After Katrina: Interview with Caterina Roman

Caterina Roman: "Even under the best conditions, one branch of law enforcement must rely on the others if its own branch is to function well. In troubled times, those pressures only mount."

Two years after Katrina, what, if any, public safety issues created by the storm remain in New Orleans?

Despite many positive strides over two years, New Orleans still faces many public safety challenges. The New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) and some of the sheriff's offices of nearby parishes remain woefully understaffed. Many detectives removed from special efforts and placed on street patrol remain on the street. Only four of the city's 11 jails have reopened and some district command stations are still operating out of trailers. That means that, overall, the city's capacity to apprehend and prosecute dangerous criminals has decreased.

Together, these issues create a cycle of hard-to-shake problems—especially low officer morale, low resident morale—that further jeopardize the region's ability to maintain safe streets.

Then, of course, there is the other side of the coin—the storm's toll on a defendant's right to an impartial criminal justice system. Even before Katrina, the New Orleans indigent defense program didn't have enough staff to provide quality representation for the thousands of cases the office receives each year. After the storm, three-fourths of the staff were laid off and the program limped along with only six attorneys. This spring, one Orleans Parish Criminal District Court judge suspended the prosecution of cases against 142 defendants and ordered 20 suspects released because of due process concerns.

There's a deep irony here. Overall, Katrina's toll on the court process united civil rights activists, federal officials, and lawyers from around the country in work on developing a more effective and fair system. But at the same time, funding for this pillar of the criminal justice system is far from adequate or sustained.

Problems like these impede more than public safety. They make it hard to build community cohesion needed to set a beleaguered city back on track.

If it were up to you, what would you do to improve public safety amid the apparent rising tide of violence in New Orleans?

First off, law enforcement agencies in New Orleans need a clearer understanding of the nature and context of the city's crime problems. Some are storm related and some aren't. And the public needs to see that rising crime may simply be a function of more people returning to New Orleans in recent months. Regardless, law enforcement need to figure out, for instance, whether new groups of individuals are causing the problems or whether crime has shifted to different neighborhoods because there are more suitable targets there.

It won't surprise you that I think research can help decipher underlying patterns in violent crimes and thus help law enforcement and community-based organizations pick the best strategies for combatting violence. Meanwhile, efforts to suppress crime—whether through heavy police enforcement and prosecution of individuals with multiple arrests for violence, surveillance cameras, or curfews—need to be coupled with culturally-sensitive substance abuse treatment, mentoring programs, and summer jobs initiatives for youth, and other forms of crime prevention. The same goes for comprehensive prisoner reentry programs for soon-to-be released prisoners. If corrections, mental health, employment, homeless services, and other agencies and services were coordinated, ex-prisoners' transition back to their much-changed communities could be easier and could lower crime levels.

What can other criminal justice systems learn from what has happened in New Orleans after Katrina?

Plenty, and some of it applies equally to natural and man-made disasters. Foremost would be establishing procedures for continuity of all criminal justice operations under the worst-case scenario. In other words, if the capacity of the local courts and jails in New Orleans was totally wiped out, procedures to book arrested individuals and hold them should be established elsewhere—in multiple locations—throughout Louisiana. Or, to take another case, cities need plans for establishing temporary courthouses and allowing judges to hear cases outside their usual venue.

Another lesson from Katrina is that coordinated tasks forces or working groups set up before disaster strikes across local and state criminal justice agencies can be a well-oiled vehicle for communication and coordination during crises. Even under the best conditions, one branch of law enforcement must rely on the others if its own branch is to function well. In troubled times, those pressures only mount. For instance, court cases can't be prosecuted successfully if police personnel lack the ability or technology to provide hard evidence against defendants or if public defenders are scarce. The glue in the most successful criminal justice systems is trust and shared goals. Experience also helps: multi-partner collaborations that jointly problem-solve day in and day out will have a better shot at preserving public safety and peace in times of chaos.

As for emergency operations, all plans need to be put in writing and key local law enforcement personnel need to be familiar with them while the sun is still shining. That way, nobody has to scramble around finding the proper equipment amid roaring floods, high winds, and blackouts or electronic communications crashes. At least twice a year, local senior-level law enforcement officials should mandate training updates on emergency operations and equipment.

States aren't off the hook here either. They need to hammer out procedures for requesting law enforcement assistance from the federal government and have contingency plans for quickly deputizing federal law-enforcement officers sent to disaster sites. Otherwise they can't enforce federal laws outside their home jurisdiction. At-the-ready plans that coordinate joint responsibilities are the best way there is to reduce the chaos that often ensues when multiple entities all believe that they are in charge or, just as bad, when no agency or individual wants the ultimate responsibility.

I would also add that though local corrections agencies in New Orleans promptly tried to locate all parolees and probationers, finding the thousands who left the state was particularly hard because community corrections agencies did not have a strong game plan in reserve. Looking forward, hotlines and websites that are set up and promoted across jurisdictions and state lines before disasters appear make sense. So do checklists and how-to's on expediting paperwork to permanently transfer individuals under supervision to another state. Clearly, much can be done before the eleventh hour.