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The Past, Present, and Future of Workplace Giving in the United States

Workplace giving has long been one of the most distinctive elements of Americans’ long tradition of small-scale charitable giving. Social work scholar Eleanor Brilliant has described it as a “significant aspect of the myth of American voluntarism” (Brilliant 1990, xv). Often channeled through the instrument of the payroll deduction and administered by a charity federation like the United Way, for more than three-quarters of a century it has functioned for many Americans as a sort of secular tithe, in Brilliant’s evocative phrase, redirecting a portion of salary to support the local community (Brilliant 1990, 266; Shaker and Christensen 2018). “To the extent that the United States has a culture of giving,” the New York Times declared in one recent and typical assessment, “United Way and its workplace campaigns...deserve a fair bit of credit.”¹

It is tempting to regard workplace giving as a natural extension of American exceptionalism, a product of our nine-to-five Tocquevillian proclivities. Americans give; Americans work. Ergo, they give at work. Yet the development of workplace giving in the United States over the past century has depended upon the practice’s alignment (and occasionally misalignment) with the structural underpinnings of American political economy. It is perhaps unsurprising that the history of workplace giving is entangled in the history of work. Appreciating that entanglement is the best way to understand both the rise of workplace giving as a dominant model of charitable giving in the US, and (more recently) its declining status.

The data on American workplace giving is imprecise, but the best estimate puts the aggregate figure at roughly $5 billion, a considerable sum, if a small proportion of the nearly $300 billion that American individuals give annually (IUPUI 2018, 11–12). Recent research suggests that “[d]onors who chose to donate at work typically made about 20% of their overall giving through that channel” (Osili, Hirt, and Raghavan 2011, 398).² Yet there is also mounting anecdotal evidence that the practice is eroding within many companies. Indeed, United Way, the leading beneficiary of workplace giving for more than a half century, has seen its annual fundraising fall by more than 35 percent over the past 25 years, after adjusting for inflation.³
That fall stems from the erosion of the landscape on which the traditional model of workplace giving was built, one distinguished by large industrial firms, stable workforces, a generally egalitarian distribution of income, widespread acceptance of giving through charitable intermediaries, and a bias toward local health and human service organizations. A new landscape has emerged over the past several decades, and workplace giving is adapting to it.

Over the past century, when leaders of the nonprofit sector raised concerns about the nation’s stores of charitable resources, the financial health of its charitable agencies, or the distribution of philanthropic responsibilities, they often turned to the workplace because it represented one of the surest venues for tapping the generosity of the nonelite. Fears about similar challenges have arisen in recent years, and it has become clear that the traditional model of workplace giving is inadequate for meeting them. Whether an updated model will be able to do so depends in part on its “fit” with prevailing labor market trends and with broader demographic and economic forces. However, such a model will also require rethinking what it means to encourage a broad base of charitable giving, including scrutinizing precisely who is included in those efforts and how those efforts fit within the changing workplace landscape.

The Community Origins of Workplace Giving

The origins of workplace giving in the US lie in the efforts of local elites to rationalize charitable giving in the decades after the American Civil War. Charity organization societies (COS’s), which emerged in England in the early 1870s and spread to the US later that decade, received donations from citizens concerned about “indiscriminate charity” and oversaw charitable distribution to recipients deemed “worthy” (Soskis 2010). Some cities also began experimenting with charity federations through which several organizations would coordinate unified campaigns, adapting aggressive fundraising practices that national charities such as the YMCA and Red Cross had recently developed (Barman 2006; Cutlip 1965).

Some communities went farther and combined the federated fundraising and allocation functions in a single institution. Cleveland was the first to do so. Facing an unrelenting wave of solicitation from the city’s charitable agencies, its local business elites were concerned that they were shouldering too heavy a philanthropic burden. The city’s chamber of commerce commissioned a survey in 1909 that confirmed this fear: the wealthiest 1 percent of the city’s residents contributed some 96 percent of the funds donated to its social welfare agencies (Hall 1992, 64; Zunz 2011, 52–53). The business community’s interest in broadening the base of givers aligned with a rising corps of social-work professionals’ desire
to make Cleveland’s charities more efficient, leading to the establishment of the Cleveland Federation for Charity and Philanthropy in 1913. The federation managed a single annual consolidated campaign for its 53 member charitable agencies (selected by a committee of the Chamber of Commerce), which included (in a notable gesture of nonsectarianism) Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish charities (Hall 1992, 163).

Within a few years, one-half of all adults in the city were participating in the campaign. Donors could give to one of the participating agencies or defer to the federation’s board—composed of representatives of the local business elite and member agencies—which made its allocation decisions after a paid staff of social service professionals conducted a careful study of the community’s needs. Yet the determination of those needs was limited by a desire to direct funding to organizations that could appeal to a community-wide consensus (as interpreted by its business elite) of what constituted a legitimate organizational beneficiary. This meant a heavy focus on health and social service organizations. Many charities, including cultural and religious organizations and those dedicated to advocacy and reform, were left out: one 1921 Philadelphia survey revealed that of the city’s roughly 1,000 charities, less than one-third were invited to join the federation (Barman 2006, 23; Hall 1992, 163–64).

The model established in Cleveland soon spread nationwide in the form of “community chests,” their growth accelerated by the fundraising demands of the First World War. Many communities created “war chests” to handle the onslaught of charitable solicitations, and those chests were converted into community chests when the war ended. By 1926, 308 federated campaigns across the US and Canada had raised some $66 million; two decades later, nearly 800 cities had established their own community chests. Although chests relied heavily on the residential door-to-door canvass in their early decades, they also turned to corporate contributions. These contributions spiked after a district court ruled in 1929 that businesses could deduct contributions to local charities as business expenses, and after chest leaders successfully lobbied Congress in 1935 to allow corporations to deduct charitable contributions. By 1950, more than 40 percent of the amount raised in local federated fund drives came from corporate contributions. Elite donors and corporations renewed the push to broaden the base of giving, and for community chests—as well as fundraisers for major national charities like the Red Cross—the workplace emerged as an especially promising quarry (Barman 2006, 19, 31; Brilliant 1990, 23–26; Cutlip 1965, 213–16, 323–29; Hall 1992, 58–61).
Wartime Charitable Demand and the Payroll Deduction: The Spread of Workplace Giving Campaigns

Of course, informal and ad hoc charitable fundraising had been a common workplace practice for centuries (especially when workplaces were also homes, as they often were before the industrial revolution). The modern practice of workplace giving, however, stemmed from three developments: (1) community chest leaders’ search for an expanded pool of donors, (2) the spread of the charitable payroll deduction, and (3) the pressure of increased charitable solicitations during World War II.

By the 1920s, community chest leaders had realized the limits of the door-to-door canvass. It was an inefficient system that, as one commentator noted in 1927, had “too much reliance on luck,” as well as on the supplementary largesse of elite givers (Morris 2015, 112). Many of those chest leaders were also corporate executives who encouraged their employees to give to local charities. George Eastman, for example, the president of Eastman Kodak (the largest employer in Rochester, New York), served as the first president of his local community chest. Historian Andrew Morris notes that at Kodak, “participation in the Chest drives was cast as part of the company’s welfare capitalist ethos” (2015, 112); divisions within the company competed to raise the most funds, and management recruited workers to visit and report on charities that received funding. Corporate executives appreciated the public relations potential of workers’ charitable efforts, especially because when newspapers publicized the results, the firm (rather than merely its employees) often received credit for the contributions (Morris 2015).

However, it took the pressures of wartime mobilization to trigger the wide scale expansion of workplace giving. “The state’s fiscal expansion during World War II had a profound and unintended impact on voluntary fundraising,” Morris writes (2015, 107). The payroll deduction was the most significant development during that period, allowing a charitable pledge to be withheld, in regular increments, from wages. This proved a decisive innovation in the promotion of a culture of mass giving because, according to Morris, it “allowed for small sums to be regularly and automatically collected from a wide variety of Americans, particularly those of modest means” (2015, 117). This reflected a governing principle driving many of the mass-based charitable campaigns of the early 20th century, from Red Cross drives to alumni campaigns in higher education. Fundraisers began courting small donors in an effort to decrease reliance on elite giving, operating under the assumption that the nonelite would give more through small, steady contributions than through large singular donations (Kimball 2015).
The widespread adoption of the automatic payroll deduction was not itself automatic and was contingent upon the confluence of several favorable factors and precedents. These included the employee contribution model for covering the costs of work-based life insurance policies and the checkoff system that many unions instituted to collect dues from wages, a practice that was incorporated into more than half of all labor agreements by the 1950s. As early as the late 1920s, some corporations had begun instituting regular deductions from their employees’ paychecks to cover their contributions to the local community chest (Morris 2015, 110). The federal government aided this practice by encouraging the use of payroll deductions to pay for the massive war bond campaigns it led during World War II, as well as the institution of a system of compulsory withholding by employers of employees’ federal income tax payments (Brilliant 1990, 27). Morris writes:

> The Roosevelt administration's effort to shift the income tax from a “class” to a “mass” tax with the Revenue Act of 1942, combined with rising wartime incomes, had made millions of workers eligible to pay the income tax for the first time. In order to avoid the problem of workers neglecting to save for quarterly tax payments and to keep tax payments current, the Treasury proposed a payroll deduction system modeled on Social Security tax withholding, and this mechanism was adopted in 1943. (2015, 119–20)

Firms’ requirement to develop the administrative capacity to withhold wages benefitted community chests. As Morris explains, the “collection at the source” model soon “became a vital method of financing for both the state and the voluntary sector” (2015, 109). Indeed, the charitable payroll deduction emerged at a key moment in the development of a mixed welfare state in the US, when “workers were contributing to other elements of the hybrid social safety net, including Social Security, private pensions, and health insurance plans” (Morris 2015, 120). Workplace giving incorporated some of the characteristics of the compulsory payments to defray the costs of those programs, promoting a “fundamentally passive model of citizenship” (Morris 2015, 124). By using the payroll deduction in this way, the workplace giving campaign updated an element of contributions to early community chests, which were often likened to tax payments because of the civic obligations they were deemed to fulfill (and the pressures citizens often felt to honor them). The automatic payroll deduction also coincided with the loss of individual discretion that occurred when employees agreed to direct their dollars to the community chest, with its preselected, constricted range of charities. Indeed, during its key growth period, workplace giving promoted less the expression of individuality and personal agency—key values now often associated with charitable giving—than an ethic of shared civic identity and communal responsibility (Barman 2006, 18; Cutlip 1965, 216).

The payroll deduction, with its low costs and high yields, had much to recommend it to both employees and employers. Yet both groups initially resisted it. Moreover, labor was generally reluctant to cooperate with the community chest movement, which business interests had long dominated.
Workers also resented the ways management dragooned them into charitable service to boost corporate public image, and reports circulated of workers being fired for failing to participate in campaigns and of suffering wage deductions. Just as elections in authoritarian nations with absurdly high voter participation rates are hardly signs of civic health, employers’ efforts to achieve 100 percent participation in giving paradoxically often exposed the strains on the voluntarist ethic that management pressure could produce. Indeed, when plants unionized, workers often stopped participating in community chest campaigns and instead sponsored their own drives (Cutlip 1965, 409; Morris 2015, 114–16).

Yet the pressures of wartime solicitations, the expansion of unions in war-related industries, and the goad of wartime patriotism softened labor’s resistance to working with community chests—as well as with national health charities and the Red Cross, which diligently courted workers—and led them to coalesce with management around the idea of the single workplace campaign. “Our shop stewards were becoming panhandlers,” one labor leader explained. “This had to stop” (Brilliant 1990, 30). The nation’s labor leadership also saw the strains of war drives as an opportunity to gain some power within the chest movement. In 1941, representatives from the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) were elected to the national umbrella organization of community chests. The following year, the two unions abandoned plans for an independent campaign, joining the Red Cross’s drive in the spring and the community (war) chest campaign in the fall. By acceding to the latter, they were able to win some concessions, including “representation at all levels of the campaign organization, inclusion of the AFL and CIO relief agencies among the funded agencies, and the promise that union locals, not employers, would be credited with the donations made by their members” (Morris 2015, 118; Aft and Aft 2004, 91–92).

In campaigns unions officially participated in, giving from workers skyrocketed: in Minneapolis, for instance, contributions from union laborers doubled between 1941 and 1942 (Morris 2015, 118). Several decades later, one commentator noted that “the labor movement is the foundation upon which the United Way movements rests” (Barman 2006, 35). One 1967 study found that the average contribution per employee was approximately 250 percent higher when unions participated in a campaign than when they did not. However, this development hints at a fascinating counterfactual: if labor had not joined the United Way movement, those campaigns might have remained separate, allowing workplace giving to develop stronger formal associations with labor solidarity (Cutlip 1965, 409; Shostak 1991, 139).5

Initially, corporate leaders had reservations about embracing a consolidated version of the community chest campaign as the dominant form of workplace giving. Chief among them was a fear that
accepting a payroll charitable deduction would represent an additional accounting burden and legitimize the “check-off” system for raising union dues that it resembled (in that system, which many corporations resisted, workers authorized union dues to be deducted from their paychecks).

Yet after enduring a torrent of solicitations—many firms reported being besieged by more than ten intensive campaigns a year—and because of the threats fundraising drives posed to productivity, corporate executives ultimately endorsed using the payroll deduction to fund one-drive-for-all community chest campaigns at the workplace. In 1958, for instance, the Ford Motor Company claimed it lost $40,000 in executive time for every plant solicitation it absorbed. The single campaign drive that community chests offered presented an alluring alternative (Barman 2006, 33; Morris 2015, 113).

Thus, corporations pushed the chests to unite with the national health charities (which had also aggressively sought to enter the workplace) to form what would be called a “United Fund.” (In 1970, the thousands of united funds that had developed throughout the country under various names agreed to take the common name “United Way.”) The first of these funds came together through the promptings of Henry Ford II and the leaders of Detroit’s automotive industry, who, as Brilliant explains, saw bringing order to charity solicitations in their plants “as part of a larger plan to contain workplace organizing efforts” (1990, 30). They made a stark offer to the local offices of national fundraising organizations: join the United Fund or be blocked from soliciting at any Ford plant. Many of those organizations felt they had little choice but to accede. The result was a consolidated campaign run in 1949 under the slogan “give once for all” that combined the member agencies of the city’s community chest, several local offices of the national health charities, and a few other local charities. The single campaign raised more money than the participating charities had raised before, combined, in their own separate annual campaigns (Barman 2006, 33–34; Cutlip 1965, 495–500).

The Golden Age of Workplace Giving in America

The model of the single, all-in-one workplace campaign that community chest professionals aggressively promoted (and which was largely funded through the payroll deduction) spread rapidly in the years following the successful initiative in Detroit. By 1959, more than 1,200 United Funds had been established across the country; that year, more than half of the Red Cross’s fundraising revenue came from united drives (Barman 2006, 34; Cutlip 1965, 500). The model appealed to a range of stakeholders. Charities (at least those selected as United Fund members) appreciated the dependability and unconditionality of the funding, as well as its low administrative and fundraising costs. Workplace donors relinquished some discretion over the direction of their gifts; however, through those gifts, they
were able to fulfill an ethic of civic duty and responsibility to their local community. Corporations, by agreeing to participate in a United Fund campaign, bought "immunity" from being solicited by any participating charitable organization throughout the year. Corporations were also protected from workers making gifts to controversial charities. The United Fund could serve as "one neutral third party, or desired intervening force, between the corporation and its employees, and agencies in the communities that met social welfare needs" (Brilliant 1990, 35).

Of course, the United Fund’s monopoly on workplace solicitation was not absolute: the major national health agencies (such as the American Cancer Society and American Heart Association) held out for several decades, insisting on the need for competition in solicitations. The expansion of United Funds also hindered the spread of alternative models of workplace giving, such as in-plant federations (also called “industrial chests”) through which campaigns were conducted entirely within the corporation, with employees determining where their collected funds were distributed. Some 535 in-plant foundations existed in 1951, but United Way leaders targeted them as “competitors” and regarded the United Fund as a means of limiting their growth (Barman 2006, 63–63; Brilliant 1990, 33, 37; Aft and Aft 2004, 90).

Indeed, as workplace giving spread in the following decades, it became increasingly synonymous with giving to the local United Fund. Total revenue of United Funds in the US and Canada doubled every decade from 1940 through the 1960s; by the early 1970s, United Funds throughout the country were raising nearly $1 billion (Smith 1977, 1,356). Workplace campaigns soon made up a significant part of the revenue of community charity federations, displacing the reliance on door-to-door canvassing. The termination of war and excess profit taxes lessened the incentives for corporate charity after World War II, and community chest leaders regarded the workplace as an opportunity to make up for the expected loss. The mass-based, democratic nature of workplace giving also attracted considerable acclaim (even while local elites assumed they would still be able to control the allocation process). In many communities, three out of four families participated in drives. As one chest fundraiser recalled in 1949, “The Community Chest movement is the most widespread of American social movements, the product of a classless mutually considerate society” (Cutlip 1965, 214). For the first time, in 1956, workplace giving from employees made up more of the revenue of United Funds and community chests (39.6 percent) than corporate gifts (38 percent); by 1970, employee giving made up around one-half of United Way revenues, while corporate support made up one-quarter (Brilliant 1990, 31, 34, 157–58).

By midcentury, the seeds had been sown for what would ultimately become the largest workplace giving campaign in the nation, the Combined Federal Campaign (CFC). In 1956, President Eisenhower called for a uniform program of fundraising for both federal civilian and military employees at their
places of work. At first, three on-the-job campaigns were held a year for three sets of charities: United Funds, national health charities, and the Red Cross. In six cities in 1964, those three campaigns were combined into one Combined Federal Campaign. By 1971, all federal campaigns throughout the nation had been brought together, and by 1977, the CFC (under the management of the Office of Personnel Management) had raised some $78.5 million from 5 million federal personnel across 535 locations (Brilliant 1990, 115).

In assessing this golden age of workplace giving, it is important to note that the United Fund model reflected and relied upon the development of a broader, postwar political economy. The single consolidated workplace campaign was particularly suited to an era dominated by large firms, for which administrative efficiency was an especially attractive benefit that made a United Fund monopoly worth accepting. Some 500,000 small firms failed during World War II, but as labor historian Louis Hyman writes, “big business took up the slack workforce as the economy doubled in size ... Workers at small and medium-sized firms (fewer than five hundred workers) fell from 52 percent of the workforce to 38 percent,” while the share of the workforce at firms with more than 10,000 employees rose from 13 percent to 31 percent. It was at these larger firms that United Fund workplace giving campaigns flourished (Hyman 2018, 47).

The development of workplace giving and of the one-drive-for-all campaign must also be understood in the context of the midcentury rapprochement between big business and big labor around common goals of stability and prosperity. In a sense, the establishment of the first United Fund in 1949 marked an early “treaty of Detroit” that anticipated the more famous one struck between General Motors and the United Auto Workers the following year. In that agreement, labor ceded its demands to control and structurally reform the workplace in exchange for workers receiving more of the benefits of their own productivity through higher wages and private welfare provision (e.g., health insurance, pension funds). Similarly, when the labor elite endorsed the United Fund model, “determin[ing] the manner of giving for large numbers of industrialized, blue-collar workers for the next three decades,” it traded the possibility of full charitable autonomy for workplace stability and a seat at the table to determine the direction of donations (Brilliant 1990, 32). Much like the more famous Treaty of Detroit, the extent to which this deal ultimately benefited individual workers is up for debate. In subsequent decades (as research conducted for the 1970s Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs highlighted) it became increasingly clear that despite labor representation, corporate leaders still maintained the upper hand on United Fund boards and volunteer allocations committees and wielded even more power through the decision whether to authorize workplace solicitation in the first place (Smith 1977, 1,355).
The United Fund model affirmed another sort of restriction of scope as well. The spread of workplace giving after the Second World War was an element of an impressively egalitarian midcentury culture of giving. A 1950 analysis from the Russell Sage Foundation, for example, estimated that 80 percent of all charitable contributions came from individuals with incomes of $5,000 or less (Zunz 2011, 176). Yet if the dominant form of workplace giving, which relied upon large firms utilizing the charitable payroll deduction, drew upon a broad base of industrial laborers, it did not draw upon other workers (such as domestic and agricultural laborers) in industries heavily represented by women and African Americans. (These workers and industries had been excluded from the benefits of Social Security, in part because of concerns about complications administering a payroll deduction, as well as for darker reasons.) Thus, even as we note that the growth of workplace giving advanced what is sometimes referred to as the democratization of charity, broadening the base of givers and affording nonelite donors a shared civic status as responsible community members, we must also acknowledge those who were excluded (whether intentionally or not) from that base and status. Inegalitarian undertones shadowed the midcentury promotion of mass giving.

The Transformation of Workplace Giving and the Rise of Donor Choice

In the final decades of the 20th century, the foundations that this model of workplace giving flourished on began to erode because of two major transformations: (1) the movement toward greater employee choice in determining the direction of gift allocation (which also challenged the United Way’s monopoly on workplace solicitations), and (2) profound shifts in the nation’s political economy.

As discussed above, the United Way restricted the choices available through workplace giving by monopolizing workplace solicitation and by limiting the member agencies to which gifts could be allocated (most often local human health and human service nonprofits, as well as local branches of several major national charities). In fact, by the mid-1970s, a group of 13 charitable agencies, including the YMCA, the Red Cross, the Boy and Girl Scouts, and the Salvation Army, took in more than 57 percent of United Way allocations (Brilliant 1990, 77).

The fact that these limitations became increasingly chafing for many donors can be attributed to a range of factors rooted both within and outside the workplace. The 1960s “Rights Revolution” led to the establishment of a host of nonprofits (fueled by an assortment of identity- and rights-based claims) that found little purchase within the circle of United Way membership. A more diverse workforce
destabilized the “consensus” that the United Way’s narrow criteria for member agencies depended on. Additionally, increased federal spending on social and human services encroached on the United Way’s purview and reduced some grantees’ reliance on its funding (Barman 2006, 64).

Around the same time, an ethic of individual choice and autonomy gained traction within the workplace. In the corporate environment, employees were increasingly granted the option to select their health care coverage and retirement portfolios. One analyst remarked on the disjuncture between the range of options available to workers in some decisions related to workplace benefits but not to others: “It was hard to tell employees who were empowered and in control of their health care and pension investments that they had to choose a single option on a [charity] pledge card” (Barman 2006, 63). This tension was amplified as corporations developed broader corporate social responsibility initiatives that afforded individual employees some discretion over the direction of certain programs. This produced an uncomfortable situation wherein employees could choose which charities to volunteer for but not which ones to give to. As these tensions grew, charities and federated fundraisers took the opportunity to challenge the United Way’s dominance and fight for access to the workplace (Lester 2010).

In the early 1970s, charities that had been largely excluded from United Way membership—and which were generally neglected by large, mainstream fundraising institutions—began to challenge the United Way’s workplace monopoly by establishing rival charity federations (later termed “alternative funds”). (As early as the late 1950s, in several cities, health agencies excluded from United Funds had combined to form “Combined Health Appeals.”) A “Black United Fund” first grew out of a local federated fundraising organization formed in Los Angeles in the wake of the 1968 Watts riots. African Americans sought to donate to charities that would target their own communities and had little faith that the city’s United Way would do so. Efforts in Los Angeles inspired other African American communities to create their own Black United Funds and led to the formation of the National Black United Fund (a nationwide federation) in 1972, as well as charity federations directed toward the needs of other underrepresented ethnic and racial groups. Alternative funds were also created to address controversial issues that the United Funds avoided, such as women’s reproductive health, social and racial justice, and LGBTQ rights. Environmental charities, which had a strong advocacy component and had also often been excluded from United Funds, joined together to create their own charity federations. Sociologist Emily Barman has written that unlike the United Way, which was organized around “communities of place,” these new fundraising organizations were organized around “communities of purpose,” and in their multiplicity reflected a model of workplace giving rooted less in
Alternative funds enjoyed their most notable early successes challenging the United Way monopoly with federal and public sector workplace drives. Congressional hearings in the late 1970s, as well as lawsuits led by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund challenging strict eligibility rules limiting participating organizations to those that provided health and welfare services, led the Office of Personnel Management to open up the Combined Federal Campaign to some 20 additional national charities, including the National Black United Fund and the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund. (A subsequent Supreme Court ruling in 1985 allowed the Office of Personnel Management to deny entry to groups it deemed controversial, a setback to the open access movement.) The United Way monopoly was also challenged at the state and local levels: by 1979, 23 states and more than 100 city and county governments had opened up workplace drives to greater competition (Barman 2006, 84; Brilliant 1990, 116–147). Barman writes that by 2002, “United Way rivals (including both Alternative Funds and independent nonprofits) gathered approximately three-quarters of all contributions made by employees of the federal government” (Barman 2006, 83).

Yet this represented just around 10 percent of total workplace giving from employees. Private-sector firms proved more resistant—even though workers often expressed a preference for greater choice in giving—in part because many corporate executives had developed strong ties to the United Way. In several cases, employees led forceful campaigns that compelled firms to open up their fundraising drives. One such campaign, organized by African American employees at New Jersey–based Bell Labs, compelled the corporation to incorporate a local Black United Fund into its workplace giving options (Barman 2006, 83, 90–91).9

The final decades of the 20th century brought a gradual (if at times grudging) expansion in the choices available in corporate workplace giving campaigns. A 1997 survey of 100 US companies, for instance, showed that 30 percent of those with workplace giving campaigns included non–United Way federated fundraisers. Large firms, however, remained relatively resistant to including non–United Way federations: in 1997, just 12 percent of Fortune 500 companies included charity federations other than the United Way in their workplace drives. Yet in the 1990s, a coalition of the major alternative funds representing more than 500 charities—America’s Charities (a federation of national health and human services nonprofits), Community Health Charities, EarthShare (which features environmental charities), and Global Impact (featuring global development NGOs)—pushed the issue and promoted open employee campaigns, while workers continued to lobby United Way and corporate managers to allow

Contending with the aftershocks of revelations of fraud and financial mismanagement by its former president William Aramony, United Way was especially vulnerable to challenges to its monopoly over workplace giving. It responded to the threat in several ways. Some of its leaders sought combat the advance of an imperative of individual donor discretion. In a 1994 essay, Mark O’Connell, then-head of United Way of Metropolitan Atlanta, rejected the “you pick ‘em notion espoused by the proponents of open choice campaigns,” a model that he likened to a “charity mall” where “donors can browse...until someone’s window display catches their eye.” He argued that the highest aim of workplace giving was not merely to help individual “Americans to support their favorite nonprofits” (there were plenty of opportunities to do so outside the workplace). Instead, he writes, the workplace campaign was “our best chance” to “be part of a process of determining what we want to achieve as a community and to have the resources to carry out at least part of that plan.” Workplace giving’s ultimate value, O’Connell contended, is not that it raises money for charitable agencies, but that it asks “employees to value community over self” (1994, 16–17). O’Connell’s conception of workplace giving extended back to its roots in the community chest movement, except that for those chests, the value of workplace giving was also linked to the ability to fund local charitable agencies.

Indeed, this conception went against the cultural grain of the late 20th century. Thus, the United Way also cultivated a strategy of “cooptation” in which it incorporated charities that addressed causes championed by rival alternative funds into its network. This meant that at some companies, donors could give to the United Negro College Fund through the United Way, or, in a few cases, even fund Planned Parenthood. Even more significantly, the United Way officially embraced a policy of donor designation in 1982, allowing donors to earmark funds to charities outside the United Way network to be distributed through the United Way, preserving the organization’s workplace monopoly. By 1990, almost 90 percent of local United Ways allowed some type of donor choice, and over the next decade, the proportion of funds given to the United Way earmarked for charities outside its network doubled to nearly one-quarter (America’s Charities and The Consulting Network 2000; Barman 2006, 94; Brilliant 1990, 103–05, 221).

The prioritization of donor choice fundamentally transformed the nature of workplace giving. It was no longer associated entirely with support for local health and human services nonprofits, or even with support for the local community itself. It redirected focus from aggregate totals and collective concerns to the satisfaction of individual employee preferences (though evidence soon emerged that satisfaction of individual choice and increased aggregate giving totals were compatible). At Dell Computers, in the
late 1990s, after the company significantly expanded donor options by including several alternative funds in their workplace campaign, employee participation increased from 10 percent to 45 percent in just three years and total giving increased from $220,000 to $2.7 million. In explaining these results, the Dell Foundation’s manager juxtaposed two possibilities that did not necessarily seem to be in tension, but which pointed to the new modes of thinking about workplace giving: should on-the-job giving “be about how much money we can raise from our employees or is it about getting employees to feel good about causes that matter in their lives?” (America’s Charities and The Consulting Network 2000, 19).

The Transformation of the Traditional Workplace

Besides the impact of a surging ethic of donor discretion, on-the-job giving was reshaped through profound transformations that reconfigured the workplace and the broader economy on which it rested. The postwar economy that large manufacturing firms had dominated—those most likely to buy into the United Way monopoly and to utilize the payroll deduction—gave way to one defined by a proliferation of small and midsized firms, which had in the past been less likely to sign on to such a campaign model. Previously, the model of the single corporate headquarters with deep ties to particular communities had served as a lynchpin of traditional workplace giving; through mergers, downsizing, corporate decentralization, and globalization, this model gave way to offices with much weaker local ties and weaker relationships with local charity federations. These dynamics help explain the traditional model of workplace giving’s gradual dissolution: according to one 2000 assessment, only about a quarter of the public reported working in a company with a workplace giving campaign (America’s Charities and The Consulting Network 2000, 13; Barman 2006, 115; Osili, Hirt, and Raghavan 2011, 395).

The nature of the workforce, and of employment itself, has changed dramatically as well. For instance, the workforce has become increasingly diverse, undermining the consensus on how to allocate funding that the postwar model of workplace giving rested on. That model was also closely linked to the rise of the secure, stable, fairly compensated postwar job. Much like tax payments, the charitable payroll deduction implicitly affirmed a dual promise: workers would share in the returns of increased productivity and would direct some of those earnings toward the public good. Yet this promise has not held: although the typical worker’s productivity increased 77 percent between 1973 and 2017, that worker’s compensation has only increased by 12.4 percent (Shell 2018, 131).

Indeed, over the past three decades, a focus on corporate “core competencies” led to a “fissuring” of the workplace as firms outsourced a vast range of activities, preferring to rely on a smaller, leaner core
staff supplemented by a contingent of temporary, flexible, and independent laborers (Weil 2014, 11; Hyman 2018). This contingent pool of labor was often deliberately detached from corporate culture and from workplace benefits. As journalist Ellen Shell relates, since the 1980s, temporary and contract work and self-employed labor have grown faster than have permanent full-time jobs. According to a survey conducted by Lawrence Katz and Alan Krueger, the share of workers with alternative work arrangements rose from 10.7 percent in 2005 to 15.8 percent in 2015 (2019). Moreover, the share of Americans having done such work is expanding: by one estimate, by 2020, nearly half of the US private sector workforce will have spent at least some time as a contractor (Shell 2018, 65).

Contingent, freelance, temporary, or gig laborers have a very different relationship to the workplace (and therefore a very different relationship to workplace giving) than that did postwar unionized factory employees. The centralized office has fractured, and employee ties to physical workspaces have loosened. To the extent that on-the-job giving campaigns were collective enterprises that relied on workplace sociability and solidarity, these are resources that trends in employment have transformed and could continue to threaten (IUPUI 2018, 21).

There is a definite relationship between the two dynamics that have reshaped workplace giving over the past decades: (1) transformations in the economy, and (2) the growth of an ethic of individual choice (many contemporary theories of the rise of neoliberalism have been built upon such a convergence of expanded consumer choice and constricted economic possibility). In fact, some of the most vigorous champions of this new short-term, flexible, deunionized workforce were high-tech firms that populated the San Francisco Bay Area and its environs. “Silicon Valley,” Hyman writes, “became the laboratory for a lean American capitalism” (2018, 211). It is not a coincidence that many of these lean firms were also some of the first to embrace a reorientation of workplace giving around “choice” and the workers’ preferences in giving. Apple, for instance, was the first Fortune 500 company to allow a charity federation other than the United Way to solicit its workers. Many other tech firms were early supporters of alternative funds: firms in the aerospace and electronics industries, including IBM and Boeing, harbored some of the most active in-plant federations (Barman 2006, 132; Brilliant 1990, 158).

This predilection has been traced to tech firms’ entrepreneurial cultures, which made them attracted to models of workplace giving that prioritized individual autonomy, to the Bay Area’s broader “elite culture of giving” (which was more donor-centric than those of midwestern or East Coast centers of philanthropy), and to the prevalence of start-up firms in the region, which lack long-standing ties to the United Way (Barman 2006, 99, 141). Analysts have less frequently highlighted the nature of the workforce favored by high-tech firms. Yet these firms’ reliance on a small cohort of permanent workers, supplemented by a larger contingent of temporary laborers, deprioritized the administrative efficiency,
order, and stability that a United Way monopoly offered. The fundraising campaign model that made sense at Eastman Kodak, which had some 145,000 workers at its Rochester industrial park at its postwar peak, made less sense at Instagram, which had just a handful of full-time employees when Facebook purchased it for $1 billion (Barman 2006, 132; Shell 2018, 86–87).  

Workplace Giving at a ‘Crossroads’: Declining Participation, Technological Innovation

Given these transformations, by the new millennium, analysts considered workplace giving to be at a “crossroads,” its status within a participatory culture of mass giving uncertain. It was clear that workplace giving was experiencing declining rates of participation among firms and their workers. The United Way reported that the number of employees that participated in the annual campaign decreased from 47 percent in 1988 to 35 percent in 1998. The drop continued in the following decade, and the United Way reported that from 2000 to 2003, more than 3.4 million donors stopped participating in the campaign, an erosion of their donor base of more than 18 percent (Greenhalgh 2006, 3). The Combined Federal Campaign, long the largest workplace campaign in the nation, experienced a similar drop in participation rates. In 1967, some 85.6 percent of federal employees participated in the CFC, but by 1992, that proportion had fallen to roughly 50 percent, and continued falling through the end of the decade (America’s Charities and The Consulting Network 2000, 12).

In the following decade, economic crisis intensified this decline. Indeed, workplace giving seems to be an especially sensitive register of economic precarity: not only are the financial resources that many Americans devote to charitable ends strained, but the jobless recoveries that have followed recent recessions have weakened the workplace as a venue for giving. In this respect, workplace giving has suffered the more general decline of small- and medium-scale giving over the past two decades. Scholars debate the roots of this decline but agree that mounting economic insecurity has played a significant role (Hyman 2018, 257; Rooney 2019).  

Indeed, United Way campaigns faced a particularly sharp decline in donations in the wake of the Great Recession. The 10 percent drop in donations from 2007 to 2009 was the largest over any two-year period the organization experienced since 1945. In one 2009 survey, only a quarter of firms reported that they conducted a traditional United Way–only workplace campaign. The economic recovery did not lead to a recuperation of the organization’s fortunes. In the last several years, in part because of a weakening of “United Way’s traditional payroll-deduction giving,” multiple local United
Way organizations were forced to make drastic cuts—sometimes as large as half—to the funds they traditionally sent to member agencies (Lester 2010; Levine 2019). Some of this decline can be attributed to challenges particular to the United Way: after all, between 2000 and 2009, giving to the Combined Federal Campaign increased by more than a quarter, suggesting, in the words of Nonprofit Quarterly, “that the workplace is capable of increased revenue.” Yet the CFC also experienced declines after the Great Recession; its participation rate fell to a quarter in 2010, and by 2017, stood at less than one in ten. As with the United Way, a good part of this decline can be attributed to its own particular administrative and technical failings and specific challenges facing the federal workforce. But the corresponding weakening of the United Way, the CFC and state and local campaigns does suggest some broader dynamics at work, implicating the vulnerabilities of workplace giving itself and of small- and medium-scale giving more generally (IUPUI 2018, 31; Lester 2010; McCambridge 2016).

This decline has provoked a range of responses. One was resignation. Recently, for instance, Brian Gallagher, president of United Way Worldwide, has argued that it no longer makes sense to try to reach donors at work; the calculus of administrative efficiency now runs in the other direction. “There are fewer people in large workplaces and so many more in small workplaces, we just can’t get to them,” he has explained. Therefore, Gallagher actually regards the decline in the share of United Way’s charitable revenue deriving from on-the-job drives in first decade of millennium (the share dropped from 63 percent in 2002 to around 46 percent in 2005) as a responsible recalibration. Instead, the United Way has sought donations from outside the workplace, doubling that amount from $280 million in 2005 to $560 million in 2014. “That’s how we’ll stay relevant,” Gallagher has remarked. Local United Ways have adopted a similar strategy. The head of the United Way of the National Capital Area, for instance, echoed Gallagher’s assessment, repudiating the organization’s traditional focus on the workplace. “If you are completely dependent on workplace giving, you are going to stagnate and stay in decline,” he told the Washington Post in 2013. From 2011 to 2017, the share of revenue that the Dallas United Way raised from outside the workplace (predominantly from large-scale gifts) increased from 3 percent to 28 percent.

It is a fitting sign of the times, and a striking historical irony, that the United Way, an organization with roots in early-20th-century elite concerns regarding the wealthy bearing too much philanthropic responsibility, now hopes to replace the funds that once came from mass workplace giving from elite donors and large “leadership” gifts (i.e., gifts of more than $1,000). From an organizational standpoint, these donors are especially attractive because they are the most likely to give directly to the United Way without engaging in donor designation. By 2000, donations of $1,000 or more made up more than
a quarter of United Way’s revenues, up from just 13 percent in the mid-1990s (America’s Charities and The Consulting Network 2000, 12; Barman 2006, 122, 145).

Another response has been adaptation to the prevailing political economic trends, especially through technological means. Over the past few decades, online workplace giving platforms and the automatization of pledge processing have begun to displace person-to-person solicitation at the workplace. In 2000, only 10 percent of employers conducted some part of their on-the-job campaign electronically; by 2012, that share had risen to 80 percent. Not only do these platforms offer low administrative costs for employers, they are also especially well-suited to a time in which workplace donors are increasingly engaged as individuals. Online platforms can cater to a distributed, “fissured” workplace and to a mobile workforce because employees can maintain access to their account even if they switch jobs. They facilitate year-round giving, outside the traditional campaign season. Finally, they affirm and amplify an ethic of choice, allowing for greater personalization and customization and providing greater information on charities. At the same time, the ease of making pledges and donations online has lessened the relative benefit offered by the payroll deduction, which long sat at the heart of the case for workplace giving (America’s Charities and The Consulting Network 2000, 5; Greenhalgh 2006; IUPUI 2018, 12).

In the early 2000s, the United Way developed an online pledge system, United-eWay.org, adopted by 65 United Ways across the country. Such systems also represented a commercial opportunity for for-profit firms, and these businesses’ arrival introduced another actor into the employer-employee-funding triad. By the 2000s, several new internet companies emerged offering platforms to corporations for their on-the-job campaigns, generating considerable hype and investment funding. In 2000, Charitableway, a company based in San Carlos, California, raised $43 million in venture capital, and ran campaigns for clients such as Hewlett-Packard and Morgan Stanley Dean Whitter. However, unable to sustain revenue growth, the company folded within a year.18

There was indeed a culling of the e-philanthropy herd with the bursting of the internet bubble. Yet throughout the decade it became clear that online giving platforms and automated pledge processing would become permanent fixtures within the workplace giving marketplace. The most dominant recent arrival is Benevity, founded in 2008, which has provided software to manage workplace giving for Alphabet (Google’s parent company), Apple, Microsoft, and Nike, among other companies. Benevity processed $649 million in donations in FY 2018, more than twice its total from just two years before.19

The spread of online platforms could obviate the need for traditional federated fundraisers in the workplace. In fact, in response to such competition, the United Way has taken steps to reconceptualize
its role as a more active and impact-focused agent. It has also promoted a program in which United Ways target a set of specific issues and adopt a process similar to the competitive grantmaking approach used by foundations to allocate funds. The United Way has also teamed up with Salesforce.org to create Philanthropy Cloud, a giving platform that offers some of the amenities of a networking app. Through Philanthropy Cloud, employees can see what causes are trending in their workplace or city and access a news feed or tax preparation software. Based on a donor’s giving history, the app can recommend other charities. The United Way also partnered with GuideStar, a nonprofit that compiles information about nonprofits, to allow donors to search for groups that don’t appear on the service, vet them, and, if they check out, to donate to them directly.20

Many of these online platforms integrate other elements of a corporation’s charitable and philanthropic initiatives, including volunteer programs and matching gifts (including “dollar for doers” programs in which volunteer hours are matched). The relationship among these various components is one of the more important factors reshaping contemporary workplace giving. There is some evidence, for instance, that the presence of a matching gift program increases employees’ inclination to give, as well as the gift amount. In a 2017 survey of more than 300 major companies, 92 percent reported offering at least one such program (with a marked increase in those offering “open” matches, available for any nonprofit of the donor’s choosing). According to research conducted by Double the Donation, 65 percent of Fortune 500 companies offer matching gift programs, and more than 18 million individuals work for companies that offer such programs. The embeddedness of traditional workplace giving initiatives within firms’ increasingly sophisticated corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs suggests opportunities to boost the former. Companies have begun to embrace a distinctive “branding” of workplace campaigns to better reflect particular corporate values, identities, and cultures, which can boost employee “ownership” of the campaign (Greenhalgh 2006, 6). However, workplace giving’s relationship to robust CSR programs also presents potential pitfalls and subtle challenges to the resurgent ethic of donative choice, as management’s temptation to pressure employees to give in ways that advance broader CSR priorities increases (CECP 2018; IUPUI 2018, 27).21

The Future of Workplace Giving

Finally, the increased focus on a firm’s business and investment practices as an essential component of corporate social responsibility (as opposed to the philanthropic imperative kicking in after the profits have been made) could force a reckoning for some workplace donors, as it has with some corporate grantmakers. Thinking more broadly about the nature of corporate social responsibility and the extent
to which corporations are honoring it should raise related questions about the workplace’s significance as a site for centering employees’ charitable commitments.22

Indeed, the reshaping of the landscape of work offers an important opportunity to reflect more broadly on that significance and on the relationship between work and charitable giving more generally. In the early 21st century, the nature of work seems to be defined by a host of paradoxes. As Shell notes, recent decades have brought increased pressure for one’s job to reflect one’s personal identity and beliefs, even as employment becomes more insecure (Putnam 2000, 91; Shell 2018, 30). The tension between work as source of fulfillment and of stress and anxiety must frame ongoing discussion of workplace giving. Americans are also working more hours than ever, even as “the workplace itself plays a far less central role” (Shell 2018, 100). This disjuncture should prompt a reimagining of workplace giving outside the context of a centralized workplace.23

Shifting our focus from workplace to work can also help us keep in focus those who have often been left out of certain elite-sanctioned practices of charitable giving, and out of workplace giving in particular. According to one recent study, “Individuals without workplace campaigns tended to have lower income and wealth levels and were less likely to have a Bachelor’s degree” (Osili, Hirt, and Raghavan 2011, 399). Another study found that workplace givers tend to be between 48 and 66 years old, confirming long-standing concerns about the difficulty of attracting younger workers to the practice. It is also worth noting that younger workers are less likely to be working today than they were a few decades ago, to say nothing of the other under- and unemployed Americans (America’s Charities and The Consulting Network 2000, 15; Shaker, Christensen, and Bergdoll 2017, 44).24

These Americans’ attenuated relationship to workplace giving highlights the significant power of those who make decisions regarding employment (and not merely in authorizing a campaign or purchasing a giving platform) to shape charitable practices. We should allow an appreciation of those power imbalances, as well as other past imbalances, to chasten any discussion of workplace giving in relation to the democratization of philanthropy. Indeed, the history of workplace giving is a reminder that a push to broaden the base of giving and to build a participatory culture of charity can also contain exclusionary elements.

One way to address those exclusionary elements is to consider the changing nature of work. The history of workplace giving suggests as much, as the rise and decline of its dominant model over the last 50 years hinged on that model’s fit with prevailing trends in economic development and political economy. To thrive today, workplace giving will need to achieve a similar fit. Online platforms are an important step in that direction, but there are others worth pursuing. In recent years, the Freelancers
Union has become one of the nation’s fastest-growing labor organizations; coworking spaces have also risen to address needs produced by the fissuring of the workplace. These institutions and others associated with the gig economy and contract labor present opportunities to rethink what it means to give at and through work. They need to be welcomed into the discussion (Shell 2018, 295).

Of course, the history of the fit between economic landscape and charitable practice can focus our energies in a different direction. As discussed above, we can develop policies and institutions related to charitable giving that are well-adapted to the current exigencies of the workplace. But if we really want to promote a model of workplace giving that exemplifies all the values we have ascribed to it over the last century—one that is efficient and productive, egalitarian, respectful of individual difference, and affirms a sense of community—we will need to make sure that the broader economy reflects those values as well.
Notes

1 Workplace giving is not an exclusively American phenomenon—it has developed in some European nations—but the amounts raised and the participation rates are significantly higher in the US. This report focuses entirely on the US context; Ron Lieber, "United Way Searches for Its Place in a World of One-Click Giving," New York Times, December 23, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/23/your-money/united-way-searches-for-its-place-in-a-world-of-one-click-giving.html.


5 As the alliance between the United Way and labor became more formalized—in the 1950s, the AFL-CIO and the national umbrella organization of community chests created a full-time liaison to train union members for placement in United Fund offices—labor leaders reported significant gains in "solidarity" from collective service in campaigns.


7 Workplace giving did not merely reflect this arrangement but was constitutive of it, as corporations began matching workers’ charitable contributions as a worker benefit. General Electric became the first firm to do so in 1954 when the GE Foundation offered to match its employees’ contributions to their alma maters. According to one tally, by the end of the decade, more than 70 firms had adopted similar programs (Brilliant 1990, 31; Hyman 2018, 44, 143; Lichtenstein 1995); David Whelan, "Matchmaker, Matchmaker," The Chronicle of Philanthropy, April 3, 2008, https://www.philanthropy.com/article/Matchmaker-Matchmaker/166867; see also "University News," Princeton Alumni Weekly 60, October 30, 1959, 13.

8 Brilliant writes that the payroll deduction also "meshed well with the conditions of the [1947] Taft-Hartley Law concerning limitations on solicitations in the workplace, and the requirements that such limitations be value neutral. Definitions of acceptable workplace fund raising thus were connected to limitations on the activities of other organizations during work time, including union organizing as well as competing charitable activity in the workplace." For the next several decades, the United Way was treated as an exception to the no-solicitation rule enforced by the National Labor Relations Board (Brilliant 1990 32, 156, 185–86).


10 Most recently, a team of scholars found that “holding all other variables constant, the presence of donor choice increased workplace donations by $58 for those already donating through the workplace” (Shaker, Christensen, and Bergdoll 2017, 33–34).


For an example of this reckoning, see Anand Giridharadas, *Winners Take All: The Elite Charade of Changing the World* (New York: Penguin, 2018).


Ebeling, “More Power with Your Pay.”
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