Research by Author & Topic

Publications by Karen E. Smith on Tax Policy

Income tax provisions affect the buildup of retirement assets during workers' careers and after-tax income following retirement. This paper uses the Urban Institute's DYNASIM model to simulate how potential changes in the tax treatment of retirement saving, Social Security benefits, and income from assets outside retirement accounts may affect boomers' retirement incomes. Changes in the income thresholds for taxing Social Security benefits have the largest impact on middle-income boomers, while changes in contribution limits for retirement saving plans and tax rates on capital gains and dividends have the largest impact on the highest-income boomers.

(Brief) Workers who delay retirement can save more and contribute more to the economy. Using the Urban Institute's Dynamic Simulation of Income model (DYNASIM3), this brief shows that someone who works an extra five years could increase retirement spending by more than half. Also, work-inducing reforms—rather than reforms that simply reduce benefits—help close the Social Security funding gap.

Encouraging work at older ages is a crucial policy goal for an aging society, but many features of the benefits and tax system discourage work. This study computes the implicit tax rate on work at older ages, broadly defined to include standard income and payroll taxes as well as changes in future Social Security benefits, employer-provided pension benefits, and health benefits associated with an additional year of employment. The results show that the implicit tax rate on work increases rapidly with age, rising from 14 percent at age 55 for a typical man to nearly 50 percent at age 70.

The choice of retirement age is the most important portfolio choice most workers will make. Drawing on the Urban Institute's Dynamic Simulation of Income model (DYNASIM3), this report examines how delaying retirement for nondisabled workers would affect individual retiree benefits, the solvency of the Social Security trust fund, and general revenues. The results suggest that delaying retirement by itself does not generate enough additional revenue to make Social Security solvent by 2045. Benefit cuts or supplementary funding sources will be necessary to achieve solvency. However, the size of the benefit cuts or tax increases could be minimized if individuals worked longer. This additional work also substantially increases worker's retirement well-being.

Most workers do not contribute the maximum allowable amount to employer-sponsored tax-deferred retirement plans. The share of maximum contributors increased between 1990 and 2003, as did the percentage of participants who contribute the maximum or at least 10 percent of earnings. But virtually all the growth in maximum contributors came from groups with high shares of maximum contributors in 1990. Recent increases in contribution limits can be expected to reduce shares of maximum contributors, but raise relative shares of maximum contributors among high-earning and education groups. Increases in contribution limits do little to increase retirement preparedness among lower-income groups.

Since 2001, the dollar limit on employee contributions to employer-sponsored tax-deferred retirement accounts has increased from 32 percent of average earnings ($10,500) in 2001 to 39 percent of earnings in 2006 ($15,000). Employees over age 50 may make additional "catch-up" contributions, which will raise the total dollar limit for them to 52 percent of average earnings in 2006. But very few employees contribute the maximum allowable amount. Of those participating in plans, only 6 percent contributed the maximum amount in 2003. Additional increases in the contribution limit are likely to reduce the share of those who contribute the maximum.

Relatively few workers take full advantage of retirement savings plans their employers offer and, among those who participate in employer-sponsored retirement plans, contribution rates vary considerably over time. Using a newly available Census dataset that combines administrative earnings records with survey reports, we find that workers raise their contribution rates when they achieve key milestones in life, such as the birth of a child or the purchase of a home. Potential negative shocks to income and increases in current consumption needs, however, do not lead workers to curtail their contributions. [View the corresponding press release]

Encouraging work at older ages is a critical policy goal for an aging society, but many features of the current system of benefits and taxes provide strong work disincentives. The implicit tax rate on work increases rapidly at older ages, approaching 50 percent for some workers by age 70. In addition, by age 65 people can typically receive nearly as much in retirement as they can by working. If older Americans could overcome these barriers and delay retirement, they could substantially improve their economic well-being at older ages. For example, many people could increase their annual consumption at older ages by more than 25 percent by simply retiring at age 67 instead of age 62.

This paper presents alternative measures of actual and projected net benefits (benefits minus payroll taxes) from the Old and Survivor’s Insurance (OASI) component of Social Security, based on results from a microsimulation model. The simulations take into account marital histories, income, and tax-burden sharing within couples and differences in life expectancy among sub-groups of the population. We find that OASI is becoming more redistributive towards lower income groups over time, even as net benefits decline, mostly because of changing demographics and earnings patterns of the workforce.