After Katrina: Interview with Fredrica Kramer

Fredrica Kramer: "Two years later, we still know little beyond the anecdotal evidence found in press and personal accounts about what faith-based and community organizations (FBCOs) did..."

Fredrica Kramer's recent work zeroes in on new federal policies for involving faith-based organizations (FBOs) in the delivery of human services, especially for disadvantaged populations. She currently co-directs two studies on Katrina's effects, one (with Kenneth Finegold) on how to study the impacts of the storm on populations served by HHS' Administration for Children and Families, the other (with Carol DeVita) on faith-based and community organizations' responses to Katrina.

The response to Katrina from charitable groups is often portrayed as more effective than governmental agencies. Why?

We know, from Bush administration accounts and those of hurricane victims, that government's failure at all levels was disturbingly apparent during and after Katrina. In contrast, nonprofits and faith-based groups were reportedly key players in relief efforts. Two years later, we still know little beyond the anecdotal evidence found in press and personal accounts about what faith-based and community organizations (FBCOs) did, for whom, for how long, and, particularly, how many were a default response to the failures of public and other responders.

With funds from HHS, the Urban Institute is conducting a survey of FBCOs and in-depth field-based case studies of specific organizations and collaborations. When we've completed our work next spring, we should have a better understanding of the extent and nature of FBCO response and a keener sense of how to coordinate better with government next time disaster strikes. That's critical because no matter what FBCOs can do, government will still retain primary responsibility for public safety and welfare, and if you don't understand the kinds of services that faith-based and community organizations provided in the immediate aftermath and beyond and how these services can mesh with governmental assistance, the nation simply can't prepare itself adequately for disasters—natural or man-made.

Coordination between government and nongovernmental agents requires well-defined roles and responsibilities, and mechanisms for making both mutually supportive. Many victims of hurricanes and other disasters inevitably move across geographic jurisdictions, and from one program's reach to another. Families should be able to rely on government to make it easier to get emergency income or food assistance as they move, for example, from Louisiana to Texas and therefore from Louisiana's TANF rules to Texas' rules. Government may be the critical means to locate individuals, reunite families, or transfer care.

And assistance needs change over time. The demands for emergency aid differ greatly from long-term help resettling or rebuilding. Public policies that encourage permanent relocation or evacuee return also shape what types of services FBCOs will be called upon to provide and where.

The Urban Institute is studying FBCOs throughout Louisiana, Mississippi, and Houston—where many evacuees went. We're trying to figure out which FBCOs responded, and what they did in the immediate area of impact and in areas that felt secondary effects. We also want to know which services they provided at different points in time so we can isolate some principles for integrating the disaster relief they can provide with the continuing responsibilities of public agencies.

Is disaster assistance provided by faith-based and community organizations any different from aid provided by governmental agencies?

Some say that faith-based organizations are inherently different and can deliver services in ways that public agencies simply can't. But all faith-based and community organizations are not alike. Some are small, locally-based, independent organizations. Others belong to larger affiliates or umbrella organizations. Some are congregationally based and not primarily social service providers, but may have prior experience in providing services that they can apply in disasters. Some deliver services very similar to those delivered by secular organizations or public agencies. Others rise to the occasion in the moment of disaster and aren't likely to keep offering services once the disaster ends.

By identifying different types of FBCO responders and different models of response, we hope to show how FBCOs can interact with each other and with government to provide more effective disaster assistance. For instance, we know that disaster relief can rely on vertical cooperation—like that between an umbrella organization and its members or affiliates, or horizontal relationships—as in new collaborations among organizations with similar or varied expertise, which create a unified response in a particular locale. Networks among FBCOs and other nonprofits and government can have varying intensities, duration, and geographic reach, so coordination can be as complicated as it is necessary. Some FBCOs in Louisiana, for example, banded together immediately before the storm to assign themselves explicit roles that capitalized on their different capabilities. One with a commercial kitchen agreed to prepare food, another provided shelter space. Others relied on their larger affiliate, often out of state, to provide financial aid, and even leadership and coordination from afar.

Understanding how collaborations form, survive, expand, or wither in a catastrophe of Katrina's size is critical to building collaborations to address future catastrophic events. Organizational mission and culture, mode of operation and content of services, knowledge of local residents and community traditions, and public distrust of government or large bureaucracies, may distinguish faith-based and grassroots organizations from larger bureaucracies. Understanding the nature of successful collaborations, and how to capitalize on the special attributes of faith-based and community organizations, is critical to creating relationships for effective disaster response in the future.