staff deemed essential for sustaining implementation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Urban research team.

Findings

In this section, drawing on the results of our thematic analysis, we summarize key findings (grouped by the domains in table 2) pertaining to the implementation of violence reduction efforts and barriers to and facilitators of implementation.

Local Context

The jurisdictions (cities and counties) where the interventions are located have diverse demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. The statistics in tables 3 and 4 represent the entire city or county
where an intervention is located and may not be representative of the more local areas (e.g., neighborhoods) where the interventions operate. The jurisdictions’ populations range from slightly more than 40,000 to more than 8 million people, with an average of roughly 1.5 million. Moreover, the shares of jurisdictions’ populations that are white range from less than 25 to more than 50 percent, and the shares that are Black and Latinx range from 5 to more than 50 percent. In nine of the locations, the share of the population younger than 65 with a disability is higher than the national average. In all the locations, more than three-quarters of the population older than 25 has graduated from high school (or equivalent). Median household income ranges from $37,203 to $112,449, with an average of $57,767.

**TABLE 3**

**Racial/Ethnic Characteristics of Selected Intervention Sites**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jurisdiction</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>% white (non-Hispanic/Latinx)</th>
<th>% Black/African American (%)</th>
<th>% Asian</th>
<th>% Hispanic/Latinx</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oakland, CA</td>
<td>433,031</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>3,979,576</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>48.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>8,336,817</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>29.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumberland County, NJ</td>
<td>149,527</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denver</td>
<td>727,211</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>29.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houston</td>
<td>2,320,268</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>45.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milwaukee, WI</td>
<td>590,157</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danville, VA</td>
<td>40,044</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>4.7</td>
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<tr>
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<td>32.6</td>
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<td>31.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>40.8</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltimore</td>
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<td>27.5</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>20.6</td>
<td>11.2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indianapolis</td>
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<td>54.5</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* American Community Survey population estimates as of July 1, 2019 (available at [https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/US/PST045219](https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/US/PST045219)).

*Note:* In the American Community Survey population estimates, the categories white, Black/African American, and Asian are given as white alone, Black/African American alone, and Asian alone.
TABLE 4
Age, Education, Disability Status, and Income in Selected Intervention Sites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jurisdiction</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>% under 18</th>
<th>% high-school graduate or higher (age 25+)</th>
<th>% with a disability (younger than 65)</th>
<th>Median household income</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oakland, CA</td>
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<td>19.9</td>
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<td>7.7</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>6.3</td>
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</tr>
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<td>24.7</td>
<td>85.8</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>$47,873</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: American Community Survey population estimates as of July 1, 2019 (available at https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/US/PST045219).

COMMUNITY CHALLENGES

In interviews with intervention staff and partners, we found that the communities in our scan experience some of the same structural challenges—and have therefore experienced similar drivers of gun violence—and possess some of the same strengths in addressing gun violence. Program staff and partners cited structural racism and oppression from criminal justice systems as heavy contributors to violence—when people have not been able rely on the criminal justice system for safety and protection and have instead experienced violence and oppressive practices from that system, they have turned to group and gun violence:

*The systems that folks should have been able to rely on, they were not able to rely on, so group violence became the approach.* —Program leader

Related structural challenges include poverty, economic hardship, and racism. Stakeholders said their communities face barriers including homelessness, poverty, and insufficient and unstable resources, and named their communities as some of the poorest in their respective states. They said that factors including white flight and the loss of industries and jobs in cities have contributed to the loss of resources and increases in poverty in Black and Latinx communities. In addition, stakeholders in at least half of the jurisdictions described how racist policies (e.g., discriminatory housing, education, drug enforcement, and justice policies) and segregation have contributed to racial tensions in their
communities, and some in the deep South noted the persistence of support for the Confederacy in their jurisdictions.

Black and brown young folks have never been centered by governance in [our city]. You have to look at housing policy, education policy, right, corporate interests, the war economy...It’s structural. —Community partner

Elaborating on these structural factors, stakeholders named more proximate drivers of gun violence, such as prominent drug markets, access to guns, retaliation, social media, and the COVID-19 pandemic. Stakeholders cited the influx of the sale and use drugs in the 1980s that led some people to use gun violence and rob drug dealers to get money. One stakeholder said, "The guys that didn't sell drugs, they got their hands on pistols who started robbing drug dealers." Stakeholders said the link between drugs and gun violence has persisted, explaining that gangs and groups are focused on selling drugs and committing robbery to obtain resources. Furthermore, program staff and law enforcement officers explained that youth and young adults can easily access guns from sources including gun shows and publicize their guns on social media or by carrying them in public. Stakeholders also said young people use gun violence to retaliate and resolve conflict, especially when family members or loved ones are injured. As one stakeholder explained, "Some of it is driven upon revenge, gang related, 'You hurt my family member. I will hurt your family member.'" According to program staff, youth and young adults frequently use social media to disrespect each other and start disagreements that can "spill into the streets." Lastly, the consequences of the pandemic, such as unemployment, turning to the drug trade for income, and a lack of structured opportunities for youth and young adults—owing to school and recreation-center closures and a lack of funding (also owing to the pandemic) to sustain extracurricular programs—were frequently cited as exacerbating violence.

COMMUNITY STRENGTHS
Stakeholders cited many strengths that help their communities address gun violence. The most commonly cited include the resilience community members need to survive, partners' willingness to work with communities, and the sense of ownership residents and organizations feel over their violence reduction strategies. According to stakeholders, because community members have experienced
violence and oppressive environments together, they have been forced to move forward and work to improve their communities' health and well-being. As one community partner explained,

We have resilient people, we have been tried and tested for so long that we have this barrier that we have to continue to move forward, deal with what's been handed to you and make the best of what's handed to you; people want to see [our city] do well. – Community Partner

Stakeholders surmised that community members take care of each other and know that together they are stronger than gun violence. For instance, intervention staff and community partners reasoned that their collective strength to combat violence and promote safety outweighs the threat and presence of gun violence. Relatedly, community members understand that no one agency or organization can reduce gun violence; rather, they recognize that everyone has a role to play. They explained that government and community leaders should prioritize larger, structural inequities along with gun-violence interventions.

Government agencies and intervention leaders noted they need to engage with community members to be successful and incorporate their perspectives into gun violence reduction efforts. Interviewees expressed that community members, organizations, government agencies, and political leaders have been eager to collaboratively design and implement violence reduction strategies. Lastly, stakeholders explained that engaging with community members and partners while developing strategies has helped them feel ownership over and responsibility for their efforts. For example, stakeholders said that when community members and partners have been given the opportunity to provide input into strategic planning, they have been more likely to support the execution of the vision. One stakeholder commented,

Neighborhoods are starting to see strategies around the action steps in the blueprint, that they suggested and we documented. People understanding that the blueprint is foundation that elevated their voice that gave them ownership and then solidified responsibility. — Intervention staff member

There is no shortage of people that care about this issue and care passionately about this issue and want to reduce gun violence. I'm talking at all levels. I'm talking' about the people in the neighborhoods, law enforcement, the political leadership, the media, the religious leaders. — Intervention staff
Populations of Focus and Geographic Area

All of the interventions in our scan define their populations of focus using multiple criteria, and their eligibility criteria vary. The most common criteria involve age, risk of shooting and being shot, gang involvement, and incarceration or supervision histories. Moreover, most interventions have relied on data to identify neighborhoods or other areas to provide services in. Intervention staff described various methods of identifying where they focus services. These include using statistics and other data collected by law enforcement agencies or other agencies to map the neighborhoods or areas with a lot of gun violence and gang activity. Drawing on these data, the interventions identified neighborhoods or zip codes with high rates of crime or shootings (sometimes called hot spots). For example, the Mayor’s Office of Gang Prevention and Intervention used Houston Police Department data on gang activity to identify the neighborhoods with the most active groups, and stakeholders in New York reviewed five years’ worth of shooting data to find the places with the highest rates of gun violence. Other interviewees described how their interventions focus on hot spots in their communities:

He [the program manager] only focuses on a small geographical area. Usually, there are hot spots. Our hot spots are areas where the violence is concentrated in our mapping.
—Law enforcement officer

Yeah, so we do look at hot spots. We have five hot spots currently in Denver. The neighborhoods in Southwest Denver. We have a lot of up-and-coming gangs there.
—Intervention staff member

The age ranges interventions focus on vary widely and have evolved. The ages the interventions focus on typically range from the midteens (i.e., 14 to 18) through the midtwenties (i.e., 24 to 26). The overall age range, however, is wide, ranging from 8 years to people in their 50s. Furthermore, some interventions strictly adhere to their age ranges of focus, whereas others use them more as guides. For the latter group of interventions, staff have found that people engaging in gun violence can be younger or older than the intended age range, and their interventions therefore began serving people outside the determined ranges. Some programs began serving younger children for earlier prevention because they found that groups or gangs began recruiting people as young as 8 or 10, and some programs removed the upper age limit because they found some people committing gun violence were older:

Our secondary prevention is targeted—it was targeted at 10-to-16-year-olds. I stretched it out from 8 years old now to about 17 just because, unfortunately, our younger youth—I know I was traumatized at 8 years old. I was abused by a man, you know what I’m saying, in ways that I shouldn’t have been at 8 years old. —Community partner

We’ve had some guys that are 11 years old. They’re out there selling drugs, carrying guns, and shooting at people. We’re gonna work with that kid. Our most recent older client was 63 years old, a great-grandfather. —Intervention staff member
Currently, we’re not limiting our upper age range at all. Even if somebody is in their fifties or sixties, we are evaluating them to see if they would qualify based on other criteria for our program. — Intervention staff member

**Interventions considered risk level when defining populations of focus.** Most interventions strive to serve people at high risk, whom program staff defined as people driving the violence by committing gun violence or carrying guns, those at risk of being shot or being victimized by gun violence, and people involved in gangs. For instance, staff in New York focus on serving youth who meet 4 of 15 risk factors, such as carrying (or having carried) a gun, being involved in gang activity, using substances, or having recently been released from incarceration or being on parole/probation. Moreover, most interventions include gang involvement—or risk of being involved in a gang—among their eligibility criteria. Program staff defined gang/group involvement as being a self-identified gang member, having friends or family members who are gang members, having a gang tattoo, or living in areas with active gangs or groups. Some of the interventions also factor young people’s incarceration or supervision histories in assessments of their risk and therefore seek to serve people who are on probation or parole or are returning to the community from prison or jail.

We’re looking for individuals that are very high risk. Whether it’s they’re active in high-risk street activities. They might be very high risk because of the neighborhood that they reside based on the gangs that are in that neighborhood. They may be high risk because they have picked up new criminal charges recently, and we know that they’re active in the streets, too, in most cases ... Our goal is to identify who might be the highest risk and who might have the greatest influence in the community as it pertains to gang involvement and try and target those guys to work with. — Intervention staff member

**Adapting eligibility criteria has been inevitable.** According to intervention staff, the dynamic nature of youth gang and gun violence has caused them to frequently assess and modify their eligibility criteria to ensure they are serving people who need services most. In most cases, programs have adapted their age ranges of focus to continue serving youth and young adults in need of support after observing changes in who gangs were recruiting and who was committing gun violence. When programs have changed the lower ends of their age ranges, it has been because stakeholders have observed groups recruiting youth at younger ages; when programs have changed the higher ends, it has been because stakeholders have observed some people at older ages committing gun violence.

**Intervention staff use their knowledge of communities and personal relationships to identify and serve people.** Program staff said that in addition to eligibility criteria, they have leveraged their knowledge and their relationships with communities to identify participants. Generally, program staff seek out young people who want to improve their lives as well as people who may be vulnerable and less likely to seek services. Staff explained it is critical to engage with populations that are difficult to reach,
such as young people from structurally marginalized communities who may not seek support because of the same factors that make them vulnerable. Staff members’ intimate knowledge of neighborhoods and communities has enabled them to identify and work with those groups.

A [organization name] activation will bring out pretty much everybody across the board ... those that are engaged and involved, they wanna know what's going on, [and] those maybe that have a need. Maybe they're not so comfortable, but they do get comfortable when you are willing to meet a material need in that moment. —Community partner

Interventions have identified prospective participants using their eligibility criteria in many ways. Stakeholders noted that recruitment is generally a challenge. Their programs have recruited youth and young adults by hosting community events, responding to the scenes of incidents or going to hospitals, reviewing shooting incidents, and receiving referrals from justice system personnel, schools, community partners, and family members. For example, in Cumberland County, New Jersey, a CC THRIVE program partner has used a tip line that people, their parents, school staff, and police officers can use to make referrals.

These things help to bring out those that perhaps are the most vulnerable and that are—here's the thing on both ends of the socioeconomic scale, you have those that are vulnerable. Then you have those that are active and that are engaged. Maybe you see that in a community. The people that are active in it are engaged. They wanna see what's going on. They wanna come and participate with [our organization]. The people that are maybe a little more vulnerable, that don't have good coping skills and stuff, a lot of times that leads to that being a family that is perhaps in need because, again, the translation of not coping well has—like I say, it does factor into a person’s ability to traverse life ... A [organization name] activation will bring out pretty much everybody across the board ... those that are engaged and involved, they wanna know what's goin' on, [and] those maybe that have a need. Maybe they're not so comfortable, but they do get comfortable when you are willing to meet a material need in that moment. —Community partner

Intervention Design and Structure

The interventions prioritize violence reduction and have taken different approaches to doing so. Many were designed to conceive of gun violence as a contagion—that is, as a consequence of preexisting systemic ills and interpersonal conflict—and have used public health approaches and/or trauma-informed approaches to address youth group and gun violence. One stakeholder stated that "gun
violence is a disease that can be passed from one individual to another," and stakeholders in several sites, including two interventions that use the Cure Violence model (a model that treats gun violence as a public health issue), discussed gun violence as a disease and virus that needs to be treated. One intervention staff member said,

Cure Violence is a health approach from Chicago. While I may not have been there since its inception, I can say from my experience that the purpose is to really treat violence like epidemiologists treat illness and disease. You have a target virus and you treat them. What social services do they need? What will make them less susceptible to violence?

A few interventions that take the public health approach have partnered with entities including hospitals and trauma centers, and others have adopted trauma-informed approaches with an orientation toward healing people and communities.

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*We see violence as a disease. — Intervention staff member*

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**Interventions work toward outcomes beyond reducing youth group and gun violence.** Though reducing gun violence is a primary outcome for these interventions, staff from all of them identified many additional outcomes that their interventions work toward to help youth and young adults live with less violence. Although these outcomes vary, some of the ones intervention staff most frequently identified were improving young people’s lives by guiding them to make positive choices and turn away from group or gang life; helping young adults develop a sense of self-confidence and self-efficacy; providing tangible resources and supports, such as transportation cards and referrals to services, jobs, licenses, and trainings; and lifting up communities. Other outcomes included helping young people finish high school and pursue college, connecting them to jobs, and finding them housing. Moreover, while helping young people become more self-sufficient, all the programs try to teach them to resist peer pressure, prevent retaliation, and build up their value systems to make informed decisions. Through these outcomes, the programs hope to reduce gun violence, help youth and young adults leave groups or gangs, and improve their lives.

**Many interventions empower youth and young adults and provide them life skills, education supports, and career opportunities.** One staff member stated that their intervention is “not just gang programs. It could be a youth program that’s just keeping ‘em positive, just keeping ‘em doing things besides being on the street corners in the neighborhoods.” Most of the interventions include services
that teach youth and young adults life skills and connect them to educational opportunities and job training. A few even have connections with particular employers and employment networks to connect participants to jobs. One community partner stated that the “overall goal is that there are no young people who choose the gang lifestyle over school and finding opportunities through success or education,” and that their organization “is a nonprofit geared towards education, recreation, gang prevention, and life skills. Our mission is to create more life.”

Many stakeholders recognize that communities have the most vital knowledge, experiences, and understanding with which to approach violence reduction, and that intervention leaders need to listen to community members and ensure their voices are heard when designing and implementing programs. Program staff view interventions as opportunities to amplify the voices of young people and community members and ensure their perspectives are incorporated into program design. This allows people impacted by group and gun violence to advocate for themselves and drive solutions. For example, in Stockton, California, former Ceasefire participants have been given leadership positions in the program. In addition, intervention staff see violence reduction strategies as ways of investing in communities and supporting local change. In Oakland, for example, community partners worked with former Ceasefire Oakland participants to change the way local policies and legislation were made and direct services were delivered. In New York, the Mayor’s Office to Prevent Gun Violence developed the Safe in the City Grant, which issues funding between $500 and $1,000 to community members who design and implement ideas for ensuring public safety and positively engaging, activating, and empowering their community. Stakeholders considered this an opportunity to engage and lift up community members.

Interventions’ funding sources vary, and many stakeholders cited funding as a challenge. The interventions are funded through government, including mayor’s offices, local government budgets and agencies, and ballot-funded initiatives. A few have received grant funding, private and charitable donations, and funding from local businesses. Stakeholders consistently noted that funding and resource constraints are challenges that owe to their interventions’ reliance on external funding to sustain daily operations, staffing, and capacity. Relatedly, some program staff said that the organizations that can obtain funding are not necessarily those that are well suited to the work. In addition, stakeholders and program staff emphasized that this work cannot be done solely by nonprofits and funded through philanthropic organizations; for the work to be sustainable and effective, government must take a role in organizing and funding it. Moreover, stakeholders mentioned challenges paying staff a living wage and retaining staff. One intervention leader discussed the challenges posed by a lack of federal funding: “One of the challenges with a strategy like this is [when an
intervention strategy] has been effective for several years. Once a community sees that the city is safer, the government will quickly defund those strategies because the problem is solved, but that is not the right way to approach it. The resources and supports have to be there and funding has to be sustained."

Even programs that have been shown to be effective may still face funding issues. Stakeholders said that funders often fail to increase funding when they see a program operates well with minimal resources and that they even withdraw funding when they see successes and feel the problem is solved.

_The transformation change that is needed to eradicate racism and inequality cannot happen on the backs of nonprofits and philanthropy. Government plays an important role in creating those things. It gives them a solid foundation for funding, including the ways we treat staff. It also gives an opportunity for young people to see government in a different way._

—Intervention leader

_Several interventions are housed in local government offices or agencies._ Stakeholders at several interventions explained that government entities, such as city councils, mayors’ offices, and departments of safety, provide oversight for those interventions. Though some cited challenges with this structure, such as local politics, approval requirements, and the need to answer to a governing body, others view themselves as separate from government and said they have the ability and flexibility to implement their violence reduction strategies as they deem appropriate.

> We are under the Department of Safety. Everything comes from them.
> —Intervention staff member

> City council has influence over how we do our work. We report back to the mayor.
> —Program leader

> The mayor oversees [our intervention] along with a governing board who oversees the budget and the annual strategic plan. Oversight of [our organization] to ensure impact, people were invested and collaborating, timeline and funding were being used wisely.
> —Program leader

_Staffing and Leadership_

The interventions have various staff positions, including outreach workers, case managers, and violence interrupters (box 4). These positions are often staffed by credible messengers, people with relevant
experience such as shared community membership, incarceration, or justice system involvement.\textsuperscript{5} When discussing staffing and leadership, stakeholders emphasized the importance of team approaches and relationship building.

\textbf{BOX 4}

\textbf{A Note on Language: Community Violence Intervention Job Titles}

A source of potential confusion in understanding the practice to address youth gun and gang/group violence is the array of common names given to the workers and types of work done by people employed outside traditional justice agencies. “Outreach workers,” “violence interrupters,” “peacekeepers,” “intervention workers,” and “case managers” are just a few of the terms used across multiple interventions. Adding to the confusion, across different communities and interventions are people with the same job titles doing different kinds of work, or with different job titles doing similar work, or combining what are distinct roles in another intervention into a single job title. Throughout this report, we use the following terms when describing roles, recognizing that single individuals may be doing more than one of them.\textsuperscript{a}

- **Credible messengers** for people who are trusted by gang/group-affiliated youth and promote risk reduction by encouraging mediation with members of a gang/group. They have a particular ability to do this relational work because credible messengers are viewed as living examples of change due to similar relevant experience such as shared community membership and experience with incarceration or general justice involvement. Credible messengers may be doing any or all of the types of work described below.

- **Outreach workers** for people who work directly to connect with gang/group-involved youth in the community to build trust and relationships, and start and maintain connection to formal programs and services.

- **Case managers** for people who are carrying a caseload of youth enrolled in a program, and facilitating and monitoring progress on life plans or other mechanisms to identify youth goals and milestones.

- **Violence interrupters** for people intervening to prevent retaliation and other modes of violence spreading through communities, through means such as responding to shooting scenes and mediating active conflicts.

Staff at some interventions have taken a team approach to and promoted collective responsibility for supporting young people. Staff from some programs expressed feeling collectively responsible for failing to reach youth and young adults in need of services, and thereby for potentially putting them at greater risk of engaging in gun violence or groups/gangs. In addition, some staff said they and other program staff work collectively to create support networks for youth and young adults. They also said that teams of staff strive to serve participants and “show up” for young people. One stakeholder commented, “[We] want them to understand they have a network of people that loves and support them. It’s hard being a young adult in the city, especially when you don’t have that family support.” Moreover, a community partner discussing the intake process at their program shared,

First, we meet with them individually, go over the intake form. Again, we have a team because, at the end of the day, it’s easy to walk in one or two people, but what if that kid is not really accepting of those two people? We try to walk in with three people. It takes seven seconds for people to get a first impression, and kids are very witty. They know if you’re here just ‘cause you’re working. They know if you’re here ‘cause you care. They know if they could trust you. Right away, this is what they do. We don’t have a lot of time to try to figure that out, so it’s like we have to […] be ready to go when we walk in that room for intake. He’s gonna gravitate to one of the three of us. He’s gonna gravitate to somebody. He or she will trust or connect with one of us, and that’s the goal because it’s about building relationships. I can’t expect you to talk about what you’re going through if you don’t trust me. —Community partner

Most of the interventions initiate engagement with youth and young adults by identifying their individual needs. Intervention staff reported that focusing first on identifying and meeting young people’s immediate needs helps build trust and relationships. Staff reported asking young people questions to understand their situations and barriers, such as a lack of housing, challenging family situations, or mental health needs. Staff identify, provide, and/or refer youth and young adults to the appropriate services based on their needs. Staff feel this also helps them foster strong relationships with participants. In addition, staff from a few sites emphasized the importance of focusing on young people’s interests to encourage engagement. For example, a participant in the City of Los Angeles Mayor’s Office of Gang Reduction and Youth Development liked to draw and was paired with a muralist to work with business owners in the community to paint a mural. A community partner of Cumberland Collective to Help Reverse Inequality and Violence Everywhere stated, “We try to model it after anything that we see is going on in pop culture. We try to gauge that through our research and seeing where we can implement things as far as the kids’ interest. If we see that dance videos are trending, we try to do our research and see how we can implement that into our program as far as developing dance programs, dance teams.” A staff member from another intervention discussing relationship building with young people shared,
I meet with them once a week. I do phone calls. I try to meet them where they are, try to figure out what is it that you need from me, how can I help you. From there, that's how I build the rapport, and that's how we work on a treatment plan, and we work on a plan, small goals, long-term goals on how long it would take. I let them also know that the steps that you take aren’t microwavable. They’re not going to come easy. If you're willing to make these steps, and you're willing to work, then I’m willing to work with you so that we can bust down these doors and get you to where you want to be.

Elements including trust and consistency are critical to building relationships with youth and young adults. Stakeholders said many things facilitate trust and relationships with young people, including listening to, identifying, and fulfilling their needs; helping them connect with their families; treating them with respect; and being credible, consistent, truthful, transparent, and genuine. For example, Safe Streets staff in Baltimore explained their approach to engaging with young people as a “co-journey.” When staff are vulnerable and courageous with participants, they expose their own humanity. This signals to the youth and young adults that they are not alone in their trauma or pain and that they can trust the staff. Program staff also explained that to build trust and rapport with participants, they have to be consistent and follow through on their commitments. Moreover, stakeholders discussed the importance of patience and how building relationships takes time.

One of the things that I know, if you stay consistent and persistent, not saying one thing and doing other, then you can be able to first win their trust. —Intervention staff member

Stakeholders emphasized that credible messengers—staff with shared community membership or similar lived experience—are effective at engaging and working with youths and young adults. At least half the interventions have hired credible messengers to work as outreach workers, case managers, and violence interrupters (among other positions), and they have leveraged their preexisting relationships and knowledge with their communities to engage with participants. For these reasons, staff feel credible messengers go a long way in fostering strong relationships with youths and young adults. One stakeholder shared, “We strategically position our violence interrupters to be from the area, so everyone knows them.” And a staff member said, “The people that we employ have a strong base in the community and a strong role in the community, so they know we’re going to help them.”

Services

Most of the services the interventions provide fit into four categories: (1) responding to incidents of violence and conflict mediation, (2) hosting community events and sharing resources, (3) providing case management, and (4) facilitating activities for youths and young adults. Activities undertaken to respond to incidents, engage in conflict mediation, and hold community events have been designed to intervene with communities, whereas case management and activities have been designed to serve
particular young people. Because of how the interventions were designed, it is difficult to determine which services the interventions provide directly and which ones program partners provide. Below, we describe in detail services that intervention staff and partners provide, using the four categories mentioned above. Table 5 provides a summary of specific activities by intervention. Those activities are italicized throughout the discussion of findings in the sections that follow.
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<th>Stockton Gun Violence Reduction</th>
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<td>Canvassing communities (e.g., program staff walking in neighborhoods and engaging with youth)</td>
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<td>Community/prayer walks following violence</td>
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<td>Responding on scene to incidents</td>
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<td>Hospital-based responses (e.g., program staff present at hospitals to meet with youth after violent incident and connect them to services)</td>
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<td>Law enforcement and criminal justice activities (e.g., call-ins, custom notifications, enhanced surveillance and enforcement)</td>
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<td>Information sharing with community (e.g., public information and messaging campaigns)</td>
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<td>Community events and resources (e.g., block parties, giveaways)</td>
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<td>Direct work with community residents to identify strategies to prevent violence (e.g., coalitions, strategic planning)</td>
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<td>Case management and connection to services</td>
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<td>Recreational and educational activities for youth (e.g., youth sports, Police Athletic League, school programming)</td>
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All the interventions engage with youths and young adults and with community members in direct response to incidents of violence and through other proactive activities. Most of the programs do this by canvassing communities with high incidences of violence, leading community or prayer walks in the days following violent incidents, facilitating conflict mediation, or responding to the scenes of incidents. Program staff described canvassing and community/prayer walks as opportunities for them to walk around neighborhoods to show their presence and directly engage with people (particularly those likely to be involved in acts of violence) to build relationships with them and their communities and refer them to services. For example, GRYD staff reported that their role is to participate in events including vigils, funerals, and fundraisers, and that they help ensure these events remain safe. Staff from several programs, who are often credible messengers, explained that they respond to violence by providing deescalation and conflict mediation and by building rapport with community members. One staff member stated, “We’re peacekeepers of our community. We are handpicked to serve each community.” In addition, some programs provide hospital-based activities with people who have experienced violence and are likely to be revictimized. Other programs have used law enforcement and justice-focused responses, such as call-in and community-activation strategies, to engage people in the community who are involved in violence, particularly shootings. Stakeholders said the call-ins and activations are intended to prevent retaliatory violence, provide communities resources and address trauma, and collect information and dispel rumors.

A majority of the interventions provided services for entire communities by hosting events and serving as resources. This community engagement served to build relationships with the community, provide residents resources (e.g., clothing, food, gift cards, diapers, wipes, toiletries, personal protective equipment), connect them to services (e.g., mental health services, grief counseling, anger management, legal services), and share information with communities about violence and available resources. Most interventions hosted community events such as cookouts, parades, raffles, talent shows, block parties, holiday parties, and school supply giveaways. In addition to these services, interventions used unique ways to directly engage with their communities to identify strategies to prevent violence. For example, stakeholders in Baltimore discussed a community center where young adults and families could come for a safe space to do homework, play games, and search for jobs. Stakeholders in Indianapolis held meetings open to the community to discuss violence and methods to address it. Lastly, stakeholders in Baltimore discussed having meetings to discuss and address physical aspects of the community (e.g., a lack of lighting, abandoned houses) contributing to violence.

All the interventions provided case management. The five types of case management included (1) case management intended to address immediate barriers, (2) case management connected to the
criminal justice system (e.g., diversion programs), (3) case management with consistent contact, (4) resource case management that included connections to services in the community, and (5) case management that provided assistance for the mid to long term. Case management included connecting youths and young adults to a wide array of services in the community including educational services, work readiness services and jobs, mentoring, housing assistance, assistance getting documents such as drivers' licenses or other identification, assistance with transportation, mental health services, substance use treatment, cognitive behavioral therapy, life skills, budgeting workshops, conflict management classes, tattoo removal, family reunification services, and food assistance. Program staff discussed catering case management activities to the needs and interests of clients and the importance of building trust with clients and getting buy-in. Further, some programs included family members (as defined by participants) in case management. In addition to case management, some interventions provided monetary incentives to participants and one program offered fun activities to participants as incentives. One stakeholder spoke of the importance of incentives, stating, “That was a critical component because illegal activity may have been providing them economic resources, who’s going to fill that gap if they step away from gang activity? Helpful to have stipends as they transition out of the lifestyle.”

Interventions offered additional activities provided by intervention staff and/or partners. Some programs provided additional recreational and educational activities for youths and young adults such as coding classes, life skills classes, sports, and arts programs offered by a mix of intervention staff, law enforcement (e.g., Police Athletic Leagues), and community partners. These activities served as healthy and safe activities for young people, opportunities to acquire new skills, and ways to mentor youth. The activities also enabled intervention staff to engage young people’s entire families. Other interventions also partnered with schools to provide and deliver curricula about violence, gangs, conflict mediation, racially motivated crimes, and white supremacy.

The duration of engagement with youth varied across interventions. The duration of program engagement varied from around three months to two years, with program staff contacting youth biweekly or monthly in many programs, based on the type and level of case management provided. A couple programs included workshop components that last between 6 and 13 weeks. But program staff explained they faced challenges with sustaining participants’ engagement and were ultimately responsive and flexible about the duration of engagement to meet the specific needs and circumstances of participants. Relatedly, some staff noted a lack of aftercare was a challenge while some programs continued to work with participants informally after formal engagement ended.
Partnerships

Partnerships and securing stakeholder buy-in were critical to successful implementation. Program staff explained it was important to obtain input from partners and community members while implementing interventions, especially when designing them. Staff also explained it was important to continue to communicate and coordinate with partnering organizations and community members, such as through routine meetings. This helped interventions demonstrate, through their actions, that they were incorporating the input and feedback they received from partners and community residents. Intervention staff also commented that once they built a network of partners, they became known as a central hub that brought various providers and organizations together.

**Interventions partnered with an array of entities.** At least 13 interventions partnered with a wide range of community-based organizations (e.g., Boys & Girls Clubs, United Ways, youth arts and sports clubs, literacy programs, employment programs, trauma counseling programs, and advocacy groups), and/or government agencies (e.g., housing departments, parks and recreation departments, offices of violence prevention, health departments, public works departments, libraries, employment programs, and child welfare agencies). Almost all interventions partnered with at least one justice system agency, primarily law enforcement (e.g., police, sheriffs, police chaplains, and federal law enforcement), and many partnered with probation or parole departments, jails, prisons, juvenile detention departments, halfway houses, and/or pretrial release agencies. Additionally, interventions partnered with local elected officials, health care agencies, school districts, colleges, faith-based organizations, corporations, unions, and other private organizations to provide donations of goods, job opportunities, and volunteers.

**These broad partnership networks allowed programs to respond to incidents of gun violence and provide a range of services to participants.** Program partners connected with interventions through activities such as call-ins, shooting review meetings, responses to incidents, and services provided to youths and young adults. Many program leaders described their roles as partly involving liaising between the community, law enforcement, and program partners. This allowed program managers or directors, for example, to receive information about shootings, quickly relay that to program staff, and deploy them to the scene to mitigate against retaliatory action and to support the community. In most of the programs, staff also emphasized the importance of leveraging organizations best suited to providing services to participants and referring youth to those service providers. An intervention staff member for one intervention stated, “I didn’t come to reinvent the wheel, I came to put the axle on.”

The tension is what’s difficult for us...When officers are arriving, there are a lot of emotions...When they see a uniform present, that creates more of a tension...Our presence
there... we can't go and put our arms around family. We can't go over and talk to rival gang members... that's where intervention comes into place. — Law enforcement officer

Our office is the strategic thinker, not the direct service arm. A lot of work in partnership with those that do the direct service. — Intervention staff member

It was important for interventions to identify the most appropriate partners for specific responsibilities. For instance, GRID assessed the field to find partners it would not have known about otherwise. Also, stakeholders in more than half the programs discussed partnerships with youth programs, including mentoring programs (e.g., Big Brothers Big Sisters), school resource officer programs, diversion programs, community education initiatives (e.g., teaching about health care through a local hospital), youth programming (e.g., afterschool sports). Some interventions were part of a local network or coalition that served as an overarching connection point for all antiviolence efforts in the jurisdiction. Further, some interventions built partnerships with grassroots organizations, recognizing the need to help the organizations overcome the barriers they faced in obtaining and sustaining large amounts of grant-based funding (e.g., grant writing, reporting, accounting).

We still opened up the window of opportunity to where we can do an assessment to see who else is out there, who are some of the people behind the scenes who maybe are not as overt in doing gang prevention services or intervention. I know when I met with the partners coming back in, in meeting with them, again, another great moment to where in just checking in with them to see what worked in the past, what didn’t work, how can we support you, again was another opportunity that was received well because they felt it wasn’t just our program as this overseeing, powerful Wizard of Oz who’s just coming in and telling them what to do. — Intervention staff member

We are looking to work with orgs closer to the ground, smaller, etcetera. A lot of smaller orgs can’t work through government contracts. The orgs that can succeed as government contractors are often white, large orgs who have been around a long time. — Intervention staff member

Through the GRID partnership, we set up a network, what we call the RISE Network. It’s Reduction, Intervene, Support, and Educate. Within that network, we have District 5 that’s on our—in our network. We have all our community partners that’s within our network that work in violence interruption or youth violence or violence, period. I have monthly check-ins with the police department. We do monthly check-ins with each other. — Community partner

Partnerships were rooted in shared goals and values, mutually beneficial relationships, and time and effort. Stakeholders in almost half the programs discussed how shared goals and values facilitated partnerships, and program staff stressed the importance of ensuring working relationships that were beneficial to all parties. This helped ensure the interests of each entity were honored and helped build solid relationships between partners. Stakeholders also emphasized that relationship building required putting in the time and effort. One stakeholder discussed how good partners are the ones that put in the time and effort to do the work, not show up for the media and then disappear.
Almost all interventions communicated formally and/or informally with their partners. Formalized communication occurred through regular meetings to discuss strategic planning and share information. For example, in Oakland partners explained that they meet with the mayor for performance management meetings every other month and interagency shooting reviews happen weekly. Some programs also held emergency meetings in response to incidents in the community. In addition to meetings, most programs had designated one or more people, such as program directors or managers, to serve as the main points of contact between partners. In some programs, a specific staffing position was dedicated to partnership coordination. Further, in places including Houston and New York City, program staff were responsible for coordinating with partners in their assigned geographic areas. Beyond the formal mechanisms, most interventions informally communicated with their partners through frequent emails, phone calls, text messages, and in-person conversations. Program staff used these methods to share timely information about participants and notify partners about incidents.

We always meet at the college which is central to everything. They get to hear about things that were available in the community and make the connections. Then out of some of that would come new initiatives that we work on. —Program leader

For the most part, I correspond with the leadership team, but I do have a core group of intervention folks that I communicate with. —Law enforcement officer

Because I work with the Department of Surgery, also, and because with the Department of Surgery through the violence prevention, everyone on the team has a cell phone, and we have a pager...I have a couple of people from victim services that I talk to on a daily basis through certain area codes for certain people like if there’s a shooting or if something happens, they’ll contact me. I’ll contact them and try to get information. If I can get the information or see if they can come to the hospital to meet with that person if that person looks at—sees them personally and talk to them about a couple of things. —Intervention staff member

Barriers such as bureaucracy, local politics, funding, lack of trust, and limited communication were cited as challenges to effective partnerships. According to program staff and partners, funding can facilitate partnerships while a lack of funding can challenge partnerships, particularly with community-based organizations that need funding. Some stakeholders mentioned issues with competitive environments where multiple organizations pursue the same funding. A few stakeholders discussed how partnering with an organization responsible for obtaining funding, managing budgets, and/or handling human resources functions could alleviate the burden of these tasks on intervention staff and improve navigation of bureaucratic systems. For example, the program manager in Milwaukee’s Office of Violence Prevention was responsible for securing funding, and Project Longevity partnered with a local university that acted as a fiscal agent for the intervention. Stakeholders also discussed challenges around building trust and communication between partners. An intervention staff member stated, “The biggest challenge has always been unifying staff because they are coming from
different groups. It’s like getting a Blood and a Crip to work together. Letting them develop their trust is important. Always have other people who like to say things or do things that can cause a rift.”

Stakeholders also identified ways to facilitate trust and communication including fostering mutually beneficial relationships and formalizing communication. For example, Oakland Ceasefire made a staff member responsible for coordinating communication between partners to help ensure partners were not working in silos.

First and foremost, I think it’s the relationship we develop with the individuals in the organization, building that trust. A lot of times you see in nonprofits where people are going after the same funding. They’ll become very combative. I think the importance is developing that trust in the relationship, saying, “Hey, how can we work together?” Realizing ahead of time, hey, if we collaborate and work together, maybe we’ll get a little less up front. but long term, we can make a better impact on our community, so making sure you’re coming together around those shared values and ideals, and then really focusing on strengths. —Community partner

Relationships with Law Enforcement

All programs fostered connections and communication with justice system personnel including police, sheriffs, prosecutors, and probation and parole departments, but in different ways.

Stakeholders explained that understanding the interventions and their impacts facilitated buy-in from system personnel, particularly law enforcement officers. For instance, a program staff member shared, “We created that program work out of the county working group, and the cops got on board because they’d see it working.” But intervention leadership and staff, community partners, and law enforcement officers across interventions reported it was sometimes difficult to secure officers’ buy-in if they were not willing to understand the interventions, or if the interventions were not well known across all agency departments. For example, a law enforcement officer in one jurisdiction stated, “A lot of our staff did not understand it and did not agree with compensation for people not getting involved in violence. I think the relationship between the [intervention] and the police department has not always been a good one.” Intervention staff and community partners expressed a range of views on enforcement activity. A handful of intervention staff and community partners expressed that they did not support the actions of the police and the criminal justice system and felt they undermined program success. In contrast, some intervention staff and community partners expressed that enforcement from police and other criminal justice system personnel enables them to communicate that there are consequences for negative actions and facilitate positive community environments by removing people who consistently perpetrate violence. This partnership is demonstrated in some interventions that partner with law enforcement to conduct call-ins and conduct custom notifications with law enforcement personnel present.
As reported by stakeholders, the young people most at risk of shooting and being shot specifically do not trust the police. Intervention staff had to consider this when structuring their programs and relationships with law enforcement. Based on this mistrust of law enforcement, intervention staff approached their relationships with law enforcement carefully. Several interviewees including intervention staff, community partners, and law enforcement stakeholders discussed strained relationships between youth and law enforcement. These stakeholders said the lack of trust stemmed from a lack of transparency from law enforcement, harmful and violent policing practices, misinformation about immigration enforcement, and a lack of understanding about the communities they serve in cases where officers may not be from the neighborhoods, or even the cities or counties, they work in. One stakeholder stated that “police need to understand the dynamics of the neighborhoods they work in. A lot didn’t grow up here.” Some stakeholders specifically discussed the histories of trauma that impact current police-community relationships.

Relatedly, tension with law enforcement agencies was noted as a challenge by stakeholders from several programs. For example, stakeholders from almost half the interventions reported that law enforcement created some barriers for program staff either through direct action or through aspects of policing work that indirectly impeded program work. Although program and law enforcement leadership may coordinate and communicate, stakeholders explained that conflict between staff and officers may occur at the street level. One stakeholder described a situation where they reported to a scene and an officer followed them around and prevented them from doing their job. A stakeholder from another program described similar interactions. A stakeholder from a different site described how officers sometimes retaliate against community members for raising issues and that this retaliatory disposition perpetuates strained relationships with community members that inhibit other intervention work.

Other [officers] who don’t support because they tend to see staff as criminals even though they’ve moved away from that life. They are marked. These officers stay away from staff and tend to agitate for things that impede the work. —Intervention leader

Interventions thoughtfully defined communication parameters with police. The majority of programs maintained a clear distinction between program staff and police officers. Some programs were entirely separate from law enforcement whereas others defined clear roles and responsibilities for program staff and law enforcement. Others were structured so that program leaders communicated and coordinated with law enforcement but deliberately kept that separate from the program staff and activities. According to program staff, these measures helped them build trust with youth and young adults and maintain the safety of program staff. For instance, when credible messengers were working to engage community members and interrupt violence, it was important for the community to trust they
were not relaying information to the police. To ensure that community members do not think credible messengers are providing information to police and acting as informants or snitches, the interventions were designed to avoid public communication between intervention staff and police officers, and in most cases, to prevent any direct communication between intervention staff and police officers altogether; instead, program leadership often facilitated communication with law enforcement leadership and personnel. In New York City, outreach workers and violence interrupters did not have any relationships with police officers. An intervention staff member stated, “There’s no real communication between the street level and police. We had to keep that totally separated ’cause if any of the credible messengers was ever seen to be working with the police department or anything like that, the program has no more effect. In actuality, sometimes the outreach worker or the violence interrupter’s life may become in jeopardy if it’s labeled that these individuals had shared information with police.”

Our work is not to solve crimes or tell people they are committing crimes. Our singular focus is to prevent violence. Have to be very careful to not appear to be directly related to law enforcement in any investigatory manner snitches/informants. — Intervention staff member

If anyone in the community thinks they're a snitch or informant, that can put their life in danger. We're always reminding our officers that their intention is not to be informants or tell us who the shooters are. I don't want them to tell me who the shooters are. I want them to stop the rumors. — Law enforcement officer

Information sharing was often one-sided, with information flowing from law enforcement agencies to programs. Most interventions did not share information with law enforcement agencies; rather, law enforcement agencies shared information with intervention staff in most sites, including crime statistics and data, notifications about incidents and information about people involved, and more general intel. Stakeholders, including law enforcement personnel, discussed the importance of sharing information with program staff to prevent retaliatory violence. For example, GRYD program staff and community intervention workers receive notifications directly from the Los Angeles Police Department. According to stakeholders, establishing this line of communication supported GRYD’s partnership with the police department and formalized communication with program staff, intervention workers, and police officers. Conversely, program staff often did not share information with officers to maintain participants’ trust, prioritize staff members’ safety, and follow data confidentiality requirements. A stakeholder shared, “We don’t wanna be known as the group that tells the cops everything because we don’t.” A law enforcement officer shared, “People have to trust that they’re not going to be bringing information to the police department, and so I get that—I get why it has to be that way.” Intervention staff and law enforcement officers commented that the working relationships
between programs and police worked best when police understood and honored programs’ need to keep information confidential.

They give us data, crime stats when certain homicides and shootings take place, so there’s us at the mayor’s office... We don’t share no information from the ground level, but they are a key part in helping us make sure that we get the right individuals to employ. — Intervention staff member

**Data and Measurement**

A majority of the interventions kept track of and analyzed data related to gun violence and program metrics. Specifically, most programs collected data on the numbers of shootings, homicides, and retaliatory shootings, as well as the locations and targets of the shootings. Programs also monitored intervention-specific measures such as the numbers of participants enrolled, the numbers of conflicts mediated, the numbers of community events or activities held, the numbers of participants attending activities, and other metrics related to participant contact and engagement. Also, many programs pointed to informal measures of success that were often minimized, such as the amount of time spent engaging with families. Lastly, several interventions discussed challenges related to data collection and pushed back on heavily quantitative approaches to measuring their effectiveness. Stakeholders appreciated the use of qualitative methods such as surveys or focus groups for understanding the local dynamics of violence and measuring their interventions’ outcomes and impact.

Interventions collected and analyzed data on their own, through an analyst, or through an external evaluator. Most of the sites collected internal-capacity data related to staff, participants, and their various programmatic activities. Most relied on police data related to shootings and homicides to map their local violence. Nearly half the interventions mentioned an evaluator partner, such as a research university or organization. For example, GRYD partners with a research and evaluation team housed at California State University, Los Angeles to support data collection, evaluate the effectiveness of GRYD, and inform implementation.

Programs found it difficult to capture all of the programmatic elements, time spent, and labor in their work, as well as their outcomes. Most programs noted the "invisible" work they did not capture in data. Interventions found it difficult to collect data on the activities they implemented and the outcomes they achieved. For example, data systems or protocols were not designed to easily capture much of the work staff do (e.g., relationship building, fostering trust, mediating conflicts) or the outcomes they achieve (e.g., conflicts averted, community awareness). Though intervention staff recognized the importance of collecting data, they did not want to limit their work to only numbers and
outcomes. Some stakeholders explicitly mentioned this. For example, one program staff member discussed looking at other markers of community wellness, such as healing:

I don’t care about that data. I feel it doesn’t capture all that we do. For example, going to a scene can take 8 to 12 hours. In that time, [intervention staff person] may have spoken to 100 people. The next day, [they have] to talk to the families and neighborhoods. The incident doesn’t just stop at one day. Families want different things. Some want a face on a candle. The data can never capture that because it’s so ongoing. I’m working even when I’m off. Ultimately, I don’t feel data can capture the full experience. —Intervention staff member

Many stakeholders regretted not having the data available to "prove" their interventions were reducing violence. They referred to budgetary challenges, such as not being able to hire an external evaluator or internal data analyst. A few sites also wanted more qualitative approaches to be used to understand their work. One staff member commented, “We are beginning a new evaluation to compare synthetic controls. This is important for funding. This new round will do qualitative work which is exciting. That will inform a lot of our work, more so than a large report. This work is so politicized so it's important to have hard evidence because people can be weary.”

I wish there was some way we could actually show the numbers of how much violence we've actually stopped before it happened. I had two gangs at a school that I was working at doing outreach. They approached me one morning. One of the guys trusted me enough to say, "Hey, these guys are—they're lashing out over here. Both groups have several guns and several people." We went and I mediated that before we contacted the police, before we contacted the school. We can't prove that that would have ever happened, that violence, because we stopped it. It’s tough because we can’t show numbers on that kind of thing. We're okay with that because we know long term, at least we stopped that violence for that day. I wish there was some way we could start tracking that. —Intervention staff member

Sustainability

When asked about sustainability, the most frequent facilitator stakeholders mentioned was funding. Stakeholders from several programs also said relationships need to be sustained with various partners. In addition, stakeholders mentioned the need to support their staff members’ professional and personal well-being because of the toll of the work. Lastly, staff felt they needed to achieve and sustain buy-in from various parties ranging from law enforcement to the local community.

Interventions identified funding as the most helpful for sustainability. Many stakeholders cited the precarious nature of relying on external funding and not being guaranteed consistent funding. To help overcome this challenge, stakeholders identified a few facilitators. First, they explained it was helpful to diversify funding sources so programs received funding from a mix of sources such as government agencies and grants. Furthermore, one stakeholder explained it helped that the program
became a line item in the local government’s budget. Second, a law enforcement officer reported that another way to help sustain funding was to ingrain the violence reduction intervention into the daily operations of the organization or agency. This made it difficult to stop funding programs deeply embedded in agency operations. Third, some stakeholders suggested it was helpful to elevate the importance of programs in reducing the effects of youth gun violence. For example, one program staff member said, “Frankly there has to be a willingness to continue the program and recognize that there is an issue that needs to be addressed.” Regardless of the funding source, programs needed more staff to sustain their efforts and needed to pay staff better wages to adequately compensate them for their labor and invest in their professional development. A few program stakeholders explained that sustained funding would also support data-related work and improve their intervention strategies. At least two programs expressed funding concerns related to the COVID-19 pandemic, and one law enforcement officer remarked, “With COVID I worry about the wave of the economic impact and these extra things are the first thing to get cut.”

_Gangs are not going anywhere. Gang violence isn’t going anywhere...we need more intervention workers and we need them to make a livable wage. My workers can go to Walmart and make a dollar more, but they do this because they have a passion. It needs to become a legitimate profession._ —Intervention leader

_Programs found it critical to sustain their relationships and partnerships._ Many of the interventions expressed a desire to strengthen their partnerships with different agencies, organizations, and institutions. As one program partner noted, “Funding and partnership are the key. Key partners have to keep partnering [with us to be effective].” Stakeholders explained that it takes time and trust to build relationships, and clearly defining roles and responsibilities facilitates partnerships. Some stakeholders explained that it was also helpful to have the same stakeholders engaged in the violence reduction strategy. But a clear, shared understanding of the intervention and roles and responsibilities helped ease the onboarding process when new partners joined the effort.

 Personally, I think [our intervention strategy] should be community driven. Maybe we could facilitate that. However, I think it should be community driven for sustainability because, in the city, we change personnel. We change all the time. We have certain constraints, maybe budgetary or staffing, things like that. I think that maybe we could help facilitate it. However, I think that the community needs to drive that piece. —Law enforcement officer
Because of the toll the work takes on program staff, supporting their professional and personal well-being was essential to sustainability. Many program staff described their work as stressful, traumatic, and emotionally draining. Interventions strove to provide ample support and opportunities for self-care and self-preservation as well as opportunities to support staff members’ professional growth and personal well-being. For example, stakeholders suggested organizations and agencies provide staff trauma-informed services and supports, as well as training and professional development opportunities. Yet, given limited resources and constraints, supporting staff was not always feasible and a lack of staff support can threaten sustainability.

It was also important to document programs’ effectiveness and program commitments to sustain violence reduction efforts. Many staff raised the need to “convince” or sway young people, partners, and community members of the utility and effectiveness of their interventions’ strategies. Stakeholders emphasized the importance of demonstrating for community members both the effectiveness of the interventions and what they do to support their communities. Further, to ensure intervention staff and partners continue to support the interventions, stakeholders suggested that staff routinely remind partners of the purposes and goals of the violence reduction strategies. One stakeholder specifically mentioned continuously training staff to help ensure they know about the intervention and that each new cohort of staff or officers is aware of it.

Getting those in the community to continue to buy in to it, what it has done for the city, and the resources it has provided for the young men; the results are evident. —Community partner

Conclusion

Urban conducted a scan of 14 interventions across the country intended to reduce youth group/gang and gun violence to learn more about implementing antiviolence strategies and to identify critical elements of implementation often missing from the research base. We aimed to lift up the tactics, approaches, and methods intervention staff and partners, law enforcement professionals, justice system personnel, and community members deemed essential for successful implementation. The following conclusions can be drawn:

- Community involvement was crucial to the successful implementation of the interventions, and intervention staff conceptualized and operationalized community engagement in different ways. Intervention stakeholders understood that communities know best, and community members’ voices must be incorporated into program design and implementation.
• Although it was important to define populations of focus, interventions found it necessary to modify eligibility criteria because the characteristics of people committing group and gun violence changed. Ultimately, many served anyone in need and staff used their knowledge and relationships with communities to identify and engage with youths and young adults.

• Some stakeholders viewed gun violence as a contagion and some interventions took trauma-informed and public health approaches to reducing gun violence. Drawing on these frameworks, interventions sought to achieve outcomes beyond reducing youth group and gun violence and focused on young people’s individual needs and outcomes to improve their lives.

• To achieve desired outcomes, program staff found it critical to foster trust with youth and young adults. Programs achieved this in many ways, namely by using staff who were credible messengers from the same communities and had had similar experiences as participants. Staff found that this resonated with young people and helped them sustain engagement.

• Partnerships were key and grounded in common goals and values, mutually beneficial relationships, and time and effort. Programs also benefited from partnering with an array of government bodies, law enforcement agencies, community and faith-based organizations, service providers, and community members.

• Law enforcement officers—mostly those directly involved in the interventions—recognized the importance of partnering with communities and community-based organizations to implement violence interventions, and some law enforcement leaders acknowledged communities should lead the work. All the interventions fostered connections with justice system personnel, and most law enforcement leaders understood that communication boundaries needed to be drawn between themselves, program staff, and youth and young adults.

• Community violence interventions faced the challenge of navigating mistrust between police and communities experiencing concentrated youth group and gun violence. Interventions defined their relationships with law enforcement carefully so credible messengers could build trust with youth and young adults and so the interventions and law enforcement agencies could work in tandem to reduce violence. Although partnerships with law enforcement were purposefully scoped and maintained at the leadership level, some interventions continued to experience issues at the street level between frontline staff and officers.

• Although challenging, interventions recognized the importance of collecting and analyzing data and/or partnering with evaluators to assess program implementation and outcomes.
The key ingredients to sustainability include funding, relationships and partnerships, staff support, and documenting and disseminating programs’ effectiveness.

In addition to contributing to the body of research in this area, we hope these lessons can inform communities looking to implement similar efforts to reduce group and gun violence.
Appendix A. Intervention Profiles

The information summarized in the following profiles was generated from the research team's interviews with intervention leadership and staff, local government officials, community members and partners, law enforcement, and probation officers. N/A = not applicable. We use N/A to indicate that a program has not specified a duration of program engagement.

Ceasefire Oakland

City: Oakland, California

Geographical area of focus: Citywide

Year created: 2012

Source of funding: City of Oakland's Measure Z fund administered by the Department of Human Services' Oakland Unite initiative

Type of model: Focused deterrence

Intervention components:

- **Data-driven identification** of the groups and individuals at the very highest risk of being involved in a shooting.

- **Respectful communication of risk** directly to those groups and individuals. Communicating public health model of the harm reduction/deterrence messages to the highest risk individuals through call-ins and custom notifications (law enforcement, Department of Violence Prevention (DVP), community leaders, clergy, service providers). Oakland DVP is actively engaged in direct communication and manages services and support.

- **Services, supports, and opportunities** that address needs and build on the strengths of those at the very highest risk of gun violence. Services and supports are most effective when given by respected members of the community with similar lived experiences or are otherwise credible to the Population of Focus (“credible messengers”). Oakland DVP provides ongoing support, engagement, and coordinates services (paid job training, substance abuse counseling), and case management/life coaching for clients.
- **Procedural justice and legitimacy**
- **Focused enforcement:** Police conduct narrowly focused enforcement operations especially on those individuals that continue to engage in violent crime after receiving communication and with the explicit purpose of preventing further violence.

**Target population:** Those considered "very high risk," meaning they have at least four of the following five characteristics:

1. Young Black and Latino men age 18-35,
2. Extensive criminal justice involvement (i.e., an average of 10 prior arrests; felony convictions, especially firearm charges; been sentenced to state prison; on active probation/parole),
3. Member of active Oakland groups,
4. Have been shot before, and/or,
5. Has a close friend or family member who has been shot in the last twelve months.

**Program reach:** Metrics not available at time of publication.

**Duration:** 18 months

**Governance and staffing structure:** Ceasefire Director housed within the Oakland Police Department, oversight by the Oakland Chief of Police and the City of Oakland Mayor’s Office

**Partners:**

- California Partnership for Safe Communities (CPSC)
- Oakland Police Department (OPD)
- Department of Violence Prevention (formerly Oakland Unit)
- Faith in Action East Bay (formerly Oakland Community Organizations (OCO))
- Community Youth Outreach (CYO)
- Alameda Health Systems Trauma Center
- Oakland Housing Authority
- Alameda County Probation
- Alameda County District Attorney
- California (CA) Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
City of Los Angeles Mayor’s Office of Gang Reduction and Youth Development (GRYD)

City: City of Los Angeles

Geographical area of focus: 23 GRYD Zones or communities (expansion from 12 GRYD Zones when program initiated)

Year created: 2007

Source of funding:
- City of Los Angeles
- Supplemental funds from the state of California
- Federal grants

Type of model: Comprehensive Gang Model (adapted)

Intervention components:
- Community Engagement: Community Engagement activities are intended to address gang violence and its community impact by raising awareness of GRYD programming through
Community Education Campaigns, collaborating with the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) on a Gun Buy Back Program, and organizing pop-up events to increase access to services and support when a violent incident does occur.

- **Gang Prevention:** The GRYD Prevention Program includes asset-based services for at-risk youth and their families that build resilience and encourage positive alternatives to gang-joining. Services include monthly case management team meetings, individual youth meetings, family meetings, and the delivery of intentional youth development activities. Referrals to other services are made and other supportive/auxiliary services (such as transportation assistance, food supplies, etc.) are provided as appropriate. In order to be eligible for GRYD Prevention services, youth must score above a threshold of risk for gang-joining on the Youth Services Eligibility Tool (YSET). The YSET is also used to gauge changes to risk-factors over time. Youth scoring below this threshold may be offered GRYD Primary Prevention services, a less intensive program with a shorter duration.

- **Gang Intervention:** GRYD Intervention Family Case Management (FCM) services for gang-involved young adults and their families are designed to increase prosocial embeddedness and transfer attachments from gangs to positive activities. Services include GRYD provider staff team meetings, individual participant meetings, and family meetings. In addition, GRYD FCM providers often make referrals to services (e.g., mentoring, counseling, tattoo removal, etc.) and provide supportive/auxiliary services for program participants as necessary. Assessment via the Social Embeddedness Tool (SET) is completed by GRYD FCM participants to gauge progress over time. Young people not ready to engage in full GRYD FCM services can participate in Transitional Client Services (TCS), engaging in work on short-term goals, and preparedness for future GRYD FCM enrollment.

- **Violence interruption:** Proactive Peacemaking and the GRYD Incident Response (IR) Program. Proactive Peacemaking is conducted in all GRYD Zones on an on-going basis by GRYD Community Intervention Workers (CIWs) who monitor community hotspots, conduct impact sessions with gang-affiliated youth/young adults and community members, hold outreach events in spaces impacted by gang-violence, and establish peace treaties and/or agreements among two or more rival groups in order to defuse community tension. The GRYD IR Program defines the response when violence occurs through joint work between the GRYD Office, CIWs and LAPD as part of the GRYD Triangle Partnership and Incident Response Protocol. All partners work together to reduce the likelihood of retaliation through short-term (e.g.,
responding to the scene, making calls to dispel rumors, etc.) and long-term (e.g., assisting with funerals, treatment services for the family, etc.) activities.

- Summer Night Lights (SNL) and Fall Friday Nights (FFN): These programs are held in 32 city parks during summer and early fall when youth violence traditionally spikes. This public/private collaboration seeks to build relationships between community members, law enforcement, and city entities; promote safe spaces within neighborhoods; and provide connections to resources and information. Additionally, SNL and FFN provide youth employment opportunities through which youth are prepared for future careers and gain connections to city departments.

**Population of focus:**

- Gang Prevention: Youth 10-15, with "significant presence" in a GRYD Zone and scoring above a risk threshold on the YSET
- Gang Intervention: Youth 14-25, with "significant presence" in a GRYD Zone and a tagger or member/affiliate of a gang or crew as determined by the provider

**Program reach:**

- Gang Prevention: There have been a total of 15,963 enrollments into GRYD Prevention services from 2011 - 2020. This includes 9,977 youth served in GRYD Secondary Prevention and 5,986 in GRYD Primary Prevention
- Gang Intervention: There have been a total of 12,556 enrollments into GRYD Intervention services from 2012 - 2020. This includes 7,484 in GRYD FCM and 5,072 in GRYD TCS
- Violence Interruption: From 2012-2020, the GRYD Incident Response Program responded to 5,673 incidents. During the same period 301,308 Proactive Peacemaking activities were conducted totaling 663,075 hours of effort in this area

**Duration: (by component):**

- Gang Prevention: Up to three 6-month cycles (third cycle requires GRYD Office permission); GRYD Primary Prevention: Up to 6 months
- Gang Intervention: Up to three 6-month cycles (third cycle required GRYD Office permission); TCS: Up to two 3-month cycles
- Violence Interruption: Proactive Peacemaking: ongoing; GRYD Incident Response (IR) Program: immediate when the GRYD Triangle Partnership is notified of a violent incident, with follow-up as needed
Governance and staffing structure: Operated by the City of Los Angeles Mayor’s Office of Gang Reduction and Youth Development (GRYD) under the Mayor’s Office of Public Safety; headed by the Director of the City of Los Angeles Gang Reduction and Youth Development Office. Service components are currently provided by 30 contracted community-based organizations selected by the GRYD Office through a competitive bid process.

Partners:

- Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD)
- GRYD Research & Evaluation Team based at California State University, Los Angeles
- Los Angeles City Departments
- Los Angeles County Office of Violence Prevention
- Los Angeles County Probation Department
- GRYD service provider organizations (see www.lagryd.org for a list of provider names).

Note: For more information regarding GRYD research and evaluation, please see: www.juvenilejusticeresearch.com/projects/gryd.

City of Milwaukee Office of Violence Prevention

City: Milwaukee, Wisconsin

Geographical area of focus: Citywide

Year created: 2017

Source of funding: Local government funding (Mayor's Office and Common Council)

Type of model: Public Health

Intervention components:

- Implement community-driven strategic plan to achieve six goals: (1) stopping violence; (2) promoting healing and restorative justice; (3) supporting children, youth, and families; (4) promoting economic opportunity; (5) fostering safe and strong neighborhoods; and (6) strengthening capacity and coordination of violence prevention efforts.
- Raise public awareness of violence as a public health issue.
- Partner with the 414Life program to send credible messenger violence interrupters (414Life team members) into communities to mediate conflict and inhibit retaliatory violence.
- Connect victims of gun violence and their families to a hospital respondent (414Life team member) to provide services and prevent retaliatory violence.
- Connect youth and community members to services and resources.
- Enhance data sharing across criminal justice and public health entities and improve analysis around victims of shootings, suicide, and overdose.

**Population of focus:** Victims of gun violence (noting that many victims are youth) (additional focus on suicide and opioid overdose).

**Program reach:** The 414Life team received 400 referrals from the hospital responder since April 2019.

**Duration:** N/A

**Governance and staffing structure:** The development of the 414Life Milwaukee Blueprint for Peace was facilitated by the City of Milwaukee Health Department’s Office of Violence Prevention and led by a steering committee appointed by the Mayor’s Office. The Blueprint also incorporated perspectives of more than 1,500 community stakeholders. The 414Life team is comprised of 1 site director, 7 violence interrupters, and 1 hospital responder.

**Partners:**
- Medical College of Wisconsin
- Level 1 Trauma Center at Froedtert Hospital
- Emergency Medical Services – City of Milwaukee
- Milwaukee Police Department
- Milwaukee County Sheriff’s Office
- Milwaukee County Medical Examiner’s Office
- Project Ujima
- Urban Underground
- Youth Justice Milwaukee
- Ascension Wisconsin
- Sherman Park Community Association
- United Way of Greater Milwaukee and Waukesha County

Crisis Management System (CMS)

City: New York City, New York

Geographical area of focus: 30 neighborhoods with high volume of gun violence across five boroughs: Manhattan, Bronx, Brooklyn, Queens, Staten Island

Year created: 2014

Source of funding: NYC Mayor’s Office, NYC City Council

Type of model: Public Health

Intervention components:

- Cure Violence
  - Violence interruption provided by violence interrupters
  - Case management provided by outreach workers (e.g., goal setting; referrals to services, educational and vocational training programs; job search assistance; resume and interview preparation)
  - Community Engagement: Activation and Responses (e.g., rallies, resource fairs, youth events)
- Legal Aid Services
  - Educational workshops
  - Legal guidance and representation
- Youth Enrichment Service (School Conflict Mediation)
  - Conflict mediation in middle schools/ high schools
  - Mentorship
  - Restorative justice practices
  - Safe Passages on corridors around the school
» Assist schools in their response to violence that occurs within and in community

- **Therapeutic Services**
  » Culturally competent therapeutic support to children, youth, and families impacted by gun violence
  » Build skills in self-management and self-care
  » Both clinical and culturally traditional practices

- **Mobile Trauma Unit (MTU)**
  » Immediate trauma response and connection to resources in communities
  » Proactive engagement of community
  » One MTU per borough

- **Works Plus Employment Program**
  » Work experience placements, skills development, and job search and career planning support

- **Anti-Gun Violence Employment Program**
  » Employment opportunities for youth aged 14-24
  » Six-week summer program and 25-week school year program
  » Access to Enrichment Academy offering a myriad of different types of courses from services providers and cultural and education organizations
  » Serviced by the partner organizations of the ONS

- **Atlas**
  » Focused on youth age 18-21 with an increased risk of arrest for violent offense (e.g., gun carrying charges)
  » Family Functional Therapy
  » Peer support
  » Support services (e.g., clothing, referrals to trainings)

- **Safe in the City Grants**
  » $500-$1,000 grants to community members who have ideas for ensuring public safety and positively engaging, activating, and empowering their community

- **Public Safety Coalition**
Coalitions comprised of police, clergy, and community residents to promote healthy neighborhoods

Liaise amongst all community stakeholders promoting peace and community activism around peace and safety

- **Gun Violence Survivors Advisory Council**
  - Council comprised of survivors of gun violence and people who have lost loved ones to gun violence
  - Council provides recommendations to agencies and organizations that respond to shootings incidents on ways to improve interactions with and service provision and support for families of shooting victims

**Population of focus:** Youth ages 16-24 with elevated risk factors for perpetrating gun violence or being victim of gun violence

**Program reach:** From 2010 to 2019, data shows the CMS has contributed to an average 40% reduction in shootings across program areas compared to 31% decline in shootings in the 17 highest violence precincts in New York City.

**Duration:** N/A

**Governance and staffing structure:** CMS is an initiative of the Office to Prevent Gun Violence (OPGV), in the Office of Neighborhood Safety, in the Mayor’s Office of Criminal Justice. OPGV includes one Executive Director, two Deputy Directors, one Senior Director of Operations, and six Managers.

**Partners:**

- Catholic Charities
- Center for Employment Opportunity
- Community-based Cure Violence providers:
  - Bronx Connect/ Urban Youth Alliance—Release the Grip
  - Good Shepherd Services—Bronx Raises Against Guns (BRAG)
  - Center for Court Innovation—Save Our Streets (SOS Bronx and Brooklyn)
  - Brownsville Community Justice Center
  - Life Camp
  - Man Up
» Street Corner Resources—Speak Peace Forward
» Getting Out Staying Out — Stand Against Violence East Harlem (SAVE)
» Gangstas Making Astronomical Community Changes
» Sheltering Arms Children and Family Services— Rock Safe Streets (RSS)
» Central Family Life Center— True 2 Life
» Community Capacity Development
» Camba—Brownsville in Violence Out
» Kings of Kings
» Jewish Community Council— Operation HOOD
» KAVI
» Not Another Child
» 100 Suits
» Elite Learners
» Brownsville Think Tank Matters
» Los Sures-Southside United—The Wick
» 67th Clergy Council/God Squad
» Lincoln Hospital/Guns Down Life Up (GDLU)
» Jacobi Hospital
» Harlem Hospital
» Richmond University Medical Center
» Jamaica Hospital
» Kings County

- Legal Aid Society
- Mayor’s Action Plan for Neighborhood Safety
- New York City Administration for Children’s Services
- New York City Criminal Justice Agency
- New York City Department of Education
- New York City Department of Probation
- New York City Health and Hospitals
- New York City Housing Authority
- New York Police Department
- New Yorkers Against Gun Violence
- Repair the World
- Rising Ground
- United Way of New York City

Source: [https://www1.nyc.gov/site/peacenyc/interventions/crisis-management.page](https://www1.nyc.gov/site/peacenyc/interventions/crisis-management.page)

**Cumberland Collective To Help Reverse Inequality & Violence Everywhere (CC THRIVE)**

**County:** Cumberland County, New Jersey

**Cities of focus:** Bridgeton, Millville, Vineland

**Year created:** 2017

**Source of funding:** Grant-funded

**Type of model:** Comprehensive Gang Model

**Intervention components:**

- **Prevention**
  - Nix Gangs Program based on Phoenix curriculum and delivered in public housing developments and schools
  - Pop Up Play Streets
  - Police Athletic Leagues
  - School-based programs (e.g., social emotional learning, summer sports camps, STEM project)

- **Intervention/Treatment**
  - Youth Enrichment Services (e.g., mentoring, job readiness services, college preparation, anger management services, group therapy, referrals to services)
  - Credible Messenger Program
  - Life skills
  - Community events
» Response to gang and gun violence
» Educational campaign

▪ Suppression
» Strategic offender initiative (identify individuals who are committing gang and gun violence)
» Quality intelligence gathering, source management and sharing
» Concerted investigations (extra resources put into investigating individuals perpetuating violence)

▪ Reentry
» Intensive case management
» Reentry planning and wrap around services
» Emergency assistance funding for reentry

Population of focus:

▪ Nix Gangs Program
  » Age 10-14
  » Attending middle school in one of focal cities

▪ Pop Up Play Streets:
  » Age 10-17
  » Residing in selected public housing complexes in focal cities

▪ Youth Enrichment Services:
  » Age 8-25
  » Demonstrating group involvement or risk for group involvement
  » Residing in focal cities

▪ Reentry Case Management:
  » Age 18-25
  » Reentering Cumberland County from incarceration

Program reach:

▪ Nix Gangs Program: 150 kids annually
- Pop Up Play Streets: 500 kids annually
- Youth Enrichment Services: 250 annually
- Suppression: 27 to date
- Reentry Case Management: 25 total

**Duration:** Typically runs the length of a 10-month school year; however, many kids are cycling back through when programs are offered again.

**Governance and staffing structure:** Led by Cumberland County Prosecutor’s Office. CC THRIVE Steering Committee comprised of approx. 80 entities representing municipal, county, and state government; law enforcement; social services; housing; youth-serving groups; faith-based organizations; schools; and hospitals and health care agencies. The Steering Committee is divided into three working groups: one prevention, one for intervention/treatment, and one for law enforcement suppression.

**Partners:** Cumberland County Board of Commissioners

- City of Bridgeton (Mayor)
- City of Vineland (Public Safety Director)
- County Prosecutor’s Office
- County Public Defender’s Office
- Bridgeton, Millville, and Vineland Police Departments
- Cumberland County Sheriff’s Department
- Bridgeton, Millville, Vineland Police Athletic Leagues
- New Jersey State Parole Board
- Juvenile Justice Commission
- Juvenile Detention Alternative Initiative
- Cumberland County Probation Department
- New Jersey State Police
- New Jersey Real Crime Center South
- Bridgeton school District
- Vineland Prep Academy
- Millville Public School District
- Vineland Public School District
- Cumberland County Board of Vocational Education
- Cumberland County College
- Cumberland County Workforce Development Board
- Cumberland County Library
- Department of Child Protection and Permanency
- Cumberland County Board of Social Services
- Cumberland County Department of Human Services
- Bridgeton, Millville, and Vineland Housing Authorities
- Police Chaplain Program
- Inspira Health Network
- Center for Family Services
- Walter Rand Institute
- Positive Vibes Community Group
- Life Worth Living Inc.
- Revive South Jersey
- Gateway Community Action Partnership
- United Advocacy Group
- Boys and Girls Club of Cumberland County
- Camden Dream Center
- Volunteers Of America
Gang Reduction Initiative of Denver (GRID)

City: Denver, Colorado

Geographical area of focus: Citywide, focused on neighborhood violent hotspots.

Year created: 2010

Source of funding: City of Denver via line item in the mayor’s budget and the Department of Safety (general funds)

Type of model:

- Comprehensive Gang Model
- Focused Deterrence
- Public Health

Intervention components:

- Prevention through Gang Resistance Education and Training (G.R.E.A.T.) school-based program; Safe Passage Program, ensuring safe routes to and from school; Community Gang Awareness Education Series; prevention-based case management; community resources guide for agencies serving gang-affiliated youth; coordinated gang, drug, and gun violence child protection project; community engagement and organizing; violence reduction public awareness campaign, faith-based led community mobilization efforts.

- Suppression by enhanced criminal justice information sharing and planning; analysis of prominent gang structures and dynamics; federal investigations and prosecutions of high-level gang crimes; vertical gang prosecutions by Denver District Attorney’s Office; building capacity of criminal justice agencies to effectively address gang violence; developing and supporting community partnerships; critical incident response protocol for violent gang incidents.

- Intervention through providing access to appropriate mental health services; hospital-based gang intervention for individuals admitted for injuries related to suspected gang activity; training on gang structures and dynamics, gang intervention and prevention, and associated strategies and programs; coordinated and comprehensive intervention and case management services to gang-affiliated youth, adults, and families; gang member notification regarding the availability of services and consequences of partaking in violent activity; addressing the needs and challenges associated with the re-entry process for gang members returning to the
community; ensure supervision and case management services are consistent with evidence-based practices in the corrections field; providing access to job training and placement and access to educational opportunities for gang members; providing individual and family mentoring and advocacy to gang members and families through the work of outreach workers.

Population of focus: GRID works to identify those small number of groups and individuals, typically ages 12-24 that drive much of the gang violence in Denver. Primary consideration is given to communities that are experiencing a large amount of gang violence.

Program reach: Metrics not available at time of publication.

Duration (by component): Typically 9-12 months, depending on level of engagement and rate of progression throughout stages of programming and case management

Governance and staffing structure: The GRID Admin Team is housed under the Department of Safety. Staff include the director, two program coordinators and a team of 5 gang outreach case coordinators, that that work alongside two multidisciplinary teams comprised of city, state and community agencies who collectively provide case management and treatment services to Denver’s highest-risk gang members. The team manages multiple service contracts with network partners who provide primary and secondary gang prevention, intervention, violence interruption and community led violence reduction responses throughout the city of Denver.

Partners: The GRID Network is comprised of government agencies, businesses, schools, community-based, grassroots and faith-based organizations, and community resident groups such as the following:

- Denver Police Department
- Denver Sheriff’s Department
- Denver District Attorney’s Office
- Colorado Department of Corrections
- Denver Adult Probation
- Denver Juvenile Probation
- Denver Community Corrections
- Safety Youth Services
- Division of Youth Corrections
Mayor’s Office of Gang Prevention and Intervention (formerly the Mayor’s Anti-Gang Office)

City: Houston, Texas

Geographical area of focus: High gang crime areas in Southwest, Southeast, North, and Northwest Houston

Year created: 1994

Source of funding: General funds from city budget, grant funds

Type of model: Comprehensive Gang Model

Intervention components:

- Prevention
  - Gang education and awareness presentations to students, community members, partners.
  - Educational workshops with students (e.g., Ladies Choice Girls Program, Young Fathers Program).
  - Summer program for youth ages 6-15 with prosocial activities and speakers.
  - Prosocial activities for youth (e.g., recreational and sports leagues, painting murals).

- Intervention
  - Individual case management from assigned counselor at Office of Gang Prevention and Intervention.
  - Gang incident response.
  - Mediation.
  - Prosocial activities for youth receiving case management (e.g., special events).
Referrals to employment and support services (e.g., vocational training, jobs, GED programs).

- Suppression/Enforcement led by Houston Police Department
- Community Engagement led by Houston Police Department

**Population of focus:**

- 14–24 years old
- Group member, group associate, or past group involvement
- Involved with most active groups in target areas
- Involved with legal system, probation, or parole
- Family members (parents, caregivers, siblings)

**Program reach:**

- An average of 100-200 presentations annually.
- Approximately 200-250 children have attended I Matter presentations hosted by Parks and Recreation Department.

**Duration (by component):**

- Case management received for 6-18 months, on average. Frequency of contact with case manager varies by level (i.e., Levels 1-4 as defined by the Comprehensive Gang Model) and ranges from 2-3 contacts per week to 1 contact per month.
- Educational workshops are 4-8 weeks.
- Summer program is 2 months.

**Governance and staffing structure:** Office of Gang Prevention and Intervention is staffed by 9 counselors and 1 program director. The program manager facilitates four, monthly Gang Violence Reduction Team (GVRT) meetings with Office of Gang Prevention and Intervention staff and community partners across the city (15-20 attendees at each meeting).

**Partners:**

- Houston Police Department
- Houston Parks and Recreation Department
Project Imagine

City: Danville, Virginia

Geographical area of focus: Citywide

Year created: 2018

Source of funding: Virginia Workforce YES program

Type of model: Comprehensive Gang Model

Intervention components:

- Community Mobilization
  - Involvement of local citizens, including former gang members and community groups and agencies, and the coordination of programs and staff functions within and across agencies.

- Opportunities Provision
  - The development of a variety of specific education, training, and employment programs targeting gang-involved youth.

- Social Intervention
  - Youth-serving agencies, schools, outreach workers, grassroots groups, faith-based organizations, law enforcement agencies, and other criminal justice organizations reaching out and acting as links between gang-involved youth and their families, the conventional world, and needed services.
Suppression

» Formal and informal social control procedures, including close supervision or monitoring of gang youth by agencies of the criminal justice system and also by community-based agencies, schools, and grassroots groups.

Organizational Change and Development

» Development and implementation of policies and procedures that result in the most effective use of available and potential resources to better address the gang problem.

Population of focus: Youth 15-21 years of age who have been identified as at-risk and gang affiliated.

Program reach: 33 participants

Duration: 9 weeks

Governance and staffing structure: Supported by Danville City Council, who employs program coordinator, receives program funding from Virginia Workforce YES program, and partners with law enforcement.

Partners:

- Averett University
- City of Danville Parks and Recreation
- Danville City Manager’s Office
- Danville Community College
- Danville Department of Social Services
- Danville Housing Authority
- Danville Juvenile Justice Department
- Danville Police Department
- Danville Public Schools
- Danville-Pittsylvania Community Services (DPCS)
- Pathfinders Resources
- Ross Innovative Employment Solutions
- Salvation Army
- Southside Community Action
- U Shine I Shine Car Care

Project Longevity

City: New Haven, Connecticut

Geographical area of focus: Citywide

Year Created: 2012

Source of funding: Connecticut Office of Policy and Management, Everytown Gun Center, IKEA grant

Type of model: Focused Deterrence

Intervention components:

- Group Violence Intervention (GVI)
  - Custom notifications to particular group members (typically conducted by social service providers and uniform patrol or police executives).
  - Call-ins between violent street groups and law enforcement, community members, and service providers to communicate (1) a law enforcement message that future violence will not be tolerated and will be met with clear and predictable consequences, (2) a community message that violence will no longer be tolerated, and (3) a genuine offer of help to those who want it.
  - Incident (shooting) reviews and group audits to assess which groups are most actively involved in gun violence and the circumstances surrounding each shooting.

- Law enforcement
  - Law enforcement agencies responding expeditiously to group violence involving the use of firearms.
  - Law enforcement working proactively and not reactively to get in front of any gun violence. As well, as to prevent retaliatory gun violence between groups.

- Support and outreach
» Full-time social services coordinator working with individuals to ensure that they receive priority attention and rapid delivery of services.

- Racial reconciliation

» The process of racial reconciliation allows police and communities to address historic tensions, grievances, and misconceptions between them and begin a new collaboration. It is in resetting those past relationships that will enable the community to be empowered and to work collaboratively with law enforcement to play a positive role in addressing the group and gun violence in their communities.

- Social network analysis

» Analysis of street groups to identify high-risk individuals to connect with community-based interventions.

**Population of focus:** People ages 18 and older who are at high risk of being involved with group or gang violence or are involved in group or gang and gun violence. Individuals are identified as those who are driving a disproportionate amount of violence in the community. Project Longevity will work with people younger than 18 if they are at high risk of involvement in group and gun violence, but the model is designed for people ages 18 and older.

**Program reach:** Metrics not available at time of publication.

**Duration:** N/A

**Governance and staffing structure:**

- Project Manager who oversees implementation in New Haven
- Statewide Director who oversees 3 cities (New Haven, Bridgeport, and Hartford)

**Partners:**

- Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives
- Connecticut Court Support Services Division (CSSD) Adult Probation Department
- Connecticut State's Attorney's Office
- Department of Correction Parole and Community Services
- Department of Sociology at Yale University
- Federal Bureau of Investigation
- National Network for Safe Communities (NNSC)
- New Haven Police Department
- US Attorney’s Office
- US Probation District of Connecticut State agencies
- Yale Law School

**Note:** Social network analysis was not used during all phases of implementation of Project Longevity. Shooting reviews and group audits were more widely and consistently used during early implementation of the intervention. See Sierra-Arévalo, Charette, and Papachristos (2017) and Sierra-Arévalo, and Papachristos (2015).

**Richmond Office of Neighborhood Safety (ONS)/Peacemaker Fellowship®**

**City:** Richmond, California

**Geographical area of focus:** Citywide

**Year created:** ONS (2007); Peacemaker Fellowship (2010)

**Source of funding:** Government

**Type of model:** Advance Peace

**Intervention components:**

- Peacekeeper fellowship/Cash stipends: “active firearm offenders who have avoided law enforcements reach”. They practice human development, healing, violence interruption, training, and conflict mediation, and promote non-violence.
- Daily, direct engagement, Conflict mediation, service referral and navigation support.
- Cultivating nurturing responses that address trauma and mental, emotional needs.
- Life Planning: used to map personal goals, needs and wants and steps towards goal accomplishment
Credible Messengers with lived experience oversee fellow activities, life planning and support goal achievement.

**Population of focus:** Focus is on active firearm offenders/habitual "shooters" who have avoided law enforcements reach – those thought to be a threat to public safety for local gun violence.

**Program reach:** 147 people served

**Duration:** 18-month cohort-based fellowship

**Governance and staffing structure:**

- Situated within the City Government's Office of Neighborhood Safety.
- Fellows engaged daily/checked on by Credible Messengers ("Neighborhood Change Agents")

**Partners:**

- Advance Peace
- The University of California, Berkeley
- RYSE Center
- Beyond Violence
- John Muir Medical Center
- Kaiser Health


### Safe Streets

**City:** Baltimore, Maryland

**Geographical area of focus:** 10 sites: Belair-Edison, Belvedere, Brooklyn, Cherry Hill, Franklin Square, McElderry Park, Park Heights, Penn-North, Sandtown, Woodbourne

**Year created:** 2007
Source of funding: Funded by City general funds and state grant funds.

Type of model: Public Health

Intervention components:

- Detecting conflict: through informal knowledge channels. Research analyst who analyzes data on previous trends.
- Credible Messengers from the community who share experiences with participants.
- Conflict mediation: working with participants in the community through direct engagement and canvassing.
- Hospital-Based Program: meet with potential clients who have been harmed by violence.
- Schools: conflict mediation in school settings.
- Community: public campaigns/events against violence, mutual aid efforts, parades, giveaways, block parties to create trust and familiarity.

Population of focus: Primarily target people age 14-25. However, take on any clients deemed at risk by staff, community members, referrals, etc. Increasingly older population that commit shootings.

Program reach: 2300 conflicts mediated (2020, per Safe Streets bimonthly email newsletter)

Duration: N/A

Governance and staffing structure: Ten sites total. Staff employed by contracted community-based vendors. Each site has at least seven members (violence interrupters, site supervisor, violence interrupter coordinator, and site director + executive leadership). Leadership team housed in the Mayor’s Office. Staff in six hospitals.

Partners:

- Baltimore Healthy Babies
- Baltimore Mayor’s Office of Employment Development
- Baltimore Mayor’s Office of Homeless Services
- Baltimore Public Schools
- Behavioral Health System Baltimore
- Jobs Plus
San Francisco Wraparound Project

City: San Francisco, California

Geographical area of focus: City and county of San Francisco. Based in the Zuckerberg San Francisco General Hospital (ZSFGH) and Trauma Center, which serves trauma victims from throughout the city.

Year created: 2005

Source of funding: Largely through City of San Francisco via line item in the mayor’s budget and the San Francisco Department of Children Youth and Families. Some program funding also comes from the University of California San Francisco (UCSF) Department of Surgery, and grant funding has supported associate research and other program activities.

Type of model: Hospital-Based Violence Intervention

Intervention components:

- Engagement of trauma victims at hospital to assess risk and offer program.
- Case Management with a focus on cultural competence.
- Safety Planning.
- Service Linkages/Brokerage via large community partner network (including crisis response, vocational training programs, employment opportunities throughout the region, after school programs, mental health services, cognitive behavioral therapy, education completion, higher education, art workshops, assistance with identification and benefits access, and tattoo removal).

Population of focus: Victims of interpersonal or youth violence evaluated in the ZSFGH emergency department.

Program reach: 850 participants since inception (as of 2019)

Duration (by component): Typically 6-12 months, but participants can be retained longer than that
**Governance and staffing structure:** The program is housed within the Department of Surgery at UCSF. Also report routinely to San Francisco City Government. Staffing consists of program director, program manager, and five case managers (including a supervising case manager).

**Partners:**

- CARECEN SF
- Friends of the Urban Forest
- Instituto Familiar de la Raza
- Project Rebound
- San Francisco Crisis Response Network
- San Francisco Department of Parks and Recreation
- Street Violence Intervention Program (SVIP)
- Trauma Recovery Center

**Stockton Gun-Violence Reduction Model (Ceasefire)**

**City:** Stockton, California

**Geographical area of focus:** Citywide

**Year created:** 2014

**Source of funding:**

- Government - The Office of Violence Prevention.
- Funding from California Violence Intervention and Prevention (CalVIP).
- Funding from Measure A (tax measure).
- Funding from other external grants.

**Type of model:** Focused Deterrence/Transformative Intervention

**Intervention components:**

- Problem analysis
» Examine shooting incidents. Assign ‘points’ based on risk. They are given a scorecard. Determine priorities of police, etc.

- Safety Meetings/Call-Ins
  » Meeting with all parties (law enforcement, outreach workers, community leaders, and at-risk individuals). weekly meetings as follow-up if enrolled.

- Violence Interruption
  » Peacekeepers’ immediate response to shooting incidents to Identify and prevent conflict from escalating to violence.
  » OVP/SPD Group Strategy analysis of conflicts to identify the key individuals driving the conflict and appropriate intervention strategies.

- Hospital intervention and partnership
  » Hospital-based referrals and situational conflict mediation to prevent retaliation.
  » Weekly review of highest risk individuals and intervention strategies with the Trauma Unit.

- Intensive Case Management
  » Peacekeepers and intervention workers that share experiences/are familiar with the community to work on both outreach and case management. Theory of change is based on building trusting relationships/establishing Safety, Stability, and Transformative outcomes. Develop client safety/life plans managed through weekly OVP case conferencing.

- CBT Healthy, Wealthy and Wise Class.
  » Highest risk clients enrolled in a 16-week CBT course focusing on: (1) Identity, (2) Decision Making, (3) Overcoming Trauma, and (4) Financial Literacy.

- Law enforcement agencies
  » Provide intel, enforcement when necessary, and communication with at-risk individuals.

Population of focus: “Highest risk” individuals identified by police data, hospital data and meetings that determine scorecards. Scorecards align the victim or suspect on a graph based on risk. People put red, yellow, and green based on risk.

Program reach (in 2019):

- 91 highest risk clients served
Communication intervention to highest risk clients:
- 101 total communications
- 22 from call-ins
- 79 from smaller safety meetings

Duration: 1 year

Governance and staffing structure: The Office of Violence Prevention (OVP) oversees the citywide Gun- Violence Reduction Model under the direction of the OVP Director. Ceasefire is jointly operated by OVP and the Stockton Police Department (SPD). OVP consists of Violence Interrupters, Case Managers, Community Engagement Coordinator, Analysis and service-providing partners. SPD’s Ceasefire model focuses on the enforcement side consisting of 3 specialized units; CRT, CIU and GVSU. The lieutenant oversees all enforcement work of the sergeants on the streets. The Lieutenant report to SPD Captain and Deputy Chief.

Partners:

- Direct Partners with OVP
  - Division of Adult Parole Operations
  - Faith in the Valley (PICO Affiliate)
  - Friends Outside
  - Local Colleges (Stanislaus State and Delta College)
  - San Joaquin County Behavioral Health Services
  - San Joaquin County Hospital (Trauma Unit)
  - San Joaquin County Juvenile Justice/Delinquency Prevention Commission
  - San Joaquin County Probation Department

- Law Enforcement Partners
  - District Attorney’s Office
  - Division of Adult Parole Operations
  - Federal Bureau of Investigations
  - San Joaquin County Probation Department
  - San Joaquin County Sheriff’s Office
  - U.S. Marshals Service

- Service-Providing Partners
TenPoint Coalition

City: Indianapolis, Indiana

Geographical area of focus: Butler-Tarkington, United Northwest, Crown Hill, and Highland Park (other neighborhoods previously)

Year created: 1999

Source of funding: Funding has changed over the years and has included local government funding, federal grant funding and donations from churches, businesses, and community members

Type of model: Faith based

Intervention components:

- Faith walks/patrols
  - Coalition members walk the streets of geographic areas of focus and talk to community members, particularly youth and work to build relationships, mentor youth, and direct them to resources and services as needed.
Homicide Support

» When a homicide occurs, IMPD will contact coalition members who come to the scene and communicate with the public to explain what is happening, keep people calm and provide comfort and prayer counseling, and interrupt retaliatory cycles of violence by building relationships with victim’s family and loved ones and encouraging them to work with law enforcement. Coalition staff also engage in these activities at funerals of homicide victims.

Population of focus: Youth (particularly men of color) age 10 – 21 in geographic areas with a high amount of violence

Program reach:

- 2016: 471 interventions (4 patrol areas)
- 2017: 446 interventions (4 patrol areas)
- 2018: 513 interventions (5 patrol areas)
- 2019: 465 interventions (5 patrol areas)
- 2020: 212 interventions (5 patrol areas with COVID-19 restrictions)

Duration: N/A

Governance and staffing structure: The initiative is led by Reverend Charles Harrison and 4-5 teams of around 4 people each, with a team lead, that focus on specific geographic areas. The team leads have informal communication with the Reverend as needed.

Partners:

- Butler Tarkington Neighborhood Association
- City Peace Coalition
- Far East Coalition
- Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department
- Peace in the Streets
- U.S. Attorney’s Office – South Indiana District

Note: The term, “interventions” for Indianapolis TenPoint is helping to prevent a shooting, stabbing, homicide, retaliation, job referrals and training, helping individuals get food, housing, and get substance abuse and mental health assistance.
Notes

1 This age range (10 to 25) is broader than the one the OJJDP uses for activities related to juvenile justice, including its Model Programs Guide. We use a broader age range because efforts focused on youth gun violence commonly define their populations of focus to include juveniles and young adults. In instances where we only use the term “youth”, we are also including youth adults; terminology in some places may be streamlined to only use the term “youth” for readability.


3 This was a mix of interventions that work exclusively with youths and young adults in this age range, and interventions that work largely but not exclusively with youths and young adults. Urban did not include in its scan any prevention intervention solely focused on mitigating future youth gang involvement and/or youth gun violence, although there were some multicomponent interventions that included prevention activities.

4 A research-based understanding of this area is still emergent, with recent work demonstrating that the relationship between social media communication and violence is complex and easily misinterpreted (Stuart 2020).


6 Other studies have identified other types of case management, including triage case management (dealing with immediate barriers), resource management (connecting to other agencies as appropriate [no intentional follow up]), intensive case management (services and follow up provided at least twice weekly), and long-term case management (services and assistance for at least one year [resources and follow up]).
References


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