View Research by Author - Caleb Quakenbush

Publications

Although the recently passed American Taxpayer Relief Act instituted meaningful deficit reduction relative to previous policy, it still left the budget a far distance from any sustainable path. Under a plausible scenario, deficits never fall below 3.4 percent of GDP and rise to 5.4 percent of GDP by 2022. Given this baseline, an additional $150-$300 billion of annual deficit reduction, instituted after the economy has fully recovered, would put the budget on a stable path in the intermediate term while allowing for continued economic recovery. Yet even that path leaves longer-term budget problems unresolved. Without a more far-reaching agreement over such long-term issues, policymakers may have limited leeway to respond to new emergencies and meet the demographic pressures of the forthcoming decade.

High marginal tax rates can make moving above poverty very difficult for low-income families. These high tax rates result from increasing direct taxes and decreasing transfer payments. A single parent with two children who increases her wages from poverty-level to 150 percent of poverty-level can face a tax rate between 26.6 percent and over 100 percent, depending on which state she lives in. In addition, her marginal tax rate can vary radically, depending on her earning pattern. This paper shows how sensitive marginal tax rates are to assumptions about state of residence, earning patterns, and program participation.

These tables show how lifetime Medicare benefits net of premiums vary based on three sets of assumptions. Two estimates are presented using current law assumptions, as is presented in the 2012 Medicare Trustees Report and the National Health Expenditure Accounts. A third estimate is based on an alternative scenario by CMS in which scheduled cuts in benefit payment rates are not implemented and productivity adjustments required under the Affordable Care Act are not fully achieved.

These tables update previous estimates of the lifetime value of Social Security and Medicare benefits and taxes for typical workers in different generations at various earning levels based on new estimates of the Social Security Actuary. The "lifetime value of taxes" is based upon the value of accumulated taxes, as if those taxes were put into an account that earned a 2 percent real rate of return (that is, 2 percent plus inflation). The "lifetime value of benefits" represents the amount needed in an account (also earning a 2 percent real interest rate) to pay for those benefits. All amounts are presented in constant 2012 dollars.

Changing age demographics have powerful implications for the shape of the nation's work force. Formal models of labor force participation fail to take into account that as the relative supply of younger workers declines, employers will increasingly turn to older workers to meet their demand for labor to provide goods and services. Increased labor force participation among older workers can add to the solvency of Social Security and the broader federal budget. Policymakers in both the public and private sectors can accommodate this trend by removing barriers that discourage hiring and retaining older workers.

Recent budget pressures have led many states to cut future pension benefits for state workers. Using New Jersey as a case study, this report describes how these reforms ignore larger employee recruitment and retention issues for today's more mobile workforce. State retirement plans generally do not attract younger workers, lock in middle-aged workers even if a job is not a good fit, and push older workers into retirement. Recent reforms also shift pension financing burdens to the young, largely sparing taxpayers and current older workers and retirees.

To control rising pension costs, many states are reducing the generosity of the retirement plans they offer their employees, partly by increasing required employee contributions. These reforms, however, ignore the employee recruitment and retention problems created by traditional pension plans. Using New Jersey as a case study, this brief shows how state retirement plans discourage younger workers from joining the state's workforce, lock in middle-aged workers even if a job is not a good fit, and push older workers into retirement. Recent reforms make these plans even less appealing to a modern, mobile workforce.

When state pension plans are underfunded, someone eventually has to pay for the shortfall. Many recent reforms designed to improve plan finances shift burdens to the young, particularly by making many new employees net contributors to—rather than beneficiaries of—these plans. Using New Jersey as a case study, this brief shows how states require higher levels of employee contributions, invest them in somewhat risky assets, and then, like a bank or financial intermediary, pay back many employees less in benefits than what they contributed and expected to earn on those contributions.

Return to list of authors