Federal Budgets and Fiscal Policy

Tax expenditures on average raise after-tax incomes more for upper-income than for lower-income taxpayers. As a share of income, special rates for capital gains and dividends and itemized deductions provide the largest benefits for taxpayers in the top 1 percent of the income distribution, exemptions and exclusions benefit taxpayers in upper middle-income groups the most, and refundable credits provide the largest benefits to those in the bottom two quintiles of the distribution. Interactions among provisions make the revenue cost of all tax expenditures about 10 percent larger than the sum of the costs of the separate provisions.

This paper takes a broad look at tax expenditures in the context of revenue raising tax reform. It first reviews how tax expenditures have changed over the past 25 years and provides estimates of the distribution of tax savings resulting from tax expenditures today. The paper then examines three approaches for applying across-the-board limits to a selected group of the largest and most widely utilized tax preferences. The three options—a fixed percentage credit, a cap based on income, and a constant percentage reduction—can all be designed to raise significant revenue for deficit reduction in a progressive manner.

In a contribution to the Christian Science Monitor, Donald Marron discusses the estimates of America's debt which vary by tens of trillions of dollars, depending on how you count. The bottom line: It's deep but not yet fatal.

Tax rates on capital gains have fluctuated over the past century, sometimes matching the rates for ordinary income but more often substantially below them. The current top gains tax rate is 15 percent, less than half the 35 percent top rate on ordinary income and lower than at any time since the depression. But if Congress does not change the law, the expiration of the Bush-era tax cuts and imposition of taxes associated with the 2010 healthcare legislation will boost the maximum tax rate on gains to 25 percent in 2013.

The report discusses the important budget events of 2011. It begins with the House Republican budget and the president's response. The very different approaches to health and discretionary spending and tax policy are analyzed in detail. The policy debate continued into the confused debt limit negotiations of July. The Budget Control Act finally emerged. It capped discretionary spending and created a "super committee" that was to propose additional deficit reductions. The committee failed miserably. An automatic across-the-board spending cut is supposed to result from that failure. The report describes its effects on defense and nondefense spending.

Funding and investing in infrastructure are not only about finding adequate resources to meet the demands of citizenry, but rather requires understanding of how infrastructure fits into the broader functions of government. This brief examines the key role of pricing infrastructure projects and how the total cost of a project (including lifetime maintenance costs) should be included in funding decisions. Current federal and state policies often encourage new building rather than maintenance and care of existing infrastructure. The role of public-private partnerships in infrastructure projects is also sometimes more about political rather than economic considerations. The author presents options to better coordinate infrastructure financing and payments across levels of government.

Decentralization projects in developing and transitional countries are typically accompanied by efforts to increase the own-revenue powers of local governments. Both the literature of fiscal federalism and the practices of donors and domestic reformers often see the strengthening these powers as critically important to the success of local government reform initiatives. The recent history of Albanian intergovernmental finance reform, however, suggests that there can be too much of a good thing: Placing the enhancement of local government tax powers at the center of decentralization projects can not only crowd out—theoretically and practically—critically important efforts to develop stable, predictable, and adequate transfer systems, but can also be politically self-blocking. In this paper, we use the Albanian case to illustrate why in developing countries with highly skewed tax bases there are good reasons to focus first on stabilizing transfer systems, and only secondarily on expanding local government own-revenue powers.

In a contribution to the Christian Science Monitor, Donald Marron discusses hopes for the global economy and the political leaders struggling to keep it on an even keel.