No. B-50 in Series, "New Federalism: National Survey of America's Families"
The nonpartisan Urban Institute publishes studies, reports, and books on timely topics worthy of public consideration. The views expressed are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the Urban Institute, its trustees, or its funders.
Over the past six years many states have changed their welfare rules to encourage and reward work among participants. For example, using federal dollars, some states have increased their earned income disregards, allowing welfare participants to keep more of their benefits when they go to work. At the same time, under federal law, adult TANF recipients can only receive benefits for a total of 60 months over their lifetime. Therefore, generous earned income disregards can cause a quandary for low-wage TANF participants: Should they combine welfare benefits with
a paycheck to increase their net income while drawing down on their benefit time limit clock, or should they leave welfare when they begin working a significant number of hours to save time on their benefit clock? To help ease this dilemma, some states have enacted policies that stop a
TANF participant's time limit clock when the participant works a minimum number of hours.
Work-related time limit exemptions are often called either "earn back," "stop the clock," or "time out" policies. Under these policies, when a welfare recipient works a sufficient amount she will receive an additional month of welfare benefit eligibility. For example, if a state set its work requirement for a time limit exemption to 30
hours per week over a one-month period, then a recipient who works at least 30 hours per week during a month would "earn" an additional month of TANF benefit eligibility. Because work is not a federally recognized reason for a time limit exemption, states must use their own
funds when they enact earn-back policies. Some of the reauthorization bills that Congress is considering would allow federal dollars to fund work-related time limit exemptions.
If a state enacts an earn-back policy, welfare recipients who work at least the minimum number of hours would automatically qualify for a time limit exemption. In addition to these welfare recipients, other groups of working caregivers may also be influenced by enactment of these policies. For example, if a state adopts a 30-hour threshold, TANF participants who work fewer hours may try to increase their hours of work in order to qualify for additional months of eligibility. This paper uses data from the 1999 National Survey of America's Families (NSAF) to estimate the potential reach of a work-related time limit exemption. We estimate how many and
what types of primary caregivers would be affected and how net income would change after enactment of an earn-back policy that provides an additional month of TANF eligibility whenever a recipient works at least 30 hours per week throughout an entire month. In addition to analyzing participants who combine work and welfare, the paper also examines the potential effect of earn-back policies on eligible nonparticipants who might choose to participate in TANF if the incentives change.
The findings suggest that many TANF participants could earn back some additional months of TANF benefits at some time during the year. Based on past work and TANF experiences, it does not seem that many eligible nonparticipants would choose to enter or reenter welfare in order to qualify for a TANF time limit exemption. Nevertheless, both participants and nonparticipants who
would change their behavior to qualify for the exemption would be financially better off as a result. All earnback qualifiers could benefit from the added security of additional months of TANF eligibility.
Data
The NSAF is a large, nationally representative survey of the civilian, noninstitutionalized
population under age 65. The NSAF asks respondents about both current and last year's welfare receipt and work activity. The majority of the analyses in this paper draws on respondents' reports of their status in the previous year (1998). A TANF eligibility flag, derived from specific states' TANF rules applied to the NSAF respondents, augments the NSAF data used in this analysis.
The augmented NSAF data provide annual measures of work and TANF receipt. As a result, all of the work and TANF participation measures reflect work or participation at some time during the year. Data limitations make it impossible to determine whether the work and participation occurred at the same or different times during the year. As such, some of the working participants in the sample probably did not combine working and TANF receipt in the same month.1
Working Caregivers Potentially Influenced by an Earn-Back Policy
If they decide to enact earn-back policies, states can choose to define their work requirements for time limit exemptions as either a minimum number of hours of work, a minimum
level of earnings, or some combination of the two. Most states that have implemented earn-back policies use a minimum number of hours threshold. Hour thresholds may be the easiest to administer because states are already required to track the number of hours worked by their TANF participants. We analyze an earn-back policy that qualifies welfare participants for time limit
exemptions if they work 30 or more hours per week.2 We explore the reach of this policy on three groups of working primary caregivers that are most likely to benefit from an earn-back policy.3 In addition to welfare participants who work 30 or more hours per week, we examine TANF participants who might increase their hours of work and TANF-eligible nonparticipants who might apply for TANF knowing that
they are not using up their limited months of benefits. Specifically, the three groups are as follows:
- Welfare participants who work at least 30 hours per week during the weeks that they work (qualify automatically)
- Welfare participants who work between 20 and 29 hours per week during the weeks that they
work (qualify with a work increase)
- Eligible nonparticipants who work at least 30 hours per week and who have received welfare at some point prior to 1998 (qualify with TANF participation)
Each of these groups of workers would face different incentives and receive different benefits from an earn-back policy. The qualify automatically group would have less of an
incentive to leave welfare because, without changing their current behavior, they would increase the number of months during which they could receive TANF benefits. These TANF recipients might also have an incentive to increase the number of months they work during the year, unless the increased work effort would render them ineligible for TANF benefits. In the absence of a cap on the number of months that a recipient could earn back, these workers could continue to receive TANF as long as they were able to work at least 30 hours per week. The qualify with a work increase group would have an incentive to increase their work hours and would also have less of an incentive to leave welfare. In addition to earning more months of TANF eligibility, these workers could also increase their economic well-being if the earnings generated from their increased hours were not offset by reductions in their TANF benefit.
The qualify with TANF participation group would have an incentive to reenter welfare. This group consists of primary caregivers who received welfare at some point in the past. A subset of this group may have left welfare because they did not want to use up all of their months of TANF eligibility while they were working. For this subset in particular the incentive to reenter TANF could be particularly strong. As well as earning additional months of TANF
eligibility, TANF-eligible workers who decide to reenter welfare after an earn-back policy is enacted would also benefit from increases in income. Each of these workers would receive a
TANF benefit in addition to the earnings that they earned before reentering welfare.
Although other caregivers who are eligible for TANF might be influenced by the enactment of earn-back policies, it seems less likely that they would readily qualify for an earn-back benefit. We assume that TANF participants who either do not work or work fewer than 20 hours per week would not readily qualify for the work-related time limit exemption. We also assume that eligible nonparticipants who have received welfare in the past would be the most likely nonparticipants to enter welfare and, thus, benefit from an earn-back policy. Furthermore, we believe that among nonparticipants with some welfare history, those who work at least 30 hours per week are the most likely nonparticipants to consider reentering TANF in order to take advantage of an earn-back policy.4
Work Characteristics of Potential Qualifiers for Time Limit Extensions
Table 1 summarizes the work characteristics of the groups of primary caregivers who might qualify for work-related time limit exemptions. The first column contains information for the group that could qualify automatically (TANF participants who worked 30 hours per week during the weeks they worked), the second column displays data for the group that could qualify with a relatively small increase in working hours (TANF participants who worked 20-29 hours per week
during the weeks they worked), and the third column presents results for the group that could qualify with TANF participation (eligible nonparticipants who worked 30 hours per week during the weeks they worked and who received welfare at some point before 1998).
|
| TABLE 1. Work Characteristics of Selected TANF Eligibles by Earn-Back Qualification Status, 1998 |
| |
| |
Qualify
automaticallya |
Qualify with a
work increaseb |
Qualify with TANF
participationc |
|
| Population size (thousands) |
613.2 |
191.5 |
749.8 |
Percent of all caregivers
who participate in TANF |
43.7% |
13.6% |
NA |
Work history (1998)
Hours of work |
| 20-24 |
NA |
62.5% |
NA |
| 25-29 |
NA |
37.5% |
NA |
| 30-34 |
18.9% |
NA |
12.3% |
| 35-40 |
16.6% |
NA |
16.0% |
| 40+ |
64.5% |
NA |
71.7% |
| Months worked |
| Less than 3 |
17.0% |
12.3% |
7.6% |
| 3-5 |
22.3% |
31.2% |
12.6% |
| 6-8 |
26.0% |
26.5% |
28.4% |
| 9-11 |
20.4% |
11.3% |
32.9% |
| 12 |
14.4% |
18.8% |
18.5% |
| Barriers to workd |
| 0 |
48.0% |
36.9% |
62.8% |
| 1 |
41.4% |
52.5% |
29.6% |
| 2 or more |
10.6% |
10.6% |
7.7% |
|
Source: Urban Institute calculations of the 1999 National Survey of America's Families.
NA = not applicable
a. Primary caregivers who received TANF and worked at least 30 hours per week sometime during 1998.
b. Primary caregivers who received TANF and worked between 20 and 29 hours per week sometime during 1998.
c. Primary caregivers who were eligible for, but did not receive, TANF and worked at least 30 hours per week sometime during 1998.
d. Barriers to work include poor health, limited education, minimal work experience, and caring for an infant or a child with disabilities. |
Approximately 613,000 primary caregivers who receive TANF could automatically qualify for time limit exemptions under a 30-hour threshold. While 65 percent of the caregivers in the qualify automatically group worked full time (at least 40 hours per week), only 14 percent worked all 12 months of the year. Thus, even if these participants received TANF in each of the months that they worked, few of them would earn back an entire year's worth of eligibility. More typically, qualifying participants would earn fewer than nine months of eligibility per year.
The group that would need to increase their work hours to qualify for additional months of TANF under an earn-back policy could find it difficult to take on more work responsibility. Sixty-three percent of the 192,000 primary caregivers who received TANF and worked between 20 and 29 hours per week, worked only 20 to 24 hours per week. These caregivers would have to increase their work effort by 20 to 50 percent to qualify for an earn-back policy with an eligibility threshold of 30 hours per week. And the majority would have to increase their hours in the face of one or more barriers to work. More than half of the lower-hours participants faced at least one barrier to work in 1998, and an additional 11 percent experienced two or more barriers. Barriers to work include poor health, limited education, minimal work experience, and caring for an infant or a child with disabilities. Earlier work on the NSAF found that women with these characteristics, particularly with two or more barriers, are less likely to be working than women without any of these obstacles to work (Zedlewski 1999).
Even if they were able to add sufficient hours to their work week to qualify for a time limit exemption, most of these caregivers would not earn back a full year's worth of time. Like their higher-hours counterparts, most of the group that would qualify with an increase in work hours worked for fewer than nine months in 1998.
In addition to the 805,000 TANF participants who might qualify for a work-related time limit exemption, 750,000 primary caregivers who were eligible for TANF but did not receive benefits in 1998 could qualify if they chose to participate in TANF. In contrast to the participants, the eligible nonparticipants reported working more hours during more months of 1998. Nearly three-quarters of the caregivers who would qualify for a time limit exemption if they began
receiving TANF worked full time in 1998, and more than half worked nine or more months during the year. It follows, then, that if these TANF eligibles reentered welfare, they could earn back quite a few months of eligibility during their first year of participation. However, if these workers have a fairly stable work history, they may soon earn too much income to remain eligible for TANF. In that case, many eligible nonparticipants may not be enticed to reenter welfare by the provision of time limit exemptions.
Continuity of Work and Welfare Benefit Receipt
As well as providing a picture of respondents' lives during the past year, the NSAF also provides information about work and benefit receipt at the time of the interview—in this case 1999. Table 2 uses these data to describe the situation of the 1998 working TANF eligibles in 1999. Comparing work and TANF experiences across time provides some information about the continuity of work and benefit receipt in these caregivers' lives.
|
| TABLE 2. Work and Benefit Receipt Continuity of Selected TANF Eligibles by Earn-Back Qualification Status (percent) |
| |
| Continuity (1998-99) |
Qualify
automaticallya |
Qualify with a
work increaseb |
Qualify with TANF
participationc |
|
| Tenure at current job (1999) |
| Not working at time of interview |
42.5 |
32.7 |
27.6 |
| Less than 1 year |
38.9 |
32.0 |
34.7 |
| 1-2 years |
6.9 |
25.8 |
11.3 |
| 2 or more years |
11.8 |
9.5 |
26.4 |
| Reports receiving TANF (1999) |
54.8 |
57.9 |
11.2 |
| Type of TANF recipient (among reported recipients in 1999) |
| Newer participant |
25.4 |
14.9 |
67.9 |
| Cycler |
23.7 |
19.3 |
32.1 |
| Stayer |
50.9 |
65.8 |
NA |
|
Source: Urban Institute calculations of the 1999 National Survey of America's Families.
NA = not applicable
a. Primary caregivers who received TANF and worked at least 30 hours per week sometime during 1998.
b. Primary caregivers who received TANF and worked between 20 and 29 hours per week sometime during 1998.
c. Primary caregivers who were eligible for, but did not receive, TANF and worked at least 30 hours per week sometime during 1998. |
The primary caregivers who would qualify automatically under the 30-hour earn-back policy are, on average, having some difficulty making a complete transition from welfare to work. Their attachment to both the labor market and the welfare system fluctuated between 1998 and 1999. Although they were all working sometime during 1998, 43 percent of the participants who worked at least 30 hours per week during their working months were not working at the time of the survey in 1999. Thirty-nine percent had worked for their employer for less than one year, and only 12 percent had worked for their employer for two or more years. Fifty-five percent of the caregivers who would have qualified automatically for more months of eligibility in 1998 were also receiving welfare at the time of the interview in 1999. Just over half (51 percent) of these welfare recipients received TANF continuously for more than two years (stayers), nearly a
quarter had moved on and off TANF over the past two years (cyclers), and the remaining quarter entered welfare during the past two years (newer participants).
Primary caregivers who would qualify for more months of TANF eligibility with an increase in work hours also lead fairly discontinuous work lives, although their attachment to the welfare system seems more secure than their counterparts who worked more hours in 1998. Thirty-three percent of them were not working at the time of the survey in 1999, and an additional 32 percent worked for their current employer for less than one year. Fifty-eight percent of the lower-hours 1998 TANF participants reported receiving TANF at the time of the interview in 1999. Nearly two-thirds of these recipients had received TANF continuously for more than two years.
The primary caregivers who would need to reenter welfare to qualify for additional months of TANF eligibility have fairly continuous work patterns and relatively few of them enter welfare over a one-year period. Seventy-two percent of the eligible nonparticipants who worked at least 30 hours in 1998 were also working at the time of the interview in 1999. More than one-quarter of these eligible nonparticipants had worked for their employer for two or more years (table 3).
|
| TABLE 3. Potential Earnings, TANF Benefits, and Poverty Rates for Selected TANF Eligibles If People Working 30 Hours per Week Are Given Time Limit Exemptions, 1998 |
| |
| Work Thresholds |
Qualify
automaticallya
(no simulation, already
eligible for earn-back) |
Qualify with a
work increaseb
(simulated to meet
work thresholds) |
Qualify with TANF
participationc
simulated to participate
in TANF) |
|
| Works at least 30 hours per week |
| Percentage still eligible for TANF |
100.0% |
97.1% |
100.0% |
| Median annual earnings (among eligibles) |
| Before simulated behavioral change |
$5,000 |
$1,771 |
$10,000 |
| After simulated behavioral change |
NA |
$2,925 |
NA |
| Median annual TANF benefit (among eligibles) |
| Before simulated behavioral change |
$2,000 |
$2,256 |
$0 |
| After simulated behavioral change |
NA |
$1,660 |
$867 |
| |
| Poverty rates before simulated behavioral change |
| Income <=100% of FPL |
69.5% |
85.6% |
50.6% |
| 100% of FPL < income <=150% of FPL |
17.0% |
9.7% |
22.5% |
| Income > 150% of FPL |
13.6% |
4.7% |
26.9% |
| |
| Poverty rates after simulated behavioral change |
| Income <= 100% of FPL |
69.5% |
80.9% |
44.8% |
| 100% of FPL < income <= 150% of FPL |
17.0% |
13.2% |
26.9% |
| Income > 150% of FPL |
13.6% |
5.9% |
28.3% |
|
Source: Urban Institute calculations of the 1999 National Survey of America's Families.
NA = not applicable
a. Primary caregivers who received TANF and worked at least 30 hours per week sometime during 1998.
b. Primary caregivers who received TANF and worked between 20 and 29 hours per week sometime during 1998.
c. Primary caregivers who were eligible for, but did not receive, TANF and worked at least 30 hours per week sometime during 1998. |
Only 11 percent of the 1998 working, TANF-eligible nonparticipants who had prior welfare receipt were receiving welfare in 1999, and more than two-thirds of those were new entrants. According to our simulation of TANF program rules on the NSAF data, these caregivers would have been eligible for relatively large TANF benefits in 1998 but they did not participate in the program. Their low participation rate in 1999 may reflect not only a decision not to participate in welfare, but also a change in eligibility status. Most of the 1998 working nonparticipants
were still working in 1999, and many had been with their employer for two or more years. These caregivers may have experienced earnings gains at work that would make them ineligible for TANF
in 1999. Given the work continuity and lack of TANF participation among these caregivers, it seems unlikely that many of the eligible nonparticipants would choose to reenter welfare to take advantage of time limit exemptions.
Effects of an Earn-Back Policy on Time Limits
The largest benefit of an earn-back policy for welfare recipients is the added security of additional months of TANF eligibility. Unfortunately our data and methods do not allow us to directly estimate the extra months that the groups of caregivers would earn. To project the influence of an earnback policy on months of TANF eligibility we would need to consider not
just caregivers' current labor supply and TANF participation but also how long they have received TANF, and we would have to project their future labor supply and TANF participation.
Most of the items on this list would require a different type of data. However, the NSAF data can suggest the average number of potential months of eligibility that each of our groups could earn over a one-year period.
Current welfare recipients who work at least 30 hours per week might earn about six months of additional TANF eligibility. Six is the average number of months worked by the 1998 welfare participants who worked at least 30 hours per week. This estimate assumes that TANF participants who would automatically qualify for earn-back benefits would not change their work patterns—such as increasing the months that they work—after a work-related time limit exemption was enacted. If all current welfare participants who work between 20 and 29 hours per week increased their hours of work to 30 per week, then they might also earn, on average, six additional months of TANF eligibility. As well as assuming that all of these participants would be able to increase their hours of work and maintain their TANF eligibility, this estimate also assumes that they would not change the number of months that they work. Finally, if all TANF-eligible nonparticipants with prior welfare receipt maintained their work effort and TANF-eligibility status and reentered welfare, those who work at least 30 hours per week would earn roughly eight months of additional TANF eligibility during the year after they return to
welfare.
Effects of an Earn-Back Policy on Economic Well-Being
Our data are better suited to examine how economic well-being would change if the working TANF eligibles considered in this report became qualified for time limit exemptions. To answer this question we simulated (1) an increase in hours, and the subsequent increase in earnings and
reduction in TANF benefits, for the working TANF participants who worked between 20 and 29 hours per week, and (2) TANF participation and the benefit amount for eligible nonparticipants who worked at least 30 hours per week and who had previous welfare experience. Table 3 contains the results from these simulations in columns two and three, respectively. For comparison, column
one contains the information for the TANF participants who would automatically qualify (those working at least 30 hours per week).
If TANF participants who worked between 20 and 29 hours per week increased their number of
hours of work to 30 hours, 97 percent of them would still remain eligible for TANF. The high rate of eligibility results, in part, from the fact that our simulation only increased hours of
work in the weeks that the person actually worked. Recall from table 1 that most of these participants worked for fewer than nine months in 1998. Among those who would remain eligible, the median earnings would increase by $1,154 to $2,925 per year, while the median TANF benefit would decrease by $596 to $1,660 per year. Because the increased earnings are not entirely offset by reductions in the recipient's TANF benefit, the poverty rate of this population would decrease from 86 percent at baseline to 81 percent after the increased hours of work.
Surprisingly, many of the nonparticipants were eligible for a relatively large TANF benefit in 1998. The median benefit among the eligible nonparticipants with prior welfare receipt who worked at least 30 hours per week was $867 in 1998.5 Participating in TANF, without any change in work effort, would unambiguously increase the incomes of every eligible nonparticipant. For the group of eligible nonparticipants who worked at least 30 hours per week in 1998, and who had received welfare in the past, reentering welfare would reduce their poverty rate by six percentage points (45 percent compared with 51 percent).
Conclusion
Providing time limit exemptions for TANF participants who meet work thresholds has the potential to reach many caregivers. About 613,000 TANF participants would automatically qualify if the work threshold were set at 30 hours per week. An additional 192,000 TANF participants would qualify if they increase their hours of work from between 20 and 29 hours to 30 hours per week. Another 750,000 caregivers could benefit from the proposal if the eligible nonparticipants with past welfare experience who work at least 30 hours per week reenter welfare.
Although it may be possible for some of the TANF participants who work between 20 and 29 hours to increase their work effort to take advantage of a time limit exemption, many of them face multiple barriers to work. Looking over time, these TANF participants have fairly discontinuous work patterns and a strong attachment to the welfare system. For those who could increase their work effort, earn-back policies might provide the additional stability they need to make a successful transition off welfare and into a job that provided sufficient earnings to render them ineligible for TANF. During that transition period, their increased earnings would not be offset by a large reduction in TANF benefits, and these participants would experience a net increase in economic well-being.
Based on their past employment and TANF experiences, it does not seem likely that eligible nonparticipants would choose to enter welfare in order to take advantage of time limit exemptions. Only 23 percent of the eligible nonparticipants had any past experience with welfare, and most of these nonparticipants have fairly stable work experiences. In addition, we estimate that many of the nonparticipants were eligible for a sizable benefit in 1998, yet they did not participate in TANF. If they did decide to reenter welfare, however, nonparticipants who would enter or reenter welfare to take advantage of an earnback policy would benefit from increased income.
In addition to potential gains in economic well-being, time limit exemptions for work activity would provide a level of security for all qualifying TANF participants. These working
caregivers would know that if their employment situation changed in the future, they could still have access to welfare benefits.
Notes
1. The share of TANF participants who work in this brief is greater than the percentage found in some other papers. A recent analysis of the 1999 NSAF found 32 percent of TANF participants working for pay while simultaneously receiving TANF (Zedlewski and Alderson 2001). This brief finds 63 percent of participants work for pay and receive TANF benefits at some point during a year. The annual measure used in this analysis captures participants who received benefits
and worked at different times during the year; the snapshot measure used in other papers captures caregivers who combine work and participation at the same time. Annual, "ever-on" measures are nearly always higher than single-month, snapshot measures. For example, an annual measure of participation will equal a snapshot measure of participation only if there are no new participants throughout the year. Given the fluidity of movement into and out of work among TANF recipients, it is not surprising that this paper finds a higher percentage of workers among TANF participants than analyses that use snapshot measures of work
and benefit receipt.
2. Of course, how high the work or earnings threshold is set will influence the reach of any earn-back policy. Results from additional analyses that used a 40-hour per week threshold were nearly identical to the results from a 30-hour per week threshold. Using an earnings threshold that is equivalent to a full-year, 30-hour per week job earning the minimum wage substantially reduces the number of participants who would be automatically eligible for the time limit exemption. The participants who would automatically qualify under the earnings threshold
have more stable work experiences. Rather than supporting families that are trying to make a tenuous transition into sustainable employment, using an earnings threshold may offer benefit security to families that are already making a successful transition.
3. This paper examines only TANF eligibles who are primary caregivers between the ages of 18 and 59. The caregiver must be eligible for TANF benefits in her own name, not just the name of a child residing in her household. Because the vast majority of states do not deem self-employment an allowable work activity, we exclude caregivers who are mainly self-employed. Using these sample definitions, there are 4,453 eligibles in the 1999 NSAF data, representing 6.3 million
caregivers, 1.4 million of whom participated in TANF for at least one month in 1998.
4. Of the 4.9 million TANF-eligible nonparticipants in 1998, less than one-quarter (23 percent)
reported receiving welfare at some point in the past. Among these 1.1 million eligible nonparticipants, 81 percent worked at some point in 1998. The majority of these workers worked at least 30 hours per week during the weeks that they worked (81 percent).
5. Although not shown in the table, 24 percent were eligible for an annual benefit of $2,000 or more, and only 9 percent were eligible for an annual benefit of $200 or less.
References
Zedlewski, Sheila R. 1999. Work-Related Activities and Limitations of Current Welfare Recipients. Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute. Assessing the New Federalism Discussion Paper 99-06.
Zedlewski, Sheila R. and Donald Alderson. 2001. "Before and After Reform: How Have Families on Welfare Changed?" Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute. Assessing the New Federalism Policy Brief B-32.
About the Author
Katherin Ross Phillips is a research associate in the Urban Institute's Income and Benefits Policy Center. Her research focuses on low-income workers with children. She is currently studying the relationships between parental work and child well-being and the effects of family policy on the work patterns of parents.
About the Series
This series presents findings from the 1997 and 1999 rounds of the National Survey of America's Families (NSAF). Information on more than 100,000 people was gathered in each round from more than 42,000 households with and without telephones that are representative of the nation as a whole and of 13 selected states (Alabama, California, Colorado, Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin). As in all surveys, the data are subject to sampling variability and other sources of error. Additional information on the NSAF can be obtained at http://newfederalism.urban.org.
The NSAF is part of Assessing the New Federalism, a multiyear project to monitor and assess the devolution of social programs from the federal to the state and local levels. Alan Weil is the project director. The project analyzes changes in income support, social services, and health programs. In collaboration with Child Trends, the project studies child and family well-being.
This analysis and paper were funded by The David and Lucile Packard Foundation.
The ANF project has also received funding from The Annie E. Casey Foundation, the W.K. Kellogg Foundation, The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, The Ford Foundation, The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Charles Stewart Mott
Foundation, The McKnight Foundation, The Commonwealth Fund, the Stuart Foundation, the
Weingart Foundation, The Fund for New Jersey, The Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation, the Joyce
Foundation, and The Rockefeller Foundation.
The author thanks Helen Oliver and Desiree Principe for their excellent research assistance,
Joyce Morton for her technical expertise, and Pamela Loprest, Alan Weil, and Sheila Zedlewski for their thoughtful comments.
Latest Research
Browse by Topic:
PDF
Printer-friendly summary
