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Raymond J. Struyk, a senior fellow at the Urban Institute, is a senior analyst in the fields of housing policy, housing finance, and community development and has extensive policy formulation experience. He joined the Urban Institute in 1972. He has been at the Institute since then except for 27 months in 1977-79 when he was the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Research at the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Among his many publications are Clear and Convincing Evidence: Measurement of Discrimination in America, coedited with Michael Fix (Urban Institute Press, 1993), A Japanese Think Tank: Exploring Alternative Models, coedited with Makiko Ueno and Takahiro Suzuki (Urban Institute Press, 1993), and Economic Restructuring of the Former Soviet Bloc: The Case of Housing (Urban Institute Press, 1998).

In recent years Struyk has served as an adviser to the newly established Institute for Urban Economics in Moscow. He spoke with the Urban Institute’s Richard Deutsch about the potential for think tanks to play influential roles in public policy development in the former Soviet Bloc.

Struyk:	The needs and the possibilities are enormous. Remember the policy development legacy these countries inherited at the beginning of the transition period: Policymaking was a very closed process, the range of alternatives considered in addressing most problems was decidedly narrow, and analytic rigor was lacking; program evaluation was essentially nonexistent. Think tanks, with well-trained staff, can be the source of stronger, more rigorous, and more thoughtful policy advice than can be provided by government staff largely inherited from the old regimes. In the short term, international agencies provided a very substantial share of the advice on economic stabilization and restructuring, but think tanks are now beginning to come into their own.
Deutsch:	Are these societies generally receptive to a critical participatory role for independent research organizations?
Struyk:	The situation varies substantially among the countries in the region. In the book, I look in depth at the situation in four countries: Armenia, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Russia. These countries were selected to provide a range of conditions for the development of think tanks, with Hungary being at the better end of the spectrum and Armenia at the other, the most difficult. Where liberal democracy and the accompanying institutions are strong, receptivity is strong. Among the four countries studied, receptivity was strong everywhere but in Armenia, where there appears to be a good deal of skepticism about independent institutions. In general, receptivity is lower in several countries in the former Soviet Union, while in central and eastern Europe receptivity is consistently high.
Deutsch:	Are there think tank models other than those found in the United States that might be adopted in these countries?
Struyk:	Because the U.S. model was introduced by American foundations, which were very active in the early days of the transition, most think tanks in the region have adhered to this model. An alternative model might be called the "European model," in which think tanks are often more closely aligned with political parties, business associations, and labor unions. In the past few years, some examples of this kind of alignment have appeared. I found such examples in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Russia. But the vast majority of think tanks still follow the U.S. model. The key difference between the U.S. and European models is in the independence—actual and perceived—with which think tanks operate. Besides direct policy development, the aligned think tanks tend to summarize research and analysis from a range of sources for their sponsors. My suspicion is that in the years ahead we will witness more movement toward the European model—especially as Western support for think tanks scales down and full independence is not financially possible for all of the existing think tanks.
Deutsch:	Have think tanks in these nations been successful in terms of public education on policy choices?
Struyk:	I think it is a mixed picture. On the one hand, a number of think tanks have been very active with the media, particularly in terms of the president or senior staff participating in TV and radio talk shows and in contributing to articles on current policy issues carried in newspapers. But very often their contribution is as an intelligent observer, not a specific expert on a topic: Their opinion is sought because they are perceived as independent of government or other interests. So, yes, they are active in public education. On the other hand, think tanks too seldom use the results of their research as a public platform for influencing debate. In part, of course, this is because they are not always working on the cutting-edge issues.
Deutsch:	You mention in the book that leaders in these think tanks generally seem to have a higher opinion of their effectiveness than the policymakers they seek to influence and serve. In looking at what these think tanks do and how they operate, what guidance can you offer for improvement?
Struyk:	I would characterize the book’s findings a bit differently. There is no question that think tanks are having influence in the policy development process. Most think tanks can cite concrete examples. It is easy to believe that this means that they are having a pervasive influence on policy. But when one asks a group of senior policymakers about where they obtain information for their decisions, generally think tanks are not prominently mentioned. Actually, only about 25 percent of the policymakers interviewed reported working regularly with think tanks. In terms of increasing the effectiveness of think tanks in the policy process, a couple of areas are clear. First, a significant share of policymakers interviewed complained about the quality of the policy recommendations produced by think tanks. From their perspective, the recommendations were sometimes too general, not based squarely on relevant analysis, seemed politically inspired, or did not deal with the hard administrative and budget issues. So improvement in this area is needed. Second, a minority of think tanks were not using dissemination techniques designed with busy policy makers in mind—reports were too long, too academic, and so forth.
Deutsch:	The role of Western governments, foundations, and other institutions has clearly been critical in supporting the formation of many of these think tanks. Will they survive a waning of Western interest and financial support? What priorities do they have in terms of survival, and what are the ways they might help themselves?
Struyk:	Survival will definitely be a challenge for many. Nevertheless, a principal finding of the book is that a few think tanks are engaged in strategic planning for a future with sharply less Western funding. A few think tanks are positioning themselves for the withdrawal of Western funding by making alliances with political parties and business associations. And a few more, really the best, are engaged in active programs of client and topic diversification. The Institute for Urban Economics in Moscow, for example, set up the country’s first credit rating agency as a for-profit subsidiary. The agency, since affiliated with Standard and Poor’s, is doing well and helping support the Institute’s main research activities. Similarly, the Center for the Study of Democracy in Sofia uses its independent survey research center to take commercial contracts as well as to conduct the scientific surveys needed by the Center. Again, these revenues support the main operations. These are exciting examples, but they are exceptional. Western support is likely to be withdrawn in stages. Many Western foundations will probably be the first to exit, followed by the bilateral donors. The World Bank and IFC will stay longer. And the European Union programs will remain active even longer than others, particularly in countries with prospects for early accession to the EU. This sequencing means that think tanks will have some time to adjust, and the survival rate may be higher than one might at first think.
Deutsch:	What is the primary audience for this book? What do you hope it will accomplish?
Struyk:	There are two audiences for the book and two objectives. One audience is the donor community. You are correct in your earlier observation that Western donors were fundamental in encouraging the creation of think tanks and in supporting them. Still, the donors have focused mainly on project support, on funding projects in which they have a strong interest. This has been somewhat at the expense of funding for institution building and for joint agenda setting. The result has been less development in financial and other types of management systems in the think tanks. For example, few think tanks can meaningfully separate direct and indirect costs. At the same time, the donor-driven agenda has likely resulted in think tanks addressing some policy questions of less immediate interest to their governments and parliaments. The book lays out a number of possibilities for changes in the way donors work with think tanks, with the objective of increasing the effectiveness of their programs. The second audience is the think tank community in the region. There is a small group of think tanks that have developed exemplary practices in organizing projects, disseminating results, managing their finances and other aspects of their operations, and formulating and executing strategic plans. They are exceptional. Less-advanced think tanks can learn from the more gifted, and the book cites practices and ideas that will be of use to many.
Deutsch:	If a reader is to carry away a single message from the book, what should it be?
Struyk:	In the past year, I have attended several events in eastern Europe and Russia organized for think tanks by Western donors. The spirit of these meeting—particularly from the Western side—is often almost like a celebration. Doubtlessly, think tanks in the region have compiled a solid record of accomplishment, especially when their short history is taken into account. Still, no one should minimize the hard work ahead in upgrading analytic skills, improving management systems, developing the kind of diversification necessary for survival and growth. So, the simple message I hope readers take from the book is that think tanks in the region have developed a solid base on which to build, but for most the developmental stage is far from over.

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