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Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Canada, People's Republic of China, Germany, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Philippines, Russia, Spain, Sudan, Switzerland—what can this diverse set of countries possibly have in common? One important answer is that each contains within its boundaries a significant territorially based group of people who are, or who consider themselves to be, distinct and different in ethnicity, in language, in religion, or just in history (ancient or recent) from the majority of the population. Indeed, contrary to the common view—one might say mythology—that the most "natural" nation-state is a unified and homogeneous entity, such "fragmented" countries (Bird and Stauffer, 2001)1 are found throughout the world. Homogeneous nations are more the exception than the rule. Indeed, heterogeneity, whether ethnic or economic, is a more common feature of most countries than homogeneity.2 A second important characteristic of many countries is that they exhibit, to greater or lesser degrees, some "asymmetry" in the way in which different regions are treated by their intergovernmental fiscal systems. While such asymmetry is often most obvious in formally federal countries, it comes up, sometimes in surprising ways, in almost every instance. This paper explores the varied extents and manners in which asymmetrical treatment helps (or hinders) the maintenance of an effective nation-state.
"Effectiveness" in this context may be understood in two ways. The first relates to the normal focus of economic analysis of public sector activities: How effectively, efficiently, and (perhaps) equitably are public services provided throughout the national territory? The second meaning, however, lies well outside the normal field of expertise of economists: What are the connections between how a country's public finances are structured and how a nation-state that is fragmented holds together in the first place? This question has risen to the forefront of public policy analysis in an especially important way when it comes to creating "new" countries out of regions torn by civil conflicts, such as those in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Sudan. But it is also much on the minds of those concerned with public policy in such long-established countries as Belgium, Canada, and Spain.
In many fragmented countries, it is not surprising that the majority group dominates politically. Sometimes, a particular minority exerts more influence, perhaps because of its wealth and power, perhaps owing to historical factors. Occasionally, as may be argued to be the case even such large federal countries as the United States and Brazil, important overriding factors may suppress much or all of the potential political influence of ethnicity.3,4 Even in countries such as Argentina, Brazil, and Germany, in which most people are ethnically and linguistically homogeneous, the economic situation of different regions may be extreme, ranging from large, rich metropolitan areas to remote, impoverished settlements, or to regions rich in petroleum or other highly- valued natural resources vs. others with little but an expanse of barren lands. Such problems may become more pronounced when regions are dominated by people of a different ethnicity from the majority of the population, and may become bitterly contested when ethnic and economic factors combine, but such problems are by no means confined to countries with this combination of characteristics.
Some potentially fragmented countries have—often through a prolonged historical process, sometimes including civil wars—reached an equilibrium in which their political, fiscal, and institutional structure balances the diverse forces and sustains the maintenance of an effective national state.5 Switzerland, the U.K., and the U.S. in different ways provide examples. Others, however, remained in turmoil and then fell apart under such
pressures—e.g., the "formers"—Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics. And the integrity and effectiveness of other countries, even such longestablished
and prosperous countries as Belgium, Canada, and Spain, remain under constant threat. In recent years such pressures have increased in many such countries in part because of globalization and the related (but not fully consistent) phenomenon of new regional economic unions—the European Union (EU) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)—that have upset the established balance of wealth and power and hence called into question the desirability and sustainability of some established nation-states.
In part in response to such factors, decentralization is on the leading edge of policy. Developed countries, developing countries, transitional countries, federal countries, and unitary countries—wherever one looks some kind of decentralization is to be taking place, or is at least being discussed. But what, exactly, is going on? And why is it going on? A variety of rationales and institutional arrangements can be, and are, encompassed under the label "decentralization."
Notes from this section
University of Toronto and Urban Institute, respectively. In Ahmad, Ehtisham and Giorgio Brosio, eds. Handbook on Federalism,(Washington, DC, USA: International Monetary Fund, forthcoming)
1 Bird and Stauffer (2001) contains the proceedings of a conference held in February 2000 in Murten, Switzerland on this topic, organized by the World Bank Institute in collaboration with the Institute du Federalisme of the University of Fribourg.
2 Alesina et al. (2002) develop a parallel concept of "fractionalization". Fractionalization is an index that
measures a country's ethnic, linguistic and religious mix. Fragmentation emphasizes the territorial
dimension of ethnic or other differentiation.
3 Even with respect to the United States (broadly conceived there are many "asymmetrical" relationships: for example, Puerto Rico. Indeed, Elazar (1957) identified 2 "federacies", 3 "associated states", 3 "home-rule territories", 3 "unincorporated territories," and 130 distinct First Nations with asymmetrical relations to the United States federal government.
4 For a brief overview of the racial and economic diversity of Brazil, see Avelar (1999); Affonso (2001) provides a useful recent review of decentralization and reform in Brazil. Watts (1999) provides a useful categorization of different forms of 'association' between territories.
5 For a discussion of the role played by fiscal factors in sustaining political equilibrium (with particular reference to Latin America), see Bird (2003). Winik (2002) in his brilliant account of the resolution of the American Civil War provides an excellent reminder oof how precarious the political balance may be at critical moments in a country's history.
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