Academic Perspectives on the Future of Public Housing

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Abstract

Many policy makers and scholars regard the HOPE VI Program as one of the nation's most successful urban redevelopment programs (c.f. Katz 2009; Cisneros 2009). But despite its very real accomplishments, the HOPE VI program's record in meeting the needs of the original residents who endured the worst consequences of the failures of public housing is mixed. With its proposed "Choice Neighborhoods" initiative, the Obama administration has the opportunity to build on the experiences of nearly two decades of experience with HOPE VI. Incorporating intensive case management and permanent supportive housing for the most vulnerable into Choice Neighborhoods and any other comprehensive redevelopment efforts is one way to ensure that these initiatives truly meet the needs of all public housing families.

Testimony

Madam Chairwoman and members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to appear here today. For the past decade, I have been studying the impact of the HOPE VI program on original residents of public housing targeted for redevelopment. While most of my research has focused on Chicago, which had more distressed public housing than any other city in the nation, I have conducted research in 13 HOPE VI sites across the country. My remarks today draw from two major studies: The HOPE VI Panel Study, which tracked residents from five sites across the country, and the Chicago Family Case Management Demonstration.

Twenty years ago, dilapidated, high-crime public housing developments populated by impoverished, female-headed households were a powerful symbol of the failures of U.S. social welfare policy. HOPE VI was a key element of a bold effort to transform these public housing communities and demonstrate that housing programs could produce good results for residents and communities. The program provided grants to housing authorities to replace their most distressed developments?those with high crime rates, physical decay, and obsolete structures—with new, mixed-income communities. In a departure from earlier efforts to "rehabilitate" public housing, HOPE VI sought to move beyond bricks and mortar and provided funding for supportive services for residents to help them move toward self-sufficiency and improve their life circumstances (Popkin, Levy, and Buron 2009).

There is no question that HOPE VI has changed the face of public housing—hundreds of those dilapidated structures have been replaced with attractive new developments, and the program has sparked innovations in financing and management (Popkin et al. 2004; Katz 2009). However, the picture for residents appears more mixed. Evidence from the Urban Institute's HOPE VI Panel Study, the most comprehensive study of resident outcomes, shows that many former residents have received Housing Choice Vouchers or moved into mixed-income developments, and now live in better housing in neighborhoods that are considerably less poor and distressed and that provide safe environments for them and their children. Studies of individual HOPE VI sites show similar results (Popkin, Levy and Buron 2009). However, there are real reasons for concern—many advocates point to the low rates of return to the new developments and the loss of hard units of public housing as critical issues (see Crowley 2009).

Of even greater concern, our research shows that the program has not been a solution for the most vulnerable families—those "hard to house" families with multiple, complex problems that make them ineligible for mixed-income housing or unable to cope with the challenges of negotiating the private market with a Housing Choice Voucher. In many cities, public housing has served as the housing of last resort for decades, with the poorest and least desirable tenants warehoused in the worst developments. As these developments have been demolished, housing authorities have often simply moved these vulnerable families from one distressed development to another, and with a concentration of extremely troubled families and a lack of adequate supportive services, these replacement developments have the potential to become even worse environments than those from where these families started (Popkin, Levy, and Buron 2009).

The Obama administration's proposed Choice Neighborhoods initiative builds on the successes of HOPE VI, and would broaden the scope of revitalization efforts beyond public housing to the surrounding community, including schools and other types of housing. However, if this new effort is to be more successful than its predecessor in improving the lives of the vulnerable families who suffered the worst consequences of living in distressed public housing, it is essential that it incorporate strategies that effectively address their needs (Popkin and Cunningham 2009). None of these solutions are simple, and all will require a long-term commitment to improving the quality of life for these households and ensuring better futures for their children (Popkin 2006).

Who Are the Hard to House?

Hard-to-house residents—families coping with multiple complex problems such as mental illness, severe physical illness, substance abuse, large numbers of young children, weak labor-market histories, and criminal records—are less likely than other residents to realize significant improvements in their quality of life as a result of HOPE VI revitalization. We used data from the HOPE VI Panel Study baseline to define four categories of "hard to house" residents:

• multiple-barrier households (living in public housing 10 years or more, no high school degree, not employed, less than 50 years old, criminal justice involvement);
• grandfamilies (older adults with more than one child under age 18) and disabled households;
• elderly households (65 years old or older and no children); and
• large households (households needing three or more bedrooms).

Our analysis showed that the proportion of families falling into one or more of these categories ranged from 37 percent in the three smaller sites (Durham, Richmond CA, and Atlantic City) to 62 percent in the two larger ones (Chicago and Washington, D.C.) (Popkin, Cunningham, and Burt 2005).

In the final round of the study in 2005, we found that at every site, hard-to-house families were more likely to end up in traditional public housing than to have received vouchers or moved into mixed-income housing (Popkin, Levy, and Buron 2009; Popkin and Cunningham 2009). Placing them in other traditional developments may well have kept them from becoming homeless, but clearly, we need better solutions for vulnerable families than simply moving them to other developments, which may well become as—or even more—distressed than the developments from which they came.

(End of excerpt. The full testimony with references is available in PDF format.)

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