View Research by Author - Katherine Lim

Publications

Continuation of current U.S. fiscal policy will lead to an enormous accumulation of debt with potentially disastrous economic consequences. Exacerbated by the recent economic turmoil and fueled by the willingness of creditors to lend at very low interest rates, there is signifi cant risk that necessary fi scal reform will be put off. In this paper, we consider the causes, mechanisms, and macroeconomic fallout of a catastrophic budget failure — a situation in which markets’ perception of the credit worthiness of the U.S. government rapidly deteriorates, leaving it unable to access credit markets at any reasonable rate of interest and generating a high probability of the previously unthinkable: the U.S. government defaulting on its debt obligations.

The Wyden-Gregg tax reform proposal would represent a broad reform of the federal income tax system. This paper examines the plan's impact on individuals' effective marginal tax rates (EMTR), the incremental amount of tax owed on an additional dollar of income. We examine the impact on the EMTR for both wage income and realized capital gains against current law and current policy baselines. We find the Wyden-Gregg plan would lower the overall average EMTR on wages relative to both current law and current policy, but would raise the overall average EMTR on gains when compared with those same two baselines.

The mortgage interest deduction (MID) is the largest single federal subsidy for owner-occupied housing, but the benefits are not evenly distributed among taxpayers. Only individuals who itemize deductions can benefit from the MID, and the value of the deduction increases with the marginal tax rate. If the government wishes to promote homeownership, a refundable tax credit available to all taxpayers would be more effective. This report presents new distributional estimates both of the current deduction's benefits by income group, family type, and race/ethnicity and of proposals to eliminate, scale back, or replace the MID with more broad-based tax incentives.

The expansion of refundable tax credits and the proliferation of specialized tax breaks means that households with similar incomes can face wildly different effective federal tax rates. For example, among middle-income households, the median effective income tax rate is 3 percent, but 10 percent of those households face effective rates exceeding 9 percent and another 10 percent receive a net government subsidy greater than 4 percent of their cash income.

In August 2009, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO, 2009) projected that the federal budget deficit would total $7.1 trillion over the 2010-2019 decade-under current law. That outcome would require the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts to sunset as scheduled in 2011 and Congress to stop "patching" the alternative minimum tax (AMT) to minimize its bite. If neither of those things happens, CBO says the cumulative deficit over the decade would jump to $11.1 trillion, more than doubling the national debt. CBO characterizes that situation as being unsustainable and it is hard to find anyone who would disagree.

The alternative minimum tax (AMT), which originally targeted high-income taxpayers, requires annual legislation to prevent it from affecting millions of middle-income individuals each year. There are two primary reasons for the AMT’s broadening impact; its parameters are not indexed for inflation and the 2001-2006 tax cuts reduced regular tax liability without changing AMT liability. In 2009, four million taxpayers will pay $33.5 billion in AMT, but without congressional action that number will rise to 27 million owing $102 billion in 2010. This paper describes the AMT and provides TPC’s latest estimates of AMT coverage, revenue, and distribution.

The largest tax preferences for housing, health care, and retirement saving reduce federal revenues by about 3 percent of GDP. They raise after-tax income proportionally more for higher income groups than lower income groups, but raise income proportionately less for those at the very top. The net distributional effects depend on how these tax preferences are financed. If paid for with higher marginal tax rates, they benefit upper-middle income taxpayers at the expense of both lower-income and the highest-income taxpayers, but if paid for by lower per-capita spending, all high-income groups gain and all low-income groups lose.

In this paper we review the current wealth transfer tax rules and the changes introduced in 2001. We offer an overview of the methodology underlying the TPC's estate tax model and then use the model to estimate the number of estate tax filers, taxable returns, and the distribution of burden under current law. Finally, we investigate the revenue and distributional effects of several proposals to reform the estate tax, including those put forth by the presidential candidates.

A taxpayer's effective marginal tax rate (EMTR) is the percentage of an additional dollar of income that would be paid in federal income tax. An individual's EMTR could affect the decision to work or save more, or avoid income tax. We use the TPC's microsimulation model of the federal tax system to calculate EMTRs under current law and under the presidential candidates' proposals. The Obama plan would lower EMTRs for the majority of households in 2009. Close to 80 percent of the population would see no change in their EMTR under Senator McCain's plan; most others would face lower rates.

Return to list of authors