Impact of the National Initiative for Building Community Trust and Justice on Police Administrative Outcomes

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For more information and findings from the National Initiative for Building Community Trust and Justice, see the following companion publications:

The National Initiative for Building Community Trust and Justice: Key Process and Outcome Evaluation Findings

Views of the Police and Neighborhood Conditions: Evidence of Change in Six Cities Participating in the National Initiative for Building Community Trust and Justice

Learning to Build Police-Community Trust: Implementation Assessment Findings from the Evaluation of the National Initiative for Building Community Trust and Justice

Impact of the National Initiative for Building Community Trust and Justice on Police Administrative Outcomes: Supplemental Materials to Impact Analyses
Executive Summary

The National Initiative for Building Community Trust and Justice (National Initiative) worked with six police departments to improve relationships and increase trust between their communities and the criminal justice system. This report focuses on whether the National Initiative interventions were associated with changes in crime rates, departmental practices, and police-community interactions. Outcomes of interest include calls for service, violent and property crimes, use-of-force incidents, pedestrian and traffic stops, and arrests. We also review changes in racial and ethnic disparities within the outcomes. We employed Bai-Perron structural break analyses to detect statistically significant increases or decreases in these metrics; increases and decreases were aligned with the National Initiative’s major milestones within each city as well as milestones between each city and a matched comparison city that did not receive the intervention. Results indicate that the impacts of the National Initiative interventions varied considerably by site.
Background

In 2014, the Department of Justice (DOJ) awarded a three-year, $4.75 million grant\(^1\) to the National Network for Safe Communities (NNSC) at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice, the Justice Collaboratory at Yale Law School (YLS), the Center for Policing Equity (CPE), and the Urban Institute to launch a National Initiative for Building Community Trust and Justice (National Initiative). The National Initiative’s mission is to improve relationships and increase trust between communities and criminal justice agencies (particularly law enforcement) while advancing public and scholarly understandings of those relationships.

In pursuit of that mission, the National Initiative undertook a body of work consisting of three core areas or “pillars” that research and practical experience suggest could generate measurable change. The first pillar, procedural justice, focuses on how interactions between police and the public impact communities’ views of police, their willingness to comply with the law and partner on crime prevention practices, and crime rates. The second pillar, implicit bias, focuses on how unconscious biases may shape criminal justice agents’ interactions with members of the public—particularly Black and brown communities—and create racially disparate outcomes even when those interactions are not overtly racist. The third pillar, reconciliation, focuses on how frank conversation about law enforcement’s complicity in historic and present-day racial tensions and harms can repair relationships and foster trust between law enforcement agencies and the communities they serve.

The National Initiative’s core interventions included the following: (1) training and technical assistance for police officers on how to engage with residents in a procedurally just manner, (2) trainings that encouraged officers to acknowledge and mitigate implicit biases, (3) developing model police department policies and identifying possible key changes to existing policies, and (4) a reconciliation process through which police officers and community members have authentic conversations to acknowledge historic tensions, harms, and misconceptions and to repair relationships. (More information on the National Initiative, along with accompanying resources and tools for communities interested in engaging in similar efforts, can be found at www.trustandjustice.org.)

In early 2015, the police departments of Birmingham, Alabama; Fort Worth, Texas; Gary, Indiana; Minneapolis, Minnesota; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; and Stockton, California began collaborating with community stakeholders and researchers to implement innovative policing practices associated with the National Initiative. To understand whether and how National Initiative activities impacted key outcomes related to police departments’ practices and officers’ actions, Urban collected administrative
data on crime events and arrests, calls for service, pedestrian and traffic stops, and use-of-force incidents. The same administrative data were also collected among a set of comparison departments, which were chosen for similar jurisdictional characteristics on population, size, historical property and violent crime rates, and a socioeconomic status index.

This report assesses whether the National Initiative impacted departments’ practices and officers’ actions. Following an overview of methodology, it offers sections that discuss the contexts in which the National Initiative was implemented in each city, a timeline and fidelity assessment of National Initiative activities, and results of the administrative outcome analyses. The report concludes with a broader discussion on the National Initiative’s impact across these measures.
Methods

This section describes the methods used to assess changes in administrative outcomes during the National Initiative evaluation period, which lasted from the initiative’s launch in April 2015 through calendar year 2017. A supplementary methodology report expands on this summary by providing more information regarding the areas of focus, the methodology for identifying the matched comparison cities, and the structural break analyses (Lawrence et al. 2019). That report also includes charts of the structural break analyses for all National Initiative sites and the outcomes of interest.

The primary outcomes we used in the impact analyses included calls for service, instances of violent crime (i.e., homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault), instances of property crime (i.e., burglary, larceny/theft, motor vehicle theft, arson), use-of-force incidents, pedestrian stops, traffic stops, and arrests. Although we intended to include an analysis of citizen complaint data, we were unable to obtain that information from any of the six sites. We collected additional demographic data within the use of force, stops, and arrest data to examine change in the proportion of these metrics by race and ethnicity.

These dependent variables reflect the National Initiative’s intended outcomes around improved public safety and reduced racial and ethnic disparities in policing practices. For each dependent variable, we conducted reviews—informed by technical assistance providers, trainers, and stakeholders—of the logic models and implementation evaluation findings to confirm the directionality of expected change. Table 1 details the directions of change we hypothesized for these outcomes as well as which outcome data we collected for in each site. We hypothesized reductions in the total count of events for all outcomes, with the exception of calls for service, for which an increase would be expected based on the assumption that if the National Initiative’s activities improved public trust in the police, community members would be more likely to place calls after witnessing a crime or being victimized. For metrics on racial disparity, we expected that after National Initiative activities, proportions of police interactions by racial/ethnic group would become more comparable with the proportions of those subpopulations present in the communities.
TABLE 1

Outcomes Analyzed by Site

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direction of change</th>
<th>Birmingham</th>
<th>Fort Worth</th>
<th>Minneapolis</th>
<th>Pittsburgh</th>
<th>Stockton</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Count of calls for service</strong></td>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>X (C)</td>
<td>X (C)</td>
<td>X (C)</td>
<td>X (C)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Count of violent crimes</strong></td>
<td>Decrease</td>
<td>X (C)</td>
<td>X (C)</td>
<td>X (C)</td>
<td>X (C)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Count of property crimes</strong></td>
<td>Decrease</td>
<td>X (C)</td>
<td>X (C)</td>
<td>X (C)</td>
<td>X (C)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Count of use-of-force incidents</strong></td>
<td>Decrease</td>
<td>X (C)</td>
<td>X (C)</td>
<td>X (C)</td>
<td>X (C)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proportions by race</strong></td>
<td>Decrease</td>
<td>X (C)</td>
<td>X (C)</td>
<td>X (C)</td>
<td>X (C)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Count of pedestrian stops</strong></td>
<td>Decrease</td>
<td>X (C)</td>
<td>X (C)</td>
<td>X (C)</td>
<td>X (C)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proportions by race</strong></td>
<td>Decrease</td>
<td>X (C)</td>
<td>X (C)</td>
<td>X (C)</td>
<td>X (C)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Count of traffic stops</strong></td>
<td>Decrease</td>
<td>X (C)</td>
<td>X (C)</td>
<td>X (C)</td>
<td>X (C)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proportions by race</strong></td>
<td>Decrease</td>
<td>X (C)</td>
<td>X (C)</td>
<td>X (C)</td>
<td>X (C)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data were provided by the National Initiative and comparison cities or obtained from public resources.

Notes: Violent crimes are homicides, rapes, robberies, and aggravated assaults. Property crimes are burglaries, larcenies/thefts, motor vehicle thefts, and arsons. (C) indicates that a comparative analysis was also conducted.

a Gary was excluded from these analyses as the agency did not share administrative data with the research team.
b Stops in Fort Worth were traffic and pedestrian stops combined.

Although the National Initiative activities are a unique collection of interventions—police trainings, community listening sessions and engagement, and department policy changes—other departmental activities and notable events that occurred during the implementation period could have influenced the outcomes we analyzed with our models. Moreover, identifying when the interventions had an effect—especially in regard to the impact of reconciliation conversations—is difficult. These interventions might also have cumulative or interactive effects, as they were selected to complement each other. These challenges informed our decision to use a quasi-experimental form of time series analysis known as structural break analysis to assess changes in outcomes of interest. Structural break analysis was best suited to such protracted and complicated interventions and reduced the likelihood of type I (rejection of a true null hypothesis) and type II (failure to reject a false null hypothesis) errors compared with other evaluation techniques. A structural break is a statistically significant shift or change in a time series. This is a well-documented econometric approach for evaluations of programs with inexact implementation dates (Piehl et al. 2003). We used the Bai-Perron (BP) structural break analysis method to test for the existence of multiple breakpoints in the outcomes within each National Initiative site, and we conducted these analyses in R statistical software, version 3.5.1.

To enhance the rigor of our analyses, the research team compared changes in the outcomes over time in each National Initiative city with those in a matched comparison city that did not receive an
intervention (i.e., a control). We identified comparison cities using data on city population, law enforcement department size, historical crime rates, and socioeconomic status. We also requested the same outcome data from the comparison cities, allowing us to better isolate the National Initiative’s possible impacts on department practices and officers’ actions from broader national trends. We conducted BP structural break analyses on the difference of the outcomes’ counts and racial proportions between the National Initiative site and its comparison city, where a break indicates a significant divergence in the National Initiative site’s trend from the comparison’s.

The structural break analyses of the impact of National Initiative activities primarily focus on the period between 2012 (three years before the initiative started) and 2017. Some of the sites conducted activities beyond 2017, but breaks pertaining to these events were not reviewed because 2018 data were not included in the analyses. Moreover, each city has a long and unique history of police-community relations, contexts that are crucial for understanding National Initiative efforts. The implementation report from this series provides a much more detailed account of each National Initiative city’s context, such as city characteristics, departments’ racial compositions compared with their communities, notable police-community encounters, and other important factors (Jannetta et al. 2019). Furthermore, Urban’s baseline community survey found that the neighborhoods experiencing the highest levels of crime in all six cities had serious concerns about whether the police were trustworthy, unbiased, operated in ways consistent with procedural justice principles, and held officers accountable for misconduct (Fontaine et al. 2019).
Findings

Birmingham, AL

Implementation Context

Birmingham is a midsized city spanning 150 square miles in north-central Alabama with a population of roughly 212,000 and a 2014 median household income of $31,217.\(^4\) In 2014, the majority of Birmingham's residents were Black (73.1 percent) or white (21.3 percent), with smaller populations identifying as Hispanic/Latinx (3.5 percent), Asian (1.0 percent), and multiracial (1.0 percent).

In the 10 years before the National Initiative, crime in Birmingham steadily declined; nonetheless, Birmingham experiences rates of violent crime, aggravated assault, property crime, burglary, and larceny theft well above the national average for cities with populations between 100,000 and 250,000.\(^5\) Wealth inequality is another of Birmingham's notable characteristics. Census data from 2000 indicate that 46.3 percent of metro-area residents lived in neighborhoods where at least 20 percent of residents had incomes below the poverty level. That number dropped to 45.6 percent between 2005 and 2009, but it is estimated to have increased to 58.4 percent between 2010 and 2014 (Kneebone and Holmes 2015). Birmingham's historic reputation as “the most segregated city in America” in the 1960s persists: today, it ranks among the most segregated metro areas in the country.\(^6\)

The Birmingham Police Department had 847 sworn officers in 2013 (Governing 2015). A. C. Roper, former assistant chief of the Hoover Police Department, was sworn in as the BPD’s chief of police in November 2007 after rising through the ranks at Hoover from patrol officer to narcotics investigator and traffic sergeant to training lieutenant.\(^7\)

Like many police departments across the country, the BPD’s demographic composition does not reflect that of the city’s resident population. Although the majority of its officers are Black (60.7 percent), that proportion is still smaller than the proportion of Birmingham residents who are Black (73.4 percent). In stakeholder interviews and discussions with BPD officers during the first National Initiative site visit, concerns were raised several times about a perceived lack of transparency in BPD internal processes, particularly regarding hiring and promotion (Jannetta et al. 2019). Interviewees hoped that the National Initiative would give the city an opportunity to attend to these issues, in addition to issues regarding police-community relations.
Police-community relations in Birmingham must be understood in the context of the BPD’s adversarial role during the civil rights movement and its long history of enforcing Jim Crow laws. Historically, the BPD has struggled to positively engage the city’s residents, particularly its residents of color. Growing reports of police misconduct set the stage for the 1963 Birmingham Campaign, which enabled dialogue between young Black students and white civic authorities, transforming the city’s discrimination laws and propelling 1960s civil rights activism more broadly. Despite decades of progressive reform meant to alleviate tensions between Birmingham’s Black residents and its police department, recent interviews of Birmingham stakeholders associated with the National Initiative—including police and community leaders—show that those tensions have persisted: instances of reported police misconduct and violence have increased, feeding an ongoing national dialogue (Jannetta et al. 2019).

Timeline of Policing Events and National Initiative Dosage

The timeline for Birmingham’s National Initiative activities before and during the evaluation period is outlined in figure 1 below. The BPD chose to combine the conceptual and tactical procedural justice training sessions, which they finished delivering in May 2016, and the implicit bias trainings followed almost a full year later. The BPD participated in 9 listening sessions during calendar year 2017 (and another 10 in 2018), engaging a wide array of residents, from members of Birmingham’s African American and Hispanic/Latinx communities to representatives of the LGBTQIA+ community, youth, and survivors of intimate partner violence and sexual assault. Notably, some listening sessions led to codification of BPD engagement through, for example, the designation of a BPD liaison to the LGBTQIA+ community and the establishment of a teen advisory council to the BPD. These trainings and convenings were complemented by BPD policy changes, such as explicitly reinforcing the BPD’s commitment to unbiased policing and mandating that the courts issue protection from abuse orders rather than making such requests the responsibility of survivors.

The environment within the BPD was relatively stable during the evaluation period, which facilitated many of the accomplishments associated with the National Initiative. However, the departure of Chief Roper in November 2017, and the subsequent leadership transition, delayed National Initiative progress in 2018.
Impact on Administrative Outcomes

Table 2 details the dates and directions of the site-specific and comparison structural break analyses for Birmingham. Based on the available data, outcomes in Birmingham included calls for service, violent and property crimes, and arrests. Structural break analyses on calls for service observed a significant decrease in calls around May 2014—roughly a year before the National Initiative kickoff meeting—but calls for service remained relatively flat after the National Initiative began and no additional breaks were observed. There were approximately 18,000 calls a month before this significant decrease and the monthly counts remained around 17,000 during the National Initiative.

We noted a significant break of increased violent crimes in Birmingham in August 2014 (before the National Initiative’s launch) and the trend line subsequently leveled off at around 325 a month. We observed no breaks in violent crimes in the site-specific or comparison analyses after the start of the National Initiative. In the month after the procedural justice trainings concluded in May 2016, Birmingham experienced an increase in property crimes, which was noted in both the site-specific and comparison analyses, but this was followed by a decrease in March 2017. As a result, the average
monthly property crime rate remained relatively flat (at about 1,200 a month) after the National Initiative began.

**TABLE 2**

**Dates and Directions of Structural Breaks for Birmingham, AL, by Outcome**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Site-specific analysis</th>
<th>Comparison analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Count of calls for service</td>
<td>No breaks</td>
<td>12/2016, Increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count of violent crimes</td>
<td>No breaks</td>
<td>No breaks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count of property crimes</td>
<td>06/2016, Increase</td>
<td>06/2016, Increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>03/2017, Decrease</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count of arrests</td>
<td>01/2016, Decrease</td>
<td>12/2015, Decrease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of arrests with community members</td>
<td>01/2016, Decrease</td>
<td>No breaks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>who were Black</td>
<td>12/2016, Decrease</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of arrests with community members</td>
<td>07/2015, Increase</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>who were Hispanic/Latinx</td>
<td>06/2016, Decrease</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of arrests with community members</td>
<td>01/2016, Decrease</td>
<td>02/2017, Increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>who were white</td>
<td>02/2017, Increase</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** Data were provided by the National Initiative and comparison cities or obtained from public resources.

**Notes:** Structural breaks observed after the National Initiative kickoff site visit in June 2015. Violent crimes are homicides, rapes, robberies, and aggravated assaults. Property crimes are burglaries, larcenies/thefts, motor vehicle thefts, and arsons. n/a: Analysis could not be conducted.

We observed a significant decrease in the average number of monthly arrests to roughly 315 in both the site-specific and comparison analyses in January 2016 and December 2015, respectively. This decrease followed an earlier significant decrease in September 2014; in the months before that, average monthly arrests had peaked at approximately 550. This second significant decrease occurred around the time the National Initiative first introduced the notion of reconciliation to Birmingham supervisors. Interestingly, although this decrease in arrests occurred in January 2016, the proportion of arrests of Black community members increased significantly the same month. This trend continued in 2016 but ended when a significant decrease in the proportion of arrests began in December 2016. Rates of arrests of white community members were the inverse of the rates of arrests of Black community members: white arrests decreased in January 2016 and increased in February 2017. In line with National Initiative activities, the significant changes that occurred between December 2016 and February 2017 happened around the same time as the trainings on implicit biases in January and February 2017. These findings suggest (but do not demonstrate) that the implicit bias trainings may have had an impact on officers’ decisions to make arrests.
Fort Worth, TX

Implementation Context

Fort Worth is a large city in north-central Texas with a 2014 population of roughly 779,000 and median household income of $52,492. Fort Worth residents were primarily white (40.9 percent) and Hispanic/Latinx (34.2 percent), with smaller proportions of Black (18.7 percent), Asian (3.7 percent), and multiracial (1.9 percent) residents. Spanning approximately 340 square miles, Fort Worth—which belongs to the much larger Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington metropolitan area—is the largest National Initiative site.

Although property crime has steadily declined in Fort Worth over the past 10 years (consistent with national trends, the city has also experienced rates of violent and property crime higher than national averages. Crime in Fort Worth peaked in the 1980s: it had the second highest crime rate in the US in 1988, second only to its neighboring city, Dallas. Like other large US cities, Fort Worth has higher rates of violent crime than the national average, and such crime is densely concentrated in several neighborhoods across the city. An observed increase in arrest rates between 2011 and 2013 coincided with Fort Worth’s declining crime rates.

The Fort Worth Police Department had 1,588 sworn officers in 2014, the year before the National Initiative began (FWPD 2014). Like many US police departments, FWPD officer demographics are not representative of the city’s population. In 2014, 16 percent of FWPD officers were Hispanic/Latinx, despite representing 34 percent of the city’s population. Twelve percent of its officers were Black, compared with 19 percent of the population. In contrast, white officers were overrepresented: 69 percent of the police force was white, compared with 42 percent of the population.

In November 2014, a few months before the National Initiative launched, Chief Jeffrey Halstead announced his retirement from the FWPD. Shortly thereafter, several Black FWPD officers filed a federal suit against Chief Halstead for racial discrimination and harassment. In September 2015, Fort Worth City Manager David Cooke selected Joel Fitzgerald as the chief of police. Chief Fitzgerald became Fort Worth’s first African American police chief and had an agenda that prioritized bridging the police-community divide through extensive internal and external reform. Having served in the police departments of Allentown, Pennsylvania, and Missouri City, Missouri, Fitzgerald arrived at Fort Worth with a reputation for community engagement. Interviews with FWPD staff and community members revealed that Chief Fitzgerald had been more engaged with the Fort Worth community than previous
chiefs; many suggest he has engaged more than any chief since Chief Windham, who died in 2000 and was credited with implementing neighborhood policing (Jannetta et al. 2019).

Incidents within the FWPD posed challenges as it began National Initiative work. High-profile incidents like the racial discrimination lawsuit filed against Chief Halstead compromised officer morale. Officers expressed that under his leadership, a lack of communication and inconsistent discipline created a widespread sense of inequity.

Timeline of Policing Events and National Initiative Dosage

As shown in figure 2, Fort Worth finished the National Initiative activities more slowly than the other participating departments; however, this is partly because of reductions to the training team, which was complicated by the fact that the FWPD had the most officers to train. The department’s conceptual procedural justice trainings began in February 2016 and the tactical trainings rolled out at the end of December 2016. The implicit bias trainings began in September 2017 and ran until April 2018, a period mostly outside of the evaluation period. Similarly, only one community listening session on reconciliation occurred during the evaluation period (in December 2017), and another three convened in 2018. Fort Worth focused on youth as the subpopulation it wanted to engage more intensively, training school resource officers on procedurally just and reconciliation-based approaches to their interactions with students.

The FWPD made several policy changes during the National Initiative’s evaluation period, including revising its general order on bias-free policing (February 2016), establishing and creating standards of operation for a procedural justice unit (November 2016), making departmental policies and metrics on use of force, arrests, stops, and discipline publicly available online (2017), and revising its General Order on Sexual Assaults (July 2017).

The National Initiative commenced and transpired during a difficult time in the FWPD’s history. Not only was it undergoing a leadership transition and contending with a discrimination lawsuit, but other incidents affected both department morale and community trust in the police. These included the sniper attack on Dallas Police Department officers, the arrest of Fort Worth resident Jacqueline Craig and her daughters in December 2016 (which was captured on video and fueled anger and uprising among community members), and the demotion and ultimate departure of Assistant Chief and National Initiative site coordinator Abdul Pridgen in May 2017 after his unauthorized release of the body camera footage from the Craig arrest.
Impact on Administrative Outcomes

Table 3 details the dates and directions of the site-specific and comparison structural break analyses for Fort Worth. The FWPD was able to provide data on all outcomes, although FWPD combines pedestrian and traffic stop data into a single database, meaning those activities could not be disentangled. Overall, analyses detected few significant, consistent shifts in metrics in the desired direction, with the exception of pedestrian and traffic stops.

Although we anticipated that the National Initiative would increase community confidence in the FWPD and thus increase the likelihood that civilians would place calls for service, monthly calls for service gradually decreased from a high of approximately 27,000 in May 2012 to a low of 19,000 in December 2017, and we detected a significant decrease in calls in February 2017. No breaks for calls for service were observed after the start of the National Initiative in the comparison analysis.

The decline in calls for service is noteworthy given the increase in rates of violent crime over the same period: from January 2013 to November 2016, rates of violent crime averaged 370 a month and were relatively stable; beginning in November 2016, the number of monthly violent crimes averaged
413, with a single-month high of 526. However, property crime rates decreased consistently from January 2013 to the end of 2016 (we observed three significant decreases during that period), then increased in January 2017, coinciding with an increase in the comparison city in March 2017. The increases in property crime rates occurred just as the FWPD began implementing the tactical procedural justice trainings, which lasted from December 2016 to June 2017.

**TABLE 3**

Dates and Directions of Structural Breaks for Fort Worth, TX by Outcome

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Site-specific analysis</th>
<th>Comparison analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Count of calls for service</td>
<td>02/2017, Decrease</td>
<td>No breaks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count of violent crimes</td>
<td>11/2016, Increase</td>
<td>09/2015, Decrease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count of property crimes</td>
<td>04/2016, Decrease</td>
<td>03/2017, Increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>01/2017, Increase</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count of use-of-force incidents</td>
<td>No breaks</td>
<td>No breaks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of use-of-force incidents with</td>
<td>No breaks</td>
<td>04/2016, Decrease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>community members who were Black</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of use-of-force incidents with</td>
<td>No breaks</td>
<td>No breaks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>community members who were Hispanic/Latinx</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of use-of-force incidents with</td>
<td>No breaks</td>
<td>No breaks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>community members who were white</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count of traffic and pedestrian stops</td>
<td>02/2016, Decrease</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No breaks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of stops with community members who were Black</td>
<td>No breaks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of stops with community members who were Hispanic/Latinx</td>
<td>No breaks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of stops with community members who were white</td>
<td>09/2015, Decrease</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count of arrests</td>
<td>02/2016, Decrease</td>
<td>No breaks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of arrests with community members who were Black</td>
<td>No breaks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of arrests with community members who were Hispanic/Latinx</td>
<td>No breaks</td>
<td>10/2015, Decrease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of arrests with community members who were white</td>
<td>03/2017, Decrease</td>
<td>11/2016, Increase</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** Data were provided by the National Initiative and comparison cities or obtained from public resources.

**Notes:** Structural breaks observed after the National Initiative kickoff site visit in May 2015. Violent crimes are homicides, rapes, robberies, and aggravated assaults. Property crimes are burglaries, larcenies/thefts, motor vehicle thefts, and arsons. n/a Analysis could not be conducted.

There was a decrease in the monthly counts of use-of-force incidents in both the site-specific and comparison models around the end of 2014 (before the National Initiative), but we noted no structural breaks in these events after the National Initiative began in Fort Worth. Similarly, the proportions of use-of-force incidents across racial and ethnic groupings were very stable after the National Initiative
began. The monthly rates of use-of-force incidents among community members who were Black, Hispanic/Latinx, and white averaged 38 percent, 27 percent, and 33 percent, respectively, after the kickoff meeting.

Average monthly pedestrian and traffic stops declined between 2013 (4,179) and 2017 (2,745). We observed two significant decreases across this period, one in November 2013 and another in February 2016, which corresponds with the beginning of the conceptual procedural justice trainings. Neither reduction was mirrored in the comparison analysis.

A key goal of the National Initiative was to reduce racial disparities in pedestrian and traffic stops. As detailed above, the Fort Worth community is 19 percent Black, 35 percent Hispanic/Latinx, and 40 percent white. Before the National Initiative began, the proportions of total monthly pedestrian and traffic stops made among Black, Hispanic/Latinx, and white community members averaged 22 percent, 29 percent, and 42 percent, respectively. After the National Initiative began, those averages changed to 17 percent, 30 percent, and 40 percent, which were somewhat more representative of the community's demographics. However, the only significant break observed was the proportion of stops among white community members, where we noted a decrease in September 2015, a finding that was not replicated in the comparison analysis.

The average number of monthly arrests also significantly declined between 2013 (3,120) and 2017 (2,352). The most recent significant structural break decrease was observed in February 2016 (the same month the conceptual procedural justice trainings began) but was not observed in the comparison analysis. After the National Initiative began, the only observed break in the proportions of arrests across racial and ethnic groupings occurred in March 2017, when the proportion of total arrests among white community members significantly decreased (this was not found in the comparison analysis). Overall, proportions of arrests among racial and ethnic groups did not change as a result of the National Initiative. The proportions of Black, Hispanic/Latinx, and white community members averaged 37 percent, 27 percent, and 34 percent, respectively, both before and after the start of the National Initiative. As such, Black community members, who made up approximately 19 percent of the population, were the most disproportionally arrested.
Gary, IN

Implementation Context

Gary, located in northwestern Indiana at the tip of Lake County, has the smallest population of the six National Initiative sites, with a 2014 population of roughly 79,000 and a median household income of $27,458.\textsuperscript{15}Gary residents were predominantly Black (82.1 percent), and the remaining residents were primarily white (10.6 percent) and Hispanic/Latinx (5.5 percent). Although crime rates have steadily decreased in Gary over the past 25 years (consistent with national trends), it has high rates of violent and property crime relative to national averages.\textsuperscript{16}Gary is well known as one of the nation’s cities that has suffered most from economic disinvestment and blight. Over the past four decades the city’s population fell by half from approximately 175,000 to 80,000. Approximately 25 percent of the buildings in Gary are abandoned.\textsuperscript{17}Although efforts are being made to alleviate blight in Gary, persistently high unemployment rates threaten its recovery.

Chief Larry McKinley, a 17-year veteran of the Gary Police Department, was appointed chief by Mayor Karen Freeman-Wilson in 2015.\textsuperscript{18}Before this, the GPD suffered a period of instability, cycling through 10 police chiefs in 12 years. When the National Initiative launched, the GPD had 181 sworn officers, down from 222 in 2013 (GPD Technical Assessment Team 2013). Although the evaluation team was unable to locate publicly available data regarding the GPD’s demographics, site calls and stakeholder interviews found that the proportion of GPD officers who are Black has declined in recent years from a majority to approximately half (the other half of officers are white). These demographics make the GPD considerably more diverse than many small US police departments, but they remain markedly unrepresentative of the city’s general population. Stakeholders have further indicated that GPD leadership is predominantly white.

In the years leading up to the National Initiative, relations between Gary’s communities and the GPD had been tense, and the city had experienced broader race- and union-related conflicts. The GPD has been the focus of several investigations and assessments over the past decade. In 2009, the DOJ Civil Rights Division investigated former GPD chief Thomas Houston, along with two other members of his command staff, for violating the civil rights of a Gary resident. Houston was found guilty of physically assaulting the handcuffed victim by kicking and striking different parts of his body. Houston was sentenced to 41 months in prison and two years of supervised release.\textsuperscript{19}

Before Gary became a National Initiative site, Mayor Freeman-Wilson launched anticrime initiatives and investigated the efficacy of the GPD. In 2013, she launched an assessment of the GPD in
collaboration with DOJ and the Indiana State Police and produced a report with findings and recommendations. In 2014, she launched an anticrime program, Gary for Life, as well as a six-month Domestic Violence Awareness Campaign (independent of and concurrent with the National Initiative) to assist victims of domestic violence in 2016. Despite the mayor’s efforts, stakeholder interviews, site calls, and a review of publicly available sources show that historical tensions and past events have contributed to the public's persistent negative perceptions of the GPD and Gary’s climate of strained police-community relations (Jannetta et al. 2019).

**Timeline of Policing Events and National Initiative Dosage**

The timeline outlined in figure 3 shows several notable events that occurred before and during Gary’s evaluation period. One of these was the fatal shooting of GPD Officer Jeffrey Westerfield in 2014 while he was responding to a domestic dispute. Another was the Group Violence Intervention initiative in April 2015, which the GPD launched the same month the National Initiative kicked off. Officers also concluded the conceptual and tactical procedural justice trainings in March and May 2016, respectively, but did not complete the implicit bias trainings until May 2017. Moreover, Gary held listening sessions with survivors of intimate partner violence or sexual assault. Other than these activities, the GPD made few improvements to its policies and procedures during the National Initiative evaluation period (because of a complicated policy architecture), which was capped off by Chief McKinley’s resignation in January 2018.
Impact on Administrative Outcomes

Given the lack of data available to conduct a rigorous impact analysis, we have no findings to report for Gary. Conversations with the site coordinator, GPD officers, and findings from the GPD Technical Assessment Team indicated that the GPD had little capacity to collect, produce, and disseminate data. This made data acquisition a slow and unwieldy process that concluded with the GPD’s inability to provide the administrative data that the evaluation team requested. As such, we did not complete structural break analyses for Gary. However, a comparison of pre- and post-National Initiative community survey responses indicate that residents’ perceptions of the GPD improved considerably over time (Fontaine et al. 2019).

Minneapolis, MN

Implementation Context

Minneapolis is a midsized city in eastern Minnesota with an estimated 2014 population of 394,000, but is part of the larger Minneapolis-Saint Paul-Bloomington metropolitan area, which has a combined...
population of roughly 3.3 million. The median household income in 2014 was $50,767, and in 2014, 61.0 percent of Minneapolis residents were white, 17.6 percent were Black, and 9.8 percent were Hispanic/Latinx. Increased immigration of Somali, Hmong, and Native American populations to Minneapolis in recent decades has made the city more racially and culturally diverse, which has created unique challenges for a city leadership and government that have historically operated in English.

Overall crime rates declined in Minneapolis between the 1990s and 2017 (consistent with national trends), though the violent crime rate had flattened in the five years before the National Initiative. Crime and police activity have been concentrated in the northwest quarter of Minneapolis and remain so today, with a smaller and less concentrated area of activity in the city’s southern half.

In 2015 (the year the National Initiative commenced in Minneapolis), the Minneapolis Police Department employed roughly 800 sworn officers and 300 civilian employees (MPD 2016), and was led by Chief Janeé Harteau, the first woman and openly gay person to serve as the city’s police chief. Chief Harteau entered office with high levels of community support and a clearly stated goal of increasing diversity and improving police-community relations. Minneapolis’s African American communities had long mistrusted the MPD, which had been charged with unjustified uses of force in numerous shootings of residents (HRW 1998). Moreover, the MPD’s history with Native American residents included such critical incidents as forcibly transporting Charles Lone Eagle and John Boney in the trunk of a police car in 1993 and using aggressive tactics to dismantle a protest of a state highway being built over Dakota land, including a site with religious significance (HRW 1998). The Somali and Hmong communities have had similar experiences with the MPD, including the 2006 police shooting of Fong Lee, a 19-year-old Hmong man, and the release of a video showing an officer threatening to break the legs of 17-year-old Somali high school student Faysal Mohamad.

Minneapolis engaged DOJ in various ways to address police-community relations before joining the National Initiative. The MPD entered a federal mediation process in 2002 under the DOJ’s Community Relations Service after a police officer injured an 11-year-old with a stray bullet during a drug raid in north Minneapolis, leading to protests and demands for federal intervention. The City, MPD, and Unity Community Mediation Team met from May to December 2003 and signed a memorandum of agreement on December 4 that presented a series of action items related to the use of force, police-community relations, mental health issues, department diversity, accountability, removal of children from their homes, and training. However, the city did not renew the memorandum of agreement when it expired in December 2008.
Timeline of Policing Events and National Initiative Dosage

Several critical incidents and criminal justice responses (detailed in figure 4 below) exacerbated tensions between the MPD and the community during the National Initiative evaluation period and frequently put the MPD in a defensive position. Stakeholder interviews and baseline community survey results (as well as information gleaned from public reports and news articles) confirm that the Minneapolis neighborhoods that had the most interactions with police had low levels of confidence in existing MPD oversight and accountability mechanisms (OJP Diagnostic Center 2015a, 2015b). Community members also perceived a lack of serious disciplinary action toward and convictions of officers involved in highly publicized incidents, citing examples of officers involved in shootings being rewarded later in their careers. The shooting of Jamar Clark (a 24-year-old African American Minneapolis resident) in November 2015 launched widespread protests, including a march that shut down Interstate 94 and resulted in the arrests of 34 adults and 8 minors. Protests culminated in an 18-day occupation of the city’s 4th precinct police station, led by Black Lives Matter organizers who demanded video footage of the incident be released. Community members criticized the city’s and the MPD’s response to the protests—namely their use of chemical irritants, marking rounds, and riot gear—as well as the MPD’s failure to protect protestors, five of whom were shot immediately outside the 4th precinct station by three masked men who appeared to be white supremacists. The city was also criticized when it proposed additional funding for “safety and accessibility” improvements to the 4th precinct station immediately after the occupation, which community stakeholder interviewees and news sources interpreted as an effort to “fortify” the station (Jannetta et al. 2019). Moreover, in March 2016, Hennepin County Attorney Mike Freeman announced that the officers involved in Jamar Clark’s death would not be charged, leading to further protests; federal prosecutors also later declined to pursue civil charges. The MPD faced further scrutiny after the fatal shooting of Philando Castile in June 2016, though it was an officer from the St. Anthony Police Department who shot Castile in a Saint Paul suburb.

Furthermore, in 2016, Minneapolis experienced a sharp increase in gun violence: 30.1 percent more shootings occurred citywide compared with 2015. This prompted the MPD to implement a Group Violence Intervention initiative, which began in May 2017. Site calls and interviews with MPD officers revealed the difficulty of striking a balance between protecting the communities most victimized by gun violence and focusing on building community trust in the agency, which Urban’s baseline community surveys indicated was exceedingly low (Fontaine et al. 2019). Chief Harteau faced dual criticisms—of overly aggressive policing and failing to protect residents—and resigned in July 2017. Medaria Arradondo, the MPD’s National Initiative liaison, was appointed chief in September 2017.
Despite these events, the MPD made substantial progress on National Initiative activities. Officer training sessions on procedural justice concepts and applications concluded in April and July 2016, respectively, and the implicit bias training concluded in December 2016. The MPD also held 18 listening sessions (8 in 2017 and 10 in 2018) with a wide array of Minneapolis populations including Native Americans, residents of Latinx and East African descent, members of the LGBTQIA+ community, youth, and sexual assault survivors. In addition, the MPD launched a robust array of changes in policies and procedures, including the following:

- establishing a transgender/gender nonconforming policy (June 2016)
- amending the MPD’s use-of-force policy to prioritize sanctity of life for both officers and civilians (July 2016)
- creating a policy requiring officers to intervene in incidents in which other officers use excessive force (July 2016)
- creating a new system to track race and gender data on traffic and other stops (September 2016)
- establishing a Procedural Justice Unit housed in the new Division of Community & Collaborative Advancement (December 2016) and charging precincts with developing precinct-specific procedural justice plans
- adapting its body-worn camera policy to require officers to turn on cameras as soon as they begin responding to 911 calls (July 2017)
- reporting officer use of force, complaint, stop, crime, and arrest statistics online (2017)
Impact on Administrative Outcomes

Table 4 details the dates and directions of the site-specific and comparison structural break analyses for Minneapolis. Because of data limitations, the outcomes we analyzed in Minneapolis were restricted to violent and property crimes and use-of-force incidents.

Although violent crime rates gradually increased between 2012 (281 a month) and 2017 (320 a month), we observed no statistically significant breaks in violent crime after the National Initiative began. Property crimes rates in Minneapolis averaged 1,489 a month before the National Initiative and 1,442 a month after, leading to relatively stable numbers, although we noted some variations and breaks. A significant decrease in property crime rates occurred in January 2015 in the site-specific model and in September 2015 in the comparison model. In August 2016, one month after the tactical procedural justice training concluded and two months before the implicit bias training, we noted a significant increase in property crime rates that was not mirrored in the comparison analysis, which found a decrease in property crimes in September 2015.
TABLE 4
Dates and Directions of Structural Breaks for Minneapolis by Outcome

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Site-specific analysis</th>
<th>Comparison analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Count of violent crimes</td>
<td>No breaks</td>
<td>No breaks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count of property crimes</td>
<td>08/2016, Increase</td>
<td>09/2015, Decrease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count of use-of-force incidents</td>
<td>05/2017, Decrease</td>
<td>01/2017, Increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of use-of-force incidents with Black</td>
<td>No breaks</td>
<td>No breaks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of use-of-force incidents with Hispanic/Latinx</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of use-of-force incidents with white</td>
<td>No breaks</td>
<td>No breaks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Data were provided by the National Initiative and comparison cities or obtained from public resources.

Notes: Structural breaks observed after the National Initiative kickoff site visit in June 2015. Violent crimes are homicides, rapes, robberies, and aggravated assaults. Property crimes are burglaries, larcenies/thefts, motor vehicle thefts, and arsons.

Before the National Initiative began, the MPD averaged approximately 78 use-of-force incidents a month; after activities began, this figure slightly decreased to 74 a month. The site-specific structural break analysis observed a significant decrease in May 2017, after which there were an average of 67 monthly use-of-force incidents. The department held its first Group Violence Intervention call that same month, and Chief Harteau resigned in July 2017; both events may have influenced rates of use-of-force incidents. There were also racial disparities in use-of-force incidents: an average of 62 percent of monthly use-of-force incidents involved Black community members, whereas 23 percent involved white community members. These proportions are almost the precise inverse of the city’s demographics: 60 percent of Minneapolis residents are white and 19 percent are Black. Across all analysis months (from January 2012 to May 2018), we observed no breaks in the trends for use-of-force incidents by race.

Pittsburgh, PA

Implementation Context

Pittsburgh is a midsized city in western Pennsylvania with a 2014 population of 306,045, of which 65.1 percent were white and 24.3 percent were Black. Pittsburgh’s median household income in 2014 was $40,009. Although crime rates have declined steadily in Pittsburgh over the past 25 years (consistent with national trends), it has rates of violent and property crime higher than national averages, though
similar to cities of comparable size. Violent crime has historically been concentrated in several neighborhoods, the largest of which are in city’s west and north sides.

The Pittsburgh Bureau of Police had 856 sworn officers in 2014 (the year before Pittsburgh launched the National Initiative); the size of the department had been consistent during the previous five years. Like many US police departments, the PBP’s officer demographics were not representative of the city’s population. In 2014, 13 percent of sworn PBP officers were Black and 85 percent were white. These proportions varied by rank: although there were more officers of color in the ranks of assistant chief, commander, and detective, the proportion of lieutenants, sergeants, police officers, and new recruits who were of color was lower than the proportion of city’s residents of color. The ACLU brought a lawsuit against the PBP in 2012 alleging hiring discrimination that was settled in 2015 and required the PBP to reform its hiring practices, establish a committee to oversee hiring reform, and compensate Black applicants rejected between 2008 and 2014.

In September 2014, Pittsburgh Mayor William Peduto appointed Cameron McLay as police chief, an important decision following the conviction of former Chief Nathan Harper for diverting public funds and failing to file tax returns; several other officers were suspended when Harper was indicted, and the previous mayor (Luke Ravenstahl) was widely believed to be involved in corruption, although he was not directly implicated or charged. Consequently, Chief McLay was brought on to bridge the police-community divide through extensive internal and external reform, and to implement a more data-driven community policing model and boost officer morale. Chief McLay made changes almost immediately, and in his first year he focused on expanding police presence at community events, implementing and enforcing departmental accountability structures (including the establishment of the Office of Professional Standards), conducting an inventory of the PBP’s data systems, and changing hiring practices to diversify the police force. Despite these efforts, improving officer morale remained challenging.

Several stakeholder interview respondents identified officer morale as one of the PBP’s greatest challenges before and during the National Initiative (Jannetta et al. 2019). Lack of transparency and consistency in internal areas such as discipline and promotions were notable concerns. Some PBP officers felt that they were frequently under attack by the city leadership: shortly after taking office, Mayor Peduto described the PBP’s culture as “mediocrity at best, and corruption at worst”; though he later publicly apologized, Peduto’s relationship with the PBP’s rank-and-file remained strained. Two of the most significant points of contention involved police officer contracts and a January 2016 ruling that prohibited officers from residing outside city limits. According to several stakeholders within and outside the PBP, officers made substantially less money, on average, than those in neighboring
jurisdictions, and officers had not received raises in the years before Pittsburgh joined the National Initiative because contract negotiations had stalled. However, PBP officers obtained a modest pay increase as a result of litigation efforts after the department joined the National Initiative.\textsuperscript{50}

Timeline of Policing Events and National Initiative Dosage

Two major incidents occurred during the PBP’s National Initiative evaluation period, both of which negatively impacted officer morale and raised public concerns. In January 2016, Port Authority police officers shot an African American man after he stabbed a K-9 officer in what began as a public intoxication stop. Though the incident did not involve PBP officers, the bureau was implicated in the public’s response, which centered on K-9 policies and on the question of whether a dog’s life is more valuable than a human’s, and specifically a Black man’s.\textsuperscript{51} Moreover, in April 2016, a PBP sergeant was indicted after the department discharged him for wrongful use of force against Gabriel Despres (a 19-year-old white man) outside a high school football game in November 2015.\textsuperscript{52} The department reviewed a video of the incident shortly after it occurred, and many officers disagreed with the sergeant’s actions; however, according to site calls with PBP command staff, a significant number of people within the PBP felt that the sergeant had not been treated fairly or supported. The community’s disgruntlement with the PBP and discord between the PBP’s rank-and-file and leadership were themes that consistently emerged in stakeholder interviews and site visits; baseline community surveys echoed these sentiments, with low levels of confidence and trust in the police (Fontaine et al. 2019; Jannetta et al. 2019). Tense relationships between Chief McLay and the police union and mayor led to McLay’s resignation in November 2016.

Against this backdrop, the PBP’s progress on National Initiative activities (detailed in figure 5 below) was perhaps surprisingly robust. The conceptual procedural justice and tactical training modules were delivered to officers in February and December 2016, respectively, and implicit bias trainings were completed in March 2018 (outside the evaluation period). The National Initiative’s reconciliation component, however, was essentially nonexistent during the impact evaluation: no listening sessions were held until 2018, when sessions focused on youth and members of the LGBTQIA+ community. However, the PBP implemented various other changes to policies and procedures, including the following:

- creating a PBP ethics document (2016)
- adding procedural justice to evaluations of field training officers and recruits (2016)
- adding "adherence to the principles of procedural justice" to the agency’s Code of Ethics
- incorporating procedural justice language into the policy regarding conduct toward the public and fellow members (May 2017)
- adding a statement on fair, unbiased decisionmaking and transparency in reporting use of force (such transparency is critical to establishing trust and legitimacy)
- revising definitions of deadly force, impact weapon, and reasonable belief for clarity
- defining “de-escalation”
- creating an order on transgender and gender nonconforming employees, including procedural justice concepts of respect and neutrality
- adding procedural justice language to policies for motor vehicle stops and warrantless searches and seizures

**FIGURE 5**
Timeline in Pittsburgh, PA

Source: Urban Institute.
Impact on Administrative Outcomes

Table 5 details the dates and directions of the site-specific and comparison structural break analyses for Pittsburgh. The PBP was able to provide administrative data on all outcomes of interest except calls for service. However, data from the comparison site restricted comparison analyses to violent crime, property crime, and use-of-force incidents by race.

Pittsburgh averaged 235 violent crimes a month before the National Initiative began. Both the site-specific and comparison structural break analyses observed a significant decrease in January and February 2017, respectively, after which the city averaged 198 violent crimes a month. This corresponds to the period immediately following the completion of the tactical procedural justice trainings. Property crime rates remained relatively flat in the period leading up to and after the National Initiative began. No breaks were observed in the site-specific analysis.

The trend line of use-of-force incidents peaked in Pittsburgh in March 2013 at 439 a month. We observed two significant decrease breaks after that time, the first in June 2014, and the second during the National Initiative in February 2016, but neither break was detected in the comparison analysis. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the February 2016 decrease coincides with the video release of the Despres use-of-force video incident, which shed negative light on PBP tactics and led to a federal investigation. Moreover, use-of-force incidents had high levels of racial disparity: use of force against Black community members accounted for 61 percent of total monthly incidents, whereas use of force against white community members accounted for 35 percent. These rates were the near inverse of the city's demographics: 65 percent of community members were white and 26 percent were Black. Across all analysis months, from January 2012 to October 2017, no breaks in the trends for use-of-force incidents by racial demographics were observed.
### Table 5
**Dates and Directions of Structural Breaks for Pittsburgh, PA by Outcome**

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<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
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<td>Count of violent crimes</td>
<td>01/2017, Decrease</td>
<td>02/2017, Decrease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count of property crimes</td>
<td>No breaks</td>
<td>02/2016, Decrease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>No breaks</td>
<td>No breaks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of use-of-force incidents with Hispanic/Latinx</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of use-of-force incidents with community members who were Black</td>
<td>No breaks</td>
<td>No breaks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of use-of-force incidents with community members who were Hispanic/Latinx</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count of pedestrian stops</td>
<td>10/2015, Decrease</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of pedestrian stops with community members who were Black</td>
<td>11/2015, Increase</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of pedestrian stops with community members who were Hispanic/Latinx</td>
<td>02/2016, Increase</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count of traffic stops</td>
<td>11/2015, Decrease</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>09/2016, Increase</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of traffic stops with community members who were white</td>
<td>10/2015, Increase</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count of arrests</td>
<td>02/2016, Decrease</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of arrests with community members who were Black</td>
<td>No breaks</td>
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**Notes:** Structural breaks were observed after the National Initiative kickoff site visit in May 2015. Violent crimes are homicides, rapes, robberies, and aggravated assaults. Property crimes are burglaries, larcenies/thefts, motor vehicle thefts, and arsons. n/a Analysis could not be conducted.

Before the National Initiative, the PBP averaged roughly 294 pedestrian stops a month; that figure decreased to 225 after the project began. Site-specific structural break analyses identified two reductions in monthly pedestrian stops, each followed by an increase. The first occurred in August 2014; before that time, the PBP conducted an average of 304 pedestrian stops a month. The second occurred during National Initiative activities in October 2015. From 2012 to 2017, the period with the
lowest amount of observed pedestrian stops—just 202 a month—occurred between a decrease break in October 2015 and an increase break in November 2016. The significant increase in November 2016 corresponded with the month Chief McLay resigned, after which pedestrian stops averaged 242 a month. Although we observed a downward trend in pedestrian stops from October 2015 to November 2016, racial disparities in pedestrian stops increased during that time. One month before the National Initiative started in May 2015, a significant decrease break was observed that lasted until February 2016. During that period, Black community members experience 58 percent of all pedestrian stops, but a significant increase break occurred in February 2016, after which Black community members experienced 63 percent of pedestrian stops. These stops were out of proportion with the community’s demographics, which were 65 percent white and 26 percent Black.

The PBP’s rates of traffic stops declined steadily from 2012 (1,430 a month on average) through the second half of 2016 (629 a month on average). The three significant decrease breaks occurred during this period: two occurred in June 2013 and July 2014 (both before Pittsburgh began the National Initiative in May 2015), and one occurred in November 2015. Like pedestrian stops, a significant increase in traffic stops occurred in November 2016, the month Chief McLay resigned. After November 2016, the monthly average increased to 886. The share of traffic stops among community members who were Black (37 percent of total monthly stops) were more in proportion with community demographics than those of pedestrian stops. However, racial disparity in traffic stops worsened after the National Initiative. A significant increase break was observed in October 2016. Before that, community members who were Black experienced 37 percent of monthly traffic stops on average; after, that share increased to 42 percent a month. This trend was not reflected in rates of traffic stops among community members who were white; those rates significantly decreased in October 2016. Traffic stops among community members who were white averaged 57 percent before October 2016 and decreased to 52 percent after.

Trends in Pittsburgh’s arrest data were similar to those in pedestrian and traffic stops. Before the National Initiative, the trend line on the count of monthly arrests was relatively flat, averaging 831 a month. A significant decrease break occurred in February 2016 (midway through the National Initiative activities), when monthly arrests averaged 688 until December 2016. After December 2016, a significant increase occurred, averaging 770 a month. The timing of these events suggest that the National Initiative may have impacted arrest rates, although the PBP’s practices changed with Chief McLay’s departure. However, significant breaks in racial disparities of arrest rates after the start of the National Initiative were not observed.
Stockton, CA

Implementation Context

Stockton is a midsized city in north-central California with a population of roughly 297,000 and a median household income of $45,347 in 2014. Residents were primarily Hispanic/Latinx (41.3 percent), white (22.3 percent), and Asian (21.2 percent), with smaller populations of Black (10.8 percent) and multiracial (3.2 percent) residents.

Over the past 25 years, Stockton has seen a steady decline in property crime rates and fluctuating violent crime rates. In 2010, it ranked among the 10 cities with the highest violent crime rates nationwide (Logan and Stults 2011). Like other midsized US cities, Stockton’s violent and property crime rates were higher than the national rate, and such crimes are most heavily concentrated in several pockets throughout the city.

After the 2008 economic and housing bubble burst, a significant number of middle-class families who were priced out of the San Francisco Bay Area housing market moved to Stockton, inflating prices and drawing more urban development. Stockton was ill-equipped to handle the growing market: home values in Stockton had decreased 67 percent in the previous five years and unemployment had skyrocketed to 17.2 percent, leading the city to file for bankruptcy in 2012. The SPD had to lay off nearly a quarter of its police force, driving the city’s unemployment rate above 20 percent. In response to these layoffs, the SPD disassembled its narcotics force and cut back on community policing, which occurred not long before Stockton broke its homicide record (set one year earlier in 2011).

Eric Jones became chief of the SPD in March 2012 after six months of interim leadership following the previous chief’s resignation in 2011. After being appointed, Jones spoke publicly about his intention to stabilize the department’s discouraging climate, which had been marked by low officer morale, record-high crime rates, and contentious relations with City Hall. In 2015, the SPD consisted of 409 sworn officers, its most since 2009. Like many US police departments, the SPD’s officer demographics were not representative of the city’s population. In 2013, 33 percent of sworn SPD officers were officers of color, whereas 62 percent were white. In contrast, 75.1 percent of Stockton’s residents in 2013 were people of color and 22.9 percent were white. This difference is particularly striking among Hispanic/Latinx residents: in 2013, 41.1 percent of the city’s residents identified as Hispanic/Latinx compared with just 1.8 percent of SPD officers.

The department has conducted several initiatives aimed at mitigating its issues with diversity and retention. In 2015, the SPD began sending minority recruiters to job fairs, colleges, and academies; that
same year, the department reached out to high school counselors and coaches to recruit for a Cadet and Sentinels program. In 2015, the department also began to draw funds from a newly implemented sales tax with priorities approved by voters. Sixty-five percent of revenues were intended to fund 120 additional officers over three years, while the remaining 35 percent was allocated toward city efforts to recover from bankruptcy as well as services for residents, businesses, and property owners. Since that time, the SPD has increased its quantity of officers, though its hiring rate remains only slightly above the rate of officer retirements, resignations, and officer departures to other law enforcement agencies.

**Timeline of Policing Events and National Initiative Dosage**

As indicated in figure 6, several major incidents impacted SPD officers and raised public concern after Stockton began its National Initiative work. In February 2016, a Stockton police officer with a record of legal, nonlethal shootings shot Angel Alan Gleason, a 36-year-old Hispanic man, alleging that Gleason had pointed a gun at officers after hitting another car during a vehicle pursuit. Amid growing neighborhood protests, the officer’s name was posted on an independent but public Facebook page called “Stockton PD Corruption Reporting Page.” The officer changed his last name shortly after, drawing further criticism from community activist groups. In June 2016, the City of Stockton settled a federal abuse-of-force case for $307,500 after James Smith, an 18-year-old Black man, was filmed being repeatedly bitten by an SPD K-9 while handcuffed on the ground. That same month, the ACLU of Northern California filed a lawsuit against the Stockton Unified School District, claiming there had been an increase in negative interactions—including allegations of harassment—between police and minority students.

Although such critical incidents can impede the National Initiative’s efforts by exacerbating Stockton residents’ distrust of police and lowering officer morale, SPD leadership was remarkably stable during the National Initiative, and it accomplished the largest and most robust array of trainings, listening sessions, and activities among the six pilot sites. The department had already begun training its officers on procedural justice concepts before the initiative began, and it administered training in tactical procedural justice applications in July 2016 and implicit bias trainings in May 2017.

Perhaps the most notable component of the SPD’s National Initiative work (and what distinguishes the agency from other participants) was its focus on reconciliation: the department hosted 20 listening sessions during the evaluation period and another 6 in 2018. The department convened listening sessions in communities with the highest levels of violence as well as with specific subpopulations, such
as youth, members of the Latinx and several immigrant communities, and members of the LGBTQIA+
community.

The SPD also instituted a wide array of changes in policies and procedures, including the following:

- adding procedural justice language to the general order on canine deployment (May 2016)
- requiring that field training officer evaluations include documentation of procedural justice
  practices and that supervisors evaluate officer understanding of procedures in transfer/special
  assignment requests and promotional examinations (2016)
- mandating that officers receive annual mental health training and make every attempt to
  mediate and defuse situations with people experiencing mental health crises (July 2016)
- creating a policy stating that “sworn personnel of the Stockton Police Department shall not
  stop, question, detain, arrest or place ‘an immigration hold’ on any person solely on the grounds
  that he or she may be a deportable alien” (January 2017)
- adding tenets of procedural justice to the equestrian unit order (June 2017)
- developing a policy on release of body camera footage (July 2017)
- creating a Community Advisory Board policy review subcommittee tasked with reviewing
  listening session themes as input into recommendations for policy change (2017)
- establishing a Neighborhood Impact Team to reach out to communities that experience tragic
  events (2017)
Impact on Administrative Outcomes

Table 6 details the dates and directions of the site-specific and comparison structural break analyses for Stockton. Outcomes in Stockton for which data were available are calls for service, violent and property crimes, traffic stops, and arrests. However, comparison site data were only available for calls for service, violent crime, and property crime.

Although we observed several significant breaks on the violent crime trend line in the period leading up to the National Initiative, the overall line remained relatively stable at 308 violent crimes a month, and no breaks occurred after National Initiative activities began. Before September 2013, property crime rates averaged 964 a month. We observed a downward trend between September 2013 and January 2016, when another significant decrease occurred, and property crimes averaged 724 a month through the end of 2017.

When community trust in the police increases, one would anticipate a subsequent increase in calls for service (reflecting the community’s confidence in law enforcement), even given stable or decreasing crime rates. Indeed, the trend line on calls for service in Stockton steadily increased from 2012 (28,779 average calls a month) to 2017 (34,666 average calls a month). We observed four significant increase

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**FIGURE 6**

Timeline in Stockton, CA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>07/12</td>
<td>Stockton files for bankruptcy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/14</td>
<td>CPI training initiated (pre-National Initiative)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/15</td>
<td>Walter Scott &amp; Freddie Gray</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07/15</td>
<td>Body-worn cameras approved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06/16</td>
<td>TPJ training concludes &amp; Smith K-9 use of force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/16</td>
<td>Geleen shooting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08/16</td>
<td>Stockton Alliance for Equity (SAFE) established; SPD officer death</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/17</td>
<td>Draft “Principles of Procedurally Just Policing” provided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/15</td>
<td>Tamir Rice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07/15</td>
<td>Sandra Bland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/15</td>
<td>Workshop on National Initiative pillars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/16</td>
<td>Jones briefed on community survey findings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/16</td>
<td>Start of reconciliation process; IB training initiated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07/17</td>
<td>Faith Love Unity Movement listening session</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/17</td>
<td>1st Stockton Listening in a New Way session</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/16</td>
<td>TPJ training initiated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07/16</td>
<td>Alton Sterling &amp; Philando Castile shootings; Dallas police sniper attack</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Urban Institute.

---
breaks in the site-specific model during that period, in October 2012, December 2013, January 2015, and May 2016. The two most recent increases occurred after National Initiative activities began. The comparison model noted an increase break in February 2014.

**TABLE 6**

**Dates and Directions of Structural Breaks for Stockton, CA by Outcome**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Site-specific analysis</th>
<th>Comparison analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Count of calls for service</td>
<td>01/2015, Increase 05/2016, Increase</td>
<td>No breaks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count of violent crimes</td>
<td>No breaks</td>
<td>No breaks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count of property crimes</td>
<td>01/2016, Decrease</td>
<td>No breaks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count of traffic stops</td>
<td>02/2015, Decrease 11/2016, Increase</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of traffic stops with community members who were Black</td>
<td>07/2015, Increase</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of traffic stops with community members who were Hispanic/Latinx</td>
<td>No breaks</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of traffic stops with community members who were white</td>
<td>No breaks</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count of arrests</td>
<td>02/2017, Decrease 12/2015, Increase</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of arrests with community members who were Black</td>
<td>11/2015, Decrease 01/2017, Increase</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of arrests with community members who were Hispanic/Latinx</td>
<td>No breaks</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of arrests with community members who were white</td>
<td>No breaks</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** Data were provided by the National Initiative and comparison cities or obtained from public resources.

**Notes:** The first National Initiative activity in Stockton occurred in April 2015, but the city conducted the conceptual PJ trainings before the initiative, in October 2014. As such, the observed structural breaks correspond to breaks after the conceptual PJ trainings. Violent crimes are homicides, rapes, robberies, and aggravated assaults. Property crimes are burglaries, larcenies/thefts, motor vehicle thefts, and arsons. n/a Analysis could not be conducted.

Similarly, although rates of traffic stops in Stockton followed an upward trajectory from 2011 to 2017, those rates briefly flattened during the implementation of National Initiative activities. In the years leading up to the National Initiative, rates of traffic stops increased from an average of 798 a month in 2011 to an average of 1,600 a month in 2014, with significant increases noted in October 2012 and February 2014. This trend levelled off from February 2015 to November 2016, which corresponded to the main National Initiative implementation period. However, the number of monthly traffic stops significantly increased in July 2017 to 1,735 a month on average. Traffic stops of community members who were Hispanic/Latinx and white were in proportion with Stockton’s Hispanic/Latinx and white populations: Hispanic/Latinx community members made up approximately
40 percent of the community and experienced 39 percent of traffic stops after the National Initiative began; white community members made up 23 percent of the community and experienced 20 percent of traffic stops. We observed no breaks in the proportions of traffic stops for community members who were Hispanic/Latinx or white after the National Initiative began. However, and importantly, traffic stops of Black community members were much more disproportionate: community members who were Black experienced 27 percent of traffic stops despite making up only 12 percent of the community. Moreover, we observed a significant increase break in the share of traffic stops among community members who were Black in July 2015, the same month that the city manager approved the use of body-worn cameras in policing.

Rates of average monthly arrests peaked during the months that National Initiative activities primarily occurred. This may have been an effect of the SPD returning to normal staff levels following the city’s bankruptcy in 2012. Arrests averaged 752 a month during the period leading up to the National Initiative, then jumped to 834 a month until a decrease break in February 2017, dropping to 729 throughout the rest of 2017. We noted numerous decrease and increase breaks for arrests of community members who were Hispanic/Latinx; however, the overall trend line remained relatively flat, averaging 35 percent each month from 2012 to 2017. We observed no breaks for arrests of community members who were white. However, one significant increase break occurred in December 2015 on the share of arrests among community members who were Black, increasing from an average of 34 percent to 36 percent in the months that followed.
Discussion

The National Initiative’s many interventions, and their unique implementations across a wide array of activities, timelines, and historical contexts, created significant challenges to measuring impact. Urban conducted many evaluation activities, including community surveys, stakeholder interviews, observations, policy and procedure reviews, and administrative data impact analyses. This report focused on the administrative data impact analyses, obtaining results by using a quasi-experimental form of structural break analysis that assessed significant changes in the outcomes’ trend lines. Outcomes of interest included monthly counts of the departments’ calls for service, violent crimes, property crimes, use-of-force incidents, pedestrian stops, traffic stops, and arrests. To the extent possible based on data availability, we also examined changes in racial disparities in the use of force, stop, and arrest data among community members who were Black, Hispanic/Latinx, and white. For each of these outcomes, we conducted reviews of each site’s implementation evaluation findings, informed by technical assistance providers, trainers, and stakeholders. We expected reductions in the total count of events in all cases, except calls for service, where we expected an increase. We also expected the proportions of those outcomes among racial groups to become more equitable (i.e., more representative of community demographics) after National Initiative efforts were implemented.

Table 7 summarizes the general impact we observed across the sites and outcomes. Results indicate that the counts of calls for service, violent crimes, and property crimes were mixed across sites. On the other hand, two of the three sites with data on use-of-force incidents observed decreases in such incidents, although we noted no impact in the third site. Changes in the rates of pedestrian and traffic stops were more consistent across the six sites: a decrease occurred during the National Initiative’s primary activities, but rates returned to previous levels after those efforts. Finally, arrest rates generally declined across the sites.

Although these results indicate some consistency in the National Initiative’s impact across sites, one of its primary goals was to reduce racial and ethnic disparities in policing practices associated with use-of-force incidents, pedestrian and traffic stops, and arrests. Impacts on racial disparities were, as a whole, minimal and decidedly mixed. We observed no impact on changes in racial disparities of use-of-force incidents in the three sites that provided data on that outcome. Finally, changes in racial disparities associated with pedestrian stops, traffic stops, and arrests are site- and outcome-specific, indicating an inconsistent impact across the National Initiative cities.
### TABLE 7
Summarized Results of Structural Breaks Analyses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Birmingham</th>
<th>Fort Worth</th>
<th>Minneapolis</th>
<th>Pittsburgh</th>
<th>Stockton</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Count of calls for service</td>
<td>No impact</td>
<td>Minor Decrease</td>
<td>No impact</td>
<td>Increase</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count of violent crimes</td>
<td>No impact</td>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>No impact</td>
<td>Decrease</td>
<td>No impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count of property crimes</td>
<td>No impact</td>
<td>Decrease, followed by an increase</td>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>No impact</td>
<td>Decrease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count of use-of-force incidents</td>
<td>No impact</td>
<td>Decrease</td>
<td>Decrease</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial disparity</td>
<td>No impact</td>
<td>No impact</td>
<td>No impact</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count of pedestrian stops</td>
<td>No impact</td>
<td>Decrease, followed by an increase</td>
<td>Greater disparity</td>
<td>No impact</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial disparity</td>
<td>Slightly lessened disparity</td>
<td>Decrease, followed by an increase</td>
<td>Greater disparity</td>
<td>Greater disparity for Black community members</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count of traffic stops</td>
<td>Decrease</td>
<td>Decrease, followed by an increase</td>
<td>Decrease, followed by an increase</td>
<td>Decrease</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial disparity</td>
<td>Lessened disparity</td>
<td>Decrease</td>
<td>Decrease, followed by an increase</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count of arrests</td>
<td>Decrease</td>
<td>Decrease</td>
<td>No impact</td>
<td>Decrase</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial disparity</td>
<td>Lessened disparity</td>
<td>No impact</td>
<td>No impact</td>
<td>No impact</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** Data were provided by the National Initiative and comparison cities or obtained from public resources.

* Gary was excluded from these analyses as the agency did not share administrative data with the research team.

* Stops in Fort Worth were traffic and pedestrian stops combined.

This “bird’s eye” view is useful for assessing the National Initiative’s overall impact, but it masks the project’s complexity and the many nuances associated with the results in the individual cities. As such, the main site-specific findings (and their association with National Initiative activities) are outlined below:

- **Birmingham**
  - Arrests decreased in December 2015, around the same time that the concepts of reconciliation were first introduced to Birmingham supervisors.
A decrease of arrests of Black community members and increase in arrests of white community members occurred from December 2016 to February 2017, around the time of the trainings on implicit bias in January and February 2017. This suggests that the implicit bias trainings may have had an impact on officers’ decisions to make arrests.

- **Fort Worth**
  - Pedestrian and traffic stops and arrests decreased in February 2016, the month the conceptual procedural justice trainings began.

- **Minneapolis**
  - Property crimes increased in August 2016, one month after the tactical procedural justice trainings concluded and two months before the implicit bias trainings.
  - The number of use-of-force incidents decreased in May 2017; MPD held its first Group Violence Intervention call that same month, and Chief Harteau resigned in July 2017, both of which may have influenced rates of use-of-force incidents.

- **Pittsburgh**
  - Violent crimes decreased around January and February 2017, immediately after tactical procedural justice trainings were completed.
  - A February 2016 decrease in the number of use-of-force incidents coincides with the video release of the Despres use-of-force video incident, which shed negative light on PBP tactics and led to a federal investigation.
  - Pedestrian and traffic stops increased in November 2016, the same month that Chief McLay resigned. An increase in racial disparity in traffic stops also occurred at this time.
  - Monthly arrests decreased midway through National Initiative activities, in February 2016; however, monthly arrests increased in December 2016. The timing of these changes may indicate that the National Initiative had an effect on the number of arrests and that those practices were altered with the new chief.

- **Stockton**
  - Rates of calls for service steadily increased from 2012 to 2017, indicating that the SPD made concrete efforts (both before and during National Initiative activities) to increase the community’s willingness to call the police.
  - Monthly traffic stops increased from 2011 to 2017, although they briefly decreased during the National Initiative. We observed an increase in the share of traffic stops among
community members who were Black in July 2015, the same month the city manager approved the use of body-worn cameras.

In summary, although implementation fidelity was not uniform across the six cities, all cities engaged in core training activities and these activities appear to be aligned with changes in outcomes of interest during the evaluation period. However, local contexts, events, and leadership changes likely impacted outcomes, with disruptions in leadership tempering the impact of trainings, policy changes, and reconciliation conversations with community members. These findings suggest that improving relationships with community members and police officers’ interactions with them are possible, but require faithful and consistent implementation and consistent, strong leadership on the part of police executives.

Implications for Future Research

The National Initiative was an ambitious and complex undertaking, consisting of multiple training, policy review, and community engagement activities. Detailed, accurate measurements of police administrative data are crucial when assessing the impacts of such complex program implementations. All six sites had varying degrees of unavailable or inconsistent data, which complicated data analyses and interpretations across sites. For example, the only measures that all five data-providing sites were able to provide pertained to violent and property crimes. Although changes in crime rates are interesting, they are not the most appropriate metric when assessing relationship-building efforts between police officers and community members. As such, we make three recommendations for future research on this complex topic: (1) standardizing data collection and definitions of current administrative data, (2) exploring new methods for collecting data on more pertinent outcomes, and (3) making data publicly available and easily accessible.

Police departments should make substantial efforts to ensure that administrative data are collected in a standardized and consistent way. Although changes to definitions or measurements are sometimes necessary, executive policing staff can be more confident in conclusions from trends or more complex analyses when the measurements of administrative data are the same over long periods of time. Moreover, clear statements identifying changes that may have occurred would support further comprehension.

Improvements to how current data are defined and measured over time are a bare minimum when examining how changes to policy and practice may affect more complex outcomes such as police-
community relations. As this report shows, many departments already have data on crime trends and other measures of policing activity, and these metrics are commonly reviewed in performance management systems such as CompStat. However, if departments wish to assess metrics associated with accountability and legitimacy, new data collection efforts that enable assessments of progress akin to CompStat's assessments of progress on crime are necessary (Jannetta and Bieler 2015). One promising practice, detailed in this series’ community survey brief (Fontaine et al. 2019), involves reaching out to community members and surveying them about their attitudes toward their interactions with officers and police departments as a whole. Another method involves examining social media to understand broad community attitudes (Oglesby-Neal, Tiry, and Kim 2019). Creating infrastructure to collect and analyze community sentiment in conjunction with administrative policing data could greatly and more directly affect a department's understandings of new policies and programs.

Lastly, departments should continue efforts to increase transparency by providing access to all data through online portals. Urban’s baseline community surveys found that residents of the National Initiative sites experiencing the highest levels of crime had serious concerns about whether the police were trustworthy, unbiased, and operated in ways consistent with procedural justice principles (Fontaine et al. 2019; La Vigne, Fontaine, and Dwivedi 2017). These types of attitudes could improve through third-party reviews of department statements and data. It is one thing for a department to state that use-of-force incidents are down, but quite another when the data are easily available and researchers or community members can reach the same conclusions.

Administrative policing data, in and of itself, is complicated and difficult to review. These issues are compounded when attempting to assess how a complex program like the National Initiative may affect policing outcomes that are difficult to measure and intended to improve perceptions of legitimacy and policing practices. Nonetheless, there are clear steps forward that both police departments and researchers can take to improve policing data and better evaluate the many efforts that departments across the country are implementing today.
Notes

1. The DOJ supplemented this grant with approximately $1 million in early 2015 to support the addition of a sixth pilot site.

2. Sites began National Initiative activities on the dates technical assistance providers first visited them, which ranged from April through June 2015.

3. We applied the method for testing for multiple break points developed by Bai (Bai 1997a, 1997b), and performed the analysis using the R statistical language (R Core Team 2008).


10. “Uniform Crime Reports,” FBI.


**NOTES**


“Uniform Crime Reports,” FBI.


References


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Daniel S. Lawrence is a senior research associate in the Urban Institute’s Justice Policy Center. His research focuses on police legitimacy and procedural justice, police technology, police screening and hiring practices, and community policing. Lawrence holds a BS in criminal justice from Northeastern University and an MA and PhD in criminology, law, and justice from the University of Illinois at Chicago.

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