ABOUT THE CHARTBOOK

The Housing Finance Policy Center's (HFPC) mission is to produce analyses and ideas that promote sound public policy, efficient markets, and access to economic opportunity in the area of housing finance. At A Glance, a monthly chartbook and data source for policymakers, academics, journalists, and others interested in the government's role in mortgage markets, is at the heart of this mission.

We welcome feedback from our readers on how we can make At A Glance a more useful publication. Please email any comments or questions to ataglance@urban.org.

To receive regular updates from the Housing Finance Policy Center, please visit here to sign up for our bi-weekly newsletter.

HOUSING FINANCE POLICY CENTER STAFF

Laurie Goodman
Institute Fellow

Janneke Ratcliffe
Center Vice President

DeQuendre Neeley-Bertrand
Director of Strategic Communications

Karan Kaul
Principal Research Associate

Michael Neal
Principal Research Associate

Jung Choi
Senior Research Associate

Linna Zhu
Research Associate

John Walsh
Research Analyst

Caitlin Young
Policy Analyst

Daniel Pang
Research Assistant

Liam Reynolds
Research Assistant

Alison Rincon
Director, Center Operations

Reagan Smith
Project Administrator

HFPC NONRESIDENT FELLOWS

David Brickman
Nonresident Fellow

Sarah Gerecke
Nonresident Fellow

Mike Loftin
Nonresident Fellow

Jim Parrott
Nonresident Fellow

Vanessa Perry
Nonresident Fellow

Ellen Seidman
Nonresident Fellow

Michael Stegman
Nonresident Fellow

Ted Tozer
Nonresident Fellow

Jun Zhu
Nonresident Fellow
Housing Supply
  Months of Supply
  Housing Starts and Home Sales

Housing Affordability
  National Housing Affordability Over Time
  Affordability Adjusted for MSA-Level DTI

Home Price Indices
  National Year-Over-Year HPI Growth
  Changes in CoreLogic HPI for Top MSAs

First-Time Homebuyers
  First-Time Homebuyer Share
  Comparison of First-time and Repeat Homebuyers, GSE and FHA Originations

Delinquencies and Loss Mitigation Activity
  Negative Equity Share
  Loans in Serious Delinquency/Foreclosure
  Forbearance Rates by Channel

GSEs under Conservatorship

GSE Portfolio Wind-Down
  Fannie Mae Mortgage-Related Investment Portfolio
  Freddie Mac Mortgage-Related Investment Portfolio

Effective Guarantee Fees & GSE Risk-Sharing Transactions
  Effective Guarantee Fees
  Fannie Mae Upfront Loan-Level Price Adjustment
  GSE Risk-Sharing Transactions and Spreads

Serious Delinquency Rates
  Serious Delinquency Rates – Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, FHA & VA
  Serious Delinquency Rates – Single-Family Loans & Multifamily GSE Loans

Agency Issuance

Agency Gross and Net Issuance
  Agency Gross Issuance
  Agency Net Issuance

Agency Gross Issuance & Fed Purchases
  Monthly Gross Issuance
  Fed Absorption of Agency Gross Issuance

Mortgage Insurance Activity
  MI Activity & Market Share
  FHA MI Premiums for Typical Purchase Loan
  Initial Monthly Payment Comparison: FHA vs. PMI

Related HFPC Work

Publications and Events
INTRODUCTION
To Offset Higher Rates, More borrowers are seeking ARMs and Paying Upfront Fees and Points.

The 30-year fixed mortgage rate has soared since the end of last year. From the end of 2021 to May 19, 2020, a less than five-month period, rates have jumped 214 basis points to 5.25 percent raising monthly mortgage payments considerably. For example, on a $300,000 original loan balance, the monthly payment would now be $1,657 per month, 29 percent greater than the $1,283 monthly payment in the year end 2021 rate environment.

Strong labor market conditions have helped supported solid earnings growth. However, the combination of higher interest rates and strong house price appreciation have offset income growth and reduced homebuying affordability. Amid worsening affordability, demand for purchase mortgages has fallen and housing market activity, both home sales and single-family starts, has softened.

Adjustable Rate Mortgage Share of Lending Activity

In addition, homebuyers are paying more fees and points upfront which helps to reduce the mortgage rate. According to the Mortgage Bankers Association, over the last three months of 2021, mortgage borrowers were paying upfront points and fees equal to a weekly average of 0.23 percent of the principal amount on 5-1 adjustable rate mortgages and an average of 0.38 of the principal amount on 30-year fixed rate mortgages. That rate has since increased to 0.73 on 5-1 adjustable rate mortgages and 0.74 on 30-year fixed rate mortgage. As of May. A combination of both an adjustable rate mortgage and paying more in points would combine to partially offset the surge in the 30-year fixed mortgage rate.

These steps come with trade-offs. For example, borrowers using an adjustable rate mortgage benefit from lower introductory rate, but also face uncertainty over their rate after that introductory window. Their mortgage rate could reset higher in the future; the rate can be adjusted at the end of the initial 5 year period and every year thereafter.

Although paying more upfront points and fees can help lower the mortgage rate, it requires additional financial resources at closing. The minimum funds needed for down payment and closing costs are usually quoted as a percentage of the sale price. As house prices rise, the finances needed at closing will increase as well, limiting the flexibility to pay points and fees and pushing homeownership out of reach for some homebuyers.

Ultimately, additional financial assistance for homebuyers through increased down payment assistance, cuts in GSE loan level pricing adjustments or FHA insurance premiums can help to partially offset the sting of higher mortgage rates. But more affordable supply such as condominiums or manufactured housing would help to relieve pressures on affordability. While builders still face significant resource costs including higher interest rates, the Administration’s recent announcement could help provide some much needed relief to families seeking homeownership.

INSIDE THIS ISSUE

- Mortgage origination volume in Q1 2022 totaled $730 billion, far lower than the $1.25 trillion total in Q1 2021 (Page 8).
- The HCAI stood at 5.0 percent in Q4 in 2021, slightly down from Q3 2021, and up from a historic low in Q3 2020 of just below 5.0 percent (Page 13-14).
The Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds Report has indicated a gradually increasing total value of the housing market, driven primarily by growing home equity since 2012. Mortgage debt outstanding increased slightly from $12.3 trillion in Q3 2021 to $12.5 trillion in Q4 2021, while total household equity increased from $26.9 trillion to $28.0 trillion. The total value of the housing market reached $40.6 trillion in the fourth quarter of 2021, 58.9 percent higher than the pre-crisis peak in 2006. Agency MBS account for 66.8 percent of the total mortgage debt outstanding, private-label securities make up 3.2 percent, and home equity loans make up 3.2 percent. Unsecuritized first liens comprise the remaining 26.8 percent with banks making up 18.6 percent, credit unions 4.7 percent, and other non-depositories accounting for 3.7 percent of the total.

**Value of the US Single Family Housing Market**

![Graph showing the value of the US Single Family Housing Market from 2000 to 2021.](image)

**Composition of the US Single Family Mortgage Market**

![Graph showing the composition of the US Single Family Mortgage Market from 2000 to 2021.](image)

**Sources:** Federal Reserve Flow of Funds and Urban Institute. *Last updated March 2022.*

**Note:** Single family includes 1-4 family mortgages. The home equity number is grossed up from Fed totals to include the value of households and the non-financial business sector.
MARKET SIZE OVERVIEW

As of Q4 2021, unsecuritized first liens held outside banks and credit unions totaled $0.47 trillion. In this space, REITs, insurers and retirements funds have experienced particularly robust percentage increases over the last decade. In April 2022, outstanding securities in the agency market totaled $8.5 trillion, 41.9 percent of which was Fannie Mae, 33.5 percent Freddie Mac, and 24.6 percent Ginnie Mae.

Unsecuritized 1st Liens Held by Non-Depositories


Agency Mortgage-Backed Securities

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.
Mortgage origination volume in Q1 2022 totaled $730 billion, far lower than the $1.35 trillion total in Q1 2021. The share of portfolio originations was 14.8 percent in Q1 2022, a decrease compared to the 25.6 percent share in Q1 2021. The GSE share was higher in Q1 2022 at 63.0 percent, compared to 57.4 percent in Q1 2021. The markedly higher GSE share in Q1 likely reflects new conforming loan limits that went into effect in Jan. 2022 and represented an 18% increase compared to 2021 limits. The FHA/VA share in Q1 2022 stood at 17.5 percent, up from 15.9 percent in Q1 2021. The PLS share was also higher in Q1 2022 at 4.8 percent, compared to 1.1 percent in Q1 2021 and at the highest share since 2008.


OVERVIEW

PRODUCT COMPOSITION AND REFINANCE SHARE

The 30-year fixed-rate mortgage continues to remain the bedrock of the US housing finance system, accounting for 81.1 percent of new originations in March 2022. The share of 15-year fixed-rate mortgages, predominantly a refinance product, was 11.5 percent of new originations in March 2022; it has dropped from 17.1 percent in April 2021. The ARM share accounted for 2.1 percent of new March originations; as page 5 indicates, more recent numbers show an increase as borrowers try to offset the effect of higher rates. From late 2018 through March 2021, while there was some month-to-month variation, the refi share (bottom chart) generally increased for both the GSEs and for Ginnie Mae as interest rates dropped. Since April 2021, in reaction to higher interest rates, the refi share has dropped significantly. In April 2022, the GSE refi shares are in the 49 to 50 percent range; the Ginnie Mae refi share was 28.6 percent. With interest rates continuing to rise, we expect further drops in the refinance shares in the months ahead.

Product Composition

Sources: Black Knight, eMBS, HMDA, SIFMA and Urban Institute.

Note: Includes purchase and refinance originations.

Percent Refi at Issuance

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.

Note: Based on at-issuance balance. Figure based on data from April 2022.
OVERVIEW

CASH-OUT REFINANCES

When mortgage rates are low, the share of cash-out refinances tends to be relatively smaller, as rate/term refinancing allows borrowers to save money by taking advantage of lower rates. But when rates are high, the cash-out refinance share is higher since the rate reduction incentive is gone and the only reason to refinance is to take out equity. The cash-out share of refinances generally declined in 2020, reaching 25 percent in September 2020 due to increased rate refinances amidst historically low rates. With rates rising dramatically and the bulk of rate-refinance activity behind us, the cash-out share increased to 76.5 percent in April 2022. Despite the increase in the cash-out share, the absolute volume of cash-out refinances has come down sharply since the spring of 2021, when mortgage rates began to rise.

Cash-out Share of Conventional Refinances

Cash-out Refi Share of All Originations

Cash-out Refinance Volume by Agency

Sources: Freddie Mac, eMBS and Urban Institute.
Note: The cashout share for conventional market is calculated using Freddie Mac’s quarterly refinance statistics from 1995 to 2013. Post 2013 it is calculated monthly using eMBS. Data as of April 2022.
OVERVIEW

AGENCY NONBANK ORIGINATION SHARE

The nonbank share for agency originations has been rising steadily since 2013, standing at 79.2 percent in April 2022. The Ginnie Mae nonbank share has been consistently higher than the GSEs, standing at 92.7 percent in April 2022. Fannie and Freddie had nonbank shares of 74.3 percent and 75.4 percent respectively in April 2022. Fannie and Freddie had higher nonbank origination shares for purchase activity than for refi activity in March 2022, while Ginnie had a slightly higher share for refi activity.

Nonbank Origination Share: All Loans

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.

Nonbank Origination Share: Purchase Loans

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.

Nonbank Origination Share: Refi Loans

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.
The non-agency share of mortgage securitizations increased gradually from 1.83 percent in 2012 to 5.0 percent in 2019. In 2020, the non-agency share dropped to 2.44 percent, reflecting increased agency refinances and less non-agency production due to COVID-19. The market recovered in 2021 with the nonagency share rising to 4.32 percent. 2021 was the largest year of non-agency securitization since 2008. In the Jan-Mar 2022 period, the nonagency share was 6.32 percent, a post-crisis high. Securitization volume reached $42.52 billion, a significant increase relative to the $28.65 billion in Jan-March 2021 and $29.46 billion compared to same period in 2020. Non-agency volume totaled $13.04 billion in March 2022. These numbers remain small compared to pre-housing market crisis levels.

**Sources:** Inside Mortgage Finance and Urban Institute.

**Note:** Based on data from April 2022. Monthly non-agency volume is subject to revision.
The Urban Institute’s Housing Credit Availability Index (HCAI) assesses lenders’ tolerance for both borrower risk and product risk, calculating the share of owner-occupied purchase loans that are likely to go 90+ days delinquent over the life of the loan. The HCAI stood at 5.0 percent in Q4 2021, slightly down from Q3 2021, and up from a historic low in Q3 2020 of just below 5.0 percent. Note that we updated the methodology as of Q2 2020, see new methodology here. The slight credit loosening from Q1 2021 to Q3 2021 was primarily led by increased borrower default risk in the government channel. The slight tightening in Q4 2021 reflected a small decrease in the Ginnie Mae share and a very modest tightening in the GSE channel. More information about the HCAI is available here.

**All Channels**

**Percent**

The trend toward greater credit availability in the GSE channel began in Q2 2011. From Q2 2011 to Q1 2020, the total risk taken by the GSE channel doubled, from 1.4 percent to 2.7 percent. This is still very modest by pre-crisis standards. However, accelerated tightening throughout 2020 induced by market conditions due to COVID-19 drove down credit risk to 2.5 percent in Q4 2020. The increase in Q1 2021, to 2.58 percent, marked the first expansion of credit availability in the GSE channel since Q1 2019. In Q4 2021, credit availability stood at 2.70 percent, unchanged from Q3 2021.

**Sources:** eMBS, CoreLogic, HMDA, IMF, and Urban Institute.

**Note:** Default is defined as 90 days or more delinquent at any point. Last updated May 2022.
HOUSING CREDIT AVAILABILITY INDEX

Government Channel

The total default risk the government loan channel is willing to take bottomed out at 9.6 percent in Q3 2013. It fluctuated in a narrow range above that number for three years. In the eleven quarters from Q4 2016 to Q1 2019, the risk in the government channel increased significantly from 9.9 to 12.1 percent but has since receded. After declining to 10.4 percent in Q3 2020 due to the pandemic, the government channel has since increased risk to 11.3 percent in Q4 2021; still far below the pre-bubble level of 19 – 23 percent.

Portfolio and Private Label Securities Channels

The portfolio and private-label securities (PP) channel took on more product risk than the government and GSE channels during the last housing bubble. After the crisis, the channel’s product and borrower risks dropped sharply. The numbers have stabilized since 2013, with product risk well below 0.5 percent and total risk largely in the range of 2.3-3.0 percent; it was 2.8 percent in Q4 2021. However, the PP market share plummeted during the COVID-19 crisis, as borrowers increasingly used government or GSE channels or could not obtain a mortgage at all. The PP share has since increased very marginally from Q4 2020 to Q4 2021 but remains a shadow of what it once was.

Sources: eMBS, CoreLogic, HMDA, IMF, and Urban Institute.
Note: Default is defined as 90 days or more delinquent at any point. Last updated May 2022.
Access to credit remains tight, especially for lower FICO borrowers. The median FICO for current purchase loans is about 26 points higher than the pre-housing crisis level of around 722. The 10th percentile, which represents the lower bound of creditworthiness to qualify for a mortgage, was 657 in March 2022, which is still high compared to low-600s pre-bubble. The median LTV at origination of 90 percent also remains high, reflecting the rise of FHA and VA lending. Origination DTIs trended lower over the course of 2020 and early 2021, reflecting the sharp decline in mortgage rates; this has reversed, with a concurrent rise in DTIs.

Sources: Black Knight, eMBS, HMDA, SIFMA, CoreLogic and Urban Institute.
Note: Includes owner-occupied purchase loans only. DTI data prior to April 2018 is from CoreLogic; after that date, it is from Black Knight. A back-update to the Black Knight historical series was made in September 2021 for data starting from 2001 onward. Data as of March 2022.
OVERVIEW
RACIAL & ETHNIC COMPOSITION

Across all channels, the share of purchase lending to minorities reached a peak of 37.0% in 2006. Following the Great Recession and amidst a period of very tight credit, the minority share of purchase lending declined to a low of 24.5% in 2013. Since then, it has slowly recovered – it stood at 31.4% in 2020. The share of purchase lending to Black borrowers varied widely by channel in 2020. 16.3 percent of FHA loans were originated to Black borrowers compared with 12.8 percent of VA loans, 4.8 percent for GSEs and 4.0 percent of portfolio loans. Similarly, 26.5 percent of FHA purchase loans were originated to Hispanic borrowers in 2020 compared to 13.3 percent of VA loans, 11.2 percent for GSEs, and 10.1 percent of portfolio loans.

Purchase Loan Shares by Race

Source: 2020 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA).
Note: Includes purchase loans only.

2020 Purchase Loan Channel Shares by Race

Source: 2020 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA).
Note: Includes purchase loans only.
In the GSE space, FICO scores for banks and nonbanks dipped in 2021 and the beginning of 2022, although they remain elevated. The difference between the two stood at 9 points in April 2022, compared to the 21 point gap between bank and nonbank FICOs in the Ginnie space. FICO scores for banks and nonbanks in both GSE and Ginnie Mae segments increased during the Q1 2019 to Q1 2021 period, due to increased refi activity; with refi activity now waning, originators, particularly nonbank originators, have been aggressively competing for new business, and are now more accommodating to borrowers with lower credit scores. Note that there has been a sharp cut-back in FHA lending by banks post-2008. As pointed out on page 11, banks now comprise only about 7 percent of Ginnie Mae originations.

### Agency FICO: Bank vs. Nonbank

![Graph showing FICO scores for banks and nonbanks over time.](image)

**Sources:** eMBS and Urban Institute.

### GSE FICO: Bank vs. Nonbank

![Graph showing FICO scores for banks and nonbanks over time.](image)

**Sources:** eMBS and Urban Institute.

### Ginnie Mae FICO: Bank vs. Nonbank

![Graph showing FICO scores for banks and nonbanks over time.](image)

**Sources:** eMBS and Urban Institute.
Non-banks are more expansive in their lending than their bank counterparts, as indicated both by higher LTVs (particularly in the GSE market) and higher DTIs (more pronounced in the Ginnie Mae market). From early 2017 to early 2019, there was a sustained increase in DTIs, which has reversed beginning in the spring of 2019. This is true for both Ginnie Mae and the GSEs, for banks and nonbanks. As interest rates in 2017 and 2018 increased, DTIs rose, because borrower payments were driven up relative to incomes. As rates fell during most of 2019 and 2020, DTIs fell as borrower payments declined relative to incomes. Since March 2021, DTIs have increased, reflecting the rise in rates and steep house price increases, both of which force households to borrow more in relation to income.

**GSE LTV: Bank vs. Nonbank**

![GSE LTV Chart]

**Ginnie Mae LTV: Bank vs. Nonbank**

![Ginnie Mae LTV Chart]

**GSE DTI: Bank vs. Nonbank**

![GSE DTI Chart]

**Ginnie Mae DTI: Bank vs. Nonbank**

![Ginnie Mae DTI Chart]

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the MBA estimate 2022 origination volume to be between $2.56 and $3.06 trillion, down from $3.99 to $4.76 trillion in 2021, representing declines of 1.4 to 1.7 trillion. Per Inside Mortgage Finance data, 2021 was the highest origination year of the 21st century, with volumes surpassing 2020, the year with the previous record. The very robust origination volume in 2020 and 2021 is due to very strong refinance activity. All three groups expect the 2022 refinance share to be 23 to 29 percentage points lower than in 2021.

### Total Originations and Refinance Shares

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Total, FNMA estimate ($ billions)</th>
<th>Total, FHLMC estimate ($ billions)</th>
<th>Total, MBA estimate ($ billions)</th>
<th>Refi Share (percent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2020 Q1</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>751</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020 Q2</td>
<td>1069</td>
<td>1090</td>
<td>928</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020 Q3</td>
<td>1287</td>
<td>1279</td>
<td>1076</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020 Q4</td>
<td>1282</td>
<td>1321</td>
<td>1261</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021 Q1</td>
<td>1239</td>
<td>1305</td>
<td>1094</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021 Q2</td>
<td>1123</td>
<td>1230</td>
<td>1050</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021 Q3</td>
<td>1103</td>
<td>1195</td>
<td>954</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021 Q4</td>
<td>1012</td>
<td>1026</td>
<td>893</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2022</td>
<td>2695</td>
<td>3055</td>
<td>2562</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2023</td>
<td>2253</td>
<td>2757</td>
<td>2449</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Mortgage Bankers Association and Urban Institute.

**Note:** Shaded boxes indicate forecasted figures. All figures are estimates for total single-family market. Regarding interest rates, the yearly averages for 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2021 were 4.0, 4.6, 3.9, 3.0, and 3.0 percent. For 2022, the respective projections for Fannie, Freddie, and MBA are 4.8, 4.6, and 5.0 percent. Freddie Mac forecasts are now released quarterly, last updated May 2022.

### Originator Profitability and Unmeasured Costs

In April 2022, Originator Profitability and Unmeasured Costs (OPUC) stood at $2.80 per $100 loan, a marginal increase from last month, but down considerably from the level during the refi boom. Increased profitability reflects lender capacity constraints amidst strong refi demand. The continued decline reflects the fact that the backlog of refinance has been processed, and originators are competing more aggressively on price. OPUC, formulated and calculated by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, is a good relative measure of originator profitability. OPUC uses the sales price of a mortgage in the secondary market (less par) and adds two sources of profitability: retained servicing (both base and excess servicing, net of g-fees), and points paid by the borrower. OPUC is generally high when interest rates are low, as originators are capacity constrained due to refinance demand and have no incentive to reduce rates. Conversely, when interest rates are higher and refi activity low, competition forces originators to lower rates, driving profitability down.

**Dollars per $100 loan**

**Sources:** Federal Reserve Bank of New York, updated monthly and available at this link: [http://www.ny.frb.org/research/epr/2013/1113fust.html](http://www.ny.frb.org/research/epr/2013/1113fust.html) and Urban Institute. Last updated April 2022.

**Note:** OPUC is a a monthly (4-week moving) average as discussed in [Fuster et al. (2013)](http://www.ny.frb.org/research/epr/2013/1113fust.html).
STATE OF THE MARKET

HOUSING SUPPLY

Months of supply in April 2022 slightly decreased to 2.2, up from a near record low of 1.7 in February 2022. Strong demand for housing in recent years, fueled by low mortgage rates, has kept the months supply limited. Fannie Mae, the MBA, and the NAHB forecast 2022 housing starts to be between 1.60 and 1.72 million units; these 2022 forecasts are above 2021 levels. Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the MBA, and the NAHB predict total home sales of 5.96 to 6.74 million units in 2022; these estimates all reflect declines from their 2021 sales volume calculations.

Months of Supply

Housing Starts and Home Sales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Housing Starts, thousands</th>
<th></th>
<th>Home Sales, thousands</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total, FNMA estimate</td>
<td>Total, MBA estimate</td>
<td>Total, NAHB estimate</td>
<td>Total, FNMA estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>1203</td>
<td>1208</td>
<td>1205</td>
<td>6123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>1250</td>
<td>1250</td>
<td>1247</td>
<td>5957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>1290</td>
<td>1295</td>
<td>1292</td>
<td>6023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>1380</td>
<td>1397</td>
<td>1397</td>
<td>6462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>1597</td>
<td>1605</td>
<td>1605</td>
<td>6891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2022</td>
<td>1598</td>
<td>1775</td>
<td>1676</td>
<td>6124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2023</td>
<td>1289</td>
<td>1776</td>
<td>1573</td>
<td>5415</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Mortgage Bankers Association, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, National Association of Home Builders and Urban Institute.

Note: Shaded boxes indicate forecasted figures; column labels indicate source of estimate. Freddie Mac home sales are now updated quarterly instead of monthly, with the last update in March 2022. *NAHB home sales estimate is for single-family structures only, it excludes condos and co-ops. Other figures include all single-family sales.
With the rise in interest rates, and rapid increases in home prices, affordability continues to worsen. As of April 2022, with a 20 percent down payment, the share of median income needed for the monthly mortgage payment stood at 29.5 percent, compared to 30.9 percent at the peak of the housing bubble in November 2005; with 3.5 percent down it is 34.0 percent, compared to a 35.8 prior peak in November 2005. These numbers represent a sharp worsening in affordability over the past year. As shown in the bottom picture, mortgage affordability varies widely by MSA.


**Note:** Mortgage affordability is the share of median family income devoted to the monthly principal, interest, taxes, and insurance payment required to buy the median home at the Freddie Mac prevailing rate 2018 for a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage and property tax and insurance at 1.75 percent of the housing value. Data for the bottom chart as of Q3 2020.
National Year-Over-Year HPI Growth

According to Black Knight's updated repeat sales index, year-over-year home price appreciation increased to 20.61 percent in March 2022, compared to 20.31 percent the previous month. Year-over-year home price appreciation as measured by Zillow’s hedonic index was 20.42 percent in March 2022, up from 20.10 percent in February. With the sharp rise in both home prices and interest rates, affordability is constrained.

Sources: Black Knight, Zillow, and Urban Institute. Note: Black Knight modified the methodology behind their HPI in February 2021, resulting in changes to historic price estimates. Data as of March 2022.

National Year-Over-Year HPI Growth by Price Tier

House prices escalated significantly in the second half of 2020 and into 2021 across all price tiers. Before the pandemic, lower priced homes appreciated much more than higher priced homes. With higher priced homes also experiencing steep appreciation last year, the gap has disappeared.

Sources: Black Knight and Urban Institute. Note: Black Knight modified the methodology behind their HPI in February 2021, resulting in changes to historic price estimates. Data as of March 2022.
First-Time Homebuyer Share
In March 2022, the FTHB share for FHA, which has always been more focused on first time homebuyers, was 83.2 percent. The FTHB share of VA lending in March was 52.1 percent; the GSE share was a very similar 51.4 percent. The bottom table shows that based on mortgages originated in March 2022, the average FTHB was more likely than an average repeat buyer to take out a smaller loan, have a lower credit score, and have a higher LTV, thus paying a higher interest rate.

Comparison of First-Time and Repeat Homebuyers, GSE and FHA Originations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>GSEs</th>
<th>FHA</th>
<th>GSEs and FHA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loan Amount ($)</td>
<td>First-time</td>
<td>Repeat</td>
<td>First-time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>321,302</td>
<td>340,568</td>
<td>263,994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit Score</td>
<td>744</td>
<td>754</td>
<td>671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTV (%)</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTI (%)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loan Rate (%)</td>
<td>3.32</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>3.44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.
Note: Based on owner-occupied purchase mortgages originated in March 2022.
Loans in and near negative equity continued to decline in Q4 2021; 2.08 percent now have negative equity, an additional 0.33 percent have less then 5 percent equity. Due to the effects of COVID-19, the share of loans that are 90 days or more delinquent or in foreclosure remained high but declined again by 50 basis points, from 2.83 percent in Q4 2021 to 2.39 percent in Q1 2022. This number includes loans where borrowers have missed their payments, including loans in COVID-19 forbearance. The bottom chart shows the share of loans in forbearance according to the MBA Weekly Forbearance and Call Volume Survey, launched in March 2020. After peaking at 8.55 percent in early June 2020, the total forbearance rate has declined to 2.06 percent as of October 31st, 2021, the final week of the call survey. The MBA has since moved to conducting a monthly survey with the most recent forbearance rate dropping to 0.94% as of April 30, 2022. GSE loans have consistently had the lowest forbearance rates, standing at 0.43 percent at the end of April. The most recent forbearance rate for Ginnie Mae loans was 1.29 percent; other (e.g., portfolio and PLS) loans had the highest forbearance rate at 2.15 percent.
The Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac portfolios remain well below the $250 billion size they were required to reach by year-end 2018, or the $225 billion cap mandated in January 2021 by the new Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements (PSPAs). From March 2021 to March 2022, the Fannie portfolio contracted year-over-year by 33.1 percent, and the Freddie portfolio contracted by 46.8 percent. Within the portfolio, both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac contracted their less-liquid assets (mortgage loans, non-agency MBS), by 40.1 percent and 49.2 percent, respectively, over the same 12 month period.

**Fannie Mae Mortgage-Related Investment Portfolio Composition**

Current size: $108.5 billion  
2021 PSPA cap: $225 billion  
Shrinkage year-over-year: 33.1 percent  
Shrinkage in less-liquid assets year-over-year: 40.1 percent

**Freddie Mac Mortgage-Related Investment Portfolio Composition**

Current size: $102.00 billion  
2021 PSPA cap: $225 billion  
Shrinkage year-over-year: 46.8 percent  
Shrinkage in less-liquid assets year-over-year: 49.2 percent

Note: Effective March 2021, Freddie Mac doesn't provide FHLMC/non-FHLMC breakout of agency MBS. The above charts were updated in May 2021 to reflect this.
GSES UNDER CONSERVATORSHIP

EFFECTIVE GUARANTEE FEES

Guarantee Fees Charged on New Acquisitions

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s average g-fees charged have largely converged since the first quarter of 2020. Fannie Mae’s average g-fees charged on new acquisitions increased from 57.6 bps in Q4 2021 to 58.9 bps in Q1 2022. Freddie’s remained flat at 59.0 bps from Q4 2021 to Q1 2022. The gap between the two g-fees was 0.1 bps in Q1 2022. Today’s g-fees are markedly higher than g-fee levels in 2011 and 2012, and have contributed to the GSEs’ earnings; the bottom table shows Fannie Mae LLPAs, which are expressed as upfront charges.


Fannie Mae Upfront Loan-Level Price Adjustments (LLPAs)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Credit Score</th>
<th>LTV (%)</th>
<th>≤60</th>
<th>60.01 - 70</th>
<th>70.01 - 75</th>
<th>75.01 - 80</th>
<th>80.01 - 85</th>
<th>85.01 - 90</th>
<th>90.01 - 95</th>
<th>95.01 - 97</th>
<th>&gt;97</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 740</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>720 – 739</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>700 – 719</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>680 – 699</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>660 – 679</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>2.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>640 – 659</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>2.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>620 – 639</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>3.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt; 620</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>3.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Product Feature (Cumulative)


Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have been laying off back-end credit risk through CAS and STACR deals and reinsurance transactions. They have also done front-end transactions with originators and reinsurers and experimented with deep mortgage insurance coverage. Historically, the GSEs have transferred a majority of their credit risk to private markets. Fannie Mae’s CAS issuances since inception total $1.98 trillion; Freddie’s STACR totals $2.52 trillion. After the COVID-19 induced spread widening in March 2020, and the reproposed capital rules released by FHFA shortly thereafter, Fannie Mae did not issue any deals from Mar 2020 to Sep 2021, while Freddie Mac continued to issue. With the proposed changes in the Capital Rule, and the more positive attitude toward CRT at FHFA, Fannie Mae resumed CAS issuance in October 2021.

### Fannie Mae – Connecticut Avenue Securities (CAS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Transaction</th>
<th>Reference Pool Size ($ m)</th>
<th>Amount Issued ($m)</th>
<th>% of Reference Pool Covered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>CAS 2013 deals</td>
<td>$26,756</td>
<td>$675</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>CAS 2014 deals</td>
<td>$227,234</td>
<td>$5,849</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>CAS 2015 deals</td>
<td>$187,126</td>
<td>$5,463</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>CAS 2016 deals</td>
<td>$236,459</td>
<td>$7,392</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>CAS 2017 deals</td>
<td>$264,697</td>
<td>$8,707</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>CAS 2018 deals</td>
<td>$205,900</td>
<td>$7,314</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>CAS 2019 deals</td>
<td>$291,400</td>
<td>$8,071</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>CAS 2020 deals</td>
<td>$210,000</td>
<td>$3,130</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>CAS 2021 deals</td>
<td>$142,202</td>
<td>$3,095</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2022</td>
<td>CAS 2022 – R01</td>
<td>$53,747</td>
<td>$1,506</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2022</td>
<td>CAS 2022 – R02</td>
<td>$44,278</td>
<td>$1,241</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2022</td>
<td>CAS 2022 – R03</td>
<td>$44,382</td>
<td>$1,242</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2022</td>
<td>CAS 2022 – R04</td>
<td>$36,440</td>
<td>$1,142</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2022</td>
<td>CAS 2022 – R05</td>
<td>$39,341</td>
<td>$952</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>$1,997,962</td>
<td>$55,781</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Freddie Mac – Structured Agency Credit Risk (STACR)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Transaction</th>
<th>Reference Pool Size ($ m)</th>
<th>Amount Issued ($m)</th>
<th>% of Reference Pool Covered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>STACR 2013 deals</td>
<td>$57,912</td>
<td>$1,130</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>STACR 2014 deals</td>
<td>$147,120</td>
<td>$4,916</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>STACR 2015 deals</td>
<td>$209,521</td>
<td>$6,658</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>STACR 2016 deals</td>
<td>$183,421</td>
<td>$5,541</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>STACR 2017 deals</td>
<td>$248,821</td>
<td>$5,663</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>STACR 2018 deals</td>
<td>$216,581</td>
<td>$6,055</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>STACR 2019 deals</td>
<td>$271,105</td>
<td>$5,947</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>STACR 2020 deals</td>
<td>$403,591</td>
<td>$10,372</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>STACR 2021 deals</td>
<td>$574,706</td>
<td>$11,024</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2022</td>
<td>STACR Series 2022 – DNA1</td>
<td>$33,573</td>
<td>$1,353</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2022</td>
<td>STACR Series 2022 – DNA2</td>
<td>$44,961</td>
<td>$1,919</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2022</td>
<td>STACR Series 2022 – HQA1</td>
<td>$45,831</td>
<td>$1,816</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2022</td>
<td>STACR Series 2022 – DNA3</td>
<td>$42,886</td>
<td>$1,842</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2022</td>
<td>STACR Series 2022 – DNA4</td>
<td>$35,369</td>
<td>$1,519</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>$2,515,400</td>
<td>$65,755</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Urban Institute. Note: Classes A-H, M-1H, M-2H, and B-H are reference tranches only. These classes are not issued or sold. The risk is retained by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. “CE” = credit enhancement.
GSES UNDER CONSERVATORSHIP

GSE RISK-SHARING INDICES

The figures below show the spreads on 2018, 2019, 2020 and 2021 indices, as priced by dealers. Note the substantial spread widening in March 2020. This reflected expectations of higher defaults and potential credit losses owing to COVID-19, as well as forced selling. Since then, spreads have narrowed significantly. Note the spread widening since February 2022 – this reflects slower prepayment expectations and longer exposure to default risk in the face of higher rates. The widening is more pronounced for 2021 indices due to less embedded housing price appreciation. 2020 and 2021 indices are heavily Freddie Mac as Fannie did not issue any new deals from Q2 2020 to Q4 2021.

Sources: Vista Data Services and Urban Institute.
Note: Data as of May 16, 2022.
Serious delinquency rates for single-family GSE loans decreased in March 2022, to 1.01 percent for Fannie Mae and 0.92 percent for Freddie Mac. Serious delinquency rates for FHA loans also decreased in March 2022, to 6.00 percent. In Q1 2022, VA serious delinquency rates declined to 3.82 percent. Note that loans that are in forbearance are counted as delinquent for the purpose of measuring delinquency rates. Fannie multifamily delinquencies decreased marginally in March to 0.38 percent, while Freddie multifamily delinquencies also remained at 0.08 percent.

Sources: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Federal Housing Administration, MBA Delinquency Survey and Urban Institute.

Note: Serious delinquency is defined as 90 days or more past due or in the foreclosure process. Not seasonally adjusted. VA delinquencies are reported on a quarterly basis, last updated for Q1 2022. GSE and FHA delinquencies are reported monthly, last updated for March 2022.

Sources: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Urban Institute.

Note: Multifamily serious delinquency rate is the unpaid balance of loans 60 days or more past due, divided by the total unpaid balance.
Agency gross issuance was $794.3 billion YTD in April 2022, a 41.6 percent decrease from YTD 2021. This reflects a 59.4 percent YTD decline in refinance activity and a 5.1 percent YTD increase in purchase activity. Net issuance (new securities issued less the decline in outstanding securities due to principal pay-downs or prepayments) totaled $210.6 billion in YTD April 2022, a 24.6% percent decrease compared to YTD April 2021.

### Agency Gross Issuance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GSEs</th>
<th>Ginnie Mae</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>$885.1</td>
<td>$171.5</td>
<td>$1,056.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>$1,238.9</td>
<td>$169.0</td>
<td>$1,407.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>$1,874.9</td>
<td>$213.1</td>
<td>$2,088.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>$872.6</td>
<td>$119.2</td>
<td>$991.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>$894.0</td>
<td>$81.4</td>
<td>$975.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>$853.0</td>
<td>$76.7</td>
<td>$929.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>$1,066.2</td>
<td>$94.9</td>
<td>$1,161.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>$911.4</td>
<td>$267.6</td>
<td>$1,179.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>$1,280.0</td>
<td>$451.3</td>
<td>$1,731.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>$1,003.5</td>
<td>$390.7</td>
<td>$1,394.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>$879.3</td>
<td>$315.3</td>
<td>$1,194.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>$1,288.8</td>
<td>$405.0</td>
<td>$1,693.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>$1,176.6</td>
<td>$393.6</td>
<td>$1,570.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>$650.9</td>
<td>$296.3</td>
<td>$947.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>$845.7</td>
<td>$436.3</td>
<td>$1,282.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>$991.6</td>
<td>$508.2</td>
<td>$1,499.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>$877.3</td>
<td>$455.6</td>
<td>$1,332.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>$795.0</td>
<td>$400.6</td>
<td>$1,195.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>$1,042.6</td>
<td>$508.6</td>
<td>$1,551.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>$2,407.5</td>
<td>$775.4</td>
<td>$3,182.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>$2,650.8</td>
<td>$855.3</td>
<td>$3,506.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2022</td>
<td>$585.0</td>
<td>$209.3</td>
<td>$794.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Change Over 2021: -44.1% -33.1% -41.6%

Annualized: $1,755.1 $627.8 $2382.9

### Agency Net Issuance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GSEs</th>
<th>Ginnie Mae</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>$368.40</td>
<td>-$9.90</td>
<td>$358.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>$357.20</td>
<td>$51.20</td>
<td>$306.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>$334.90</td>
<td>$77.60</td>
<td>$257.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>$82.50</td>
<td>$40.10</td>
<td>$42.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>$174.20</td>
<td>$-42.20</td>
<td>$132.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>$313.60</td>
<td>$0.20</td>
<td>$313.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>$514.90</td>
<td>$30.90</td>
<td>$545.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>$314.80</td>
<td>$196.40</td>
<td>$511.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>$250.60</td>
<td>$257.40</td>
<td>$508.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>-$303.20</td>
<td>$198.30</td>
<td>-$105.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>-$128.40</td>
<td>$149.60</td>
<td>$21.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>-$42.40</td>
<td>$119.10</td>
<td>$76.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>$69.10</td>
<td>$87.90</td>
<td>$157.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>$30.5</td>
<td>$61.6</td>
<td>$92.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>$75.1</td>
<td>$97.3</td>
<td>$172.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>$127.4</td>
<td>$125.8</td>
<td>$253.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>$168.5</td>
<td>$131.3</td>
<td>$299.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>$149.4</td>
<td>$112.0</td>
<td>$261.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>$197.8</td>
<td>$95.7</td>
<td>$293.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>$632.8</td>
<td>$19.9</td>
<td>$652.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>$753.5</td>
<td>$5.6</td>
<td>$759.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2022</td>
<td>$182.8</td>
<td>$27.8</td>
<td>$210.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Change Over 2021: -36.9% 362.0% -24.6%

Annualized: $548.4 $83.3 $631.8

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.
Note: Dollar amounts are in billions. Data as of March 2022.
Fed Absorption of Agency Gross Issuance

MBS on the Fed balance sheet totaled $2.74 trillion in April 2022, the highest level ever. The Fed is currently holding its MBS holdings constant, buying to replace runoff. The Fed’s April purchases totaled $35.4 billion, 20.8 percent of monthly gross issuance. In the March FOMC meeting, the Federal Reserve announced that they would soon begin to trim the size of the portfolio, allowing up to $35 billion in agency MBS to run off each month. Portfolio trimming will be phased beginning in June 2022. The Federal Reserve’s portfolio was a critical policy tool during the pandemic. In March of 2020, the Fed announced they would buy mortgages in an amount necessary to support smooth functioning markets; March and April of 2020 were the largest two months of mortgage purchases ever. Once the market stabilized, the Fed began to purchase $40 billion net of MBS each month; this buying plus runoff replacements equated to Fed purchases of $100–$125 billion per month. In November of 2021, the Fed began to reduce purchases, with these purchases ending in March of 2022.

Sources: eMBS, Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Urban Institute.
MI Activity
In the first quarter of 2022, private mortgage insurance written decreased by $44.5 billion, FHA decreased by $23.8 billion, and VA decreased by $61.2 billion relative to Q1 2021. Over the same period (i.e. from Q1 2021 to Q1 2022), the private mortgage insurers share decreased from 40.3 to 44.7 percent, FHA’s share increased from 23.2 to 26.5 percent, and VA’s share decreased from 34.8 to 28.8 percent.
FHA premiums rose significantly in the years following the housing crash, with annual premiums rising from 50 to 135 basis points between 2008 to 2013 as FHA worked to shore up its finances. In January 2015, President Obama announced a 50 bps cut in annual insurance premiums, making FHA mortgages more attractive than GSE mortgages for the overwhelming majority of borrowers putting down less than 5%. The April 2016 reduction in PMI rates for borrowers with higher FICO scores and April 2018 reduction for lower FICO borrowers has partially offset that. As shown in the bottom table, a borrower putting 3.5 percent down with a FICO of less than 700 will find FHA financing to be more financially attractive, borrowers with FICO's of 740 and above will find GSE execution with PMI to be more attractive.

FHA MI Premiums for Typical Purchase Loan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case number date</th>
<th>Upfront mortgage insurance premium (UFMIP) paid</th>
<th>Annual mortgage insurance premium (MIP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/1/2001 - 7/13/2008</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/14/2008 - 4/5/2010*</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/4/2010 - 4/17/2011</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/18/2011 - 4/8/2012</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/9/2012 - 6/10/2012</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/11/2012 - 3/31/2013a</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/1/2013 - 1/25/2015b</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beginning 1/26/2015c</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Ginnie Mae and Urban Institute.

Note: A typical purchase loan has an LTV over 95 and a loan term longer than 15 years. Mortgage insurance premiums are listed in basis points.

* For a short period in 2008 the FHA used a risk based FICO/LTV matrix for MI.

a Applies to purchase loans less than or equal to $625,500. Those over that amount have an annual premium of 150 bps.
b Applies to purchase loans less than or equal to $625,500. Those over that amount have an annual premium of 155 bps.
c Applies to purchase loans less than or equal to $625,500. Those over that amount have an annual premium of 105 bps.

Initial Monthly Payment Comparison: FHA vs. PMI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FHA MI Premiums</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FHA UFMIP</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>1.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FHA MIP</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSE LLPA*</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMI Annual MIP</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Monthly Payment

| FHA | $1,537 | $1,537 | $1,537 | $1,537 | $1,537 | $1,537 | $1,537 | $1,537 |
| PMI | $1,820 | $1,755 | $1,717 | $1,628 | $1,584 | $1,545 | $1,503 | $1,479 |
| PMI Advantage | -$283 | -$218 | -$180 | -$91 | -$47 | -$8 | $34 | $58 |


Note: Rates as of May 13, 2022.

Mortgage insurance premiums listed in percentage points. Grey shade indicates FHA monthly payment is more favorable, while blue indicates PMI is more favorable. The PMI monthly payment calculation does not include special programs like Fannie Mae's HomeReady and Freddie Mac's Home Possible (HP), both offer more favorable rates for low- to moderate-income borrowers. LLPA= Loan Level Price Adjustment, described in detail on page 25.
Upcoming events:
See our events page for more information on other upcoming and past events.

Projects

State Data to Target Homeowner Assistance Fund Dollars
The Mortgage Servicing Collaborative
Housing Credit Availability Index (HCAI)
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act Projects
Mortgage Markets COVID-19 Collaborative
Reducing the Racial Homeownership Gap

Data Tools Available Online

Tracking Rent Payments to Mom-and-Pop Landlords
Tracking Homeownership Wealth Gaps

Publications

Revisiting Automated Valuation Model Disparities in Majority-Black Neighborhoods
Authors: Linna Zhu, Michael Neal, Caitlin Young
Date: May 18, 2022

Low Rise Infill Housing in Los Angeles
Authors: Sarah Gerecke, Joseph Schilling, Jung Hyun Choi, Linna Zhu, John Walsh, Peter J Mattingly
Date: May 16, 2022

Comment Letter on NIST Initial Draft of Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework
Authors: Judah Axelrod, Alena Stern, Michael Neal, Linna Zhu
Date: May 5, 2022

Comment Letter to the FHFA on Enterprise Seller/Servicer Eligibility Requirements
Authors: Karan Kaul, Laurie Goodman, Ted Tozer
Date: April 21, 2022

How Fannie and Freddie Can Use Pricing to Expand Affordable Homeownership
Authors: Laurie Goodman, Jim Parrott, Bob Ryan, Mark Zandi
Date: April 21, 2022

Blog Posts

What Will it take to Help Latina Moms Hold onto Homeownership Gains?
Authors: Janneke Ratcliffe, Caitlin Young
Date: May 18, 2022

How Higher Mortgage Rates Have Historically Affected Home Prices
Authors: Laurie Goodman, Michael Neal
Date: May 2, 2022

How People-Based Special Purpose Credit Programs Can Reduce the Racial Homeownership Gap
Authors: Liam Reynolds, Jung Hyun Choi, Vanessa Perry
Date: April 22, 2022

Using Rental Payments in Mortgage Decisions Could Create a more Inclusive Housing Finance System
Authors: Michael Stegman, Kelly Thompson Cochram
Date: April 6, 2022

Three Challenges Facing Single Female Borrowers Entering the Mortgage Market
Authors: Laurie Goodman, Jun Zhu
Date: March 30, 2022

The Community Reinvestment Act Meant to Combat Redlining’s Effects. 45 Years Later, Black Homebuyers Are Still Significantly Underserved
Authors: Linna Zhu, Laurie Goodman, Jun Zhu
Date: March 24, 2022

The Real Rental Housing Crisis is on the Horizon
Authors: Jung Hyun Choi, Laurie Goodman, Daniel Pang
Date: March 11, 2022

Emergency Rental Assistance is Not Reaching Tenants with the Lowest Incomes Fast Enough
Authors: Daniel Pang, Jung Hyun Choi, Laurie Goodman
Date: March 9, 2022

Who Serves More People of Color in Mortgage Lending: Banks or Nonbanks?
Authors: Linna Zhu, Laurie Goodman, Jun Zhu
Date: February 21, 2022

Will California’s New Zoning Promote Racial and Economic Equity in Los Angeles
Authors: Linna Zhu, Sarah Gerecke
Date: February 10, 2022

34
Acknowledgments

The Housing Finance Policy Center (HFPC) was launched with generous support at the leadership level from the Citi Foundation and John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. Additional support was provided by The Ford Foundation and The Open Society Foundations.

Ongoing support for HFPC is also provided by the Housing Finance Innovation Forum, a group of organizations and individuals that support high-quality independent research that informs evidence-based policy development. Funds raised through the Forum provide flexible resources, allowing HFPC to anticipate and respond to emerging policy issues with timely analysis. This funding supports HFPC’s research, outreach and engagement, and general operating activities.

The chartbook is funded by these combined sources. We are grateful to them and to all our funders, who make it possible for Urban to advance its mission.

The views expressed are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the Urban Institute, its trustees, or its funders. Funders do not determine research findings or the insights and recommendations of Urban experts. Further information on the Urban Institute’s funding principles is available at www.urban.org/support.

Housing Finance Innovation Forum Members as of May 2022

Organizations
400 Capital Management
AGNC Investment Corp.
American Bankers Association
Andrew Davidson & Co.
Arch Capital Group
Auction.com
Bank of America
BlackRock
Caliber Home Loans
Citizens Bank
Ellington Management Group
Enact (formerly Genworth MI)

FICO
Freedom Mortgage
Housing Policy Council
Ivory Homes
MGIC
Mortgage Bankers Association
Movement Mortgage
Mr. Cooper
National Association of Home Builders
National Association of Realtors
National Foundation for Credit Counseling
New American Funding
Ocwen Financial
Pretium Partners
Pulte Home Mortgage
RiskSpan
RocketMortgage
SitusAMC
Tilden Park Capital
Union Home Mortgage
U.S. Mortgage Insurers
VantageScore
Wells Fargo
Zillow

Individuals
Kenneth Bacon
Mary Miller
Jim Millstein
Shekar Narasimhan
Andrew Rippert
Faith Schwartz
Carl Shapiro
Bill Young
Mark & Ava Zandi

Data Partners
Avail
Black Knight, Inc.
CoreLogic
First American
Moody’s Analytics